[EAI·言論NPO Joint Press Conference] Announcement of the 8th Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laQBa8f6eEQ

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◆ 8th Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey

The East Asia Institute (EAI, President Son Yeol), a global think tank in Korea, and Genron NPO (Representative Yasushi Kudo), a non-profit think tank in Japan, conducted the 'Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey' targeting citizens of both countries in September and October 2020, and will announce the survey results on Thursday, October 15th at 1:00 PM. The Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey has been conducted annually since 2013, marking its 8th year. The survey aims to continuously understand the changes in understanding and perception of each country's citizens towards the other, thereby resolving various perception gaps and promoting mutual understanding. The main results of the 2020 survey will be announced at a press conference connecting Korea and Japan via video conference on October 15th at 1:00 PM, with domestic and foreign press in attendance. The press conference materials can be found in (1) this summary presentation and (2) the main data tables.

◆ Press Conference for Domestic and Foreign Media

· Date and Time: Thursday, October 15, 2020, 13:00-14:00

· Venue: Mae Hwa Room, 19th Floor, Press Center

· Presenters: Son Yeol (President of EAI, Professor at Yonsei University), Yasushi Kudo (Representative of Genron NPO)
· Target Audience: Reporters from domestic and foreign broadcast, newspaper, and online media outlets, including Korea and Japan.
· Language: Korean-Japanese simultaneous interpretation

Detailed results of this survey will be discussed at the '8th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue,' jointly hosted by EAI and Genron NPO via video conference connecting Korea and Japan on October 16-17, under the theme '<Korea-Japan Cooperation Amidst Changes in the Global Order: Is Building a Future-Oriented Korea-Japan Relationship Possible?>'. The 8th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue aims to bring together private experts and intellectuals from both countries to deeply discuss ways to bridge the widening perception gap between the two nations and improve Korea-Japan relations.

◆ Program

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Video Transcript

Hello, I am Son Yeol, President of the East Asia Institute. Mr. Kudo is present today, and we have received your congratulations. Hello? Our Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey is in its 8th year. Every year, we conduct detailed opinion surveys on the perceptions of Korean and Japanese citizens towards each other through face-to-face surveys of approximately 1,000 people in each country. The survey period is usually between May and June. This year, we also planned to conduct it between May and June, but as you can imagine, due to the COVID-19 situation, we couldn't conduct the survey and had to postpone it. We postponed it to September, but fortunately, the COVID-19 situation in both Korea and Japan was relatively manageable last month, allowing us to successfully conduct the survey.

As you know, our opinion survey for 2020 reflects the public's reaction to various events that have occurred between Korea and Japan over the past year. After conducting the survey in May and June last year and discussing the results at the Korea-Japan Future Dialogue, unfortunately, on July 1st, the Abe administration announced export restrictions. Following this, various retaliatory measures were taken, leading to a severe deterioration in Korea-Japan relations.

In Korea, there were boycotts of Japanese products, tourism boycotts, and various controversies surrounding the termination of GSOMIA. The issue of the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor has led to a stalemate in relations between the two countries, and efforts to lift export restrictions are also in a deadlock. This year, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the relationship between the two governments has been characterized by what could be called an emotional conflict, with unresolved issues persisting. Starting from July 1st last year, which can be seen as a turning point, the stalemate has continued for 14 months. Therefore, public opinion is directly reflected in this survey. I would like to ask you to consider this period when interpreting the survey results. I will provide some interpretations for about 10 minutes, and then Mr. Kudo, representative of Genron NPO, will speak for about 10 to 15 minutes. After that, we will have a Q&A session.

You may have received the materials, but the most striking finding is the sharp decline in Koreans' favorability towards Japan. We place considerable importance on favorability ratings. The media also tend to focus on this aspect, and favorability is crucial in interpersonal relationships. The amplitude of this favorability directly correlates with the willingness to visit the other country, as well as evaluations of military and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and other issues. This is influenced by emotions. Since favorability and impressions significantly impact various policy aspects, we place great importance on surveys related to affinity or closeness. From this perspective, as indicated in the table I provided, since 2015, following the comfort women agreement, the four lines have rarely deviated from the 10% range. However, in this year's survey of Korea, unfavorable impressions of Japan have surged to 21-22%, while favorable impressions of Japan have dropped by 20%. This is the most significant change and appears to be a decisive indicator that deviates from the established trend. We need to discuss the reasons for this. There are likely two main reasons. First, how does Genron view this issue? Second, in contrast to the sharp rise and fall in Korea, Japan has shown a slight increase of about 5% in favorability. How should we interpret this change in Japanese public opinion? This can likely be understood from Genron's perspective. Let's briefly look at the reasons for unfavorable impressions. Interestingly, over the past year, the historical issue, which has been a major factor for unfavorable impressions of Japan in Korea, with about 15% citing Japan's lack of reflection on its history, and 12% citing the Dokdo issue. While these major factors have seen a considerable decrease, the factors that showed an increase of over 5% include the remarks and actions of Japanese politicians and leaders—now that he has stepped down, Prime Minister Abe—and the Japanese government's export control measures, accounting for 88%, and anti-Korean sentiment within Japan at 7.5%. Therefore, the survey indicates an increase in these three categories. This suggests that the export controls were a significant factor, and the overall negative reaction of the Korean public to Prime Minister Abe's remarks and actions, including the export controls, played a significant role.

Regarding the export controls, as you likely understand, Korean public opinion, particularly in our November survey assessing the Moon administration's foreign policy, showed that 70% believed the Japanese government's measures were unjust and unfair. This was not primarily driven by anti-Japanese sentiment but rather by strong doubts about the legitimacy of the measures. The argument that Japan imposed export controls due to insufficient management of strategic materials, which is a national security issue, is not understood by the majority of Korean citizens. The survey asks whether the Korean government's management of strategic materials poses such a significant threat to national security that it warrants export restrictions. This is not understood. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe's remarks, which seemed to dismiss Korea, before and after the measures, have been significantly criticized. This suggests that the perception of 'Korea Discount' in the international community is also a factor.

This perception also spread widely in Korea and was heavily criticized. Never before had a Japanese leader officially and publicly questioned Korea's identity. However, comments such as classifying Korea as a country that violates international law, where rule of law does not apply, and thus an untrustworthy nation, have conveyed a significant sense of unease. Therefore, we assess that these factors are at play. Additionally, looking at the age demographics, our previous surveys on favorability towards Japan showed a steady increase from 12% in 2013 to 32% last year. This means that about one-fifth of the population had a favorable view of Japan. The primary source of this favorability was the 20s and 30s age groups. Last year, this was emphasized: the favorability among those in their 20s was higher than unfavorable views, reaching about 40%. Among teenagers, it was as high as 57% in last year's survey. This was a major source of favorability. However, this year's survey shows that unfavorable views towards Japan have increased the most among the 20s and 30s age groups compared to last year.

As you can see here, unfavorable views among those in their 20s increased by 55.8% compared to last year, and by 83.6% among those in their 30s. This is a much larger increase compared to other age groups (40s, 50s, 60s) who have historically shown unfavorable views towards Japan. This indicates a significant departure of the 20s and 30s age groups from favorable views toward Japan. Favorability has also sharply declined in these two age groups, which were the main sources of favorable impressions of Japan, particularly among the 30s, dropping by 71%. Therefore, although we need to examine this year's survey results more closely, it appears that the sharp decline in favorability towards Japan is accompanied by a significant exodus of individuals from their 20s and 30s. The reasons, as mentioned earlier, are the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations following Japan's export controls and the various comments made by Japanese leaders towards Korea, which have had a significantly negative impact. This is the first key point of today's press conference announcement: the evaluation of the current Korea-Japan relationship also reflects this trend, showing a deviation. However, the somewhat less concerning aspect is that Korean citizens still recognize the importance of Korea-Japan relations, with 82% still believing that Korea-Japan relations are important. This is a matter that can be addressed. It is also noteworthy that there has been a consistent 'Korea Discount'—a discounting of Korea's importance—by Japan, and this trend has not changed.

The second point is, as mentioned in the previous presentation, the favorability towards the leaders of the other country. From Korea's perspective, Prime Minister Abe, and from Japan's perspective, Presidents Moon Jae-in and Park Geun-hye, the favorability ratings are extremely low. With only 1% favorability, it means that out of 1,000 people, fewer than 10 have a favorable view, which is statistically negligible. Furthermore, the evaluation of the other country's government's policies—meaning the evaluation of Japan's policy towards Korea and Korea's policy towards Japan—is also very low. This indicates a strong distrust in the policies of the opposing government. Regarding the leaders' approval ratings, the approval rating for the Japanese government's policies is around 0.1% for 'doing very well,' which is negligible. For 'doing poorly,' it's about 56-57%. In contrast, for the Korean government's policies, the approval rating is 30% for 'doing well' and 34% for 'doing poorly.' This means that one out of every three Korean citizens believes the government is not doing well. Similarly, the approval rating for the Abe administration's policies in Japan is also not high. As you can see, 'doing poorly' exceeds 20%, and 'doing well' is less than 30%. Therefore, the approval of the Moon administration's policy towards Japan is about 30%, and the approval of the Abe administration's policy towards Japan is slightly less than 30%. This suggests that the current difficulties in Korea-Japan relations are not solely the responsibility of one party. Lastly, the third point is that time is running short.

As shown in the graph, favorability toward Japan steadily increased from 12% in 2013 to 32% last year. This means about one-fifth of the Korean public has a favorable view of Japan. The primary source of this favorability is people in their 20s and 30s. This was also emphasized last year; favorability among those in their 20s is quite high, even higher than 40%. For teenagers, it was 57% in last year's survey, making them the main source of favorability. However, this year's survey shows that unfavorability toward Japan has increased the most among those in their 20s and 30s compared to last year.

As you can see here, unfavorability among those in their 20s increased by 55.8% compared to last year, and among those in their 30s, it increased by 83.6%. This is a much larger increase compared to other age groups, such as the 40s, 50s, and 60s, who have historically shown unfavorability toward Japan. This suggests that people in their 20s and 30s have largely disengaged from favorable views of Japan. Favorability also saw a significant decline of 50%, particularly 71% among those in their 30s, in these two age groups, which historically held the most favorable views of Japan. Therefore, while we need to examine this year's public opinion poll more closely, the sharp decline in favorability toward Japan may be due to the large-scale departure of individuals in their 20s and 30s. The reasons for this, as previously mentioned, are...

...following Japan's export restrictions and various comments made by Japanese leaders about South Korea, which were poorly received. This is judged to have had a significant negative impact. Therefore, the first point of today's press conference is that the current evaluation of South Korea-Japan relations, reflecting this favorability, also shows a deviation from the trend. However, a somewhat less concerning aspect is that the importance of South Korea-Japan relations for the Korean public has not deviated from the trend, with 82% still believing that relations are important. This indicates that while there has been a consistent discount on South Korea's importance by Japan, known as Korea Discount, this trend remains unchanged. This is a peculiar situation. Second, as mentioned in the previous presentation, the favorability toward the leaders of the respective countries—Abe for South Korea, and Presidents Moon Jae-in and Park Geun-hye for Japan—is extremely low.

With 1%, it means fewer than 10 out of 1,000 people have a favorable view, which is statistically negligible. The evaluation of the respective governments' policies toward the other country is also very low. That is, there is significant distrust in the policies enacted by the opposing government toward its own country. This is concerning. On the other hand, as you can see here, the evaluation of the Japanese public towards the Japanese government's policies is also quite low, with 'doing very well' being around 0.1%, which is about one person in a thousand. I don't know who they are. 'Not so well' is about 2.7%. 'Not doing well' is around 57%, 56%. The evaluation of the Korean public towards their own president or government is that 30% think they are doing well, and 34% think they are not. This means one out of every three citizens assesses that their government is not performing well. The Japanese public's assessment of the Abe administration's policies is also not favorable.

As you can see here, 'not doing well' exceeds 20%, and those who believe it is doing well do not even reach 30%. Therefore, the support for the Moon Jae-in administration's policies toward Japan is around 30%, and the support for the Abe administration's policies toward Japan among the Japanese public is also slightly below 30%. This suggests that because South Korea-Japan relations are currently very difficult, the responsibility does not lie solely with one party. Lastly, the third point, as time is limited...

...concerns the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor and the issue of reparations. As shown here, last year, nearly 60% believed that Japanese companies should provide compensation in accordance with the court ruling, but this year, it has dropped significantly to 36%. Various other proposals have been made, and there is considerable support for them, as indicated here, including those related to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, there is also a view, particularly from the Japanese side, that since the issue was already resolved by the 1965 treaty on basic relations, Japanese companies are not obligated to comply with the Korean court's ruling, and 14% of respondents hold this view. Conversely, only about 30% of Japanese respondents support the Japanese government's position that South Korea has violated international law and therefore should not enforce the ruling. Thus, we can see that only about 36% of Koreans support this position, and only about 29% of Japanese respondents support their government's basic stance. Of course, our public opinion poll is quite technical...

Thank you. In 2013, the favorability rating was 12%, and it steadily increased to 32% last year. This means that about one-fifth of the population has a favorable view of Japan. The primary source of this favorability was the 20s and 30s age groups. Last year, this was emphasized: the favorability among those in their 20s was higher than unfavorable views, reaching about 40%. Among teenagers, it was as high as 57% in last year's survey. This was a major source of favorability. However, this year's survey shows that unfavorable views towards Japan have increased the most among the 20s and 30s age groups compared to last year. As you can see here, unfavorable views among those in their 20s increased by 55.8% compared to last year, and by 83.6% among those in their 30s. This is a much larger increase compared to other age groups (40s, 50s, 60s) who have historically shown unfavorable views towards Japan. This indicates a significant departure of the 20s and 30s age groups from favorable views toward Japan. Favorability has also sharply declined in these two age groups, which were the main sources of favorable impressions of Japan, particularly among the 30s, dropping by 71%. Therefore, although we need to examine this year's survey results more closely, it appears that the sharp decline in favorability towards Japan is accompanied by a significant exodus of individuals from their 20s and 30s. The reasons, as mentioned earlier, are the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations following Japan's export controls and the various comments made by Japanese leaders towards Korea, which have had a significantly negative impact. This is the first key point of today's press conference announcement: the evaluation of the current Korea-Japan relationship also reflects this trend, showing a deviation. However, the somewhat less concerning aspect is that Korean citizens still recognize the importance of Korea-Japan relations, with 82% still believing that Korea-Japan relations are important. This is a matter that can be addressed. It is also noteworthy that there has been a consistent 'Korea Discount'—a discounting of Korea's importance—by Japan, and this trend has not changed.

The second point is, as mentioned in the previous presentation, the favorability towards the leaders of the other country. From Korea's perspective, Prime Minister Abe, and from Japan's perspective, Presidents Moon Jae-in and Park Geun-hye, the favorability ratings are extremely low. With only 1% favorability, it means that out of 1,000 people, fewer than 10 have a favorable view, which is statistically negligible. Furthermore, the evaluation of the other country's government's policies—meaning the evaluation of Japan's policy towards Korea and Korea's policy towards Japan—is also very low. This indicates a strong distrust in the policies of the opposing government. Regarding the leaders' approval ratings, the approval rating for the Japanese government's policies is around 0.1% for 'doing very well,' which is negligible. For 'doing poorly,' it's about 56-57%. In contrast, for the Korean government's policies, the approval rating is 30% for 'doing well' and 34% for 'doing poorly.' This means that one out of every three Korean citizens believes the government is not doing well. Similarly, the approval rating for the Abe administration's policies in Japan is also not high. As you can see, 'doing poorly' exceeds 20%, and 'doing well' is less than 30%. Therefore, the approval of the Moon administration's policy towards Japan is about 30%, and the approval of the Abe administration's policy towards Japan is slightly less than 30%. This suggests that the current difficulties in Korea-Japan relations are not solely the responsibility of one party. Lastly, the third point is that time is running short. Regarding the Supreme Court's ruling on forced laborers and the compensation issue, the proportion of people who believe that Japanese companies should compensate in accordance with the court ruling was nearly 60% last year, but this year it has dropped significantly to 36%. Various other solutions have been proposed, and there is considerable support for them. For example, there is also a view that the issue has already been resolved through the Korea-Japan Claims Agreement, and Japanese companies are not obligated to comply with Korean court orders, with 14% holding this view. Similarly, in Japan, the proportion supporting the Japanese government's claim that Korea has violated international law and therefore the ruling should not be enforced is less than 30%. Thus, about 36% in Korea and about 29% in Japan support their respective government's basic position. Of course, there may be some doubt as to whether the public fully understands these technically complex survey questions and provides informed answers. Therefore, a significant portion should ideally respond 'Don't know,' but in Korea, the number of 'Don't know' responses is not very high. Therefore, perhaps a separate interpretation is needed for these responses. Finally, this is the situation: if this crisis is left unattended, it could lead to further conflict. In Japan, support for taking countermeasures against the Korean judiciary's ruling and the seizure of assets remains high, with over 50% believing that countermeasures should be taken or that they are unavoidable. Conversely, in Korea, there are opinions favoring diplomatic compromise, concerns about the dispute, and support for countermeasures at 19.7%. However, if the situation escalates, Korea should also consider countermeasures, and nearly 50% believe that strong countermeasures should be taken, mobilizing all available means. Therefore, the survey suggests that if the current conflict continues, there is a possibility of a significant crisis, at least based on public opinion. I will conclude my presentation here as I have exceeded the allocated time, although there are other points, such as items 5, 6, and 7.

Thank you. 1822, 2013, 8, 20066, 16, 2016728, 9, 2018, 753, 42%, 37.4, 1, 2, new, Ready, approximately 80%, 6, 0, 2017, 1, 71%, 7, +, +, 1, 7, UB, 61.2%, 38.8, 44, 4, Min-ida, Min-ida. Next, we will proceed to the Q&A session.