[EAI ACADEMY Lecture 6] Lee Seung-ju

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCJftOX2GS0

■ Lee Seung-ju_ Director of the EAI Center for Trade, Technology, and Transformation · Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. His main research areas include international political economy, the international politics of trade, and global digital governance. His major works and edited volumes include "The Political Economy of Cyberspace" (edited by Lee Seung-ju), "Institutional Balancing and the Politics of Mega FTAs in East Asia," co-edited in "Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration?", and "Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions" (co-edited).

Video Transcript

Regarding the new Northern Policy, what level of comprehensiveness are we talking about? Fundamentally, when the Korean government pursued the "New Southern Policy," it was planned to be pursued concurrently with the "New Northern Policy." Within that framework, it was understood that the "New Southern Policy" and the "New Northern Policy" could not be pursued separately from the overarching concept of the "Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility."

However, as a result, the "Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility," the overarching concept, is not explicitly being pursued at the moment. In the early stages of this administration's launch, within the broad framework of the "Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility," the "New Northern Policy," the "New Southern Policy," and their synergy were pursued. You likely haven't heard the term "Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility" much in reality, have you? This is one reason why the overarching concept has been weakened. Consequently, there is an aspect where the linkage between the "New Southern Policy" and the "New Northern Policy" has weakened. Originally, they were linked as the "New Southern Policy" and the "New Northern Policy" under the overarching concept. As the overarching concept has weakened, the connection between the "New Northern Policy" and the "New Southern Policy" has also somewhat weakened.

In that regard, we need to devise measures to strengthen the linkage between the "New Northern Policy" and the "New Southern Policy" again. The Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as you mentioned, are indeed planned with an aspect of countering each other. However, as I mentioned earlier, Korea has a need for cooperation with the BRI and also a certain degree of need for cooperation with the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Korea's official stance to date is to pursue linkage between these two. Therefore, we will not make a choice to cooperate with only one side.

However, if the competition between the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the BRI becomes too intense, there is a view that Korea will inevitably face pressure to choose between the two. In other words, some perspectives argue that ultimately, a choice must be made. However, on the other hand, while it is true that the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the BRI are in a competitive relationship, they also differ to some extent.

The fact that they are different implies that there are aspects that can lead to complementarity. And perhaps Korea's role lies there. If we focus solely on the competitive dynamic, we will inevitably face the dilemma of having to choose between the US-China rivalry or the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. To avoid such a choice, we must consider how to discover and foster complementarity between the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the BRI. For example, both the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Strategy pursue infrastructure development.

Infrastructure development. However, there are significant differences in how infrastructure development is supported between the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The question is whether we view these differences as competition or complementarity. The BRI focuses on building infrastructure at a relatively low cost and at a rapid pace. In contrast, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, led by the US with significant cooperation from Japan, focuses on what is called "high-quality infrastructure." This is undeniably different from the BRI.

Should we understand the infrastructure development pursued by the BRI as being completely replaced by the Indo-Pacific Strategy, viewing it as a highly competitive dynamic? Or, in some cases, there is a need for BRI-style infrastructure, and in other cases, there is a need for the high-quality infrastructure pursued by the Indo-Pacific Strategy. If we can foster complementarity between these, and if Korea plays a certain role in that, then Korea might be able to avoid the dilemma of choosing between the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the BRI. I am not sure if this answers your question.