[EAI ACADEMY Lecture 3] Son Yeol

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wngP2fSTGEY

■ Son Yeol: President of EAI, Professor at Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served as Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies and Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies at Yonsei University. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Association of International Studies (2019) and President of the Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, Japan Foundation, and the Advanced Research Center for Waseda University. He has served as a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, and as a specialist member of the Committee for Northeast Asian Cooperation. He is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Self-Evaluation Committee. His areas of expertise include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, and 『한국의 중견국외교』 (Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy) (2017, co-edited).

Video Transcript

I will proceed with the discussion for now. There seems to be active discussion regarding the post-Abe era. Do the likely candidates for the next party leader share the paradigm of conservative nationalism? And to what extent is there a possibility of them showing a forward-looking attitude towards neighboring countries? I believe this is a question for the respondents to answer. I will proceed with the answers. Furthermore, I believe that the rapid growth of China, rather than Korea, was a more significant factor in the rise of conservative nationalism in Japan in the 2010s. Is that correct? Yes, I would like to hear your thoughts on this. Going forward, considering the China factor, what specific measures can be taken to improve Korea-Japan relations?

Regarding the China issue and the evaluation of their own government's attitude towards the other country, the ratio of positive and negative opinions among the citizens of both countries was evenly split, and the figures were similar. However, the gap between political factions in Japan appears to be larger than the gap between political factions in Korea. I believe this is not unrelated to the fact that bilateral relations change dramatically with changes in our government. What is the reason for this, and what are your thoughts on the impact of inconsistent strategic foreign policy towards Japan on our overall foreign policy? Also, do you believe that a diplomacy of reconciliation, like that seen in Europe, cannot occur in Northeast Asia?

Do you see it that way? Is the nationalistic tendency a problem viewed from abroad? If so, from what perspective should we approach it? This alone will take an hour. There are more questions. Yes, this is from online. While explaining nationalism, I thought it was possible to gauge the degree of nationalism in Korea and Japan. I am curious about the criteria for that evaluation. Also, what are your thoughts on the feasibility of reforming national identity to resolve nationalism in Korea and Japan? Let's divide the questions like this.

The issue of nationalism is related to global public opinion surveys and has influenced Korea's foreign policy. Regarding China, as mentioned earlier in the cartoon, China is not yet attempting to change its external image through historical issues. This is a trend that was seen during the Park Geun-hye administration and continues to some extent under the current administration. However, on a different level, regarding China's rise, it is likely that China's rise, rather than Korea's, had a greater impact on Japan's conservative nationalism. Is that correct? Yes, of course. China surpassed Japan's GDP in 2010, didn't it?

It is rising rapidly. I see it that way. Japan's conservative nationalism emerged within that framework. What is interesting is that both China and Korea, as well as Japan, are currently facing identity politics. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, there is a considerable possibility of forming a kind of historical alliance. From Korea's perspective, what strategy should we adopt in this situation? Historical issues and security issues must be viewed separately. If they are not, the China issue becomes entangled, and Korea's options become very limited. Therefore, it is crucial to respond separately, ensuring that they are not linked, which requires a very delicate diplomatic stance. That is my assessment.

Next, regarding the question of how to overcome conservative nationalism, what will be the outcome? It is likely that for the older generation, nationalism is too deeply ingrained, making it difficult to overcome. Rather than overcoming it, the only current possibility is to suppress it. They have experienced it before, haven't they? They had an experience last year, and they are still fighting. Therefore, at the very least, if the older generation conducts foreign policy based on nationalistic fervor and exclusive nationalism, it will have significant security and economic repercussions. We have already experienced this historically during the Park Geun-hye administration and again last year. If we repeat this, it is like a cycle of history. Therefore, in the current situation, perhaps Korea and Japan need to fight a bit more until the older generation realizes that they need to meet anew.

Unfortunately, after that happens, I believe they will begin serious efforts to forge a new path. This is my opinion. Currently, as mentioned earlier, regarding the issue of forced mobilization, on August 3rd, there was a formal notification or public notice of the measure to convert assets into cash, which can be seen as the first step for Japan to accept it. The next step is to implement various stopgap measures to prevent the conversion of assets into cash.

But those are just stopgap measures, aren't they? The issue must be resolved eventually. I believe this issue will ultimately be resolved through dialogue between the leaders and proper engagement. On August 15th, the President's commemorative speech, and subsequently, the Japanese government urged Korea to act sincerely, while Korea urged Japan to do the same. We are hearing the same things from both sides. However, it seems we are not at a stage where we can meet; the willingness to meet is not there. That is my impression.

Will the world change if the government changes? I don't think it will be a complete transformation. It will improve, and new possibilities will emerge. However, as you have seen, the overall nationalistic trend remains strong, and perceptions of Japan have significantly declined. There is talk of a hostile atmosphere towards Japan within Japan itself. Will this trend change just because the administration changes? It is quite difficult to say. Therefore, if there is a possibility, the current possibility lies in another candidate within the Liberal Democratic Party becoming prime minister or leader.

However, for a real change, a change of government is necessary to form a new trend. Simply replacing Abe with someone else within the current Liberal Democratic Party government, as is being discussed, will not bring about immediate change. Similarly, in Korea, the term is fixed until June 2022. I have no idea who will become president then. Will it really change? Especially regarding policy towards Japan, which is part of a larger nationalistic trend in South Korea. Primarily, this is a very politically sensitive issue, but primarily, I believe that a change in leadership offers the possibility of a positive change. However, for a significant shift in the trend, various factors, as we have discussed, such as overcoming nationalism, must be in place.

From the current perspective, I don't see much of that. Therefore, as I mentioned earlier, it's not because you are in power, but rather, perhaps, when younger voices, rather than the current ones, are more incorporated into the political sphere, things will gradually begin to change. I think that's the direction. It seems like the answers are mostly covered. And regarding the change of government, it seems to be roughly settled. I hope nothing unexpected happens for the next week or two. I hope nothing unexpected happens. Japan is Japan, but North Korea is also making us quite anxious these days. That's right. Depending on your personal judgment, we have 4, 5, 6, 7 more lectures. Looking at the overall flow of the lectures, it doesn't seem like the capacity or atmosphere is such that 50% of people can just come. Therefore, if you wish to attend in person, please continue to come and engage diligently. I will now conclude today's lecture.

Thank you.