North Korea's Official Declaration of Permanent Nuclear Status and the Risk of a Prolonged Sanctions Regime
Executive Summary
Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui's September 24 statement reaffirms the legal framework already finalized through the 2022 Law on the State Policy on Nuclear Forces and the 2023 constitutional amendment, serving as a response to the reaffirmation of "complete denuclearization" in the South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral joint statement. Following the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi Summit, North Korea shifted to a "frontal breakthrough" line and has already discarded phased denuclearization negotiations predicated on sanctions relief. However, what this statement rejects is the goal of "complete denuclearization," not the channel for dialogue with the United States itself. Therefore, this should be viewed as a separate track from the possibility of top-down events, such as a North Korea-U.S. summit in November. It is also confirmed that North Korea's sanctions-evading economic networks, such as dispatching overseas workers, have become entrenched on a significant scale, structurally lowering the incentives for negotiation. Businesses and the government need to readjust their timelines for North Korea-related projects to three to five years or more, and establish a risk management system that sets a low probability for actual sanctions relief, regardless of whether summit-level dialogue takes place.
I. Issue Analysis
North Korea's Official Declaration of Permanent Nuclear Status: Issue Analysis
1. Background and Progress
The legal foundation for North Korea's recent statement was completed three years ago. In September 2022, the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly adopted the "Law on the State Policy on Nuclear Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." This measure codified nuclear forces as a means to "defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and fundamental interests of the state"[3]. In September 2023, this content was incorporated into the constitution[3]. The recent statement by Choe Son Hui is close to a pre-planned step built upon this legal framework.
The catalyst was the trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of South Korea, the United States, and Japan held in New York on September 21 (local time). South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi issued a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to the "complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions"[9][12]. In addition, the three countries specified their commitment to "prohibiting support for revenue generation" for North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs[9]. From North Korea's perspective, this was perceived as once again locking in denuclearization as a prerequisite for any discussions on sanctions relief.
North Korea's negotiation line toward the United States had already shifted following the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi Summit. During the working-level contacts in Sweden in October of that year, North Korea demanded the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" rather than the "denuclearization of North Korea," putting forward security guarantees as a prerequisite[5]. In December of the same year, the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea formalized the "frontal breakthrough" line. The core of this line was to "completely frustrate the U.S. sanctions and blockade schemes through self-reliance"[5]. The 8th Party Congress in 2021 reaffirmed this line, redefining the United States as the "principal enemy"[5].
2. Current Situation
In her September 24 statement titled "The DPRK's Will to Hold Nuclear Weapons Is Eternal," Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui declared, "We reaffirm and reassert in the most resolute terms our state's unwavering will to possess nuclear weapons, which will remain absolutely immutable even after a hundred or a thousand years"[1][4][6]. Targeting the trilateral joint statement, she asserted, "It has been proven once again that no matter how the United States and its allied forces vary their expressions and change their packaging, they have not abandoned—and cannot abandon—their unattainable delusion of denuclearization"[1][4]. She went on to claim, "The policy of force against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has failed"[1].
On the same day, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a separate statement. The spokesperson condemned the joint statement criticizing North Korea's nuclear activities issued by the ministerial meeting of the "Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)" in New York, calling it a "grave political provocation"[13]. On the 16th, a day earlier, a statement was also issued by a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defence, warning of a potential nuclear response if South Korea-U.S. cooperation in countering WMDs is strengthened[16]. In effect, the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, and the Ministry of National Defence spokesperson issued a series of statements targeting the United States and South Korea within the single month of September. Choe Son Hui's statement was also published in the Rodong Sinmun. This is interpreted as an attempt to internally impress upon the public the permanence of the nuclear weapons policy[8].
Even under the sanctions regime, North Korea showed an unyielding attitude. When the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), composed of 11 UN member states, pointed out North Korea's dispatch of overseas workers as a violation of UN resolutions in its September 16 report and estimated that the revenue generated from this would reach $450 million to $800 million as of 2025[17], North Korea flatly refuted it, calling it a "fabricated announcement"[17]. Instead of succumbing to sanctions pressure, North Korea countered with a frame of "normal economic cooperation."
Externally, North Korea also pursued closer ties with China. In his speech at the Beijing Xiangshan Forum on September 17, Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il defined North Korea's nuclear policy as "irreversible" and expressed a commitment to strengthening military cooperation with China[10]. He also claimed that the "80 years of reckless political and military confrontation schemes" by the United States and its allies are the "root cause" of the confrontational structure on the Korean Peninsula[10].
3. Positions of Key Countries
North Koreais employing a strategy of locking in its nuclear forces as a constitutional fait accompli rather than a subject of negotiation. Through the 2022 Law on the State Policy on Nuclear Forces and the 2023 constitutional amendment, it has raised the domestic legal cost of reversal on its own[3]. On this basis, Choe Son Hui, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of National Defence divide roles to sequentially issue press statements pressuring the United States and South Korea. North Korea's practical demands are the prior resolution of its right to development (complete lifting of sanctions against North Korea) and its right to existence (suspension of joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises and the deployment of strategic assets)[5]. It has consistently maintained the position since the working-level contacts in Sweden that "there will be no meaningful contact with the United States" unless these conditions are met[5].
South Koreais presenting a dual message. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed the goal of complete denuclearization through the trilateral joint statement[9][12]. However, around the same time, President Lee Jae-myung argued in an interview with The New York Times that "aiming for denuclearization under the current circumstances will achieve nothing," advocating a pragmatic approach that prioritizes a nuclear freeze over denuclearization[14]. While these remarks were made amid discussions about a potential North Korea-U.S. summit in November, domestic experts warn against the risk of a "freeze" practically leading to the recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state[14]. The difference in tone between the Foreign Ministry's official statement and the President's pragmatic approach could remain a point of contention in the future process of coordinating North Korea policy.
United Statesis maintaining a dual-track approach, reaffirming the principle of complete denuclearization under the name of Secretary of State Rubio[9], while keeping the possibility of a North Korea-U.S. summit in November open. This is a structure where the principled goal of denuclearization and practical attempts to resume dialogue run in parallel.
Chinadoes not directly endorse North Korea's nuclear weapons policy, but it provides a platform to accommodate messages of strengthening military cooperation with North Korea, as seen in Vice Minister Kim Kang Il's remarks at the Xiangshan Forum[10]. This aligns with the MSMT report's point that China continues to serve as a de facto bypass route under the sanctions regime. This is supported by the fact that the primary destinations for North Korean overseas workers are China and Russia[17].
4. Key Issues
The first issue is whether the negotiation framework itself has collapsed. As long as South Korea, the United States, and Japan hold onto "complete denuclearization" as a prerequisite for negotiations, there is structurally no incentive for North Korea to accept it. North Korea has already created an irreversible state legally and constitutionally[3].
The second issue is the difference in policy lines between "denuclearization versus freeze" within the South Korean government. With the Foreign Ministry's principled stance and the President's pragmatic approach coexisting, the key is how this rift will manifest at the negotiating table if a North Korea-U.S. summit actually takes place in November[9][14].
The third issue is the effectiveness of sanctions implementation. Despite the MSMT pointing out sanctions violations regarding overseas workers, if the structure of North Korea refuting this as "normal economic cooperation" and directly confronting it becomes entrenched[17], the UN Security Council sanctions regime may end up as a mere nominal framework with its actual enforcement power weakened.
II. In-Depth Analysis
North Korea's Official Declaration of Permanent Nuclear Status: In-Depth Analysis
1. Root Cause Analysis
The superficial catalyst for Choe Son Hui's statement was the trilateral joint statement by South Korea, the United States, and Japan. However, the root causes were structured much earlier. The collapse of the 2019 Hanoi Summit was the turning point. North Korea sought to swap the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility for partial sanctions relief. The United States rejected this. Following this failure, North Korea concluded that phased denuclearization negotiations themselves held no utility[5].
The "frontal breakthrough" line is the product of this judgment. It was formalized at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in December 2019. It contained the goal of "completely frustrating the U.S. sanctions and blockade schemes through self-reliance"[5]. Instead of seeking sanctions relief through negotiations, North Korea shifted its line toward building its own capabilities to neutralize sanctions. Under this line, North Korea has demanded the preemptive withdrawal of the U.S. hostile policy as a condition for resuming dialogue. In terms of the right to development, it demands the complete lifting of sanctions against North Korea, and in terms of the right to existence, the suspension of joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises and the deployment of strategic assets[5]. Both demands are conditions that are politically difficult for the United States to accept. Given that North Korea presented them knowing this, these function as a threshold to block dialogue itself rather than as cards for resuming negotiations.
The codification of nuclear capabilities is the logical conclusion of this line. Through the 2022 Law on the State Policy on Nuclear Forces and the 2023 constitutional amendment, North Korea elevated its nuclear status to a constitutional position to "defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and fundamental interests of the state"[3]. Bringing matters clearly specified in laws and the constitution to the negotiating table constitutes an infringement of sovereignty under North Korea's internal logic. Choe Son Hui's characterization of denuclearization as an "unattainable delusion" is not rhetorical exaggeration but a direct repetition of this legal logic[1][4].
2. Structural Context
Political Structure
Under the Kim Jong Un regime, nuclear possession is a core pillar of domestic legitimacy. Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI North Korea Research Center, assesses this as a reaffirmation of the regime's ultimate goal of "communizing the Korean Peninsula" and an attempt to accumulate personal political achievements for Kim Jong Un[3]. At the same time, some analyses suggest that behind the offensive nuclear strategy lies a wariness regarding the instability of the one-man ruling system[3]. This means that the act of publicly declaring nuclear possession internally functions as a means of regime consolidation. This is supported by the fact that Choe Son Hui's statement was published in the Rodong Sinmun, exposing it to the North Korean public[8]. This indicates that propaganda for internal solidarity is being run in parallel, rather than it being a statement solely for external consumption.
Economic Structure
The fact that sanctions-evading economic structures have already become largely entrenched is another factor lowering the incentives for negotiation. In its September 16 report, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) estimated that North Korean overseas workers are active in at least 17 countries, including China and Russia, with their numbers ranging from 35,600 to 101,280, generating between $450 million and $800 million in revenue as of 2025[17]. North Korea's Foreign Ministry refuted this as "normal and mutually beneficial economic cooperation," defining the report itself as a "fabrication"[17]. The fact that North Korea maintains substantial foreign currency revenue channels even under the sanctions regime serves as the material basis for its confidence that it can endure without sanctions relief.
Security Structure
The fact that a warning statement regarding South Korea-U.S. WMD response cooperation was issued by a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defence simultaneously with North Korea's statement targeting the United States is part of the same structure[16]. At the Beijing Xiangshan Forum in China, Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il reaffirmed the "irreversibility" of the nuclear policy and expressed a commitment to strengthening military cooperation with China[10]. The logic is that the U.S. coercive policy toward North Korea has persisted for 80 years, trapping the Korean Peninsula in a "vicious cycle of confrontation"[10]. The structure in which North Korea transmits statements targeting the United States in parallel with messages to South Korea and China suggests that it is framing its response to denuclearization pressure not as a solo confrontation with the United States, but as a multi-faceted front that simultaneously utilizes the China-Russia friendly axis and pressure on South Korea.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparison with Similar Cases
This is not the first time North Korea has declared its possession of nuclear weapons. Precedents include the first declaration of nuclear possession through a Foreign Ministry statement in 2005, the specification of North Korea as a "nuclear-weapon state" through the revision of the constitutional preamble in 2012, and the adoption of the line of parallel development of the economy and nuclear forces in 2013. However, the recent statement is qualitatively different from the past. In past declarations, the intention to use them as leverage in negotiations coexisted[2]. Indeed, after concluding that its nuclear weapons program was virtually complete, North Korea sought to utilize it in direct negotiations with the United States to secure the lifting of economic sanctions and de facto recognition as a nuclear-weapon state[2]. The recent statement is distinct in that it discards this negotiation leverage framework itself. The expression "even after a hundred or a thousand years" is a declaration that it will set no time limit, and is closer to a preemptive declaration that it will exclude denuclearization from the agenda in any future negotiation phase.
As a comparative case, we can refer to the path of entrenching nuclear possession taken by Pakistan and India. Following their nuclear tests in 1998, both countries faced international sanctions, but this ultimately resulted in their de facto nuclear-weapon state status being condoned due to the strategic value of South Asia and the U.S. need to counter terrorism and China. Evidence that North Korea is modeling itself after this path appears in several places. Choe Son Hui's assertion that "the policy of force against the DPRK has failed"[1] is predicated on the calculation that, over time, the international community will have no choice but to accept reality. The statement by Kim Yo Jong last month, which countered the 70th IAEA General Conference resolution by defining North Korea's nuclear status as "absolutely irreversible," is also on the same line of calculation[3].
However, there is a crucial difference from the cases of Pakistan and India. Those two countries obtained justifications for sanctions relief by being tied to the core interests of UN Security Council permanent members (counterterrorism, countering China). In contrast, North Korea has a clear legal status as a party violating UN Security Council resolutions, and the United States, a permanent member, is directly involved as a party. Therefore, it is difficult for the Pakistani-style path of condonement to be replicated exactly. Nonetheless, the current structure, where additional sanctions resolutions at the Security Council level are virtually blocked due to vetoes by China and Russia, opens up the possibility that the situation will drift toward weakening the enforcement of existing sanctions rather than imposing new ones.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is whether a North Korea-U.S. summit, rumored for November, will be held. In an interview with The New York Times, President Lee Jae-myung expressed a pragmatic stance, stating, "Aiming for denuclearization under the current circumstances will achieve nothing," and arguing that a nuclear freeze should be secured first instead of denuclearization[14]. This remark shows a difference in tone from the principle of complete denuclearization in the South Korea-U.S.-Japan joint statement. Experts worry that this statement could be read as a signal that practically recognizes North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state[14]. If a summit is realized and denuclearization is pushed down the agenda, there is a possibility that the negotiation framework itself will shift from "denuclearization" to "arms control and freeze," as foreshadowed by Choe Son Hui's statement.
The second variable is the speed of nuclear capability advancement, including the second enrichment facility at Yongbyon. In its August 28 report, the IAEA confirmed the construction of a new facility separate from the existing uranium enrichment facility[3]. The fact that Kim Jong Un did not conceal this but disclosed it through state media shows that he chose a line of demonstrating capability rather than using it as a card for negotiations[3]. Because the structure is one where nuclear materials and delivery vehicles accumulate the longer negotiations are delayed, time works in favor of North Korea, not the United States.
The third variable is the degree of closeness between China, Russia, and North Korea. Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il's remarks at the Xiangshan Forum are an example of publicly declaring the intent to deepen military cooperation with China[10]. China and Russia are also the largest host countries for the dispatch of overseas workers pointed out in the MSMT report[17]. As long as the two countries, which are permanent members of the Security Council, maintain a passive attitude toward implementing sanctions against North Korea, the UN-level sanctions regime is highly likely to follow a path where it exists nominally but its effectiveness gradually weakens.
The fourth variable is the direction of public opinion and policy lines within South Korea. If the government's pragmatic approach is perceived domestically as a de facto recognition of North Korea's nuclear possession, it could face political backlash[14]. If the domestic political support base for North Korea policy is shaken, the phased and realistic approach that the government seeks to pursue may lose its sustainability. This functions as a domestic variable that determines whether the shift in the North Korea negotiation framework can succeed.
III. Recommended Response Measures
North Korea's Official Declaration of Permanent Nuclear Status: Comprehensive Response Measures
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Response Measures
Choe Son Hui's statement is not a negotiation tactic but a reaffirmation of the regime's policy line. It is merely a repetition of the legal framework already finalized through the 2022 Law on the State Policy on Nuclear Forces and the 2023 constitutional amendment[3]. This fact must be the starting point of the response strategy. This means there is no need to be swayed by the intensity or expressions of individual statements.
At the same time, it must be made clear that the negotiation framework itself has not collapsed. What Choe Son Hui rejected was the joint statement on "complete denuclearization" reaffirmed by South Korea, the United States, and Japan[9][12]. This is a different issue from the "freeze-first" approach outlined by President Lee in his interview with The New York Times[14]. North Korea has rejected the goal of denuclearization itself, not closed the channel for dialogue with the United States. This is the background against which the possibility of a North Korea-U.S. summit in November continues to be discussed[14]. Therefore, at the practical level of businesses and the government, it is rational to separate and assess "the impossibility of denuclearization" and "the possibility of resuming negotiations" as separate tracks.
The core of the recommended response measures consists of three points. First, plans for North Korea-related projects predicated on sanctions relief must have their timelines readjusted to at least three to five years in the future. This is because the legal irreversibility of the Law on the State Policy on Nuclear Forces and the constitutional amendment acts as a fixed variable, regardless of whether negotiations resume[3]. Second, even if top-down events such as a North Korea-U.S. summit occur, it is dangerous to immediately interpret them as signals of sanctions relief. As the case of the collapse of the Hanoi Summit demonstrates, a significant gap exists between summit-level dialogue and actual sanctions adjustment[5]. Third, based on the premise that North Korea's sanctions-evading economic networks have already become entrenched on a significant scale, a system must be established to constantly monitor risks in supply chains and labor networks directly or indirectly linked to North Korea[17].
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-term (3–6 months): Continuously track developments regarding the US-North Korea summit, rumored for November, through working-level channels [14]. Even if the summit takes place, separate scenarios must be prepared to brace for the possibility that the agenda shifts from 'complete denuclearization' to a 'nuclear freeze' or 'arms control.' At the same time, reports on North Korean overseas labor and financial evasion published by multilateral monitoring bodies, such as the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), should be regularly monitored to check for any indirect exposure of the company's suppliers and logistics partners [17].
Medium-term (1–2 years): Under the assumption that the resumption of discussions on easing UN Security Council sanctions is highly unlikely, business plans premised on trade with or investment in North Korea should be suspended or minimized. Instead, if the commitment to 'ban the generation of revenue for North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs' [9]—as specified in the US-ROK-Japan trilateral joint statement—moves to the actual implementation phase, due diligence on transaction networks transiting through China and Russia must be strengthened, considering the potential expansion of secondary sanctions risks.
Long-term (3–5 years or more): Under the assessment that North Korea's constitutional status as a nuclear-armed state has become fixed as an irreversible variable, the risk management framework for North Korea policy should be redesigned from a 'denuclearization premise' to a 'managing a nuclear-armed state' premise. While this aligns with a shift in the government's policy framework toward North Korea, corporations also need to update their internal guidelines to treat Korean Peninsula risk as a permanent variable.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is the agenda-setting of summit-level US-North Korea contacts. The key trigger is whether 'complete denuclearization' is actually dropped from the agenda and explicitly replaced by a 'freeze' or 'arms control.' In this case, the potential for cracks to emerge in the UN Security Council sanctions regime must be reassessed.
The second indicator is the operational status of nuclear facilities, including the second enrichment facility at Yongbyon [3]. If the completion and operation of these facilities are confirmed through satellite imagery or other means, it signals that the structural dynamic—where delays in negotiations directly lead to the accumulation of North Korean capabilities—remains ongoing.
The third indicator is the publication cycle and content of reports from multilateral sanctions monitoring bodies, including the MSMT [17]. If updates show an expansion in the scale of North Korean overseas labor deployment or revenue estimates, it should be interpreted as a sign that sanctions evasion networks are becoming more sophisticated.
The fourth indicator is the level of formalization of military and economic cooperation between North Korea and China, as well as North Korea and Russia. As seen in the case of Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il expressing a commitment to strengthening military cooperation with China at the Beijing Xiangshan Forum [10], we must watch whether North Korea's moves to fill its economic and security gaps by strengthening cooperation with China and Russia, rather than negotiating with the West, become more visible. This is a variable that undermines the very effectiveness of the sanctions regime against North Korea.
The fifth indicator is changes in the South Korean government's messaging toward North Korea. Depending on whether President Lee Jae-myung's 'freeze-first' remarks are elevated to official policy in the future or if the government returns to a principled denuclearization stance, the alignment of ROK-US coordination could shift [14].
4. Summary and Conclusion
Choe Son Hui's statement is not a new threat, but rather a reaffirmation of a policy line that has already been codified into law [3]. While it is true that describing the negotiation framework as having collapsed is not an exaggeration, it is also difficult to conclude that all channels of dialogue have been closed. North Korea has merely rejected the goal of denuclearization itself; it has not blocked the possibility of contact with the United States [14]. Corporate and government working-level officials must distinguish between these two levels—the 'de facto end of the denuclearization framework' and the 'persistence of limited possibilities for dialogue'—in their response. For now, the most realistic response is to shelve business plans premised on sanctions relief for at least three to five years, while continuously tracking summit-level dialogue trends and multilateral sanctions monitoring reports to avoid missing early signals of a policy shift.
References
[7] [14ymedio] Pyongyang insiste en que tendrá armas nucleares
[10] [NK News] North Korean official rebukes US, defends nukes during international conference
[11] [NK News] North Korea slams ‘unrealistic’ calls for denuclearization by US, ROK, Japan
[15] [NK News] Top diplomats of US, ROK, Japan reaffirm North Korean denuclearization goal
[16] [NK News] North Korea warns US-ROK WMD cooperation could trigger nuclear response
[17] [Daily Maverick] North Korea says new sanctions cannot block development, KCNA reports
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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