Deepening North Korea-China Military Cooperation: Implications of Vice Minister Kim Kang Il’s Visit to China and Their Agreement on Strategic Communication
Executive Summary
The participation of Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il in the Beijing Xiangshan Forum is a follow-up to the restoration of summit diplomacy, marked by Kim Jong Un's visit to China in September 2025 and Xi Jinping's reciprocal visit in June 2026. The fact that Rodong Sinmun covered the event briefly alongside domestic news indicates that Pyongyang is treating this exchange not as a showcase but as a manageable, routine diplomatic engagement. However, Kim's emphasis at the multilateral forum on U.S. responsibility and the irreversibility of North Korea's nuclear status can be interpreted as an attempt to seek tacit international approval for its anti-U.S. narrative. China's decision not to highlight these points, focusing instead on restoring military dialogue with the United States, suggests that Beijing's interests do not fully align with Pyongyang's. South Korea should avoid overstating this event as a full restoration of the military alliance but must proactively prepare for the possibility that combined North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia engagement could weaken the effectiveness of sanctions coordination against Pyongyang.
I. Analysis of the Current Situation
Deepening North Korea-China Military Cooperation: Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il's Visit to China and Agreement on Strategic Communication
1. Background and Developments
High-level exchanges between North Korean and Chinese military authorities had virtually ceased around 2019. President Xi Jinping did not visit North Korea during the first seven years of his rule (2012–2019). The summit-level diplomacy that resumed thereafter was also irregular [5]. Xi's second visit to Pyongyang did not occur until June 2026, a full seven years after his first in 2019 [5]. Much of this hiatus coincided with the period of COVID-19 border closures and the intensification of the U.S.-China strategic competition.
The Beijing Xiangshan Forum is the largest defense and security dialogue that China hosts annually to build a multilateral security discourse under its leadership [3]. North Korea had only sent military attachés to the two most recent forums. This marks the first time in seven years that a delegation at the vice-ministerial level from the Ministry of National Defence has formally participated [1]. The dispatch is part of the broader trend of restoring summit-level diplomacy, which followed Kim Jong Un's attendance at Beijing's Victory Day celebrations in September 2025 and Xi Jinping's reciprocal visit in June 2026 [5]. In effect, exchanges have expanded to the defense bureaucracy level within a year of the resumption of reciprocal visits between the two leaders.
2. Current Situation
On September 16, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and Rodong Sinmun reported that a delegation led by Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il had departed from Pyongyang. They noted that officials from the Ministry of National Defence, along with the defense attaché and staff from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, saw the delegation off at Pyongyang International Airport [4][6]. This suggests that the dispatch was a pre-coordinated event.
In a follow-up report on September 18, KCNA announced that the delegation had participated in the 13th Beijing Xiangshan Forum, held under the theme “Building a Common Understanding of Stability to Jointly Advance Security Governance” [8][9]. The report also noted the scale of the event, with delegations from over 100 countries, international organizations, and experts in attendance [8]. Kim Kang Il delivered a speech at the third plenary session on September 17 [8][9].
In the Rodong Sinmun's news overview for the same day, the participation of the Ministry of National Defence delegation was mentioned briefly along with other domestic news items [19]. This editorial choice is noteworthy, as it indicates that North Korean media treated the event as a routine diplomatic engagement rather than a matter of major domestic importance.
NK News reported that in his speech, Kim Kang Il identified the “80 years of reckless political and military confrontation maneuvers” by the United States and its allies as the root cause preventing the Korean Peninsula from escaping a “vicious cycle of confrontation” [10]. It was also reported that he declared North Korea's nuclear status “irreversible” and pledged to deepen military cooperation with Beijing [14]. Channel NewsAsia noted that at the same forum, Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun urged for expanded dialogue in emerging domains like AI, space, and the deep sea, briefly mentioning Kim Kang Il’s attendance alongside Singapore’s defense minister and others [11]. Editorials in Chinese state media about the forum focused on the restoration of U.S.-China military dialogue and did not separately highlight the North Korean delegation’s participation [12].
3. Key Actors and Positions
North Korea's Ministry of National DefenceThrough its participation, the ministry sent two messages simultaneously. One was its willingness to expand military cooperation with China. The other was its rationale for justifying its nuclear armament, aimed at the United States [10][14]. The fact that Kim Kang Il specifically emphasized U.S. responsibility and the irreversibility of North Korea’s nuclear status at a multilateral forum demonstrates that the venue was used not just for ceremonial attendance but also as a channel for messaging Washington. As a vice-ministerial official activated a working-level channel in step with the restoration of summit diplomacy, this visit to China can be seen as the extension of Kim-Xi summitry to the bureaucratic level.
China's Ministry of National DefenseThe ministry has long operated the Xiangshan Forum as a platform for building a China-led security discourse [3]. Minister Dong Jun's remarks this time focused on emerging security domains such as AI and space, and on resuming dialogue with the United States [11]. Hosting the North Korean delegation likely served as a way for Beijing to demonstrate its regional influence amid negotiations with Washington, while maintaining the forum's multilateral appearance. The fact that a delegation of young Chinese cadres led by Ri Kyong Son visited Pyongyang and toured various regions during the same period [17][20][19] also demonstrates that Sino-North Korean exchanges are not confined to defense channels but are proceeding in parallel at the party and youth organization levels.
The U.S. Department of DefenseThe department sent a higher-level delegation to this year's forum compared to last year, signaling its intent to restore U.S.-China military channels [3]. However, as evidenced by former Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai’s admission at the same forum of a lack of trust, the restoration of channels and the actual building of confidence are proceeding on separate tracks [3]. From Washington’s viewpoint, the restoration of the North Korea-China defense channel could be interpreted as one of Beijing’s negotiating levers ahead of the U.S.-China summit (scheduled for September 24) [3].
Internal Trends in the North Korean MilitaryInternal trends within the North Korean military must also be considered. On September 12, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) conducted a coordinated firepower strike drill with its long-range artillery and missile units, under the guidance of Pak Jong Chon, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party. New combat systems were mobilized, including unmanned attack aircraft, strategic cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles [18]. Earlier, North Korea’s minister of national defence had warned of a “powerful” response to trilateral U.S.-South Korea-Japan exercises [21]. The fact that these military demonstrations were conducted concurrently with the diplomatic visit to China suggests that Pyongyang is treating pressure on the United States and South Korea and closer alignment with China not as separate policies, but as two components of a single strategic axis.
4. Key Issues
The first key issue is whether this visit to China will lead to a substantive expansion of military cooperation or remain merely a symbolic gesture aligned with the restoration of summit diplomacy. North Korean media reports only mentioned “deepening strategic communication” without disclosing specific areas of cooperation [8][9]. The second issue is the political implication of the timing. The fact that this North Korea-China defense exchange was publicly revealed on a multilateral stage just before a U.S.-China summit suggests the possibility that Beijing used it to signal and reassert its regional influence in its negotiations with Washington cannot be ruled out [3][16]. The third issue is the potential impact of this trend on the Korean Peninsula's security landscape. As North Korea is concurrently pursuing closer military ties with China, justifying its nuclear program against the U.S., condemning trilateral exercises, and conducting live-fire drills, there is a possibility that its negotiating posture toward South Korea and the United States will harden, backed by its relationship with China.
II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue
Deepening North Korea-China Military Cooperation: Root Causes and Structural Context
1. Root Cause: The Changing Status of North Korea-China Relations in the Wake of U.S.-China Strategic Competition
The primary driver for restoring North Korea-China military exchanges is not an internal North Korean factor but the changing dynamics of the U.S.-China strategic competition. Following the August 2022 visit to Taiwan by then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, China unilaterally suspended military-to-military dialogue channels with the United States [3]. For nearly four years afterward, U.S.-China military relations remained frozen. During this period, Beijing felt the need to diversify its negotiating levers with Washington and chose to close the distance with Pyongyang as one of its strategic options.
From Pyongyang’s perspective as well, this period offered increased incentives for closer alignment with Beijing. The strengthening of U.S. extended deterrence and the regularization of trilateral U.S.-South Korea-Japan military exercises consistently provoked reactions from North Korea's Ministry of National Defence [21]. The defense minister had previously warned of a “powerful” response to these trilateral drills [21]. In this climate of external pressure, North Korea needed to reaffirm its backing from China. Kim Kang Il’s reference at the Xiangshan Forum to the “80 years of reckless political and military confrontation maneuvers” by the United States and its allies [10] transcends mere domestic propaganda, as it was delivered in a multilateral setting. It can be read as an attempt to secure tacit support for its anti-U.S. narrative on an international stage provided by China.
However, it is premature to define this as a full restoration of the North Korea-China military alliance. The regularity of bilateral summits had already been significantly eroded since Xi Jinping took power [5][7]. The seven-year gap in reciprocal visits by the top leaders after 2019 [5] cannot be explained solely by COVID-19 border closures. A more fundamental reason is Beijing’s long-standing reluctance to shoulder additional burdens related to North Korea while confronting the United States over Taiwan and the South China Sea. The resumption of vice-ministerial defense exchanges should be seen not as a sign that this inertia has been overcome, but rather as the result of Beijing reassessing the utility of its Pyongyang card at a time when U.S.-China tensions were peaking.
2. Structural Context
Political Structure: The Time Lag Between Summit Diplomacy and Bureaucratic Exchanges
In North Korea-China relations, the restoration of trust between leaders and the institutionalization of working-level exchanges have always proceeded with a time lag. Summit diplomacy was restored with Kim Jong Un’s attendance at Victory Day celebrations in Beijing in September 2025, followed by Xi Jinping’s reciprocal visit in June 2026 [5]. The dispatch of the vice-ministerial defense delegation is a bureaucratic follow-up, coming roughly one year after this restoration of summitry. However, Rodong Sinmun's editorial choice to cover the event briefly alongside domestic news [19] indicates that the North Korean authorities felt no need to give it domestic prominence. This can be interpreted as Pyongyang treating military cooperation with China not as a “showcase achievement” but as “manageable, routine diplomacy.”
Economic Structure: The Asymmetry of Dependence on China and Negotiating Power
Underlying the discussions on military cooperation is North Korea's structural economic dependence on China. As the UN sanctions regime has become protracted, North Korea's foreign trade has become entrenched in a structure that is almost entirely concentrated on China. In such an asymmetric relationship, Pyongyang's leverage over Beijing is limited. North Korea's simultaneous expansion of military cooperation with Russia can be seen as an attempt to partially offset this asymmetry. In the current case, however, the Russia variable is not a direct factor. The key elements to watch are the pace and scope of the restoration of the North Korea-China channel itself.
Security Structure: The Pressure of Realignment into a U.S.-South Korea-Japan vs. North Korea-China-Russia Framework
The regularization of trilateral U.S.-South Korea-Japan military exercises and the strengthening of extended deterrence [21] reinforce Pyongyang’s perception that the peninsula’s security architecture is realigning into a U.S.-led bloc confrontation. North Korea has used this perception to build a rationale for expanding military cooperation with China and Russia. The KPA’s coordinated firepower strike drill involving long-range artillery and missile units, which mobilized new systems like unmanned aircraft, strategic cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles [18], demonstrates that Pyongyang continues to strengthen its own military capabilities in parallel with its diplomatic engagement with Beijing. Expanding military cooperation with China and building up its own forces are not mutually exclusive. Instead, this should be seen as a dual strategy in which Pyongyang seeks international legitimacy for its military buildup through its cooperation with Beijing.
3. Historical Background
Differences from Kim Il Sung's Consecutive Visits to China in the 1950s and 1964
Professor Lee Dong-ryul points to the precedent of Kim Il Sung making several consecutive visits to China around the Korean War and again during the height of the Sino-Soviet split (1964) [7]. Both are assessed as having been “strategically very urgent times” in the history of North Korea-China relations [7]. Compared with these precedents, the current restoration of military exchanges has a different degree of urgency. Those earlier visits were concentrated and occurred during crises where regime survival or bloc realignment was at stake. In contrast, the recent dispatch of the vice defense minister was for a relatively low-intensity institutional exchange—participation in a multilateral forum. It is more empirically sound to see this not as a crisis-driven alignment but as a natural bureaucratic follow-up to the restoration of summit diplomacy.
Contrast with the Hiatus Around 2019
The pattern of a seven-year gap before Xi Jinping’s first visit to North Korea after taking power, and another seven years before his second [5], shows that summit diplomacy between the two countries had deviated from the regular, blood-alliance relationship of the Cold War. During this hiatus, North Korea sent only military attachés to the Xiangshan Forum. The recent dispatch of a vice minister is a symbolic step to fill this void. However, it differs in nature from the concentrated pattern of multiple summit-level exchanges in a short period, such as Kim Jong Il’s three consecutive visits to China (May 2010, August 2010, and May 2011) [7]. The current sequence—summit, reciprocal visit, and then working-level exchange—represents a more phased, institutionalized approach.
The Parallel Structure with the Restoration of U.S.-China Military Channels
The context of the 13th Xiangshan Forum, where the restoration of U.S.-China military channels became more visible with the U.S. Department of Defense sending a higher-level delegation [3], provides a crucial reference point for interpreting the North Korea-China exchange. However, as has already been assessed, channel restoration and confidence-building are proceeding on separate tracks [3]. Applying the same logic to the North Korea-China relationship, the resumption of vice-ministerial defense exchanges does not automatically signify a deepening of substantive military cooperation or a restoration of trust. A distinction must be made between the fact that a channel has been reopened and what is actually being coordinated through it.
4. Key Variables Shaping the Issue's Development
The first variable is the outcome of the Trump-Xi summit. Ahead of the U.S.-China summit, there are reports that measures to improve military-to-military relations are under discussion [16]. The possibility of resuming arms control talks, suspended in 2024 over arms sales to Taiwan, is reportedly on the table [16]. If U.S.-China relations enter a phase of détente, the strategic value that Beijing assigns to the Pyongyang card may diminish. Conversely, if conflict between the U.S. and China reignites, the intensity and pace of North Korea-China military exchanges are likely to increase.
The second variable is China’s attitude toward North Korea’s status as a nuclear-weapon state. Beijing has not publicly endorsed Kim Kang Il’s declaration at the forum that this status is “irreversible” [14]. Chinese state media editorials on the forum also emphasized the restoration of military dialogue with the U.S., rather than highlighting North Korea’s rationale for its nuclear armament [12]. Whether China moves toward explicitly recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state or maintains its traditional strategic ambiguity will determine the practical upper limit of bilateral military cooperation.
The third variable is whether these exchanges become regularized. The implications would be completely different if this dispatch remains a one-time event compared to a scenario where it leads to future exchanges at the defense minister level or the creation of a new working-level military dialogue mechanism. A key point to monitor is whether this pattern of upgrading participation from the attaché level to the vice-ministerial level is sustained at the next Xiangshan Forum or through other bilateral channels.
III. Final Recommended Responses
Deepening North Korea-China Military Cooperation: Overall Assessment and Recommendations
1. Overall Assessment and Recommended Responses
The participation of Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il in the Xiangshan Forum should not be assessed as an isolated incident. It must be viewed as an extension of the restoration of summit diplomacy, which included Kim Jong Un’s visit to Beijing in September 2025 and Xi Jinping’s reciprocal visit in June 2026 [5]. Given that it typically takes around a year for restored trust at the leadership level to filter down to bureaucratic exchanges, this dispatch was akin to a scheduled procedure. However, Rodong Sinmun's editorial choice to cover it briefly alongside domestic news [19] indicates that Pyongyang is treating this engagement not for domestic grandstanding but as a manageable, routine diplomatic affair. In this light, interpreting the event as a signal of the full restoration of the North Korea-China military alliance is an exaggeration.
At the same time, it would be a misreading to dismiss the event as a meaningless ceremonial gesture. Kim Kang Il’s use of a multilateral stage to decry the United States’ “80 years of reckless political and military confrontation maneuvers” [10] and to declare his country’s nuclear status “irreversible” [14] was an act of seeking tacit approval for an anti-U.S. narrative on an international security platform hosted by Beijing. The fact that China did not highlight these remarks, focusing instead on restoring military dialogue with the U.S. [12], simultaneously reveals that Beijing’s interests do not align perfectly with Pyongyang’s. For China, the North Korea card is but one of several negotiating levers with the United States; it is not a priority high enough to warrant shouldering additional burdens while confronting Washington over the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
South Korea’s response should be two-pronged. First, it must accurately track how these exchanges are used to legitimize North Korea’s hardline foreign policy, without exaggerating the pace of their institutionalization. Second, it must proactively prepare for potential shifts in the deterrence landscape should these Sino-North Korean exchanges combine with North Korea-Russia military cooperation. If a dynamic solidifies in which North Korea secures political cover from both China and Russia, the effectiveness of sanctions coordination as a tool of pressure against Pyongyang will be structurally weakened.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plan
Short-term (within 3 months)South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense should define Kim Kang Il's visit to China as the "first stage of institutionalization" of North Korea-China military cooperation and establish a dedicated monitoring channel to track subsequent exchanges. This requires a system for compiling weekly updates on exchanges between defense attachés, working-level visits, and the issuance of any joint statements. Concurrently, the resumption of North Korea-China military exchanges should be placed on the formal agenda of the ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG). This is to prepare for the possibility that the dynamic previously identified by EAI—where the restoration of U.S.-China military channels and the de-escalation of on-the-ground tensions proceed on separate tracks[3]—could similarly apply to the Korean Peninsula.
Medium-term (6 months to 1 year)The key question will be whether reciprocal visits at the defense minister level or higher take place between North Korea and China. Whether exchanges are elevated from the vice-ministerial level to the level of defense ministers is a core indicator for assessing the next stage. During this period, it will be necessary to compare the pace of North Korea-Russia defense cooperation with that of North Korea-China exchanges to analyze the balance Pyongyang is striking between its two partners. South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and relevant companies should consider measures to strengthen customs inspections for dual-use items among controlled exports to and imports from China that could potentially be diverted to North Korea.
Long-term (1–3 years)The ultimate turning point will be whether North Korea-China military cooperation moves beyond summit diplomacy and exchanges between defense officials to the level of joint military exercises or cooperation on weapons systems. If it reaches this stage, a reassessment of the entire deterrence architecture on the Korean Peninsula will be inevitable. In that case, it would be necessary to re-examine the effectiveness of the ROK-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and the extended deterrence framework, and to consider opening a separate management-focused dialogue channel with China through diplomatic avenues.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
First are changes in the level of exchanges between North Korean and Chinese defense authorities. If reciprocal visits materialize at a level higher than vice-minister of national defense—such as between defense ministers or vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission—it should be interpreted as a clear signal of deepening cooperation.
Second are changes in the prominence of coverage in Chinese and North Korean state media. Currently, both sides are covering these exchanges in a restrained tone [12][19]. If Xinhua News Agency or the Rodong Sinmun begins to feature North Korea-China military cooperation as a top front-page story, it would signal a policy shift by both countries to turn the relationship into an asset for external display.
Third is the intensity of North Korea's rhetoric in multilateral forums. It is necessary to track whether the phrases used by Kim Kang Il, such as "80 years of confrontational machinations"[10] and North Korea's status as an "irreversible nuclear-weapon state,"[14] are repeated and intensified in the future at the United Nations or other multilateral channels.
Fourth is the parallel pace of cooperation with Russia. If North Korea-China exchanges show a pattern of overlapping in timing with or complementing North Korea-Russia military cooperation, it would signify that Pyongyang has begun in earnest to implement a strategy of competitively leveraging the two major powers.
Fifth are changes in Beijing's attitude toward North Korea following the U.S.-China summit (reportedly scheduled for September 24, 2026)[3]. If U.S.-China relations stabilize to a certain degree, China may reduce its use of the "Pyongyang card." Conversely, if U.S.-China conflict reignites, Beijing's approach to North Korea could become more proactive again.
4. Summary and Conclusion
Kim Kang Il's visit to China is both an expected procedural step in the restoration of North Korea-China summit diplomacy as it extends to the bureaucratic level, and the result of Beijing's reassessment of the "Pyongyang card's" utility amid the U.S.-China strategic competition. However, the restrained tone of North Korean media coverage[19] and the low level of attention from the Chinese side[12] suggest that these exchanges have not yet led to substantive, alliance-level solidarity. South Korea needs to maintain a balanced perspective, neither underestimating nor overestimating this development, while continuously tracking it through five key indicators: changes in the level of exchanges, the prominence of media coverage, the intensity of rhetoric, the parallel pace of cooperation with Russia, and the variable of U.S.-China relations. The core of an effective response lies not in an immediate policy shift, but in establishing an observation framework now that can discern whether a transition to the next stage is occurring.
References
[1] [NK News] North Korea sends military delegation to China’s major security conference
[10] [NK News] North Korean official rebukes US, defends nukes during international conference
[15] [Korean Central News Agency] Newspaper Review, September 16, 2026
[17] [Rodong Sinmun] Chinese Young Cadres Delegation Arrives
[19] [Korean Central News Agency] Newspaper Review, September 18, 2026
[20] [Korean Central News Agency] Chinese Young Cadres Delegation Arrives
[21] [NK News] North Korean defense chief warns of ‘powerful’ response to US-ROK-Japan drills
[22] [The Diplomat] North Korea Confirms September 12 Missile Launch Was Joint Firepower Drill
[23] [NK News] Kim Jong Un thanks troops deployed to Russia in founding anniversary ceremony
[24] [Korean Central News Agency] Newspaper Review, September 15, 2026
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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