Trump and Gulf Leaders to Discuss Post-War Iran Strategy: Implications of a Dual Track of Containment and Negotiation
Executive Summary
President Trump is scheduled to discuss a post-war strategy for Iran with leaders of the six Gulf states on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. However, this meeting is less a final peace plan and more of a preliminary draft of a dual-track strategy that combines containment and negotiation. Six months after the war began, the initial military objectives of regime change and the dismantlement of nuclear facilities have not been achieved, and Trump's predictions of a swift end to the conflict have repeatedly proven false. Since the expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum, Iran has begun reasserting control over the Strait of Hormuz by force, leading to an escalation of hostilities in September. The Gulf states are also showing divisions in their approach to Iran; Bahrain is keeping its distance, while the UAE continues to engage in pragmatic contact with Tehran. The South Korean government and companies should not interpret the meeting's outcome as a definitive end to the war or a finalized containment policy. Instead, they must consistently and individually manage the differing approaches of Gulf states toward Iran and the ongoing risks to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
I. Situational Analysis
Trump to Discuss Post-War Iran Strategy with Gulf Leaders on Sidelines of UN General Assembly
1. Background and Timeline
The U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran began on February 28, 2026 [3][9]. The objectives at the outset of the war were regime change, the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, and the neutralization of Iran's missile and drone programs [3][9]. Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed in an Israeli airstrike [9]. However, the regime change intended by Israel did not materialize [9].
Early in the war, President Trump predicted the conflict would be over in "four to five weeks" [3][8][11]. He later repeatedly stated it would take "two weeks, a few more days at most" [3][8][11]. Six months later, these predictions have not come to pass [3]. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) assessed that six months into the war, the United States has "no good options" [8][11].
On June 17, President Trump and the Tehran government signed the 'Islamabad Memorandum' [6][9], which called for an immediate cessation of military actions on all fronts [6][9]. The memorandum was interpreted by some as including a provision that could allow Iran to permanently restrict navigation through the Strait of Hormuz [6]. The agreement expired in August [9], after which Iran reverted to an offensive posture, exercising control over passage in the Strait of Hormuz by force [9]. On August 30, the U.S. struck a launch site on Larak Island [9]. Iran retaliated with attacks on U.S. military bases in Jordan and the UAE [9].
Hostilities have intensified in September. On September 3, the largest-scale engagement since the war began took place [3]. This has created a contradictory situation where Washington discusses ending the war while the conflict on the ground continues [3].
2. Current Situation
According to various media outlets citing a report from Axios, President Trump is scheduled to meet with leaders from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman in New York on September 22 during the UN General Assembly [1][4][7][10]. Bahrain's Gulf Daily News reported that the meeting will focus on a post-war strategy for Iran [4]. The UAE's The National characterized it as a discussion of "Trump's post-war plan for Iran" [10].
President Trump is sending mixed signals ahead of the meeting. In North Carolina on September 17, he said, "I hope we are moving toward the end of the war" [4][12]. However, Italy's La Repubblica reported that around the same time, Trump stated it was "a critical moment in which he is deciding whether to completely crush Iran" [12]. Previously, in a September 14 statement, Trump had left the door open for dialogue, saying, "The failed state of Iran wants to make a deal, quickly and desperately" [14][15]. He added that the U.S. would decide whether to engage with Iran [15].
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains its stance that it will respond forcefully to any miscalculation by the "enemy" [12]. Turkey's Hürriyet reported that large anti-American billboards have been installed in Tehran, with one reading, "The devil's army will be buried in the Persian Gulf" [7].
Cracks are also appearing among the Gulf states. Germany's Die Presse reported that Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed Al Nahyan met with Iranian President Pezeshkian at the BRICS summit in New Delhi. The paper interpreted this as a move by Gulf Arab states to seek a separate compromise with Tehran amid the U.S.'s inability to end the war [16]. Iran is reportedly expected to present an outline for an agreement on maritime passage through the Strait of Hormuz on Monday [16].
3. Key Actors and Positions
United States (Trump Administration)is simultaneously pursuing a dual track of containing Iran while leaving open the possibility of dialogue. The White House is drafting a post-war strategy for Iran's containment [3], while Trump himself has stated the war would end after the November midterm elections [9][18], a remark that suggests low-intensity conflict will continue for at least eight more weeks [9]. At the same time, he has repeatedly made statements suggesting a deal with Iran is possible [14][15], following a typical pattern of combining military pressure with incentives for negotiation.
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman (the six GCC countries)are pursuing a dual approach of aligning with the U.S. while trying to deter further escalation [9]. Among them, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are parties that have pledged approximately $4 trillion in investments in the U.S. as part of Trump's "America First" investment initiative [5]. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) has analyzed that the war with Iran is imposing significant costs on these three economies, raising doubts about both their ability and willingness to fulfill these commitments [5]. The Central Bank of the UAE raised its own interest rates in response to the U.S. Federal Reserve's 25-basis-point hike, a move interpreted as an effort to manage inflationary pressures arising from geopolitical uncertainty [10].
Iranhas defined control over passage through the Strait of Hormuz as leverage for bilateral negotiations with the United States [6]. This structure favors direct talks with Washington over multilateral negotiations with the GCC [6]. Simultaneously, Iran is maintaining pressure during the negotiation phase by showcasing its military deterrence through the IRGC [12].
Bahrainhas declared it will not participate in multilateral contacts with Iran until diplomatic relations are restored [6], whereas the UAEhas continued unusual contacts with Tehran, seeking an interim agreement on shipping lanes [6][16]. This shows a divergence in approaches to Iran even within the GCC.
4. Key Issues
The first issue is whether the duality in Trump's statements reflects a genuine split in policy direction. The fact that his remarks about the war nearing its end and his statement that he is "deciding whether to crush Iran" were made around the same time [4][12] suggests that the final form of the post-war strategy has not yet been decided within the White House.
The second issue is whether the GCC countries can unify their positions. The UAE's engagement with Iran and Bahrain's declaration of non-participation [6][16] indicate that the six Gulf states may find it difficult to form a united front against Iran at the upcoming New York meeting.
The third issue is the Gulf states' ability to follow through on their investment pledges to the U.S. The fact that the economic costs of a prolonged war are constraining their ability to fulfill the $4 trillion investment commitment [5] suggests that the security cooperation and economic cooperation agendas at the summit will likely be intertwined.
The fourth issue is the negotiation track for the Strait of Hormuz passage problem. Iran's framing of this issue as a bargaining chip for bilateral talks with the U.S., rather than for multilateral negotiations with the GCC [6], could limit the influence of the Gulf states at the New York meeting.
II. In-Depth Analysis
Trump to Discuss Post-War Iran Strategy with Gulf Leaders on Sidelines of UN General Assembly — In-Depth Analysis
1. Analysis of Root Causes
The root cause of this Gulf leaders' summit is the gap between Washington's military objectives and the actual situation on the ground. The initial goals of the war were regime change, the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, and the neutralization of Iran's missile and drone programs [3][9]. Six months later, none of these objectives have been achieved [8][11]. Despite the death of Khamenei, the regime change intended by Israel did not occur [9]. The CFR assessed that at this point, the U.S. has "no good options" [8][11].
President Trump's repeatedly inaccurate predictions about the war's end form the backdrop for convening the Gulf leaders. His forecast of "four to five weeks" was shortened to "two weeks, a few more days at most," and then also failed to materialize [3][8][11]. Six months on, the war is not over [3]. These repeated miscalculations prompted the White House to shift from declaring a military victory to pursuing a containment strategy [3][9]. The fact that Iran began reasserting control over the Strait of Hormuz by force after the Islamabad Memorandum expired in August [9] demonstrates that the U.S. cannot regulate Iran's behavior through military force alone. Ultimately, the discussion with Gulf leaders should be seen as an attempt to supplement an incomplete military campaign with diplomatic and economic containment.
At the same time, President Trump's openness to dialogue is not unrelated to his domestic political calendar. With the November midterm elections approaching, there is a need to either end the war or at least make it appear to be entering its final phase [18]. His statement that "the failed state of Iran wants to make a deal, quickly and desperately" [14][15] can be read as an attempt to send a message to both domestic voters and Gulf partners that the U.S. holds the upper hand in negotiations.
2. Structural Context
Political Structure
The six Gulf countries do not have a unified set of interests in this war. Bahrain has declared it will not participate in Oman-mediated talks, citing the lack of restored diplomatic relations with Iran, while the UAE has continued unusual contacts with Tehran to explore an interim agreement on shipping lanes [6]. The fact that Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed Al Nahyan met with Iranian President Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the BRICS summit [16] shows that both hardline and pragmatic engagement approaches toward Iran coexist within the Gulf. Germany's Die Presse interpreted this as Gulf Arab states leaning toward finding common ground with Tehran after witnessing the "inability of the U.S. to finish a war it started" [16]. Trump's attempt to gather the six nations to forge a single post-war strategy is, paradoxically, a move predicated on the existence of these very divisions among them.
Economic Structure
The Gulf states' capacity to fulfill their investment pledges to the U.S. being undermined by the war is another structural constraint. Three countries—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE—promised approximately $4 trillion under Trump's "America First" investment initiative [5]. This accounts for the majority of the $6 trillion total pledged by foreign governments [5]. However, reports indicate that the war is imposing significant costs on these three economies, reducing the financial resources available to meet these commitments [5]. With traffic in the Strait of Hormuz plummeting from over 100 vessels per day before the war to just a handful now [2], the very foundation of the Gulf economies' energy exports is being shaken. The Central Bank of the UAE's decision to raise its benchmark interest rate in response to the U.S. Federal Reserve's rate hike [10] is another example of how geopolitical uncertainty is translating into real burdens on Gulf financial markets.
Security Structure
Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz was the transit point for about one-fifth of the world's crude oil supply [6]. The prolonged blockade of this strait is changing the security calculus of the Gulf states. Iran is framing the reopening of the strait not as a matter for multilateral negotiation with the GCC, but as leverage for bilateral talks with the U.S. [6]. This implies that no matter what unified post-war strategy the Gulf states agree upon, the key to resolving the strait passage issue lies in the bilateral relationship between Washington and Tehran. While the IRGC maintains its stance of responding forcefully to any miscalculation by the "enemy" [12], Iran's past retaliatory strikes on U.S. bases in Jordan and the UAE [9] perpetuate a sense of insecurity among Gulf states, whose territories could become the stage for further escalation.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases
This situation is structurally similar to past U.S. policies toward Iran and Iraq, following a pattern of 'shifting to containment without a military victory.' The cycle of signing the Islamabad Memorandum, its expiration in August, and the subsequent re-escalation should be seen as an instance where a ceasefire agreement served only as a temporary pause without resolving the underlying conflict [6][9]. The interpretation that the memorandum contained a clause effectively recognizing Iran's right to restrict passage through Hormuz [6] shows that a ceasefire reached without a clear military advantage can result in handing negotiation leverage to the opposing side.
The attempt to build a common front against Iran by gathering the Gulf states is also not a new approach. What is different this time, however, is that disagreements among member states—such as the UAE's outreach to Iran and Bahrain's conditional non-participation—are more visibly on the surface than in the past [6][16]. The fact that the Trump administration is preparing a post-war strategy centered on the twin pillars of containing Iran and expanding the Abraham Accords [3] can be seen as an attempt to simultaneously pursue the 'maximum pressure' campaign and the 'expansion of regional normalization' that Washington sought after withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). The difference now is that these two tracks must be pursued while an actual military conflict is ongoing.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
Three key variables will likely determine the final shape of the post-war strategy. The first is Israel's general election in October. With the initial war aim of regime change unfulfilled, shifts in Israel's domestic political landscape could affect the continuation of its hardline stance against Iran [3]. The second is the U.S. midterm elections in November. President Trump himself has stated the war will end "right after the midterms, maybe before" [18], meaning the election calendar itself is acting as a political constraint defining the timeline for peace negotiations.
The third variable is whether the actual fighting continues. The fact that the largest-scale engagement since the war began occurred on September 3 [3] highlights a contradictory situation where military clashes on the ground are intensifying even as Washington discusses an end to the war. President Trump's simultaneous optimistic statement that he "hopes we are moving toward the end of the war" [4][12] and his hardline remark that it is "a critical moment in which he is deciding whether to completely crush Iran" [12] suggest that the White House has not yet decided whether to prioritize dialogue or pressure.
In addition, the economic variable of the Gulf states' capacity to fulfill their investment pledges to the U.S. also constrains the feasibility of the post-war strategy [5]. No matter what plan Washington designs for containing Iran and expanding normalization, if the actual availability of Gulf capital to support it is diminishing due to a prolonged war, the pace and scope of the strategy's implementation are likely to be smaller than originally envisioned.
III. Final Recommended Response
Comprehensive Recommended Response and Action Plan
1. Overall Assessment and Recommended Response
The meeting of Gulf leaders on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly is unlikely to lead to a single, definitive peace agreement. Instead, it is more akin to a preliminary draft of a dual-track strategy combining containment and negotiation. This is supported by President Trump's simultaneous statements that he "hopes we are moving toward the end of the war" [4][12] and that it is "a critical moment in which he is deciding whether to completely crush Iran" [12]. The White House's parallel efforts to draft a post-war containment strategy while also leaving the door open for dialogue with Iran [14][15] point to the same conclusion. This should be interpreted to mean that Washington has not yet finalized its policy direction.
The internal divisions among the six GCC countries are another variable limiting the effectiveness of this meeting. Bahrain is keeping its distance from multilateral engagement, citing its lack of restored diplomatic relations with Iran, while the UAE is continuing its unusual contacts with Tehran [6]. The fact that the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi met with the Iranian president on the sidelines of the BRICS summit shows that a pragmatic approach toward Iran has already taken root within the Gulf [16]. It is difficult to expect these divisions to be immediately healed just because Trump has gathered the six leaders in one place.
The recommended response for the South Korean government and companies can be summarized in three points. First, they should not prematurely interpret the outcome of this meeting as a definitive end to the war or the finalization of a containment strategy. Second, they should not treat the Gulf states as a single risk entity but should individually track the differing national approaches toward Iran [6]. Third, it would be rational to respond separately to Washington's requests for sanctions compliance and for military contributions, and to hold back on investment and negotiation cards until a final policy direction becomes clear.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plan
Short-term (immediately after the UN General Assembly meeting to four weeks later)
The original text of any joint statement or individual briefings from the meeting at the UN General Assembly should be carefully reviewed. It is particularly important to distinguish whether the phrase "post-war strategy" refers to the Iranian regime or to the maritime order in the Strait of Hormuz, as the two meanings are often used interchangeably [4][10]. During this period, South Korean energy importers should re-examine the renewal dates for war risk insurance in their crude oil and gas procurement contracts. Given that Iran has a history of forcibly controlling passage through the Strait of Hormuz after the Islamabad Memorandum expired [9], transit risks must be managed continuously, regardless of the meeting's outcome.
Medium-term (1–3 months, around the November midterm elections)
The timeframe President Trump himself indicated for the end of the war—"right after the midterm elections, maybe before"—is approaching [18]. Whether this prediction materializes will be a litmus test for the binding power of the post-war Gulf strategy. If hostilities continue after the midterms, the White House's draft post-war strategy will likely be revised to strengthen containment. During this period, South Korean companies should also monitor the implementation of investment commitments made by Gulf countries to the United States. Given assessments that the approximately $4 trillion in investment pledges from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are already being delayed by the financial burden of the war [5], South Korean companies with projects linked to these nations should remain open to the possibility of rescheduling their project financing.
Long-term (beyond 3 months)
If the containment strategy is formally institutionalized, it could lead to an expansion of secondary sanctions against Iran. South Korean companies should preemptively reassess their exposure through indirect transactions related to Iran, particularly in the petrochemical and shipping sectors. Conversely, if President Trump's signal that "Iran wants to make a deal" [14][15] translates into actual negotiations, opportunities may arise for South Korean companies to re-enter the market during a phase of sanctions relief. It would be prudent to prepare scenario-specific response manuals in advance to be ready for both possibilities.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
First is the specific content of the draft post-war strategy announced by the White House following the UN General Assembly meeting. The key criterion is whether the U.S. continues to aim for regime change in Iran or pivots to a dual approach of containment and engagement.
Second are changes in traffic volume through the Strait of Hormuz. Before the war, over 100 vessels passed through daily; this has now dwindled to only a few [2]. Whether this figure recovers after the meeting will be a leading indicator of tangible de-escalation.
Third is whether the individual approaches of Gulf states begin to diverge. Actions such as the UAE continuing or expanding contact with Tehran, Bahrain restoring relations with Iran, or Oman attempting to resume mediation will be indicators of whether internal policy divisions among the Gulf states are deepening or healing [6][16].
Fourth are changes in President Trump's statements regarding the end of the war around the November 3 midterm elections. It is necessary to monitor whether his predicted timeline is postponed again and whether his words are accompanied by actual ceasefire measures [18].
Fifth is the response level of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Whether it maintains or softens its existing position to "respond strongly to any enemy miscalculation" [12] will be a basis for determining whether a phase of dialogue is beginning.
4. Summary and Conclusion
President Trump's meeting with Gulf leaders should be seen not as an occasion to finalize a post-war strategy for Iran, but as a process of seeking buy-in from Gulf partners while keeping the conflicting options of containment and dialogue on the table. Given that hardline stances and pragmatic engagement approaches toward Iran coexist within the six Gulf states, it is unlikely that a unified regional strategy will emerge from this meeting alone [6][16]. The South Korean government and companies should avoid prematurely interpreting the outcome as confirmation of a specific scenario. Instead, they must maintain a continuous monitoring system to track both the actual evolution of the conflict around the midterm elections and the diverging approaches of individual Gulf states.
References
[1] [TASS] Trump says to discuss Iran with regional allies at UN
[4] [Gulf Daily News] Trump says 'hopefully we are towards end' of Iran war
[7] [Hürriyet Daily News] Trump to hold Iran summit with Gulf leaders next week: Report
[10] [The National (UAE)] TrendingTrump's postwar plans for Iran and Houthi weapons experiments
[14] [Vanguard (NG)] Trump says ‘open’ to engaging with Iran
[15] [Gulf Daily News] Tehran wants deal to end Mideast war says Trump
[16] [Die Presse] BRICS-Gipfel: Demonstrative Einigkeit als Kontrapunkt zu Trump
[17] [Gulf News] Trump says ‘open’ to engaging with Iran to end Middle East war
[18] [JoongAng Ilbo] Trump: "Iran War Will End Right After November Midterms... Maybe Before"
[19] [Hürriyet Daily News] Trump says Iran war likely to end after US midterms
[20] [Al Jazeera] Fiscal pressure from Iran War clouds Gulf States’ US spending plans
[21] [Khaleej Times] LiveTrump says oil is flowing through Hormuz, US open to engaging with Iran
[22] [TASS] White House develops strategy for post-war containment of Iran — Axios
[23] [Yonhap] Trump says countries that have been 'no help' should reimburse U.S. when Iran war ends
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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