The Beijing Xiangshan Forum and the Restoration of U.S.-China Military Channels: The Gap Between Dialogue and On-the-Ground Tensions

Executive Summary

The restoration of U.S.-China military channels became more concrete at the 13th Xiangshan Forum on September 15, where the U.S. Department of Defense sent a higher-level delegation than last year. However, former Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai’s admission of a trust deficit at the same forum reaffirmed that channel restoration and trust-building are proceeding on separate tracks. The bilateral crisis management framework, modeled on the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), has a structural blind spot: it focuses on managing naval and air force encounters and does not cover gray-zone friction involving coast guards and maritime militias. This can be interpreted as Beijing’s negotiating leverage and a signal of “manageable competition” ahead of the September 24 summit, but there is little clear evidence that it will directly lead to de-escalation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. South Korea should apply these structural lessons to refine its response systems for gray-zone contingencies in the West Sea and to expand the agenda of the ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group.

I. Situational Analysis

The Beijing Xiangshan Forum and the Resumption of U.S.-China Military-Security Dialogue: A Situational Analysis

Background and Developments

The Beijing Xiangshan Forum is the largest high-level security and defense dialogue hosted annually by China. This year marked its 13th iteration. The forum began as an attempt by China to build a multilateral security discourse under its leadership. It has operated separately from the ups and downs of U.S.-China military channels themselves.

The breakdown of U.S.-China military channels dates back to August 2022. Following the visit of then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, China unilaterally suspended military dialogue channels with the United States [6]. Subsequently, the two countries sought to restore them through summit-level and high-level diplomatic channels. At the APEC summit in San Francisco in November 2023, the Biden-Xi meeting resulted in "an agreement to enhance communication and build trust by resuming high-level military dialogue, without reaching compromises on pending issues" [3]. The agreement at the time included the restoration of channels at multiple levels, including defense ministerial talks, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and theater commander-level calls [3].

This trend continued into the second Trump administration. In May of this year, President Trump and President Xi Jinping met in Beijing and reached an agreement to build a "constructive and strategically stable relationship" [14]. Following this, a U.S.-China theater commander-level contact took place in Canada. This was a meeting between Yang Zhibin, commander of the Southern Theater Command, and Samuel Paparo, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command. The Southern Theater Command is the key command responsible for operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea [6]. However, this contact had the limitation of being mediated through a multilateral security dialogue led by Canada and the United States, rather than being a bilateral U.S.-China engagement [6]. Chinese state media did not give significant coverage to this meeting [6]. This suggested that Beijing is operating crisis management communication and pressure related to Taiwan on separate tracks [6].

Current Situation

At the 13th Xiangshan Forum on September 15, Cynthia "Xan" Carras, U.S. Department of Defense Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, led the U.S. delegation [4]. The SCMP assessed this as a higher-level participation compared to last year. This contrasts with last year, when a defense attaché from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing led the delegation [4].

The Global Times characterized this as a "continued resumption" of U.S.-China security dialogue, assessing in an editorial that it contained several signals [1]. Citing a Reuters report, it noted that hundreds of military officers, diplomats, and scholars from dozens of countries, regions, and international organizations would attend "amid roiling regional tensions" [1]. The distinctive rhetoric of Chinese state media reveals an intent to frame the elevated U.S. delegation as part of a narrative of 'relationship normalization' that Beijing desires.

In contrast, the SCMP reported that the problem of a trust deficit in U.S.-China relations was reconfirmed at the same forum [7]. Cui Tiankai, former Chinese Ambassador to the U.S., said in a forum session, "There is an agreement on constructive strategic stability, but we have no illusions that the road ahead will be smooth" [7]. He added, "There are always problems, and sometimes very big problems" [7]. This statement, coming ahead of President Xi Jinping's expected visit to Washington, shows that a cautious mood, wary of optimism, exists within Beijing even in the run-up to the planned September 24 summit [7].

U.S.-China contacts on other tracks during the same period are also noteworthy. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Besant announced a weekend meeting with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng ahead of the summit [13]. Discussions related to Iran sanctions were mentioned as a potential agenda item [13]. The security channel (Xiangshan Forum) and the economic channel (Besant-He Lifeng) are operating in parallel in the lead-up to the summit. This suggests that Beijing is also using the restoration of military channels as leverage to create a favorable atmosphere for economic and trade negotiations.

Key Actors and Positions

Chinauses the forum as a stage for its own security discourse and a tool for managing its narrative on relations with the U.S. The editorial tone of the Global Times is focused on framing the upgraded U.S. delegation as a 'diplomatic achievement' for Beijing [1]. In contrast, statements by former diplomatic elites like Cui Tiankai reflect a more cautious stance, aimed at tempering excessive domestic expectations [7]. The Chinese government has pursued a dual-track strategy of selectively restoring military crisis management channels while maintaining a hardline stance on the Taiwan issue on a separate track [6].

The United Statessignaled its willingness to restore channels by sending a senior Pentagon official for China affairs as its representative [4]. This is a continuation of measures following the May MMCA working-level meeting and the theater commander-level contact. However, this move by the Pentagon runs parallel to, and does not replace, its existing policy of maintaining a deterrence posture in Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Third-Party Observerssuch as former diplomats like Cui Tiankai and Hong Kong media outlets like the SCMP, play a role in highlighting the structural mistrust underlying the channel restoration [7]. Their perspectives show a different temperature from the optimistic narrative of state-run media.

Key Issues

The first issue is the gap between the 'level' of channel restoration and its 'substance.' Upgrading the delegation, the theater commander contact, and expanded forum participation are all formal steps forward. However, whether this leads to a reduction of gray-zone provocations in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait is a separate matter [6]. It has already been assessed that the likelihood of expanding to the defense ministerial or Military Maritime Consultative Agreement level after the Canada meeting is limited [6].

The second issue is whether the MMCA-style crisis management framework, designed on the premise of managing naval and air force encounters, can also cover gray-zone friction involving coast guards and maritime militias. Even if channels between regular military forces are restored, the forward deployment of coast guard assets or friction involving third countries remains outside this framework. The paradox of simultaneous channel restoration and on-the-ground tension stems from this.

The third issue is the timing, with the September 24 summit approaching. The early restoration of the security channel and the parallel operation of the economic channel (Besant-He Lifeng) [13] are not unrelated to Beijing's calculation to signal 'manageable competition' and create a favorable atmosphere for negotiations ahead of the summit. Whether this signal leads to institutionalized mechanisms that continue after the summit, or remains a mere gesture for the meeting, will be determined by its implementation over the next few months [7].

II. In-Depth Analysis

The Beijing Xiangshan Forum and the Resumption of U.S.-China Military-Security Dialogue: An In-Depth Analysis

Root Cause: Why Are Channels Being Restored Now?

The primary driver for restoring U.S.-China military channels is the summit scheduled for September 24 [14]. Ahead of President Xi Jinping's visit to Washington, Beijing needs to demonstrate both domestically and internationally that the bilateral relationship is 'manageable.' The Global Times's emphasis on Director Carras's attendance as a "continued resumption" containing multiple signals [1] is linked to this need. From Beijing's perspective of maximizing the summit's outcome, restoring military channels is a high-impact, low-cost card to play.

The motivation on the U.S. side is different. The Pentagon's decision to upgrade its delegation from an attaché to a director-level official [4] is less a re-evaluation of the forum's value and more a practical step to support the "constructive and strategically stable relationship" [14] agreed upon at the May summit in the military domain. With the May MMCA working-level meeting and the first theater commander contact in Canada, the channel restoration takes on a dual character: it is both a byproduct of summit diplomacy and preparatory groundwork for the upcoming summit.

However, structural mistrust remains at the foundation of this restoration. Former Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai's statement at the forum that "there is an agreement, but we have no illusions that the road ahead will be smooth" [7] is an admission that the channel reopening is not a result of restored trust, but rather a mechanism to manage its absence. The forum thus reaffirmed that channel restoration and trust-building are on separate tracks.

Structural Context: Three Separate Tracks

U.S.-China military relations are moving along at least three separate tracks. The first is the summit-level strategic dialogue track. The May summit in Beijing and the follow-up summit scheduled for September 24 fall into this category [14]. The second is the defense ministry and military channel track. The MMCA working-level meeting, theater commander-level contacts, and attendance at the Xiangshan Forum belong to this level [4][6]. The third is the operational track on the ground. This involves the movements of naval, air force, and coast guard assets that actually encounter each other in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

The problem is that these three tracks operate at different speeds and with different logics. As EAI pointed out in its previous analysis of the Canada meeting, "The fact that Chinese state media did not give significant coverage to this meeting and maintained a hardline stance on the Taiwan issue at the Pacific Islands Forum shows that Beijing is operating crisis management communication and pressure related to Taiwan on separate tracks" [6]. The same structure is repeating at this Xiangshan Forum. The Global Times extensively promotes the channel restoration [1], but statements from the forum floor reported by the SCMP show that the fundamental problem of a trust deficit remains unresolved [7].

This separated structure is not accidental but an inherent design in Beijing's strategy toward the U.S. It uses military channels as an outcome of summit diplomacy while separately continuing on-the-ground pressure regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea. By doing so, Beijing can simultaneously manage its image as a 'responsible nation open to dialogue' and its message of 'not backing down on core interests.' For the United States, this dual structure itself is a factor that complicates its response. The dilemma arises from the Pentagon having to respond to channel restoration [4] while simultaneously strengthening its deterrence posture in the region.

The economic context also supports this structure. An AmCham Shanghai report noted that the business confidence of American companies in China rebounded sharply against the backdrop of an "improved geopolitical environment" [8][9]. The trend of a 'détente narrative' being created simultaneously on both economic and military tracks ahead of the summit suggests that Beijing is sending parallel friendly signals through various channels to ensure the success of the Trump-Xi summit. Conversely, the fact that U.S. Treasury Secretary Besant sought to coordinate on Iran sanctions with Vice Premier He Lifeng just before the summit [13] shows that the United States is also activating multiple working-level channels simultaneously in the lead-up to the meeting.

Historical Precedent: A Repeat of the 2023 APEC Model

The current situation is quite similar to the pattern seen before and after the November 2023 APEC summit in San Francisco. EAI's analysis at the time concluded, "In the end, no compromise was reached on pending issues; instead, an agreement was reached on enhancing communication and building trust through the resumption of high-level military dialogue" [3]. Core issues like Taiwan and advanced technology were left untouched, while the summit's achievements were filled with the 'manageable outcome' of restoring military dialogue [3].

The lead-up to the September 24 summit is following the same script. Presidents Trump and Xi already reached an agreement at their May Beijing meeting on a "constructive and strategically stable relationship," a deal that emphasizes the framework over substance [14]. Within this framework, a series of military channel restoration measures—the MMCA working-level meeting, the theater commander contact, and attendance at the Xiangshan Forum—are being sequentially accumulated. This follows the same grammar as the 2023 case, where the restoration of defense ministerial talks, the MMCA, and theater commander calls were presented as the 'tangible outcomes' of the summit [3].

The difference this time is that the channel restoration has already progressed significantly before the summit. Whereas in 2023 the summit was the occasion for the agreement to restore channels, this time it is likely that the restoration has occurred first, following the May summit, and the September summit will serve to endorse and expand upon it. This means Beijing has reversed the order of its 'gift diplomacy,' using military channels as a tool to create a favorable atmosphere beforehand to ensure the summit's success.

The cycle of suspension and restoration following the Pelosi visit in August 2022 is another relevant precedent. At that time, China used the suspension of military channels as a tool for its hardline response to the Taiwan issue [6]. This time, too, the channels are being restored, but there is no evidence to confirm that Beijing's fundamental position on the Taiwan issue has softened. In this respect, former Ambassador Cui Tiankai's statement [7] is akin to a warning not to confuse channel restoration with genuine de-escalation.

Key Variables: Summit Outcome and Continuation of On-the-Ground Pressure

The first variable that will shape future developments is the actual agenda and outcome of the September 24 summit. The key question is whether the restoration of military channels will expand to include defense ministerial meetings or additional crisis management agreements. Considering the assessment that the Canada contact had "limited likelihood of expanding to the defense ministerial or Military Maritime Consultative Agreement level" [6], it is uncertain whether institutionalization beyond a symbolic level will be achieved at this summit.

The second variable is the continuation of gray-zone pressure on the ground. If coast guard, maritime militia, and military aircraft activities continue in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, separate from the channel restoration, the achievements at the summit and defense channel levels will not translate into de-escalation on the ground. This is intertwined with the inherent limitation of the MMCA-style bilateral crisis management framework, which was originally designed to cover only encounters between navies and air forces. Friction involving coast guards and third countries lies outside the scope of this framework.

The third variable is the extent to which the narrative gap between Chinese state media and Western-affiliated media is reflected in actual policy. The very coexistence of the Global Times's "continued resumption" narrative [1] and the SCMP's reports on the trust deficit [7] suggests that the tension between sending conciliatory signals to the U.S. and maintaining a hardline stance has not been fully resolved within Beijing. Whether this gap persists after the summit or converges toward one side will be an indicator of the future stability of U.S.-China military relations.