The Iran-GCC Summit and the Strait of Hormuz Blockade Crisis: Situational Analysis and Policy Recommendations

Executive Summary

The Salalah talks, mediated by Oman, were postponed just before they were scheduled to be held. Bahrain announced it would not participate until diplomatic relations with Iran are restored, while the UAE, in contrast, continued unusual contacts with Tehran to explore a temporary shipping lane agreement. Iran defines the reopening of the strait not as a matter for multilateral negotiations with the GCC but as leverage for bilateral negotiations with the United States. Therefore, this summit should be seen not as a turning point for lifting the blockade but as a phase of realignment in the GCC's internal policy toward Iran. EAI presents as its base case scenario (50% probability) the entrenchment of a "new normal" with Brent crude fluctuating in the $88-95 per barrel range, where negotiations and blockades alternate. Even in an optimistic scenario, EAI judges that Iran's system of selective passage approval will remain in place. Korean companies should not treat the GCC as a single risk entity but should individually assess the passage safety and policy reliability of each member state. A dual-track response is needed to reduce reliance on Iran's unilateral passage system.

I. Situational Analysis

The Iran-GCC Summit and the Continuing Strait of Hormuz Blockade Crisis: A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Timeline

The Strait of Hormuz blockade crisis began on February 28, 2026, with a US-Israeli air strike on Iran [8][9]. Since the start of the war, the strait has been under a de facto blockade [3][9]. Before the war, about one-fifth of the world's crude oil supply passed through the strait [9].

On June 17, President Trump and the Tehran government signed the "Islamabad Memorandum" [2][3]. It called for an immediate cessation of military actions on all fronts [9]. The memorandum has been interpreted as including a provision that would allow Iran to permanently restrict navigation in the Strait of Hormuz [2]. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) pointed out that if this provision is incorporated into a final peace treaty, it could have repercussions for freedom of navigation not only in the Gulf region but worldwide [2].

When the memorandum expired in July, Iran shifted to a more aggressive posture [3]. The United States ruled out an extension of the temporary agreement [3]. During this phase, Oman has been representing the Gulf states in ongoing negotiations with Iran for a transit corridor [16]. On August 20, Brent crude rose to $94.06 per barrel, a result of the oil price reflecting Iran's attack on a UAE vessel [9].

2. Current Situation

In a statement on September 11, Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Iraq and the Gulf states would discuss the Strait of Hormuz issue in Salalah, Oman [1][4]. Iran's state-run IRNA news agency reported that the talks would be "the first step in establishing a regional framework for security cooperation in the region" [12]. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei also confirmed plans to attend the meeting of foreign ministers from the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman countries [17].

However, cracks began to show ahead of the talks. Bahrain announced it would not attend any talks related to Hormuz until diplomatic relations with Iran are restored [7]. The Bahraini newspaper Gulf Daily News linked this directly to the issue of "unjustifiable aggression" [7]. Al Jazeera reported that Oman had not officially announced the meeting and that other countries in the region had also remained silent [7].

The situation then took another turn. Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi announced the postponement of the GCC-Iran meeting scheduled to be held in Salalah [10]. The reason given for the postponement was that "more time is needed to create the conditions for constructive dialogue" [10]. The Iranian side had stated in advance that even if the talks were held, no signed agreement would be produced [16]. In an interview with the Tehran Times, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi stated, "The reopening of the strait depends entirely on the United States returning to its obligations under the June provisional agreement mediated by Pakistan and ceasing its hostile moves against the Islamic Republic" [15]. He reaffirmed the position that an understanding with Oman alone is not sufficient to reopen Hormuz [15].

Meanwhile, the South China Morning Post reported that Iran is preparing to announce a temporary shipping lane agreement with Oman, and that unusual contacts between high-level officials from Tehran and Abu Dhabi had taken place in the process [14]. However, this agreement would not mean a full reopening of the strait, and Iran's practice of individually vetting transiting vessels is expected to continue [14].

3. Key Actors and Positions

Iran defines its control over the strait as an asymmetric lever tied to regime survival [6]. Araghchi's statement reaffirms its position that it will not lift the blockade without a US military withdrawal and the lifting of sanctions [15]. At the same time, Iran is trying to avoid international isolation and seize the initiative in regional security discussions through a multilateral framework with Iraq and the GCC countries [12][17].

Oman has been the sole mediation channel, continuing negotiations with Iran for a transit corridor over the past several months [16]. The Omani government, while hosting the summit, opted to postpone it, citing a lack of preparation [10]. This reflects Oman's caution in trying to maintain a negotiation framework that has the support of other Arab states in the region [16].

Bahrain chose not to participate, making the normalization of diplomatic relations with Iran a precondition for its attendance [7]. This is not unrelated to Bahrain's experience of being directly exposed to Iran's military threats since the start of the war in 2026 [4]. According to related reports cited by Al Jazeera, Iran has inflicted tangible damage on US military bases in Bahrain and Jordan [4]. Bahrain's non-participation reveals the lack of consensus within the GCC on an approach to Iran.

The UAE held unusual high-level contacts with Tehran during this phase of the talks [14]. This is read as a signal that the UAE, unlike other Gulf states, is trying to maintain a pragmatic channel [14]. Iraq is specified as a party participating alongside the Gulf states in this summit [1], and given its geopolitical position bordering Iran, its interests in stabilizing transit overlap with those of the Gulf oil-producing countries.

The United States is not a direct participant in these talks. However, since the US-Iran deadlock over the implementation of the Islamabad Memorandum is the fundamental backdrop to this summit [2][3], Washington's policy choices remain a background variable that will determine the success or failure of Oman's mediation.

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the legally binding nature of the talks. An Iranian official stated in advance that no signed agreement would emerge from this summit [16]. Even if a temporary shipping lane agreement is announced, it would be closer to an extension of a system where Iran individually decides which vessels can pass, rather than a full reopening of the strait [14].

The second issue is whether the internal rifts within the GCC will become entrenched. Bahrain's non-participation is not a one-off protest but demonstrates a fundamental difference in perspective among the Gulf states on Iran policy [7]. This rift could potentially evolve into a problem of representation for the Omani mediation framework itself in the future.

The third issue is the future of the provision on navigation restriction rights in the Islamabad Memorandum. SIPRI warned that if this provision is permanently incorporated into a final peace treaty, it could escalate into a freedom of navigation issue beyond the Gulf region [2]. A future point to watch is whether the temporary corridor mediated by Oman is a provisional operational method for this provision or if it will lead to an alternative norm.

The fourth issue is the duration of the US-Iran deadlock. Iran has repeatedly stated that a US return to the Pakistan-mediated agreement is a precondition for reopening the strait [15]. As long as this condition is not met, multilateral channels, including the Oman talks, are likely to remain auxiliary means of de-escalation and will not lead to a fundamental resolution of the blockade.

II. In-depth Analysis

The Iran-GCC Summit and the Continuing Strait of Hormuz Blockade Crisis: An In-depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The root causes of this crisis are not singular. On the surface, it is a diplomatic event involving the postponement of the Omani talks and Bahrain's non-participation, but beneath this lie three overlapping layers of causes.

First is the ambiguity inherent in the text of the Islamabad Memorandum itself. The memorandum, signed on June 17, declared an immediate cessation of military action, but the wording of the key paragraph on navigation rights in Hormuz left room for interpretation as granting Iran permanent control [2]. SIPRI warned that if this language were to be incorporated verbatim into a final peace treaty, freedom of navigation itself could be undermined, not just in the Gulf but globally [2]. The fact that Iran immediately returned to an aggressive posture after the memorandum expired in July is due to the reality that the document did not resolve the issue of navigation rights but merely papered over it [3].

Second is Iran's negotiation strategy itself. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi stated, "The reopening of the strait depends entirely on the United States returning to its obligations under the June provisional agreement mediated by Pakistan and ceasing its hostile moves against the Islamic Republic" [15]. He reaffirmed that an understanding with Oman alone is not sufficient to reopen Hormuz [15]. This signifies that Tehran defines control of the strait not as a subject for regional negotiations with Gulf states, but as leverage for bilateral negotiations with Washington. The advance statement by an Iranian official that there would be no signed agreement even if the Oman talks were held is an extension of this dual-track strategy [16].

Third is the fissure in trust toward Iran within the Gulf states. Bahrain has insisted it will not participate in any Hormuz-related talks until diplomatic relations with Iran are restored [7]. The Gulf Daily News reported this using the phrase "unjustifiable aggression," which shows that Iran's attacks on US military bases and regional targets at the beginning of the war remain an unresolved security trauma within Bahrain [7]. In contrast, there have been reports that the UAE has moved toward a temporary shipping lane agreement through unusual contacts between high-level officials in Abu Dhabi and Tehran [14]. This means that even within the same GCC, the approach to Iran is diverging by country.

2. Structural Context

Structurally, from a political perspective, this situation is a dissonance arising from the fact that the US-Iran bilateral dynamic and the GCC's internal multilateral dynamic are moving at different speeds. Washington is maintaining its pressure on Iran by refusing to extend the temporary agreement [3]. In contrast, Oman is trying to preserve its space as a mediator by postponing the talks on the grounds of "creating the conditions for constructive dialogue for regional security enhancement" [10]. As long as these two tracks are misaligned, the incentive for Gulf states to independently resolve the navigation rights issue with Iran is limited. Iran itself has only defined these talks as "the first step in establishing a regional framework for security cooperation," not presenting an agreement on navigation rights as the goal itself [12].

In the economic structure, the fiscal structure of the Gulf oil-producing countries itself acts as a vulnerability. As Al Jazeera reported, the blockade is particularly damaging to the Gulf states, where oil and gas revenues constitute the absolute majority of their budgets [1]. This means that GCC member states are under structural pressure that makes it difficult to sustain an indefinite hardline confrontation with Iran. At the same time, as seen with Brent crude rising to $94.06 per barrel on August 20, the prolonged blockade has solidified into a structure that, while detrimental to the Gulf states, also imposes a risk premium on the entire global energy market [9]. As the case of Kenya shows, this shock is not confined to the Gulf region but is transmitted to third-world economies, such as those in Africa, through fuel and fertilizer prices [11].

In terms of the security structure, the key point is that Iran defines control of the strait as an asymmetric lever directly linked to regime survival [6]. The United States has lost its direct economic incentive to defend the strait due to its increased energy self-sufficiency, but it faces a dilemma where the oil price shock from a blockade becomes a domestic political burden [6]. This asymmetry allows Iran to pursue a dual approach, simultaneously sending signals of a hardline stance toward the US at the negotiating table and signals of partial compromise toward Oman.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparison with Similar Cases

This is not the first time a blockade and tension have surrounded the Strait of Hormuz. The "Tanker War" during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s remains a precedent where threats to the strait through attacks on oil tankers prompted direct intervention by the US Navy. The difference with the current situation is that back then, the US had a clear economic incentive to guarantee the strait's security, whereas now that incentive has weakened due to America's increased energy self-sufficiency [6]. This is the background for why Washington is prioritizing a negotiated exit over military deterrence, unlike in the past.

The 2019-2020 period of tanker seizures and drone attacks also showed a similar pattern. At that time as well, Oman took on the role of a behind-the-scenes mediator between Iran and the Gulf states, and a pattern of alternating tension and partial de-escalation emerged. The postponement and renewed push for the Oman talks can be seen as an extension of that. However, a unique feature of the current situation is the existence of a formal document, the Islamabad Memorandum. While past crises were resolved at the level of informal restraint and tacit acceptance, this time the issue of navigation rights remains in the form of a codified international agreement, which gives it a different legal ramification [2].

Furthermore, Qatar's experience playing a balancing role between Iran and Saudi Arabia since the 1990s, and the UAE's precedent of maintaining economic interdependence with Iran, form the backdrop for the current rifts within the GCC. The reports of Abu Dhabi-Tehran contacts are a continuation of this pragmatic line [14], while Bahrain's hardline refusal is consistent with its own security policy, which has historically aligned with the Saudi-Iran confrontational framework [7].

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is whether Oman can sustain its status as a mediator. The fact that the Omani foreign minister cited the need to "create the conditions for constructive dialogue" when postponing the talks is a signal that Oman still intends to manage the negotiation space [10]. However, as President Trump's threat to bomb Oman has been mentioned, the possibility that this sole mediation channel itself could be shaken cannot be ruled out [3].

The second variable is the policy choice of the United States. Iran's negotiating posture will change depending on whether Washington reconsiders extending the temporary agreement or maintains economic pressure on Iran [3]. Iran insists that there will be no reopening of the strait without a change in the US attitude [15], making this variable a structural condition that operates at a higher level than the discussions among the Gulf states.

The third variable is the internal cohesion of the GCC. If the current situation, where Bahrain's declaration of non-participation coexists with the UAE's pragmatic contacts, continues, Iran will gain the leeway to target individual countries separately rather than dealing with the GCC as a single negotiating partner [7][14]. This could act as a factor that weakens the Gulf region's united front against Iran.

The fourth variable is the legal nature of the temporary shipping lane agreement. The temporary transit agreement that Iran is reportedly preparing separately with Oman does not signify a full reopening of the strait and is known to be a structure where Iran retains the right to decide on transiting vessels [14]. If this provisional measure becomes the de facto standard route, there is a possibility that a "new normal" with an unstable legal status will become entrenched for the long term [3].