Netanyahu's "Permanent War" Strategy and the Outlook for Protracted Middle East Risk

Executive Summary

Prime Minister Netanyahu's policy of multi-front escalation is a structural outcome of the combined pressures from his corruption trial and the veto power of his far-right coalition partners, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. A fundamental resolution is unlikely even after the October 27 general election. Israel is simultaneously maintaining its refusal to withdraw from Gaza and its policy of preemptive strikes on regional fronts, including Iran and Syria, while discussions on ending the war have vanished from the election discourse. The most probable scenario is a prolonged, low-intensity, multi-front stalemate (55%), while the possibility of a full-scale escalation leading to an Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz also remains (30%). The South Korean government and corporations should reclassify this issue as a structural risk rather than temporary volatility and proactively establish permanent hedging mechanisms for energy and shipping routes, as well as risk management plans for project delays in the Middle East.

I. Situational Analysis

Situational Analysis: Netanyahu's "Permanent War" Strategy and Israeli Domestic Politics

1. Background and Developments

The Gaza war began with Hamas's surprise attack on October 7, 2023. Over the subsequent three years, Israel expanded its military operations beyond the Gaza Strip to a total of six countries: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Qatar, and Iran [4]. This trajectory of escalation is not an accumulation of reactive responses. Local analyses have repeatedly suggested that it is a strategic choice directly linked to Prime Minister Netanyahu's political survival [3][6].

Netanyahu was already under indictment on corruption charges before the war broke out [3]. If the war ends, he is structured to immediately face calls for accountability for failing to prevent the October 7 catastrophe [6]. This political constraint was pointed out in an EAI analysis as early as 2024, which diagnosed that "Prime Minister Netanyahu, facing corruption charges along with accountability for failing to prevent the war, is in a dilemma where his political survival would be difficult if the war were to end" [6].

The presence of his far-right coalition partners adds another structural constraint. National Security Minister Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Smotrich have effectively pushed their hardline stance—opposing both a withdrawal from Gaza and the survival of Hamas—in the policymaking process [3][9]. The possibility of these two figures leaving the coalition has consistently served as a factor limiting Netanyahu's negotiating flexibility [3]. EAI has previously characterized this as "a matter of political survival, not a negotiating tactic" [9].

2. Current Situation

Ahead of the Israeli general election scheduled for October 27, analyses suggest that Netanyahu has openly adopted a policy of routinizing preemptive military action. The logic is that, learning from Hamas's October 7 attack, Israel must launch preemptive strikes against all potential security threats it faces, regardless of the outcome [1]. This is seen as a decision made at the risk of damaging the base of pro-Israel support within the United States [1].

On the ground in Gaza, Netanyahu has repeatedly reaffirmed his refusal to withdraw troops. During a visit to a military outpost in Gaza on September 2, he stated, "We are in control of this area," and said there were no plans to withdraw from the occupied territory [7]. Al Jazeera also reported on the same day that Netanyahu reaffirmed he would not withdraw from occupied Gaza, adding that he would continue efforts to disarm Hamas and demilitarize the strip [14].

The front with Iran is also active. This front, which opened with U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, intensified again in September. Haaretz reported that amid renewed U.S. strikes on Iran, the U.S. embassies in Israel, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar issued security alerts warning of the possibility of "unpredictable escalation" [10]. Israel's August 18 airstrike on the Abu al-Duhur military airport near Idlib, Syria, is interpreted in the same context. Regarding the reason for striking a closed airport where only a runway remains, some suggest that Netanyahu's own remarks explained his intent [15].

The French newspaper Le Monde diagnoses that in the current election campaign, the very discussion of ending the war is missing. Despite poll results showing an Israeli public weary from three years of conflict, voters appear resigned to its continuation [4]. In public debates and party platforms ahead of the October 27 general election, any discussion of a timeline for ending the war is virtually excluded [4].

3. Key Actors and Positions

Prime Minister Netanyahuhas made the doctrine of preemptive strikes the cornerstone of his election strategy [1]. His personal constraint of a corruption trial and the political liability of being held accountable for the October 7 catastrophe act as incentives to prolong the war [3][6]. Haaretz reported an assessment that with the current coalition's approval ratings failing to rebound, Netanyahu himself is in a state of "panic" [17].

National Security Minister Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Smotrichrepresent their far-right political base and have exercised a veto over any withdrawal from Gaza or the survival of Hamas [3][9]. The threat of their departure from the coalition is a structural variable that substantially limits Netanyahu's room for negotiation [3].

New Right-Wing Parties in Israelare also emerging as a variable. According to a Haaretz political podcast, the emergence of multiple new right-wing parties, including one led by Reserve General Ofer Winter, is exacerbating anxiety in Netanyahu's camp [17]. The influence of the settler violence issue on voter sentiment is also cited as an electoral variable [17].

Hamashas been unable to bridge its fundamental differences with Israel over the sequencing of disarmament. The August shuttle diplomacy by Special Envoy Kushner resulted only in the procedural step of establishing a working group to verify disarmament [9].

The United Statesis militarily participating in Israel's two-front operations in Iran and Gaza, while also expressing concerns about the risk of regional escalation through its embassy alerts [10]. Brookings raises the risk that a U.S.-Israeli war against Iran could even erode U.S. policy priorities toward Africa [13].

Gulf and Arab Actorsare showing moves to maintain channels of dialogue with Iran. After a meeting with the Prime Minister of Qatar, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi remarked that the door to diplomacy is not closed, as long as the United States admits that "pressure does not work" [12].

4. Key Issues

The first key issue is that the question of ending the war cannot be separated from Netanyahu's personal political survival. The dual constraints of his corruption trial and the veto power of his far-right coalition partners constitute a structural problem that will be difficult to resolve even after the election [3][9].

It is also noteworthy that the refusal to withdraw from Gaza and the expansion of the Iran front are being used to rally his support base during the election campaign [7][14]. The very fact that discussions on ending the war are excluded from election platforms suggests that a tacit acceptance of continued escalation has formed within Israeli society [4].

The risk surrounding freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz also remains a structural issue. It has been pointed out that the text of the U.S.-Iran Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, signed on June 17, contains language that could allow Iran's restrictions on navigation to become permanent [11]. This is an issue that could have repercussions for global maritime transport far beyond the Gulf region [11].

Amid this security uncertainty, the Israeli energy industry is exploring a strategy to become an energy hub via the Mediterranean. The CEO of NewMed Energy, the largest partner in the Leviathan gas field, mentioned that even on February 28, the day the war with Iran broke out, he continued a phone call with an energy industry figure in the Gulf region, proposing a role for Israel as a gateway to the Mediterranean [16]. This shows that even with prolonged security risks, Israel's energy sector has not given up on expanding regional connectivity.

II. In-Depth Analysis

In-Depth Analysis: The Structural Roots of Netanyahu's "Permanent War" Strategy

1. Root Cause: The Conflict Between Political Survival and Ending the War

Behind Netanyahu's adoption of a "permanent war" policy lies not a singular security logic, but overlapping political constraints. He was already under indictment on corruption charges before the war broke out [3][9], and this trial is still ongoing. The structure is such that the moment the war ends, two forms of accountability will surface simultaneously.

One is accountability for the security failure of not preventing the October 7 catastrophe [6][9]. The other is the loss of the political shield that the trial itself has become. His status as a wartime prime minister has provided him with a dual shield: delaying judicial proceedings and rallying public opinion. The core of the problem is that the moment this shield disappears is precisely the moment the war ends.

Foreign Affairs explicitly points this out, diagnosing that Netanyahu has adopted a strategy of openly supporting an endless war while "ignoring the immense cost in blood and treasure, and even the damage to support for Israel in places like the United States" [1]. It notes he is promoting the logic that, learning from Hamas's October 7 attack, Israel must carry out preemptive strikes against all potential security threats, regardless of the consequences [1]. While this is presented as a security doctrine, in reality, it is inseparable from a political calculation to indefinitely postpone the end of the war.

2. Structural Context: The Dual Constraints of Coalition Politics and the Election Schedule

An examination of Israel's domestic political structure reveals that Netanyahu's personal options are narrow to begin with. National Security Minister Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Smotrich have effectively pushed their hardline stance against withdrawing from Gaza or allowing Hamas to survive in the policymaking process [3][9]. The possibility of these two figures leaving the coalition is a constant that continually reduces Netanyahu's negotiating flexibility [3]. EAI has previously characterized this as "a structural issue intertwined with Israel's coalition structure and Netanyahu's personal political survival, not a negotiating tactic" [3]. This dynamic operates identically not only in the context of Gaza but across the fronts with Iran, Lebanon, and Syria as well.

This is compounded by the general election scheduled for October 27. Haaretz reports that as multiple new far-right parties spring up, the approval ratings for Netanyahu's coalition are faltering. Haaretz columnist Dahlia Scheindlin assessed that nothing is helping the coalition's ratings rebound and that Netanyahu is in a state of "panic" [17]. While whether the issue of settler violence will become an election issue is also mentioned as a variable, the key point is that the fragmentation of the right-wing vote provides Netanyahu with an incentive to distinguish himself by adopting an even more hardline security policy.

Paradoxically, the very discussion of ending the war is missing from this election campaign. Le Monde diagnoses that although Israeli society shows fatigue from three years of conflict in opinion polls, it is resigned to the war's continuation [4]. The agenda of ending the war is not even being addressed in public debates or party platforms ahead of the October 27 election [4]. This implies that a majority of Israeli voters have accepted the continuation of the war as a security constant, which gives Netanyahu more room to maintain his hardline policy without incurring political costs.

On an economic level, the interests of Israel's energy industry are also intertwined in this structure. Yossi Abu, CEO of NewMed Energy, the largest partner in the Leviathan gas field, recalled the start of the war with Iran on February 28, mentioning that when sirens went off during a call with a contact in the Gulf energy market, he continued the conversation from a bomb shelter [16]. His remarks, which aim to position Israel as a gateway to the Mediterranean, show that the Israeli energy industry is seeking links with the Arab world even as regional escalation continues. This creates a dynamic where the burden of a prolonged war on the Israeli economy as a whole coexists with the opportunities that specific industries find within it.

3. Historical Precedents: The Recurring Pattern of Intervention in Lebanon and Settlement Expansion

This is not the first time Israel has prolonged a military intervention under the pretext of security threats. After the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli military remained in Southern Lebanon for 18 years, ostensibly to maintain a "security zone." This presence, initially planned as a short-term operation, became protracted in the absence of a political agreement to set a withdrawal timeline. In the current Gaza situation, Netanyahu's denial of withdrawal plans from occupied territory near the "Yellow Line," stating "We are in control of this area" [7], is structurally similar to the past logic of the occupation of Southern Lebanon. It is a pattern of indefinitely extending a military presence by setting the opponent's complete disarmament as the condition for withdrawal, using an unverifiable goal as a pretext.

The August 18 airstrike on the Abu al-Duhur military airport near Idlib, Syria, can also be read within this pattern. It is suggested that the motive for striking a closed airport with only a runway was not to eliminate a tangible military target, but rather to send the political message of demonstrating preemptive deterrence [15]. This overlaps with the logic of the 'no-fly zone' patrols the United States repeatedly conducted over Iraq after the Gulf War—a pattern of military action where the demonstration of deterrence itself, rather than the removal of an actual threat, becomes the objective.

4. Key Variables

The variables that will shape the development of this issue can be condensed into three main categories. The first is the result of the October 27 general election. If the proliferation of small far-right parties leads to Netanyahu's coalition failing to secure a majority, a paradoxical outcome is expected where his negotiating leverage over Ben-Gvir and Smotrich could actually be strengthened. The second is whether the United States will condition its military aid. Haaretz reported that amid renewed U.S. strikes on Iran, the U.S. embassies in Israel, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar issued alerts for "unpredictable escalation" [10]. The key question is whether Washington has the incentive and ability to put real brakes on Israel's policy of preemptive strikes.

The third is the issue of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. SIPRI points out that a specific clause in the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding signed by the U.S. and Iran on June 17 could potentially lead to the permanent acceptance of Iran's right to restrict navigation in the Strait of Hormuz upon the signing of a final peace treaty [11]. Although this agreement is currently assessed as fragile, there are concerns that if it holds, its economic, political, and legal repercussions could spread beyond the Gulf region [11]. This asymmetric structure, in which Netanyahu's permanent war policy and a separate U.S.-Iran negotiation track are proceeding simultaneously, remains the most uncertain variable that will determine the future direction of regional risk.