The Escalation of the Israel-Iran War and the Strait of Hormuz Crisis: A Geopolitical Risk Analysis

Executive Summary

More than four months after it began in February 2026, the Israel-Iran war is hardening into a standoff over control of the Strait of Hormuz. While the United States has lost the direct economic incentive to protect the Strait due to improved energy self-sufficiency, it remains caught in a structural dilemma in which the oil price shock from a blockade continues to rebound as domestic political burden. Iran, for its part, has defined control of the Strait as an asymmetric lever directly tied to regime survival, and maintains its position that it will sustain the blockade unless US forces withdraw and sanctions are lifted. Although the Oman-mediated 'middle corridor' agreement is showing progress, it is most likely that, if it amounts to no more than a temporary patch, a costly new normal will become entrenched in which negotiation and tension alternate on a recurring basis. The international community must concentrate its efforts on ensuring that the navigation-restriction provisions of the Islamabad Memorandum do not become permanent, and instead transition toward a multilateral navigational-safety governance regime; energy-importing countries, including South Korea, need to review in advance their alternative shipping routes and strategic petroleum reserve response systems.

I. Situation Analysis

The Escalation of the Israel-Iran War and the Strait of Hormuz Crisis: Situation Analysis

1. Background and Development of the Issue

The current war began with Israeli and US airstrikes on Iran on February 28, 2026 [12]. Even now, more than four months after the outbreak of hostilities, not even the 'unstable ceasefire unlikely to be indefinitely extended' referenced by President Trump has taken hold [8]. The US Navy continues to conduct operations in the Strait of Hormuz, and negotiations held in Pakistan have repeatedly started and stalled [8].

Iran's strategy has been clear since the early stages of the war: leveraging the Strait of Hormuz as a geopolitical lever. An Iranian military spokesperson stated that "the United States has no choice but to accept Iran's order in the Strait of Hormuz" [17]. An Iranian security official has declared that Iran will keep the Strait blockaded until the United States withdraws from the Middle East and lifts sanctions against Iran [16]. President Pezeshkian characterized the United States as "genuinely untrustworthy," while emphasizing that relations with regional countries are improving. He noted that Pakistan is "cooperating with all its strength" [16].

In this process, signs of a reordering of the Gulf regional order have become unmistakable. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement in Jeddah. The agreement includes a clause stipulating that an armed attack on any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack on all three [6]. This agreement was concluded against the backdrop of renewed threats of a resumption of the Iran war, attacks by Yemen's Houthi forces that had already materialized, and a moment when Gulf states began to question the United States' role as security provider [6]. The Turkish government immediately clarified that this agreement does not conflict with its existing obligations as a NATO member. The government's disinformation response service stated that "this agreement does not conflict with Turkey's existing international alliance commitments, including NATO," characterizing it instead as "an additional cooperative mechanism that supports the region" [1].

2. Current Situation

Negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz appeared to gain rapid momentum in early August. Iran's Foreign Ministry announced that its agreement with Oman over control of the Strait was in its "final stage" and would soon be concluded "provided certain forces do not obstruct this process" [9]. Iran's state-run Press TV reported that negotiations between Tehran and Muscat had entered a "new phase" aimed at establishing a 'middle corridor' within the Strait of Hormuz [4]. Notably, although the Iranian Foreign Ministry did not name him explicitly, its statement implicitly pointed to President Trump as the party who could derail the process—raising concerns that the very figure who triggered the war on February 28 and halted shipping through the Strait could once again scuttle the agreement [9]. Iranian officials pointed out that "factors destabilizing the Strait of Hormuz from the American side, in particular the naval blockade and aggressive and threatening actions against Iran, still persist" [9].

On August 7, Italy's La Repubblica reported that Supreme Leader Khamenei was in critical condition, while also reporting that a Hormuz agreement was imminent. President Trump remarked that "Tehran wants a deal and does not want to be bombed," stating that he expects the war to end "pretty fast" [7].

At the same time, US Central Command announced that, as of August 8, as part of blockade operations against Iran, it had rerouted 53 merchant vessels, disabled 2, and boarded 2. More than 30 vessels were permitted passage for humanitarian purposes [11]. Vice President JD Vance stated that he had informed Washington that Iran had "no" plans to impose tolls on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz [11]. This can be interpreted as a calculation by Iran to minimize American backlash by exercising de facto control over the Strait while refraining from imposing a symbolic toll.

Meanwhile, Yemen's Houthi forces stated that they had targeted eight Saudi oil tankers since the blockade began [4]. Iranian parliamentarian Esmail Kowsari, in an interview with Iran's state broadcaster IRIB, criticized President Trump as "contradictory and untrustworthy" in negotiations [4]. There was also an attack on a vessel belonging to the UAE's state oil company ADNOC, which regional allies including Oman condemned [11].

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) highlighted on June 17 the fact that the United States and Iran had signed the 'Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding' to end the war, analyzing that the wording of a key provision in the agreement suggests the possibility that the United States could permanently grant Iran restricted navigation rights over the Strait of Hormuz in a final peace treaty [3]. While assessing that this agreement is currently in a highly fragile state, SIPRI warned that, should this provision be implemented, it could generate economic, political, and legal ripple effects for the principle of freedom of navigation worldwide, extending far beyond the Gulf region [3].

3. Key Actors and Positions

Iran: The regime's negotiating strategy is to treat the Strait of Hormuz as a lever 'that cannot be abandoned.' A former Iranian judge stated that Iran "will not withdraw from the Strait of Hormuz at any cost" [14]. A committee under the Iranian parliament also approved an outline of a 'strategic action plan' related to Hormuz [13]. That said, given the reports about Supreme Leader Khamenei's health issues, the possibility that the regime's internal consistency in negotiations could waver cannot be ruled out [7]. President Pezeshkian justified his country's security rationale by stating that

United States: President Trump has simultaneously voiced pressure-oriented remarks that Iran "cannot hold out much longer" and expectations for an early end to the war [1][7]. Internally within the administration, in an interview with Axios, he adopted a wait-and-see posture toward the accumulating economic pressure, stating that "we are responding at a low level" and "only conducting half-hearted negotiations" [13]. However, according to EAI analysis, following the shale revolution, the share of US oil imports from the Gulf plummeted from 25% in 2014 to approximately 8% in 2025, a factor that is structurally weakening the United States' direct economic incentive to protect the Strait of Hormuz [5]. At the same time, there is a dilemma in which a surge in oil prices resulting from a blockade of the Strait would reignite domestic inflation in the United States and increase domestic political burdens [5]. This dilemma is understood to be the backdrop against which the Trump administration is simultaneously emitting signals of hardline rhetoric and an early return to negotiations.

Oman: Oman has taken on the role of mediator between Iran and the United States. Muscat has been pursuing a provisional agreement with Iran aimed at increasing commercial vessel transit through a 'middle corridor' within the Strait [4][9]. However, this agreement is a temporary measure lasting two to four months, and is more in the nature of a stopgap that buys time rather than a fundamental resolution. Oman has maintained a stance that prioritizes regional stability, including by condemning the attack on the ADNOC vessel [11].

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan: Through the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, these countries have built their own security network in response to declining trust in the US security umbrella [6]. The direct background to the conclusion of this agreement is the circumstance in which Gulf states, exposed to repeated Iranian drone and missile attacks, began to question the United States' role as security provider [6]. Turkey moved swiftly through diplomatic damage control to preempt concerns about a conflict with its NATO commitments [1]. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has become a target of Houthi tanker attacks, meaning the effectiveness of the defense agreement has already been put to an early test [4].

Yemen's Houthi Forces: The Houthis have declared a blockade of the Red Sea and continue independent military action by targeting Saudi oil tankers. Regardless of whether this is under Iran's direct instruction, this is a factor expanding the Strait crisis into a more complex multilateral conflict configuration [4].

4. Summary of Key Issues

First, there is the temporary nature of the provisional Oman-Iran agreement. A timeframe of two to four months is not a fundamental solution, but merely a brief postponement of the next crisis phase. Continued strong distrust within Iran regarding the sincerity of the Trump administration's negotiating intentions also constrains the durability of the agreement [4][9].

Second, there is the possibility that navigation-restriction rights in the Strait of Hormuz could become permanent. If the wording of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding leaves room for granting Iran permanent restricted navigation rights, this would set a precedent for the principle of freedom of navigation worldwide, extending beyond the Gulf region [3].

Third, there is the recalculation of trust by Gulf allies regarding US security commitments. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is already a product of that recalculation [6]. The structural backdrop in which improved US energy self-sufficiency paradoxically operates as pressure for an early return to negotiations is also accelerating this recalculation of trust [5].

Fourth, there is the internal regime variable. If reports about Supreme Leader Khamenei's health condition are confirmed to be true, Iran's negotiating consistency and its entire strategy toward the United States could be recalibrated [7].

II. In-Depth Analysis

The Escalation of the Israel-Iran War and the Strait of Hormuz Crisis: In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The root cause of this war cannot be explained solely by the longstanding conflict over Iran's nuclear and missile programs. The essence of the armed conflict that has persisted for more than four months since it began on February 28 lies in the fact that it occurred at a time when the United States' willingness to engage in Middle East security is structurally weakening. Following the shale revolution, the share of US oil imports from the Gulf region plummeted from 25% in 2014 to approximately 8% in 2025 [5]. The United States has been a net energy exporter since 2020, and in 2025 its crude oil production hit an all-time high [5]. This shift weakened the United States' direct economic incentive to protect the Strait of Hormuz [5]. At the same time, however, the US-Iran armed conflict has exposed the strategic limits of US energy self-sufficiency. Should a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz occur, global oil prices would surge, leading to a reignition of domestic inflation in the United States and domestic political burdens [5]. A paradox has thus arisen in which improved energy self-sufficiency, rather than fostering strategic patience, instead functions as a factor pressuring an early return to negotiations [5]. President Trump's remarks that he is "handling this at a low level" or engaged in "half-hearted negotiations," even as he emphasizes that economic pressure is accumulating against Iran, reflect this dilemma [13].

From Iran's perspective, the root cause comes down to the matter of regime survival. An Iranian security official stated that Iran will keep the Strait of Hormuz blockaded until the United States withdraws from the Middle East and lifts sanctions against Iran [16]. This is less a negotiating tactic than a principle that the regime treats as non-negotiable. The former Iranian judge's statement that Iran "will not withdraw from the Strait of Hormuz at any cost" reflects the same context [14]. For Iran, control of the Strait is the sole asymmetric lever offsetting its military inferiority. Lacking the conventional military capability to counter Israeli and US air-strike capacity, holding hostage a strait through which a substantial share of global oil shipments pass is nearly the only response option available to Iran.

2. Structural Context

Looking at the political structure, this crisis has occurred at a juncture when US Middle East policy is shifting toward 'offshore balancing.' As the United States' "America First" orientation combines with improved energy self-sufficiency, the domestic political legitimacy of protecting Gulf sea lanes is weakening [5]. This structural trend is expected to lead to pressure for burden-sharing and military contributions from energy-import-dependent countries such as South Korea, Japan, and the EU [5]. At the same time, China is likely to structurally benefit strategically from this vacuum [5]. As the United States reduces its direct burden of protecting sea lanes, conditions are being created in which China can expand its influence by deepening economic and energy relations with Gulf states.

At the level of security structure, a new phenomenon has emerged: the consolidation of the Gulf region's own defense capabilities. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement concluded by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan symbolizes this trend [6][1]. This agreement includes a collective defense clause stipulating that an armed attack on any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack on all three [6]. The Atlantic Council analyzes that this agreement was concluded at a moment marked by the renewed threat of the Iran war, actual attacks by Yemen's Houthi forces, and Gulf states' growing doubts about the United States' role as security provider [6]. The fact that Turkey rushed to clarify the possibility of conflict with its status as a NATO member paradoxically demonstrates that this agreement was born out of the gaps in the existing US-centered alliance system [1]. A structure in which a country is simultaneously a NATO member and a participant in a non-Western collective defense body is an experiment with few precedents in the post-Cold War Middle East security order.

On the economic-structure dimension, the status of the Strait of Hormuz itself risks creating a new precedent that conflicts with the principle of freedom of navigation. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) points out that, given the wording of the key provision of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding signed by the United States and Iran on June 17, there is a possibility that the United States could permit Iran to permanently restrict freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz in a final peace treaty [3]. SIPRI assesses that this agreement "appears highly fragile for now," but warns that, should it be realized, it could produce "economic, political, and legal ripple effects that extend far beyond the Gulf region" [3]. This is not simply a bilateral matter between Iran and the United States; it has the potential to expand into a challenge to the entire regime of international strait transit rights as stipulated under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

3. Historical Precedents and Comparison with Similar Cases

The strategy of leveraging the Strait of Hormuz is not fundamentally different from the 'Tanker War' (1984-1988) during the Iran-Iraq War. At that time as well, Iran threatened transit through the Strait via tanker attacks and mine-laying, and the United States responded by deploying naval power. However, the manner of the US response in the current case is qualitatively different from the past. US Central Command stated that, as of August 8, it had rerouted 53 merchant vessels, disabled 2, and conducted boarding inspections of 2. It permitted the transit of more than 30 vessels for humanitarian purposes [11]. This suggests a shift, unlike the past freedom-of-navigation guarantee operation (Operation Earnest Will), toward a form closer to a blockade operation in which the United States directly controls the Strait. The logic by which the United States, during the Cold War, defended sea lanes to contain Soviet expansion runs in the exact opposite direction from the logic by which the United States now controls transit through the Strait itself as a means of pressuring Iran.

Another point of comparison is the structure of proxy wars waged by regional great powers, as seen in the Syrian civil war since 2011. However, the current crisis is qualitatively different in that it is not a proxy war but takes the form of a conventional war in which the United States and Israel directly strike Iranian territory. The pattern of escalation seen during the 2024 Israel-Hamas war—when Israel assassinated a senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander in Syria and eliminated Hamas leaders in Lebanon—can be seen as a precursor to the current war [10]. At that time as well, Prime Minister Netanyahu displayed a willingness to risk escalation for the sake of political survival, and this is a structural factor that is being repeated in the current war as well [10].

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement can be compared to the 1955 Baghdad Pact or the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the 1980s. However, this agreement is decisively different in that it was not led or sponsored by the United States, but rather emerged from the voluntary consolidation of regional states against a backdrop of distrust in US security commitments [6]. This can be interpreted as a signal that the US-centered Middle East security architecture of the post-Cold War era is substantively fracturing.

4. Key Variables in the Development of the Issue

The first variable is the health and succession issue within Iran's supreme leadership. It may not be a coincidence that reports of Supreme Leader Khamenei's critical condition emerged at the same time as reports that a Hormuz agreement was imminent [7]. If a change in supreme leader is imminent, it becomes uncertain whether the current negotiating line would be maintained under the next leadership. This is a factor that could shake the very sustainability of the Oman-mediated agreement.

The second variable is the issue of political credibility within the United States. Iranian parliamentarian Esmail Kowsari publicly criticized President Trump as "contradictory and untrustworthy" in negotiations [4]. President Pezeshkian likewise repeatedly characterized the United States as "genuinely untrustworthy" [16]. Even if Iran's negotiating team actually implements an agreement, Iran's fundamental skepticism as to whether the Trump administration will honor it is a structural risk that will persist even after a negotiated settlement.

The third variable is the independent action of Yemen's Houthi forces. A Houthi spokesperson stated that eight Saudi oil tankers had been attacked since the blockade began [4]. This shows that, even if a bilateral agreement is reached between Iran and the United States, the actions of regional armed groups not directly controlled by Iran could separately threaten the stability of the Strait. The case in which Gulf allies, including Oman, condemned the attack on a vessel belonging to the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) [11] similarly suggests that actors outside the negotiating table could undermine the effectiveness of any agreement.

The fourth variable is the legal status of the Oman-mediated agreement. Although there have been reports that negotiations between Iran and Oman have entered a phase aimed at establishing a 'middle corridor' within the Strait [4], the fact that this agreement is merely a temporary measure lasting two to four months means it falls short of a fundamental resolution. The Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that the agreement was in its "final stage," while attaching the condition "provided certain forces do not obstruct it" [9]. This is an expression that shows Iran itself is not confident about the sustainability of this agreement.