WAIC 2026 and the Launch of WAICO: An Assessment of China's Strategy for Global AI Governance Leadership and South Korea's Response

Executive Summary

The WAIC 2026 and the launch of WAICO mark a strategic turning point where China is shifting the focus of the AI technology race from development to norm-setting. This is a systematic attempt to incorporate 29 Global South countries into a China-centric AI governance order. China's strategy, combining proven technological capabilities demonstrated by DeepSeek with the discourse of 'openness, cooperation, and sharing,' is forming a substantial counter-pole to the US-led Pax Silicana regime. However, the strategic success remains fluid due to the unverified technological absorption capacity and institutional effectiveness of the founding member states. South Korea, as a founding member of Pax Silicana, needs a dual strategy of 'selective engagement and norm leadership' to maintain its credibility while independently entering the Global South AI governance space that China is seeking to preempt. As the US-China AI competition intensifies, the cost of strategic ambiguity rises. Therefore, South Korea must proactively establish its unique position as a middle-power AI norm broker, leveraging its semiconductor and AI technological capabilities.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

WAIC 2026 and China's Strategy for Global AI Governance Leadership: Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Progress of the Issue

The Structuring of US-China AI Competition and China's Strategic Shift

Artificial intelligence has become a core foundational technology that cuts across military-security, economic growth, and socio-cultural norms. It is now a focal point for reshaping the world order, comparable to spinning technology during the Industrial Revolution or nuclear technology during the Cold War [8]. In this context, the United States and China have not only engaged in a race for technological development but have also fully launched a strategic competition to spread their respective AI technologies and norms globally. In a May 2025 US Senate hearing on "Winning the AI Race," key industry figures, including Sam Altman, warned that while the US currently holds an advantage, the gap with the challenger, China, is not significant [2].

China's strategic confidence was further bolstered by the emergence of DeepSeek-R1 in early 2025. DeepSeek, a low-cost, high-efficiency model, garnered international attention as an alternative to US-led AI development. Emboldened by this success, the Chinese government began to actively engage in shaping the global AI governance order. China has designated 2026 as a historical turning point for changes in the international order and has set the establishment of a multipolar world order and the expansion of its global role as key foreign policy objectives [5]. This is an extension of the reform of the global governance system that has been consistently emphasized since the Xi Jinping administration took office and carries the character of a systematic challenge to the US-led liberal international order [14].

Evolution of WAIC: From Technology Exhibition to Governance Platform

The World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC), held annually in Shanghai, is China's largest AI event. It has served as a window to showcase the growth trajectory of China's AI industry, with significant involvement from the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) [3]. However, the 2026 conference took on a qualitatively different character. According to analyses from Chinese local media, such as 36Kr, WAIC 2026 placed a greater emphasis on AI applications and the creation of commercial value in actual business settings, as well as AI governance agendas, rather than solely on technology exhibitions [7]. The conference theme, "Intelligent Partners, Co-creating the Future (智能伙伴，共创未来)", further underscored the discourse of cooperation and shared prosperity over technological competition.

2. Current Situation

Development of WAIC 2026 and the Launch of WAICO

Held from July 17 to 20, 2026, across four exhibition halls in Shanghai—the Shanghai World Expo Exhibition & Convention Center, Zhangjiang, and Xuhui—WAIC 2026 was planned not merely as an industrial expo but as a venue to set a new milestone for global AI governance [7]. On July 16, the day before the conference opening, representatives from 29 countries, including Brazil, Russia, Egypt, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, Qatar, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, Oman, Cuba, Ethiopia, Belarus, Venezuela, Kenya, South Africa, and Algeria, signed the agreement to establish the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in Shanghai [1][4]. The agreement explicitly states its main objectives as promoting a human-centric approach, fostering innovation, and strengthening international cooperation for the responsible development and utilization of AI [4].

On July 17, the second day of the conference, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech, sending a message of AI openness and cooperation to the international community. Xi emphasized the need to "seize this rare historical opportunity to promote open source, openness, cooperation, and sharing," and declared that "China is ready to take more open and practical actions" [17]. During the conference, a chairperson's statement and two governance action plans were announced, and a global initiative on the connectivity and interoperability of trustworthy AI agents was also proposed [6].

Perspectives from Participating Countries

Local media and government agencies in the participating WAICO countries actively view their involvement as a strategic opportunity to enhance their AI capabilities and develop their digital economies. For Kazakhstan, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev personally signed the WAICO establishment agreement during his official visit to China on July 16. The local media outlet Astana Times described this as a significant step contributing to Kazakhstan's emergence as a regional AI hub and its role in shaping global AI governance [1]. Similarly, in Oman, local media reported WAICO membership as part of a long-term strategy to build a knowledge-based digital economy, emphasizing Oman's ambition to play a leading role in regional and global AI governance [15]. The Republic of the Congo framed its participation in WAIC 2026 as a means to build new strategic partnerships in digital diplomacy, linking it to the government's vision of leveraging digital technology for national development and economic growth [13].

South Korea's Response: Practicing Strategic Ambiguity

Despite China's request for high-level participation, the South Korean government sent only attachés and mid-level officials to WAIC 2026. This decision is analyzed as being influenced by the diplomatic burden of sending high-level representatives, considering South Korea's participation as a founding member in "Pax Silicana," the US-led semiconductor and AI supply chain consortium, in December 2025 [10]. This represents a practical manifestation of the strategic ambiguity South Korea is adopting amidst the intensifying US-China AI competition.

3. Key Actors and Positions/Interests

China: A Dual Strategy of Norm Preemption and Ecosystem Building

Through WAIC 2026, China pursued two strategic objectives simultaneously. First, it aimed to preempt the discourse on global AI governance. President Xi Jinping's emphasis on 'openness' and 'cooperation' as key keywords was an intentional positioning to construct a narrative contrasting with the US-led AI norm system, which is centered on technological control and export restrictions [17]. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) actively utilized WAIC as a platform to publicize the 'growth code' of China's AI development to the world, showcasing the expansion of its AI ecosystem based on domestic large-scale models both domestically and internationally [3]. Second, China seeks to build a China-centric AI supply chain and governance ecosystem. WAICO is assessed to function not merely as a cooperation organization but as an institutional platform to integrate Global South countries into China's AI technology standards and governance norm system.

Global South Participating Countries: Pragmatic Interests and Strategic Choices

The composition of the 29 founding member states includes countries in conflict with the US, such as Russia, Belarus, Cuba, and Venezuela, alongside major emerging economies in the Global South like Brazil, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Oman, Egypt, South Africa, Kenya, Mozambique, and Ethiopia [4]. The motivation for these countries' participation is based more on pragmatic interests than a simple pro-China stance. For developing countries with limited AI technological capabilities, China's technological support and cooperation platforms are perceived as realistic means to accelerate their own digital economic development. Kazakhstan's framing of WAICO membership as a stepping stone to becoming a regional AI hub [1] and Oman's linkage of it with its knowledge-based economy strategy [15] exemplify this pragmatic approach.

United States: Maintaining Technological Hegemony and Alliance Cohesion

The US continues its strategy of containing China's AI rise through measures such as semiconductor export controls and the establishment of AI supply chain consortiums. "Pax Silicana" is an attempt to institutionalize a US-led AI supply chain order, implicitly aiming to bind key allies, including South Korea, into this system [10]. However, the US's control-centric approach to technology can be perceived as exclusionary by Global South countries, creating an opening for China's discourse of 'openness and cooperation'.

South Korea: At a Crossroads of Strategic Choice

South Korea faces a structural dilemma: it must participate in US-led AI supply chain consortiums while maintaining its economic interdependence with China. In the current reality where "artificial intelligence is becoming a focal point for reshaping the world order, extending beyond technological levels to encompass economic security and norms" [2], South Korea is seeking a balanced strategy that strengthens its independent AI technological capabilities while preserving cooperative spaces with both the US and China.

4. Summary of Key Issues

Issue 1: Effectiveness and Institutional Binding Power of WAICO

The core issue is whether WAICO will remain a merely declarative cooperation body or evolve into an institutional platform that produces substantive AI governance standards and norms. While the participation of 29 countries is outwardly impressive, there are limitations in representativeness due to the significant disparities in AI technological levels and governance capacity among member states, and the absence of major AI-advanced nations like the US, Europe, Japan, and South Korea. Whether the chairperson's statement and the two governance action plans announced during the conference [6] can develop into genuinely binding norms depends on the future level of institutionalization within WAICO.

Issue 2: Authenticity and Strategic Utilization of the 'Openness' Discourse

A key issue is whether the discourse of 'openness, cooperation, and sharing' emphasized by Xi Jinping will translate into actual technological openness or remain merely strategic rhetoric to incorporate Global South countries into China's AI ecosystem [17]. China's duality of promoting openness externally while strengthening internet control and data sovereignty internally raises questions about whether participating countries can expect genuine technology transfer and capacity building through WAICO.

Issue 3: Fragmentation of AI Governance and Standard Competition

With the coexistence of the US-led AI norm system (Pax Silicana, G7 AI Principles, etc.) and the China-led WAICO system, the fragmentation of global AI governance is becoming increasingly likely. The reality that "AI competition is unfolding comprehensively, centered on the US and China's race for leadership in AI models and technological infrastructure, alongside the EU's norm-setting strategy, the AI development strategies of the UK, Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East, and efforts to regulate AI weapons and establish global AI safety governance" [2] suggests that the formation of a unified global AI governance system is becoming increasingly difficult. This fragmentation of governance could lead to a situation where multiple, incompatible orders compete in areas such as AI technology standards, data norms, and safety regulations.

Issue 4: Middle Powers' Strategic Choices and the Pressure of Bloc Politics

The positioning of middle powers, including South Korea, amidst the intensifying US-China AI competition is emerging as a significant issue. South Korea's dispatch of only working-level officials to WAIC 2026 [10] is an attempt to maintain strategic ambiguity under the pressure of bloc politics. However, as the pressure from both the US and China to choose sides intensifies, the sustainability of this balanced strategy is expected to face increasing challenges. The reality that "countries are striving to increase investment and cultivate talent to enhance their AI technological innovation capabilities and utilization, while simultaneously formulating technological diplomacy strategies to expand their influence in AI technology development and application" [2] suggests that middle powers must act as proactive strategic actors rather than passive choosers.

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

WAIC 2026 and China's Strategy for Global AI Governance Leadership: In-depth Issue Analysis

1. Analysis of the Fundamental Causes of the Issue

Narrowing Technological Gap and China's Recovery of Strategic Confidence

China's strategy for global AI governance leadership, as exemplified by WAIC 2026, stems primarily from the perception that China's AI technological capabilities have significantly narrowed the gap with the United States. The emergence of DeepSeek-R1 in early 2025 served as a decisive catalyst, injecting strategic confidence not only into the Chinese government but also across its entire industrial sector, beyond mere technological achievement. DeepSeek, as a low-cost, high-efficiency model, demonstrated to the international community that an alternative path to US-led AI development exists. This bolstered confidence prompted the Chinese government to engage more actively in shaping the global AI governance order [2]. The warning from key industry figures, including Sam Altman, at the May 2025 US Senate hearing that "while the US currently holds an advantage, the gap with the challenger, China, is not significant" acknowledged this reality from the US side as well [2]. This upward convergence in technological capabilities has created the conditions for China to shift the focus of its strategy from the development stage to the norm-setting stage.

Structural Backlash Against the US-Led AI Norm System

The second fundamental reason China has put forth the launch of WAICO and global AI governance initiatives is the structural perception that the US-led AI norm system fundamentally conflicts with China's interests. The US has pursued a strategy of excluding China from the technological ecosystem by rallying allies around the "Pax Silicana" semiconductor and AI supply chain consortium. South Korea's participation as a founding member of Pax Silicana in December 2025 is a concrete example of this US-led alignment, and the fact that the Chinese government repeatedly requested high-level attendance at WAIC 2026, but South Korea sent only attachés and mid-level officials, illustrates this dynamic [10]. From China's perspective, the US-led AI governance order is an exclusive system cloaked in the language of norms, making the establishment of an alternative multilateral platform a strategic imperative.

Convergence of Global South's AI Demand and China's Supply Capacity

The third fundamental reason lies in the structural opportunity arising from the convergence of AI development demands in Global South countries and China's capacity to supply technology and capital. Examining the list of WAICO founding member states reveals that most of the 29 countries, including Brazil, Russia, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, Oman, Cuba, Ethiopia, Belarus, Venezuela, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria, Laos, and Qatar, belong to the Global South or non-Western blocs [1][4]. These nations share a common perception of being excluded from the US-European-centric AI ecosystem, despite having strong aspirations for AI technology development. Kazakhstan views its WAICO membership as a platform to realize its ambition of becoming a regional AI hub [1], while Oman has linked its WAICO accession to its long-term strategy of building a knowledge-based digital economy [15]. The Republic of the Congo has designated its participation in WAIC 2026 as part of its digital diplomacy and an opportunity to strengthen strategic partnerships with China [13]. Thus, WAICO has naturally formed a point of convergence where the demands of Global South countries meet China's supply capabilities.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: The Combination of Multipolar World Order Discourse and AI Governance

WAIC 2026 is the product of a political initiative that extends China's long-standing discourse on a multipolar world order into the realm of AI governance. China has designated 2026 as a historical turning point for changes in the international order and has set the establishment of a multipolar world order and the expansion of its global role as key foreign policy objectives [5]. This is a logical conclusion of Chinese diplomacy, which has consistently emphasized the reform of the global governance system since the Xi Jinping administration took office, advocating for "the multipolarization of an equal and orderly world" and actively expressing its intent to transform the existing international order [14]. President Xi's repeated emphasis on 'openness, open source, cooperation, and sharing' in his speech at WAIC 2026, and his declaration that "China is ready to take more open and practical actions" [17], reflect a political calculation to preemptively secure moral superiority over the US-led order by reframing the language of technological hegemony into that of cooperation and shared prosperity.

The active involvement of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) in WAIC, defining it as a "window to observe China's AI development," demonstrates that this event is planned and operated as part of national strategy, not merely as a private industry event [3]. The adoption of a chairperson's statement and two governance action plans at WAIC 2026, along with the proposal of a global initiative on the connectivity and interoperability of trustworthy AI agents [6], clearly shows that this event serves a political agenda-setting function.

Economic Structure: Competition for Restructuring the AI Industry Ecosystem's Supply Chain

On the economic front, WAIC 2026 is part of a strategic effort to build a China-centric AI supply chain and ecosystem. According to an analysis by the Chinese local media outlet 36Kr, WAIC 2026 highlighted AI applications and the creation of commercial value in actual business settings more than technology exhibitions [7], indicating that China's AI industry is transitioning from model development competition to the application and commercialization stage. By providing low-cost, high-efficiency AI models, exemplified by DeepSeek, to Global South countries, China is presenting a tangible alternative to the high-cost AI ecosystem dominated by US tech giants. This strategy aims to foster comprehensive supply chain dependencies, extending beyond mere technology exports to include data infrastructure, cloud services, AI chips, and application software. The analysis stating that "artificial intelligence is becoming a focal point for reshaping the world order, extending beyond technological levels to encompass economic security and norms" [8] accurately captures the essence of this economic structural competition.

Security Structure: Technological Alignment and Normative Warfare

From a security perspective, WAIC 2026 symbolizes a structural turning point where the US-China technological alignment is expanding into a competition over AI governance norms. As "artificial intelligence is a core foundational technology that cuts across military-security, economic growth, and socio-cultural norms" [8], the question of who sets AI governance norms is directly linked to who builds the foundation for the future military and security order. The US is building a technology security ecosystem that excludes China through alliance-based AI cooperation frameworks such as QUAD and AUKUS, and Pax Silicana [16]. In response, China is deepening the fissures in technological alignment by forming a non-Western AI cooperation network through WAICO. Although the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggests that the US and China, as the two countries building the world's most advanced AI systems, should explore avenues for cooperation in AI safety [12], in reality, the AI governance competition between the two nations is intensifying in a confrontational rather than cooperative direction.

3. Comparative Analysis of Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

Precedents of ITU and the Fragmentation of Internet Governance

The launch of WAICO can be understood as an AI-centric version of the US-China conflict surrounding the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Since the 2010s, China has sought to influence internet governance norms through the ITU, and at the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai, it allied with countries supporting increased internet control to challenge the US-European-led multi-stakeholder model. The alignment of Russia, China, and Arab nations supporting state-led internet governance against the Western bloc at that time shares structural similarities with the current strategy to incorporate the Global South into a China-centric AI governance order through WAICO. However, unlike the ITU case where China's attempts yielded limited results due to strong Western opposition, China's strategic space is broader in the field of AI governance due to the absence of an established international normative framework.

Lessons from the Huawei and 5G Standards Competition

A more direct precedent is the competition over 5G technology standards and supply chains centered around Huawei. China, with Huawei at the forefront, secured significant market share in the 5G sector by providing low-cost infrastructure to Global South countries. However, due to US sanctions against Huawei and pressure from allies to exclude Huawei, it was effectively ousted from Western markets. This experience left China with two key lessons: First, technological supply capacity alone is insufficient to dominate global standards; the ability to set governance norms is essential. Second, Global South countries possess the willingness and capability to choose Chinese technology despite US pressure. WAICO can be seen as a strategic upgrade reflecting these two lessons. While the 5G era focused on technology supply, the AI era aims to preemptively establish governance norms.

Continuity with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Digital Silk Road

The launch of WAICO should be understood as an extension of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy, initiated in 2013, particularly its digital iteration, the Digital Silk Road. Through the Digital Silk Road, China has fostered digital dependency by providing telecommunications infrastructure, e-commerce platforms, and smart city solutions to countries in Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. WAICO represents a strategy of overlaying an AI governance norms superstructure onto this infrastructure base, signifying an evolution from physical connectivity to normative connectivity. Kazakhstan's assessment of WAICO's accession as a stepping stone to becoming a regional AI hub [1], and the Republic of the Congo's designation of it as part of its digital diplomacy [13], demonstrate that these countries perceive China's digital infrastructure investment and AI governance cooperation as a continuous strategic package.

Challenging the Bretton Woods System and the AIIB Case

At the institutional level, the launch of WAICO follows a similar pattern to China's challenge to the Bretton Woods system, centered around the World Bank and IMF, with the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015. At the time of AIIB's founding, China cited the limitations of existing international financial institutions in meeting the infrastructure demands of developing countries as justification, successfully drawing in 57 founding member states. The participation of Western allies, including the UK, Germany, and France, despite US opposition, was a significant diplomatic shock to the US at the time. Although WAICO is smaller in scale (29 countries) than AIIB, its composition solely of non-Western nations without the participation of Western allies makes its exclusionary nature more pronounced. However, unlike AIIB, which secured institutional legitimacy by largely adopting existing international financial norms, it remains uncertain whether WAICO can establish a distinct normative system that differentiates itself from US-led AI governance norms.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

Variable 1: The Level of Substantive Institutionalization of WAICO

The first key variable determining the success or failure of WAIC 2026 is whether WAICO can evolve from a declarative cooperative body into an institution with substantive norm-setting capabilities. The WAICO founding agreement outlines principled objectives such as a human-centric approach, fostering innovation, and the responsible development of AI [4]. However, the crucial question is whether these principles can be translated into concrete technical standards, data governance norms, and safety regulations. The adoption of a Chairperson's Statement and two governance action plans at WAIC 2026, along with the proposal of an initiative on the connectivity of trustworthy AI agents [6], are positive signals. Nevertheless, the robustness of its institutional foundation, including the coordination of interests among 29 countries, financial contributions, and secretariat operations, remains to be seen.

Variable 2: Strategic Autonomy and Dual Participation of the Global South

The second key variable is whether WAICO member states will be substantively integrated into a China-centric AI ecosystem or maintain strategic autonomy between the US and China, pursuing dual participation. Major emerging economies such as Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa are interested in AI cooperation with China but are unwilling to completely abandon their connections with the US-led technology ecosystem. It is highly probable that they will use WAICO as leverage for negotiation rather than as a signal of integration into the Chinese bloc. In such a case, WAICO might remain a loose multilateral cooperation forum rather than a bloc constructed by China's intentions. South Korea's participation in the US-led Pax Technica while maintaining relations by sending working-level officials to WAIC 2026 [10] exemplifies this dual participation strategy, and many countries are expected to adopt a similar approach.

Variable 3: Substantive Competitiveness and Supply Capacity of China's AI Technology

The third variable is whether China can provide WAICO member states with technology and infrastructure that can substantively replace the AI services of US Big Tech. Foreign Policy reported that China is fully embarking on an "AI-Maxxing" strategy with WAIC 2026, and that Chinese AI models such as Moonshot's Kimi K3, Alibaba's Qwen, and DeepSeek are strengthening their international competitiveness [17]. However, amidst ongoing US export controls on advanced semiconductors, it remains a significant uncertainty whether Chinese AI companies can overcome computing power limitations and provide sufficient AI infrastructure to Global South countries.

Variable 4: US Response Strategy and Alliance Management

The fourth variable is how the United States responds to the launch of WAICO and China's offensive in global AI governance. If the US can strengthen the cohesion of its allies through Pax Technica and offer alternative AI cooperation packages to Global South countries, it can curb the expansion of WAICO. Conversely, if the US focuses solely on export controls and technology exclusion strategies while neglecting the AI development needs of the Global South, WAICO could attract more countries and expand its influence. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's suggestion to explore pathways for US-China AI safety cooperation [12] reflects an awareness of the risks in this confrontational dynamic, but the possibility of substantial cooperation between the two countries in the current strategic competition is limited. As long as the perception that "securing and utilizing artificial intelligence technology is becoming an essential element for economic prosperity, enhanced national security, and global leadership in the 21st century" [2] is shared by both countries, the strategic competition surrounding AI governance is expected to intensify.