Red Sea/Gulf Maritime Transport Crisis and Oil Price Surpassing $100: Compound Chokepoint Risks and South Korea's Industrial Response Strategy

Executive Summary

In July 2025, a compound maritime transport crisis materialized as the United States launched additional airstrikes against Iran, Iran intensified its control over the Strait of Hormuz, and Houthi rebels attacked Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea, pushing Brent crude oil prices above $100 per barrel. With three chokepoints—the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, and Strait of Malacca—simultaneously destabilized, global shipping freight rates are structurally increasing while supply chain shocks are compounding. This crisis is likely transitioning from a short-term shock to a prolonged period of 'managed uncertainty' (base scenario probability: 50-55%). South Korea, which relies on the Middle East for over 70% of its crude oil imports, is structurally vulnerable to supply shocks if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. The nation faces unavoidable compound impacts from rising costs and logistics expenses across its refining, petrochemical, shipping, and manufacturing sectors. Therefore, immediate measures such as expanding strategic reserves and diversifying raw material procurement are necessary in the short term. In the medium to long term, the core response strategy should be 'Conditional Readiness,' involving diversification of non-Middle Eastern supply sources, including US and Australian LNG, and strengthening alternative shipping route capabilities.

I. Analysis of the Issue Situation

Red Sea/Gulf Maritime Transport Risks and Oil Prices Surpassing $100: Analysis of the Issue Situation

1. Background and Progression of the Issue

The current Red Sea and Gulf maritime transport crisis is not the product of a single event but the result of decades of structural conflict between the United States and Iran exploding into military confrontation. In early 2025, tensions between the US and Iran escalated into military engagement. After approximately four months of conflict, on June 2025, President Trump officially declared an end to the war with Iran and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, seemingly paving the way for a diplomatic resolution [15]. While a temporary de-escalation occurred with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) mediated by Pakistan and Qatar and high-level talks held in Switzerland, this agreement was a superficial resolution that failed to fundamentally address the three core issues: Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missile capabilities, and its support for regional proxy forces [15].

This fragile balance cracked just nine days after the MoU was signed, with the recurrence of attacks on civilian oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz [15]. Iran began to exert pressure by strengthening passage fees and route controls for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, leading to repeated instances of navigational confusion and diversions [11]. This tension subsequently spread to the Red Sea. Supported strategically by Iran, Houthi rebels in Yemen launched attacks targeting Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Houthi rebels publicly claimed responsibility for attacking two Saudi oil tankers, declaring a blockade of Saudi oil exports. This action was a retaliatory measure taken immediately after the Saudi military conducted airstrikes on Sana'a Airport [1]. Consequently, an unprecedented compound crisis emerged, with two critical energy transport chokepoints, the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, being simultaneously threatened.

2. Current Situation

The situation rapidly deteriorated again on July 22nd when the United States conducted additional airstrikes against Iran and immediately reinstated sanctions on Iranian oil sales [4]. In response, Iran continued its pressure by persistently attacking oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz and demanding payment of transit fees. Although the US military asserted that the strait was "open for passage," actual traffic volume remained significantly reduced [4].

According to data compiled by the maritime analytics firm Kpler, the number of cargo ships passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait plummeted to an 11-ship weekly total as of Sunday following the Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities along the Red Sea coast, reaching a multi-month low. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz also remained low throughout the weekend [16]. As a result, the three straits—the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, and Strait of Malacca—have become simultaneously unstable, leading to compounding shocks to global supply chains [11].

The energy market reacted immediately to these geopolitical shocks. Brent crude futures surpassed $100 per barrel on July 24th, marking the first time since May that prices reached three digits [1][12]. This represented a surge of approximately one-third from the low point recorded in the previous month. However, this is still below the peak of $126 per barrel reached in April during the height of the conflict [12]. Goldman Sachs suggested that Brent crude could exceed $120 per barrel in the fourth quarter if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz persist [10]. BloombergNEF, on the other hand, has not ruled out the possibility that current oil prices, averaging $104 per barrel for the month, may have already peaked or are close to peaking [9]. As of the end of July, US-Iran ceasefire negotiations are on the verge of collapse amidst ongoing retaliatory strikes from both sides, and the Trump administration is openly threatening to withdraw from the MoU [3].

3. Key Actors and Their Positions/Interests

Iranis the primary architect of the current crisis, leveraging its control over the Strait of Hormuz as maximum leverage in negotiations with the United States. Iran's strategy is to drive up global energy prices by threatening to blockade the strait, thereby increasing inflationary pressure on the US domestic economy and forcing the Trump administration back to the negotiating table [8]. Iran is pursuing a dual strategy of securing economic benefits through sanctions relief without relinquishing its nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, or support for regional proxies. The pressure exerted on the Red Sea via Houthi rebels is an extension of this strategy [7].

Houthi Rebelsare strengthening their role as independent actors in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait with strategic support from Iran. While they cite the ongoing conflict with Saudi Arabia as a pretext, they are effectively acting as proxies, extending the Iran-US conflict into the Red Sea [14]. The Houthi rebels' attacks on Saudi oil tankers serve not merely as military actions but as a means of economic coercion, holding global energy supply chains hostage [7].

Saudi Arabiafaces a severe threat to its energy export security as its oil tankers and export infrastructure become direct targets. While continuing military responses against the Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia is paradoxically benefiting from short-term revenue increases due to soaring oil prices. However, repeated attacks on its oil tankers and facilities pose a structural threat, undermining Saudi Arabia's image as an energy powerhouse and its export reliability [16].

United Statesfinds its direct economic motivation for ensuring Middle East energy security weakened due to structural changes in its energy self-sufficiency. Since the shale revolution, US imports of Gulf crude oil have plummeted from 25% in 2014 to approximately 8% in 2025, and the US has transitioned to being a net energy exporter since 2020, facing structurally weakened domestic political justification for protecting the Strait of Hormuz [8]. However, the surge in global oil prices caused by a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz leads to renewed inflation and domestic political burdens in the US. This creates a paradoxical situation where increased energy self-sufficiency does not strengthen strategic patience but rather promotes an earlier return to negotiations [8].

Asian Energy Importers (South Korea, Japan, China, etc.)form the group most directly affected by this crisis. With high dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil, these nations are exposed to the dual shocks of soaring oil prices and increased shipping costs. The pressure from the United States to shift the burden of protecting maritime transport routes to its allies is also gradually intensifying [8].

4. Summary of Key Issues

The key issues of this situation can be summarized across four dimensions.

First, the simultaneous instability of energy supply chokepointsis a major concern. The Strait of Hormuz, prior to the conflict, was the single largest energy transport route, through which approximately one-fifth of global crude oil trade passed [4]. The Strait of Malacca handles 29% of global seaborne crude oil trade and over one-third of global trade [11]. If these two straits become simultaneously unstable, the impact on global supply chains will create cascading effects that exceed simple summation.

Second, the structural incompleteness of US-Iran negotiationsis critical. The current phase of 'managed uncertainty' involves a temporary containment that has not fundamentally resolved the three core issues: Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missile capabilities, and its support for regional proxies. The probability of an optimistic scenario is only 20-25%, while the probability of the base scenario, implying prolonged tension, is 50-55% [11].

Third, the weakening of US willingness to intervene in the Middle East and the shifting of burden to alliesis a significant issue. The US transition to an energy self-sufficient structure structurally weakens its direct economic motivation for protecting Gulf maritime routes. This is expected to lead to gradually increasing pressure on South Korea, Japan, the EU, and other energy-importing nations for contributions and military support [8].

Fourth, the risk of reignited global inflationis a major concern. Oil prices exceeding $100 per barrel risk reigniting inflationary pressures worldwide by increasing costs across transportation, manufacturing, and food sectors [10]. In Asia, there is a possibility of this escalating into stagflationary pressure [11]. These complex issues converge into a long-term challenge that demands a structural redesign of energy security beyond short-term crisis management.

II. In-depth Analysis of the Issue

Red Sea/Gulf Maritime Transport Risks and Oil Prices Surpassing $100: In-depth Analysis of the Issue

1. Analysis of the Root Causes of the Issue

The fundamental cause of the current Red Sea and Gulf maritime transport crisis lies in the simultaneous manifestation of the structural animosity between the United States and Iran through multiple proxy actors. Iran is strategically leveraging non-state actors like the Houthi rebels to maximize its strategic pressure while minimizing the costs of direct military confrontation. The Houthi rebels' attacks on Saudi oil tankers should be understood not merely as an extension of the Yemeni civil war but as part of a multi-layered strategy by Iran to exert asymmetric pressure simultaneously on the US and Saudi Arabia [7][14].

Iran's strategic calculation is clear: by threatening two global energy transport chokepoints—the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea—it aims to drive up international oil prices, thereby reigniting inflation in the US and increasing political pressure on the Trump administration [7]. Indeed, Iran is directly exercising economic pressure by imposing transit fees and strengthening route controls on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz [11]. This is a coercive strategy operating in a legal and economic gray zone rather than a military blockade, effectively maximizing supply disruption while weakening the justification for US military response.

The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels also serves as an independent root cause of this crisis. Following the Saudi military's airstrikes on Sana'a Airport, the Houthi rebels retaliated by directly targeting Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea [1]. This signifies that the Yemeni civil war has now entered a phase where global energy supply chains are becoming a direct battlefield. The Houthi rebels have declared a blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, publicly expressing their intent to cut off Saudi oil exports [14]. This represents a strategic shift beyond mere military retaliation, utilizing energy geopolitics as a direct bargaining tool.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: US Energy Self-Sufficiency Transition and Weakening Middle East Intervention Will

The most critical structural variable for understanding the current crisis is the fundamental change in US Middle East strategy driven by its increasing energy self-sufficiency. Since the shale revolution, US imports of Gulf crude oil have plummeted from 25% in 2014 to approximately 8% in 2025. The US has transitioned to being a net energy exporter since 2020 and is projected to reach record levels of oil production in 2025 [8]. This structural shift is weakening the direct economic motivation for the US to protect the maritime routes in the Gulf.

Paradoxically, it is crucial to note that the US's increased energy self-sufficiency is not strengthening strategic patience but rather acting as a catalyst for an earlier return to negotiations [8]. The surge in global oil prices caused by a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz reignites inflation in the US and exacerbates domestic political burdens. Therefore, despite its increased energy self-sufficiency, the US remains vulnerable to the economic ripple effects of Middle East instability [8]. The Trump administration's adoption of a 'phased deal' approach—granting 60-day temporary licenses for Iranian oil sales to maintain negotiation momentum while retaining leverage to immediately reinstate sanctions if the agreement is violated—reflects this structural dilemma [15].

The combination of the "America First" policy and increased energy self-sufficiency has structurally weakened the domestic political justification for protecting Gulf maritime routes. This implies a gradual increase in pressure on energy-importing nations such as South Korea, Japan, and the EU to contribute financially and militarily [8]. The structural trend of the US shifting the costs of Middle East intervention to its allies is likely to accelerate further due to the current crisis.

Economic Structure: Simultaneous Instability of Multiple Chokepoints and Cascading Shocks

The economic structural characteristic of the current crisis is the compounding of global supply chain shocks due to the simultaneous instability of three key maritime chokepoints: the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, and Strait of Malacca [11]. Prior to the conflict, the Strait of Hormuz was a route through which approximately one-fifth of global crude oil trade passed [4]. The Strait of Malacca is the single largest chokepoint, handling 29% of global seaborne crude oil trade and over one-third of global trade [11]. As long as tensions persist in the Strait of Hormuz, the bottleneck pressure on the Strait of Malacca cannot be structurally resolved, signifying a transition to a phase of structural instability rather than a one-off event [11].

The surpassing of $100 per barrel for oil prices is triggering widespread cost shocks beyond a simple increase in energy prices. Goldman Sachs forecasts that Brent crude could exceed $120 per barrel in the fourth quarter if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz continue [10]. This could lead to a resurgence of inflationary pressures across all industries, including transportation, manufacturing, and food [10]. The decisions by ships to reroute and the surge in war risk insurance premiums are creating cascading effects that increase overall global logistics costs. Even under the base scenario (50-55% probability), a structural increase in freight rates of 10-30% is likely to become entrenched [11].

Security Structure: US-Iran 'Managed Uncertainty' and the Spread of Proxy Warfare

The current security structure is characterized by a phase of sustained 'managed uncertainty' rather than a complete resolution or breakdown [15]. The US-Iran MoU signed in June 2025 was a superficial agreement that failed to fundamentally resolve the three core issues: Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missile capabilities, and its support for regional proxies. The fragility of the agreement was immediately exposed, with attacks on civilian oil tankers recurring in the Strait of Hormuz just nine days after its signing [15]. With both the US and Iran resuming mutual airstrikes after July 22nd, the fragile ceasefire system is effectively on the verge of collapse [3].

Cracks in the response coordination within the Western bloc are also a significant structural variable in security. While the United States does not recognize Iran's imposition of tolls, Europe leans towards practical acceptance, creating a vicious cycle that strengthens Iran's negotiating power[11]. As assessments that military strikes are ineffective in achieving Iran's denuclearization gain traction[2], the strategic utility of U.S. military intervention in the Middle East itself is being questioned.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

The Iran-Iraq War and the 'Tanker War' of the 1980s

The most directly comparable historical precedent to the current crisis is the 'Tanker War' during the Iran-Iraq War from 1984 to 1988. During that period, Iran and Iraq systematically attacked tankers passing through the Persian Gulf to disrupt each other's oil exports, with over 400 vessels being hit. The United States provided maritime escort through Operation Earnest Will, which involved reflagging Kuwaiti tankers, marking a historical instance of direct U.S. military involvement in protecting Gulf shipping lanes. However, a fundamental difference exists today: the U.S. has achieved structural improvements in its energy self-sufficiency, making it difficult to expect the same level of proactive military engagement as seen then[8].

The 2019 Strait of Hormuz Crisis

In 2019, tensions escalated with Iran's seizure of a British oil tanker and the downing of a drone in the Strait of Hormuz, raising threats of a blockade. While oil prices saw a short-term surge, the market stabilized relatively quickly as Iran did not proceed with a full blockade. Unlike the 2019 situation, the current crisis involves actual military engagements sustained over several months, and the simultaneous opening of the Red Sea front through the Houthi rebels means the scale and duration of the impact are significantly greater. BloombergNEF suggests that Brent crude may have already peaked or is nearing its peak at around $104 per barrel on a monthly average basis[9], but this analysis is predicated on the assumption that geopolitical tensions do not escalate further.

The 2021-2022 Red Sea Houthi Attack Cycle

Houthi attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea, which began in 2021, significantly expanded in 2023-2024, leading to surges in global shipping rates and a sharp decline in Suez Canal transits. However, a qualitative difference exists: while previous attacks primarily targeted vessels linked to Israel, the current strategy has expanded to encompass the blockade of Saudi Arabia's crude oil exports themselves[14][16]. The sharp drop in the number of cargo ships transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to just 11 as of Sunday, a multi-month low[16], demonstrates that these attacks are effectively disrupting maritime traffic.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

Variable 1: The Direction of U.S.-Iran Negotiations and Trigger Points

The most critical variable determining the development of this issue is the trajectory of U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations. The current situation is at a critical juncture where the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) framework is on the verge of collapse due to the immediate reinstatement of U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil sales and further airstrikes[3][4]. If the Trump administration maintains its transactional diplomacy approach and pursues a phased agreement, tensions may remain manageable. However, if negotiations completely break down, a pessimistic scenario (20-25% probability) could materialize, leading to a further surge in oil prices by $30-50 per barrel and triggering stagflationary pressures in Asia[11]. As long as Iran refuses substantial concessions on the three core issues—its nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support for proxy forces—the possibility of a permanent agreement remains low[15]. The most probable scenario is the entrenchment of a structural increase in shipping rates by 10-30%[11].

Variable 2: Houthi Autonomy and Iranian Control

A key variable in crisis management is whether the Houthi rebels act under Iran's direct orders or based on their own strategic judgment. Even if U.S.-Iran negotiations progress, if the Houthi rebels independently continue their Red Sea attacks, it could undermine the credibility of the negotiations themselves by revealing the limitations of Iran's ability to use the Houthis as a bargaining chip[7]. Conversely, if Iran exercises control over the Houthis and halts their attacks, it would mean Iran forfeiting leverage to gain substantial concessions at the negotiating table, making it a difficult option for Iran to choose.

Variable 3: China's Strategic Positioning

As the largest importer of Iranian crude oil and heavily reliant on Middle Eastern energy supply chains, China occupies a unique strategic position in the current crisis. China has sustained Iran's economic survival by continuously importing Iranian crude oil, circumventing U.S. sanctions, which structurally limits the effectiveness of U.S. pressure on Iran[8]. Simultaneously, China itself faces the 'Malacca Dilemma' due to its dependence on the Strait of Malacca, raising concerns of complex risks if this dilemma combines with tensions in the South China Sea[11]. As China leans more towards supporting Iran in the U.S.-Iran conflict, the U.S.-China energy geopolitical competition intensifies, and the strategic options for allies shrink[8].

Variable 4: Structural Buffering Capacity of Global Oil Supply

According to BloombergNEF's analysis, the oil market is currently in a phase of temporary supply disruptions superimposed on a structurally bearish trend[9], which could partially buffer the impact of geopolitical tensions on oil prices. However, the key variable determining the oil price trajectory will be how quickly OPEC+ countries' production capacity and the elasticity of U.S. shale production can offset supply shocks. Goldman Sachs' projection of a potential $120 per barrel in the fourth quarter reflects concerns that current supply buffering capacity may not be sufficient to absorb long-term disruptions[10].