[Global NK Special Report] ② Evidence-Based North Korea Research: The Shift in National Strategy and Elite Dynamics in the Kim Jong-un Era

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1. Introduction: An Era of Disruption, Yet the Turning Point Will Come Again

By the end of 2023, North Korea has defined the South and North as 'hostile two nations' and has erased the word unification from its vocabulary. The channels for dialogue have closed, and exchanges have virtually ceased. There are almost no ties left between the two Koreas. However, this winter will not last forever. For over 70 years, inter-Korean relations have oscillated like a pendulum between disruption and thawing, and turning points have always arrived without warning. The real question is how prepared we are when that moment arrives. The key to that preparation is the ability to read changes in North Korea accurately and in advance.

So how have we read North Korea? Generally, we have interpreted it based on 'the leader's instructions' or 'the party's official documents'. This study questions such traditional practices. If we only read North Korea's policy announcements, all decisions appear to stem from the mind of the supreme leader alone. Thus, we have long explained changes in North Korean policy as unilateral decisions of the leader, a so-called 'leader decisionism'.

However, as research on authoritarian regimes consistently points out, even dictators do not rule alone. When the direction of policy changes, elite groups that benefited from the previous line are pushed aside, and new groups that will support the new line emerge. The dissatisfaction of the losing groups soon becomes a threat to the leader. Therefore, significant policy shifts are likely the result of a tug-of-war over power-sharing between the leader and the elites.

The question of this study is simple. Are the significant national strategy shifts during the Kim Jong-un era unilateral decisions by the leader, or are they the result of specific elite groups rising to drive the changes? Policies do not necessarily begin at the moment they are announced. Before the announcement, the individuals standing next to the leader may change first. If so, we can track those changes to read the direction of North Korean policy in advance. This study aims to answer such questions with empirical evidence.

This work also embodies a methodological attempt. Due to the regime's closed nature, North Korean studies have long relied primarily on discourse analysis and anecdotal case interpretations. However, if we can systematically gather and verify various signals that seep through the cracks of the regime, similar to accumulating and analyzing data on individuals surrounding the supreme leader, we will be able to make more accurate and scientific estimations. The term 'evidence-based North Korea research' in this study refers to such an approach. However, this presentation does not complete that approach but rather suggests a direction. Based on the data of elites accompanying Kim Jong-un's public activities, it serves as an exploratory study showing how such a methodological shift can be achieved.

This study proceeds in the following order. Chapter 2 discusses why the research question is important in relation to previous studies, and Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical lenses of power-sharing and 'red/expert'. Chapter 4 presents the data and methodology, followed by Chapter 5, which proposes three competing hypotheses, and Chapter 6, which illustrates the four strategic shifts as 'four scenes'. Chapters 7 and 8 will present academic implications and policy recommendations, respectively. Finally, Chapter 9 will address the limitations of this study and future research directions.

2. Why is this research important: The Position of this Study in Previous Research

Research on authoritarian regimes has long assumed that 'the interaction between leaders and elites' is a core mechanism of politics. In systems with weak institutional legitimacy, such as elections, leaders must employ various strategies to co-opt or suppress elites for their survival. However, most empirical studies still focus on the survival strategies of the 'leader'. They explain how to manage coups and popular uprisings and why they operate institutions like parliaments or parties, while elites are perceived not as active agents but as passive representatives manipulated by the leader's strategies.

The discussions of Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2011) on 'winning coalitions' and 'selectorates', or Geddes et al. (2018) on institutions and co-optation, ultimately share a leader-centric perspective in asking which elite management strategies are favorable for the leader's survival. In other words, while elites are the subjects of analysis, they are not the agents of action.

2.1. Recent Shift: Elites as 'Actors'

Recent studies that recognize these limitations have shifted the focus of analysis from the individual leader to the backgrounds, compositions, and influences of elites. Newson & Trebbi (2018) analyzed the activity records of elites in North Korea, China, and Africa, concluding that authoritarian power distribution operates not as 'winner-take-all' but rather as 'winner-take-more'. This means that while the leader retains more power, a significant level of power is also distributed among internal factions and elites. Shih & Lee (2023) demonstrated how patron-client factions maintain cohesion using data on Chinese Communist Party personnel, and Kim (2021) empirically showed that the institutional cohesion and career paths of North Korean elites determine the risk of purges.

Insights connecting changes in elite composition to policy lines are particularly evident in studies of China. Lee Hong-young (1997) and Joo Jang-hwan (2009; 2017) showed that the process of changing the ruling elite in China from 'revolutionary cadres' to 'technical bureaucrats' to 'ordinary bureaucrats' coincided with shifts in policy lines such as reform and opening. In other words, when the 'type' of elite changes, the 'direction' of policies prioritized by the regime also changes.

2.2. The Empty Space of North Korea

The problem is that while this 'elite agency theory' has been accumulated primarily around China, Russia, and Vietnam, where data access is relatively easy, empirical analysis regarding North Korea remains very scarce. Han Gi-beom (2009; 2019; 2023) unraveled the promotion and retreat of North Korean economic reforms through 'organizational behavior' and 'bureaucratic politics' models, pointing out the limitations of 'leader decisionism', while Ishiyama (2014) tracked the replacement of hardliners and moderates through local guidance networks. Pyun Yoon-shin and Heo Jae-young (2019) captured the rise of the party since 2016 in the party-government-military accompanying network during the Kim Jong-un era. However, most of these studies merely described the elite status at a specific point in time or analyzed networks fixed at one point.

In summary, the gap in existing research is evident. There has been almost no research that examines specific policy transition phases over time and compares changes in elite composition before and after to trace the causal relationship between the two. This study aims to take the first step in filling that gap by identifying the four major strategic shifts during the Kim Jong-un era and tracking the changes in 'accompanying elites' before and after each point, while also presenting a methodological agenda for identification.

3. Theoretical Framework: Power-Sharing and Red/Expert Conflict

3.1. Power-Sharing

Svolik (2012) argues that the core conflict in authoritarian politics is not between the leader and the masses but rather the issue of power-sharing between 'leaders and elites'. According to his empirical findings, most dictators who lose power in unconstitutional ways are ousted not by popular uprisings but by coups from within their elite circles. This indicates that the greatest threat to leaders lies not externally but among their close associates. Therefore, leaders cannot simply suppress elites but must also share a certain amount of power to appease and co-opt them.

Applying this logic to policy decisions makes it difficult to explain significant shifts solely as decisions made by the leader. New policies benefit some groups while disadvantaging others. Therefore, leaders may seek to weaken the groups that will incur losses before formalizing policies and proactively elevate the groups necessary for policy implementation to reduce the risk of backlash. Elites can also exercise agenda-setting power by providing information and alternatives that reflect their preferences, shaping the leader's perception of the situation. As Meng et al. (2023) state, true power-sharing involves not just the distribution of benefits but also guarantees such as agenda-setting authority and coercive means. Both directions can be observed as 'changes in the configuration prior to the announcement', which serves as the analytical starting point of this study.

3.2. Conflict Model and 'Red/Expert'

Elite groups are never homogeneous. Groups that prioritize political loyalty and revolutionary spirit have different policy preferences than those that emphasize expertise and practical abilities. The conflict model, which views authoritarian policy decisions as the product of inter-group conflict, connects to the policy tendency model, which sees policies as the competitive outcomes of groups with differing policy preferences. Hamrin (1990) divided Chinese elites into reformists and conservatives to explain policy direction as a competition between these factions, while Moody (1984) conceptualized this as the conflict between 'red' (revolutionary) and 'expert' (technical). The competition between 'reds', who emphasize revolutionary spirit and ideological legitimacy, and 'experts', who prioritize expertise, practicality, and economic performance, encapsulates the conflict in policy direction.

During the radical reconstruction period of early socialism, 'reds' (revolutionary cadres) dominated, but as the new direction of economic development and reform emerged, the demand for 'experts' (technical bureaucrats) to manage a complex industrial society surged. Observing whether the ruling elite at a specific time leaned towards 'reds' or 'experts' serves as a key indicator for reading the regime's policy priorities and power dynamics.

Table 1. Concepts of 'Red' and 'Expert'.

3.3. Application to North Korea

This framework is also applicable to North Korea. On the surface, North Korea's decision-making appears hierarchical, but in reality, organizations with different interests, such as the party, military, and cabinet, simultaneously participate in policy formation and implementation. The leader inevitably relies on the information provided by each organization, which necessarily reflects the preferences of those organizations.

The economic reform phase in North Korea during the 2000s serves as a good example. As the cabinet pushed for market utilization and increased autonomy through measures like the July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measures (2002) and the official recognition of comprehensive markets (2003), the party, concerned about a loss of control, framed this as 'excessive reform' and began to intervene. Ultimately, the disbandment of the cabinet's executive committee (2005), the establishment of a new Ministry of Planning led by Park Nam-ki (2005), and market control through the June 18 discourse (2008) led to a retreat in reforms. This was not merely a policy failure but rather the result of conflicts and power reconfigurations among organizations. In this context, the cabinet, which prioritized practicality and the economy, corresponds to 'experts', while the party, which emphasized control and ideology, corresponds to 'reds'. In other words, there was indeed a policy conflict between 'reds' and 'experts' within North Korea.

This tension continues during the Kim Jong-un era. In December 2022, at the party's plenary meeting, Kim Jong-un characterized the tendencies of economic officials who prioritize external economic cooperation and advanced technology as 'defeatism and technological mysticism', criticizing that 'old ideas are lurking'. This scene shows that the tension between 'experts', who prefer openness and technology, and 'reds', who are wary of them, continues even amid prolonged sanctions.

4. Data and Methods

4.1. Why 'Kim Jong-un's Accompanying Data'?

Existing studies on North Korean elites have generally read power changes through official position changes, such as 'who was appointed to which position'. However, official appointments are confirmed only after changes have progressed significantly. It is difficult to capture subtle signs of substantial status changes.

Therefore, this study focuses on 'Kim Jong-un's public activity (on-site guidance and events) accompanying data'. The individuals accompanying the supreme leader are not chosen randomly. The policy demands of the time determine who is kept close, and accompanying individuals tend to appear before official position changes. In particular, on-site guidance involves long-distance travel, providing ample opportunities for policy discussions between the leader and accompanying elites. In other words, the list of accompanying individuals is closer to a more sophisticated real-time signal of how the power mechanism operates.

Of course, the frequency of accompaniment does not perfectly measure influence. Ceremonial accompanyings may be mixed in, and there may be influential figures who accompany less frequently. However, the goal of this study is not to measure the hierarchy of individual elites but to observe changes in the overall proportion of 'red' or 'expert' groups before and after transitional phases at the group level. In this regard, accompanying data holds sufficient analytical value. The data is constructed based on the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) 'Kim Jong-un Public Activity Report Analysis Database', and missing or unclear items were cross-verified with reports from the Rodong Sinmun and personnel information from the Ministry of Unification (2012–2022).

4.2. Coding 'Red/Expert'

Another limitation of existing research is that elites are primarily divided by their 'affiliated institutions', such as the party, government, and military. However, this classification method makes it difficult to indicate preferences and roles in policy lines when individuals with similar functions belong to different affiliations. Therefore, this study coded 'reds' and 'experts' based on the actual functions and expertise that individuals have performed, rather than their affiliations.

Each individual was coded as 'red (1)' or 'expert (0)', with those who transitioned between the party and cabinet judged based on their primary duties at the time of accompaniment, prioritizing actual job experience over educational background. The principle was established that individuals without relevant practical experience would be excluded from the respective type, ensuring consistency in coding.

4.3. Analytical Tools and Identification Cautions

The primary analytical tool of this study is Lead-Lag Regression. Based on the four policy announcement points, a total of 13 months of 'elite-month' panels were created, estimating the trends of 'red' proportions six months before and after each announcement. If the proportion of reds and experts changes only after the announcement (lag), it indicates a 'top-down' approach where the leader has predetermined the policy and fitted individuals into it. If the proportions have already changed before the announcement (lead), it suggests that the elite configuration moved first to drive the decision, indicating a 'bottom-up' approach.

However, to definitively identify 'whether it is lead or lag', two additional conditions are necessary, but the current data does not sufficiently meet those conditions. First, to claim that 'lead is higher than usual', there must be a sufficiently distant pre-announcement baseline. However, if we only look at ±6 months from the policy announcement point, the entire 13 months are event periods, so there is no comparison baseline within the window. This makes it possible to identify overall patterns but difficult to confirm the 'statistical significance' of the lead. Second, since strategic shifts have occurred only four times during the Kim Jong-un era, the statistical power of average inference is somewhat limited. Therefore, the coefficients and significance of this presentation should be read as exploratory patterns rather than definitive hypothesis tests.

4.4. Analysis Subjects: Four Strategic Shifts

The subjects of analysis are the four strategic shifts officially announced through party plenary meetings and the Supreme People's Assembly since Kim Jong-un came to power: ① the dual policy of economic and nuclear power construction (March 2013, 6th Plenary Meeting), ② the total concentration on socialist economic construction (April 2018, 7th 3rd Plenary Meeting), ③ the frontal breakthrough (December 2019, 7th 5th Plenary Meeting), ④ the legalization of nuclear power (September 2022, 14th Supreme People's Assembly). All four phases represent times when the priorities between the two pillars of regime survival, 'national defense (nuclear power)' and 'economic construction', were readjusted, making them suitable for exploring red/expert dynamics.

5. Three Competing Hypotheses

This study sets three competing hypotheses and explores which interpretation is more valid in light of the data. Hypothesis 1 reflects the traditional 'leader decisionism', Hypothesis 2 reflects 'power-sharing/elite agency theory', and Hypothesis 3 reflects a 'continuous power-sharing' that dynamically combines the two. The key is not which hypothesis is proven, but rather examining which mechanisms are emphasized in which phases.

Table 2. Three Competing Hypotheses

6. Analysis Results: Four Scenes

First, here is a comparative illustration of the four phases. The first observation is that the patterns are distinctly different in each phase. The fact that the same data and analysis methods yield such clearly different results suggests that North Korea's policy transitions are dynamic political processes that cannot be reduced to a single formula. The following four 'scenes' are exploratory sketches that describe the composition of reds/experts in each phase and interpret them in context, rather than definitive test results.

Figure 1. Comparison of Changes in the Proportion of Accompanying Reds and Experts Before and After the Four Strategic Shifts

6.1. Scene ① Dual Policy (March 2013) — Predominance of 'Reds' Throughout the Phase

Figure 2. Before and After the Announcement of the 'Dual Policy of Economic and Nuclear Power Construction' (Positive Value = Predominance of Reds)

During the dual policy phase, a high proportion of 'red' elites is observed throughout the phase. Positive values continue from six months before the announcement (lead6, coefficient 0.131) to shortly after the announcement (lag2, 0.178), then weaken from the fourth month (lag4). The direction of this transition, which elevates nuclear and national defense as a key pillar, aligns with the relative superiority of regime-preserving (red) elites.

6.2. Scene ② Total Concentration Policy (April 2018) — The Most Robust Rise of 'Experts'

Figure 3. Before and After the Announcement of the 'Total Concentration on Socialist Economic Construction' (Negative Value = Predominance of Experts)

The opposite pattern is observed here. In this transition, which aims to concentrate resources on economic construction, 'expert' elites stand out. Interestingly, this pattern is already evident in the pre-announcement phase — it appears that economic and practical elites were already positioned close to the leader before the formal declaration of 'economic concentration'. Moreover, the rise of 'experts' in this phase is statistically confirmed as the most robust pattern when comparing all four phases. Considering that the 2018 'economic concentration' coincided with the sudden inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summit diplomacy that year, this rise of 'experts' may indicate not just personnel changes but a forewarning of a shift in policy direction. This can be interpreted as supporting the bottom-up interpretation (Hypothesis 2).

6.3. Scene ③ Frontal Breakthrough (December 2019) — Movement from 'Experts' to 'Reds'

Figure 4. Before and After the Announcement of the 'Frontal Breakthrough' (Transition from Experts to Reds)

In the context of the frontal breakthrough, which emphasizes 'self-reliance' amid sanctions, it appears that both mechanisms emerge sequentially. 'Expert' elites dominate before and after the announcement, but approximately three months after the announcement (lag3), the balance shifts towards 'reds'. In a phase where negotiation momentum remained, practical and economic elites led the agenda, but as the deadlock solidified, the ruling coalition was reconfigured with regime-consolidating elites.

6.4. Scene ④ Legalization of Nuclear Power (September 2022) — No Significant Changes Observed

Figure 5. Before and After the Announcement of the 'Legalization of Nuclear Power' (Mostly Non-Significant)

In the fourth scene, no significant changes are observed before and after the announcement. This measure, which formalizes nuclear doctrine into law, is closer to a 'symbolic and declarative' policy that does not significantly involve resource allocation or role reconfiguration, and the 'non-response' of the elite configuration aligns with this interpretation.

6.5. A Table Viewing the Four Scenes

Table 3. Observed Patterns and Exploratory Interpretations of the Four Scenes

In summary, the four phases exhibit different profiles of red/expert compositions. The two most robust observations are (a) the structural persistence of 'reds' predominating in most phases, and (b) the relative rise of 'experts' in the economic-oriented phase (total concentration). Meanwhile, more robust verification of the claim that 'the elite configuration moved before the announcement' remains a task for further design. It is clear that the linear picture of 'the leader decides and the elites follow' (Hypothesis 1) cannot adequately explain the heterogeneity of these phases.

7. Three Implications

1) Clues to Overcome Leader Decisionism

The heterogeneous patterns of the four phases, especially the rise of 'experts' in the economic-oriented phase, suggest that even in North Korea, classified as the most closed form of personal dictatorship, policy lines and elite compositions can be interconnected. This cannot be captured by a linear top-down perspective alone and provides clues to extend the 'elite agency theory' accumulated in comparative authoritarianism in China, Russia, and Vietnam to the case of North Korea, where data constraints are greatest.

2) The 'Nature' of Policies Can Determine Elite Dynamics

There may be different responses in elite configurations between policies that actually readjust resource allocation and priorities and those that remain symbolic declarations. If this difference is robustly confirmed in subsequent analyses, the response of elite configurations could serve as a supplementary criterion for discerning whether a given announcement is 'words' or 'actions'.

3) Announcements May Be Results Rather Than Starting Points — Potential as Leading Indicators

If elite reconfigurations precede policy announcements, then North Korea's official announcements are closer to a 'destination' where significant internal adjustments have already been largely completed. In that case, to read North Korea's next steps, we should not wait for the announcements but proactively track changes in the elite configuration surrounding the leader, and accompanying data serves as a strong basis for early warning.

The overarching message connecting these three implications is as follows. North Korea is a 'black box', but it is not entirely dark. Subtle changes in who stands next to the leader provide clues about the direction and weight of policies that announcements do not reveal. If we can systematically gather and rigorously analyze these clues, we can read North Korea not as an 'exceptional case' but within the framework of comparative authoritarianism, while simultaneously obtaining valid clues for our North Korea policy and information analysis.

Now, when the locks of 'hostile two nations' are firmly fastened, paradoxically, it is time to prepare for what comes next. Even in a situation where exchanges have ceased, the elite configuration within North Korea continues to move, and as seen in the accompanying data, that movement gradually seeps outwards. If we consistently, systematically, and methodologically read these signals, when the next turning point arrives, we will be positioned not as 'passive responders' but as 'proactive readers and designers'. The value of evidence-based North Korea research lies precisely here.

8. Policy Implications and Recommendations

The results and approaches of this study do not merely contribute academically. They also provide direct implications for practical work related to North Korea in government ministries, intelligence analysis, and the media. The implication converges into one: we must read North Korea 'as it is' rather than 'as we wish it to be', based on clear evidence. Three recommendations are added for this purpose.

1) From 'Wishing North Korea' to 'As It Is' — From Value Involvement to Evidence-Based

North Korea policy is often influenced by wishful thinking or political preferences, painting North Korea as 'what we hope it would be'. However, as this study shows, by systematically analyzing observable signals like accompanying data, we can more accurately gauge the actual power dynamics and policy priorities within North Korea. For instance, the structural persistence of 'reds' predominating in most phases tempers optimism about 'reform and opening being imminent', while the relative rise of 'experts' observed in the economic-oriented phase provides clues about 'under what conditions' practical lines gain strength. Understanding North Korea as an 'entity based on objective evidence' should be the starting point for policy, rather than normative expectations.

2) Training Professionals to Interpret and Judge Objective Information

No matter how much high-quality data exists, it is useless without the capacity to interpret it. As this study shows, the same signals can lead to entirely different conclusions depending on how they are analyzed and how their limitations are assessed. Therefore, government, intelligence agencies, and the media urgently need 'methodologically trained' professionals who can collect, accumulate, and interpret North Korea-related data and make careful policy judgments based on that. This requires personnel who possess both regional knowledge and quantitative and qualitative methods, and who can critically question the uncertainties of signals and the limitations of identification. To this end, I propose institutionalizing a track for training interdisciplinary analysts that connects graduate education with practical retraining.

3) Institutionalizing Data Collection and Accumulation for Predicting North Korean Behavior

The greatest constraint of this study ultimately lies in data limitations. That is, there are only four events, and the observation window is short. This is not merely an issue for individual researchers but a problem of 'research infrastructure'. A national data foundation is needed to systematically collect, standardize, and accumulate observable signals such as Kim Jong-un's public activities, personnel changes, purges, media discourse, budgets, and trade over the long term. It is necessary to have 'continuously accumulating' data rather than one-off analyses to capture turning points in advance. I propose a standard dataset and public codebook shared by the Korea Institute for National Unification, the Ministry of Unification, intelligence agencies, and academia, along with a permanent system for updating and managing it.

These three recommendations are not separate but form a cycle. Gathering signals (data), nurturing those who can read them (personnel), and making judgments based on evidence (evidence-based policy). Only when this cycle operates can we position ourselves not as 'passive responders' to the next turning point in inter-Korean relations but as 'proactive readers and designers'. Even in the closed North Korea, evidence can be accumulated, and capabilities can be developed.

9. Conclusion: Limitations and Next Steps

This study is exploratory and requires further robust data accumulation and analysis work. Several limitations related to the study can be pointed out. First, there are limitations in measurement. The frequency of accompaniment does not fully measure influence (issues of ceremonial accompaniment, influential figures who accompany less frequently, etc.). However, since the focus is on trends in group proportions rather than individual rankings, this issue is somewhat alleviated. Second, there is subjectivity in coding. The distinction between 'red' and 'expert' involves certain judgments regarding career interpretations. Coding rules will be transparently disclosed and supplemented through cross-validation, and plans to report inter-coder reliability (κ) in the future are in place. Third, there are limitations in identification. The ±6-month window covers the entire event period, leaving no suitable pre-announcement baseline, and since there are only four strategic shifts, the statistical identification and generalization of dynamic effects are inherently limited. Therefore, the interpretations related to 'lead' in this presentation are exploratory rather than definitive conclusions.

The next research phase should be conducted in a way that overcomes these limitations. First, the time window should be expanded to ±12 months before and after the announcement to secure a local pre-announcement baseline, and the four phases should be combined to estimate average changes against a common baseline with valid standard errors. This will help separate whether 'lead movements' are leading effects or phase-level differences. Next, we should delve into individual-level entry and exit dynamics (survival analysis) beyond group proportions to directly track 'who rises first'. Additionally, acknowledging the inherent constraint that strategic shifts are rare events, we should employ a mixed design that combines quantitative techniques with process tracing (Rodong Sinmun, plenary meeting documents, personnel tracking) to elucidate causal mechanisms within the case. Finally, it is necessary to combine accompanying data with other signals such as personnel changes, purges, and media discourse, and in the long term, to extend the time series causal analysis with a text-based policy orientation index to broaden the scope of 'evidence-based North Korea research'.

The closed nature of North Korea is the fate of North Korean studies, but if we systematically and methodologically gather the signals that seep through the cracks, we can read the politics beyond 'the leader's instructions'. The long winter of disruption between the two Koreas may seem prolonged, but it will not last forever. The side that reads the turning point of spring first will be the one that has systematically gathered signals in advance.

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■ Kim Taek-bin_Professor of Security Policy at the National Defense University.

■ Responsible and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher

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