[EAI Issue Briefing] Differences in Perceptions of Japan and Korea: An Analysis of the Results of the 13th Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey Focused on 'Perceptions of the Counterpart Country'

I. Introduction

Among the results of the Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey conducted annually since 2013, the item that has garnered the most attention from academia and the media is the perception of the counterpart country. Perception, as expressed in terms such as pro-Japanese, anti-Japanese, pro-Korean, and anti-Korean, refers to the phenomenon acquired from the relationship with the counterpart country that is represented or symbolically depicted in the mind, also known as image or mental representation. Perception evokes specific interests and brings about an emotional form of attitude, which is the readiness for action or behavior. The analytical significance of perception in Korea-Japan relations lies in the fact that perceptions of the counterpart country influence attitudes toward that country, particularly the recognition of the relationship with that country. A review of past Korea-Japan opinion polls reveals that the more positive the perception of the counterpart country, the higher the level of trust in that country, and the greater the sense of improvement in the relationship with that country.

The perception of Japan among South Koreans and the perception of Korea among Japanese citizens have improved steadily since experiencing the worst situation in 2019-2020, marked by export controls and mutual trade retaliation between the two governments, leading to security conflicts. The results of the 2026 survey reflect this trend. In South Korea, the percentage of positive perceptions rose from a low of 12.3% in 2020 to 54.3% in 2026, while the percentage of negative perceptions fell from 71.6% to 38.5% during the same period. In Japan, the percentage of positive perceptions increased from a low of 20.0% in 2019 to 35.3% in 2026, while the percentage of negative perceptions decreased from 49.9% to 44.1%.

Narrowing the timeframe to examine changes over the past year, both Korea and Japan faced various external shocks, including tariff and investment pressures from the second Trump administration, significant increases in defense spending, requests for participation in the Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz, and economic threats from China. Domestically, both countries also underwent significant political changes with regime shifts. Despite these variables that could disrupt Korea-Japan relations, the results of the 2026 opinion poll generally continue the existing trend. On the other hand, differences in mutual perceptions between the two countries have also emerged. As of 2026, while South Korea's positive perception of Japan remains robust, Japan's improvement in perception of Korea has shown fluctuations and is relatively weak. What has driven the improvement in perceptions of the counterpart country since 2020? Where do the differences in driving forces between the two countries come from?

This paper utilizes the data from the Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey jointly conducted by the East Asia Institute and the International House of Japan on July 20-21, 2026, to conduct two regression analyses and analyze the factors contributing to the improvement of mutual perceptions based on the derived variables. The main results are as follows.

1. The impressions of the Korean public towards Japan, the level of trust in Japan, and evaluations of Korea-Japan relations have shown a solid upward trend since 2020. In the case of Japan, the positive impression towards Korea recorded an increase of 10.5 percentage points compared to 2025; however, this level merely compensates for the decline of the previous year, indicating an overall unstable upward trend characterized by fluctuations. This also suggests that the momentum for improving impressions in Japan is relatively weak compared to that of Korea.

2. As for the factors driving the rise in perceptions, the first is the bottom-up factor of increased affinity through direct and indirect contacts at the civilian level (visits to the counterpart country and consumption of popular culture). The more travel, shopping, food culture, and consumption of popular culture occur in both Korea and Japan, the higher the positive perception of the counterpart country. The second is the top-down factor, where the perception of the leaders of the counterpart country is a major variable. The more positively citizens of both countries perceive the leaders of the counterpart government, the higher the positive perception of the counterpart country.

3. Analyzing the changes in perceptions of the counterpart country based on these three variables, the reason why the driving force for the improvement of South Korea's perception of Japan is stronger than that of Japan's perception of Korea is that the influence of visits to the counterpart country and consumption of popular culture is relatively greater, and the perception of national leaders has also improved relatively. Meanwhile, the confusion regarding the perceptions of President Lee Jae-myung and Prime Minister Takaiichi Sanae among the citizens of both countries acts as a variable that delays the improvement of perceptions of the counterpart country.

II. Trends in Perceptions of the Counterpart Country between Korea and Japan

Looking back over the past ten years of the Korea-Japan joint opinion survey, negative perceptions of Japan have shown a solid downward trend, except for the year 2020 ([Table 1]). The percentage fell from 56.3% in 2017 to 49.9% in 2019, but following the trade dispute and security conflicts triggered by Japan's export controls against Korea in 2019, negative perceptions surged as Korea-Japan relations fell into the worst state since the normalization of diplomatic relations. However, after peaking at 71.6% in 2020, negative perceptions have shown a steady decline, reaching 38.5% in 2026. In contrast, positive perceptions, or affinity, rose from 26.9% in 2017 to 31.7% in 2019, then plummeted in 2020 (12.3%), but have steadily increased since, recording 54.3% in 2026. This represents a remarkable change of 42 percentage points in just six years.

In Japan, negative perceptions of Korea recorded small fluctuations, remaining around 46-49% from 2017 to 2021, before dropping to 32.6% in 2023. Although it surged to 51% in 2025, it fell to 44.1% this year. Positive perceptions of Korea steadily increased from 20% in 2019 to 37.4% in 2023, achieving a golden cross between positive and negative perceptions. However, after a sharp drop to 24.8% last year, it rebounded to 35.3% this year, recovering the decline ([Table 2]).

[Table 1] Perceptions of Japan among South Koreans, 2017-2026.

[Table 2] Perceptions of Korea among Japanese Citizens

[Table 3] Comparison of Perceptions of the Counterpart Country between Korea and Japan, 2013-2026

[Table 3] compares the trends in perceptions of the counterpart country between Korea and Japan over the past 14 years. In comparing the two, two characteristics can be observed. First, from the implementation of the survey in 2013 until 2023, Japan's affinity for Korea maintained a generally higher level than Korea's affinity for Japan, but this reversed after 2024, with Korea's affinity for Japan becoming higher. The percentage of 'good impressions' of the counterpart country was consistently higher for Japan than for Korea, except for 2018-2019, but reversed in 2025-2026. Similarly, the percentage of 'bad impressions' was consistently lower for Japan than for Korea until 2023, but reversed in 2025-2026.

Second, comparing the trends in the improvement of perceptions of the counterpart country between Korea and Japan, it is evident that Korea has established a clear trend of improvement in perceptions of Japan since 2020, while Japan's trend of improvement in perceptions of Korea has been relatively gradual and has shown some fluctuations. This indicates that the driving force for improvement in perceptions is relatively weaker in Japan compared to Korea.

So, why do these differences occur? More specifically, what are the factors that have allowed Korea's perception of Japan to catch up with Japan's perception of Korea as of 2026? In other words, what has driven the improvement in perceptions of Japan since 2020? Meanwhile, what are the reasons for the fluctuations in Japan's perception of Korea?

III. Analysis of Perceptions of the Counterpart Country among Respondents from Both Countries in 2026

1. Analysis of Korean Public Perception of Japan

This paper identifies the factors influencing the perceptions of Japan among Korean respondents by setting Japan's perception as the dependent variable and classifying independent variables into four sub-models (personal contacts and consumption related to Japan, perceptions of Japanese leaders and government attitudes, functional cooperation with Japan, and surrounding country factors) to conduct a logit regression analysis. The results ([Table 4]) show thatExperience visiting Japan, perception of Japanese leaders, consumption of Japanese popular culture, current evaluation of Korea-Japan relationsare statistically significant at the 5% significance level. All these variables show a positive relationship with positive perceptions of Japan. The average marginal effect of a one-unit change is largest for the experience of visiting Japan, with respondents who have visited Japan having an average 23 percentage points higher probability of a positive perception of Japan compared to those who have not. The predicted probability change across the entire scale of the variables is most pronounced in the perception of Japanese leaders, where an increase from 1 to 5 in leader perception raises the predicted probability of a positive perception of Japan from 31.8% to 82.5%, an increase of 50.7 percentage points.

The variables of perception of the United States and recognition of the threat from China showed a high level of statistical significance in the small model, but only reached significance at the 10% level in the full model including all other variables. In contrast, the strengthening of Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation was statistically significant in the small model but lost significance in the full model. This suggests that the explanatory power of these variables may overlap with other variables added to the full model.

[Table 4] Key Factors Influencing Perceptions of Japan among Korean Respondents in 2026

Note: The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

The table presents only those variables among the main explanatory variables that are statistically significant at the 5% level.

2. Analysis of Japanese Public Perception of Korea

The analysis of perceptions of Korea among Japanese respondents in 2026 revealed that evaluations of Korea-Japan relations, consumption of Korean popular culture, perceptions of Korean leaders, and experience visiting Korea are all statistically significant at the 5% level. All significant variables show a positive relationship with positive perceptions of Korea. The average marginal effect of a one-unit change is largest for the experience of visiting Korea, with respondents who have visited Korea having an average 12.0 percentage points higher probability of a positive perception of Korea compared to those who have not. The predicted probability change across the entire scale of the variables is most pronounced in the evaluation of Korea-Japan relations, where an increase from 1 to 5 raises the predicted probability of a positive perception of Korea from 13.3% to 65.4%, an increase of 52.1 percentage points. Additionally, the strengthening of Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation was statistically significant in the small model but showed reduced statistical significance in the full model, reaching significance only at the 10% level.5% were statistically significant at the 5% significance level. All significant variables showed a positive (+) relationship with favorable impressions of Korea. The average marginal effect per unit change was largest for the experience of visiting Korea; respondents who had visited Korea had an average predicted probability of 12.0 percentage points higher of having a favorable impression of Korea than those who had not. The predicted probability change across the full scale range of the variables was largest for the evaluation of Korea-Japan relations. As the evaluation of Korea-Japan relations increased from 1 to 5, the predicted probability of a favorable impression of Korea increased from 13.3% to 65.4%, a 52.1 percentage point increase. Furthermore, while strengthening Korea-Japan security cooperation was statistically significant in the small-scale model, its statistical significance decreased in the full model including all other variables, becoming significant only at the 10% significance level.

[Table 5] Key Results of Logit Regression Analysis on Perceptions of Korea among Japanese Respondents in 2026

Note: The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

The table presents only those variables among the main explanatory variables that are statistically significant at the 5% level.

The variables of perception of the United States and recognition of the threat from China showed a high level of statistical significance in the small model, but only reached significance at the 10% level in the full model including all other variables. In contrast, the strengthening of Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation was statistically significant in the small model but lost significance in the full model. This suggests that the explanatory power of these variables may overlap with other variables added to the full model.

IV. Experience Visiting the Counterpart Country, Consumption of Counterpart Country's Popular Culture, and Perception of Counterpart Country Leaders

Interestingly, the factors influencing the perceptions of the counterpart country among the citizens of both Korea and Japan are almost identical. The bottom-up factors of experience visiting the counterpart country and consumption of counterpart country's popular culture, as well as the top-down factor of perception of counterpart country leaders and current evaluation of Korea-Japan relations, were commonly identified. Among these, the variable of current evaluation of Korea-Japan relations is highly interrelated with the dependent variable (i.e., perception of the counterpart country), so it was excluded from this analysis. The analysis of the changes in perceptions of the counterpart country and the differences in perceptions between the two countries based on the remaining three variables is as follows.

1. Experience Visiting the Counterpart Country

Experience visiting the counterpart country means forming one's own image through direct experience with that country. In the case of Korea, there are stereotypes about the counterpart that are reproduced within established media and educational systems. Feelings of inferiority and humiliation towards Japan due to colonial experiences, as well as a sense of moral superiority, create competitive, critical, and negative emotions or attitudes towards Japan, which are amplified through conflicts over historical issues (Lee Yong-hee 1970). In contrast, direct experiences in Japan serve as a pathway to break away from stereotypes. South Koreans express fondness for the Japanese people's 'kindness, cleanliness, and emphasis on order' through direct visits or indirect visits via new media, and enjoy 'attractive food culture, shopping, and travel,' leading to positive perceptions of Japan ([Table 6]). The overwhelming percentage of respondents who answered that their impressions changed to good after visiting the counterpart country or that their good impressions remained unchanged is 84.3%, which evidences the influence of direct experience ([Table 7]).

[Table 6] Reasons for Having a Positive Impression of the Counterpart Country

[Table 7] Changes in Impressions After Visiting the Counterpart Country, Comparison of 2021 and 2026

In Japan, there are also stereotypes about Korea, particularly among the older generation. A sense of superiority as a developed country, paternalistic thinking stemming from the colonial relationship, and anxiety about Korea's pursuit have contributed to the formation of negative perceptions. The extreme form of xenophobia is 'anti-Korean sentiment' (Seok Joo-hee 2023). However, direct visits or indirect visits through new media serve as opportunities to break these stereotypes. In fact, the percentage of respondents who answered that their impressions changed to good after visiting Korea or that their good impressions remained unchanged reached 79.6% ([Table 7]). The reasons cited by Japanese citizens for their positive impressions include 'the attractiveness of travel destinations such as food culture, shopping, and tourism' ranked first, followed closely by 'the appeal of popular culture such as K-Pop, dramas, and movies' in second place, and 'fondness for the friendly demeanor of Koreans' in third place ([Table 6]).

2. Consumption of Popular Culture

Along with direct visits, consumption of popular culture is also a major factor. The popularity of dramas, movies, K-Pop, fashion, and beauty in Japan, as well as the popularity of comics, animation, dramas, movies, J-Pop, and novels in Korea, has been shown to contribute to the improvement of mutual perceptions, as revealed in several studies (Son Yeol, Lee Ha-yeon, 2021; Choi Eun-mi 2025). The 2026 opinion survey also confirms the findings of previous studies. The response that popular culture has a positive impact on improving perceptions of the counterpart country is overwhelming, with 82.5% in Korea and 87.4% in Japan ([Table 8]). Additionally, the fact that the main consumer demographic is in their 20s and 30s confirms that they are the primary driving force in breaking down stereotypes about the counterpart country in both societies.

[Table 8] Changes in Impressions Due to Consumption of Popular Culture, Comparison of 2022 and 2026.

Thus, while civilian-level visits and cultural exchanges are key factors in improving mutual perceptions, the scope of exchanges and consumption between the two countries is not symmetrical. In terms of experience visiting the counterpart country, based on the first year of reopening from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2022, the percentage of respondents who reported having experience visiting the counterpart country was 38.7% in Korea and 27.6% in Japan, indicating a gap between the two countries. In this year's survey, 71.6% of South Koreans reported having visited Japan, while only 28.8% of Japanese reported having visited Korea, showing a significant increase of 32.9 percentage points in Korea over four years, while Japan showed a minimal increase of 2.2 percentage points. Consequently, the gap between the two countries widened from 22.1 percentage points in 2022 to 42.8 percentage points in 2026 ([Table 9]). Considering these figures, it can be concluded that the effect of improvement in perceptions due to visits to the counterpart country is significantly greater for Korea than for Japan.

[Table 9] Experience Visiting the Counterpart Country, Comparison of 2022 and 2026

The pattern for consumption of popular culture shows some differences compared to visits. In 2022, the percentage of respondents who enjoyed the counterpart country's popular culture was 18% in Korea and 34.5% in Japan, indicating that Japan had a higher percentage. This may be due to the continued expansion of the popularity of K-Pop and K-dramas in Japan. However, by 2026, the figures had shifted to 42% in Korea and 29.7% in Japan, indicating that Korea had surpassed Japan ([Table 10]). Over the past four years, Korean popular culture has recorded a remarkable growth of 24%. In particular, anime and J-Pop combinations such as 'Demon Slayer,' 'Jujutsu Kaisen,' and 'Chainsaw Man' have gained immense popularity, and numerous performances by Japanese artists in Korea have been held. Since the 1998 Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration, the opening of Japanese popular culture has entered an unprecedented boom period. Overall, it can be assessed that the effect of improvement in perceptions due to popular culture has a greater impact on Korea.

[Table 10] Consumption of Counterpart Country's Popular Culture, Comparison of 2022 and 2026

3. Top-down Factors: Perception of Leaders

While experience visiting the counterpart country and consumption of popular culture are primarily factors that lead to improvements in perceptions of the counterpart country, the perception of counterpart country leaders can simultaneously bring about both improvement and deterioration in perceptions. As shown in [Table 11], the trend of perceptions of the Japanese Prime Minister among South Koreans and the trend of perceptions of Japan show similar patterns. Negative perceptions of the Japanese Prime Minister peaked during Shinzo Abe's administration and declined after his resignation in 2020, while positive perceptions, which were extremely low during Abe's administration, have steadily increased since his departure. Alongside this, the trend of negative perceptions of Japan among South Koreans has also steadily declined since peaking in 2020, while positive perceptions have consistently risen. Positive perceptions peaked under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba (32.5%) and subsequently fell to 27.3% under Prime Minister Sanae Takaiichi.

[Table 11] Perceptions of Japanese Leaders

The factors contributing to negative perceptions of the Japanese Prime Minister generally reflect the factors contributing to negative perceptions of Japan. As seen in [Table 12], South Koreans attribute their negative impressions of Japan to reasons such as 'the failure to properly reflect on the history of invading Korea' or 'the unresolved historical issues such as comfort women and forced labor.' The target of criticism regarding Japan's historical recognition is not the general public in Japan but rather its leaders. Therefore, when a Japanese leader expresses a revisionist view of history, as in the case of Prime Minister Abe, it elicits strong rejection, while a more progressive recognition, as shown by Prime Minister Ishiba, leads to positive impressions.

[Table 12] Reasons for Having Negative Impressions of the Counterpart Country, 2026

[Table 13] Perceptions of Korean Leaders

On the other hand, Japanese citizens express negative impressions of Korea due to 'criticism of Japan or anti-Japanese sentiment' or 'when Korea fails to uphold agreements or promises related to comfort women or forced labor.' This indicates that their impressions are shaped more by attitudes toward handling historical issues rather than the historical recognition itself. The negative sentiment towards President Moon Jae-in during the period when the Korea-Japan comfort women agreement was undermined and anti-Japanese protests swept the streets, and the positive impression of President Yoon Suk-yeol, who maintained a conciliatory approach towards Japan, exemplify this.

In this context, the sharp deterioration in perceptions of Korea among Japanese citizens in 2025 (with negative perceptions rising sharply from 32.8% to 51%) can be attributed to the perception that Korean democracy is regressing amid political instability, including martial law and impeachment, alongside the negative image formed by President Lee Jae-myung's strong remarks towards Japan during his time as opposition leader. The opinion poll conducted just two months after President Lee's inauguration, from August 18-20, 2022, primarily reflects the image from his time as opposition leader. The negative impression of President Lee reached 39.2%, a staggering increase of 35.1 percentage points from the 4.1% recorded by former President Yoon Suk-yeol in 2023. Positive impressions also plummeted from 32.1% to 10.5%.

In the 2026 survey, President Lee's positive impression rebounded to 15%, and negative impressions fell to 29.6%. This appears to be the result of various diplomatic efforts, including three summits with Prime Minister Ishiba and five with Prime Minister Takaiichi, following President Lee's visit to Japan on August 23, 2025. Since taking office, President Lee has emphasized pragmatic diplomacy, stating that it is undesirable to overturn inter-state agreements regarding the comfort women issue and forced labor, and has expressed that excessive fixation on historical issues should not hinder cooperation, thereby striving to form a new image among Japan's political circles and the public (Son Yeol 2025). The results of this opinion poll suggest that Japanese citizens are experiencing some confusion regarding President Lee's mixed image as both a hardliner towards Japan and a pragmatist.

Meanwhile, the perception of Prime Minister Takaiichi among South Koreans is generally negative. Negative perceptions increased from 32.5% under Prime Minister Ishiba to 43.7%, while positive perceptions fell from 32.5% to 27.3%. Prime Minister Takaiichi, who took office in October 2025, is a prominent hawkish politician within the Liberal Democratic Party and has positioned herself as a successor to Shinzo Abe. She has regularly visited the Yasukuni Shrine and has a history of maintaining a critical stance towards the 'Murayama Statement,' which contains an apology for colonial rule, and the 'Kono Statement,' which acknowledges the coercive nature of comfort women. Consequently, South Koreans are likely to hold a negative image of Prime Minister Takaiichi. However, amid deteriorating public relations, she has maintained a pragmatic approach to stabilize Korea-Japan relations by managing sensitive issues such as historical and territorial disputes and has made efforts to create a friendly image among South Koreans through shuttle diplomacy. The slight deterioration in perceptions in this opinion poll can be seen as a result of these diplomatic efforts. Thus, similar to President Lee, South Koreans appear to be experiencing a mix of images of Prime Minister Takaiichi as both a right-wing hardliner and a pragmatist.

V. Conclusion

The citizens of Korea and Japan are witnessing an improvement in mutual perceptions. Following the historical conflicts, trade disputes, and security confrontations that plunged the two governments into a vortex of distrust around 2020, mutual perceptions between the citizens also fell to their worst state, but they have rapidly improved since then. This improvement has been driven by bottom-up factors such as increased visits to the counterpart country and consumption of popular culture. On the other hand, top-down factors, such as the perceptions of the leaders of the counterpart country, have both facilitated and delayed or worsened the improvement of mutual perceptions. Since perceptions of leaders are formed by ideological, political, and international political factors, when the factors influencing perceptions of leaders align with the image of improving Korea-Japan relations, they have driven improvements in perceptions of the counterpart country; conversely, when confusion or instability in perceptions occurs, improvements have been delayed or regressed. The differences in the patterns and speeds of improvement in perceptions between Korea and Japan in the 2020s can be attributed to the varying degrees of visits to the counterpart country, consumption of popular culture, and the level of confusion regarding perceptions of leaders.

Meanwhile, as of 2026, international political variables such as the alliance with the United States, Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, Korea-Japan economic relations, and the threat from China showed significance in the small model of regression analysis but lost significance in the full model. However, it is necessary to verify whether Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation was a significant explanatory variable for perceptions during the past Biden administration when cooperation was on track, and to examine whether mutual perception changes occur when the incentives for cooperation between Korea and Japan increase amid the alliance anxieties experienced during the second Trump administration.

Above all, the improvement in perceptions of the counterpart country should lead to positive and cooperative attitudes beyond mere interest and attention, prompting both Korea and Japan to seek strategic plans for improving mutual perceptions. It is essential to not only expand opportunities for visits to the counterpart country and cultural exchanges but also to devise legal and institutional measures to significantly enhance human exchanges between future generations. A more critical task is for the political leadership of both countries to break away from the stereotypes of the older generation and construct the impression factors required of political leaders in the new era.

References

Seok Joo-hee, [Series on Korea-Japan Relations through Public Opinion] ③ "Viewing the Phenomenon of Hatred and Korea-Japan Relations through the Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey." 2023. 11.

Son Yeol, [EAI Issue Briefing] "Korea-Japan Relations Desire Future-Oriented Cooperation over Historical Issues: An Analysis of the Results of the 2025 EAI East Asia Perception Survey." 2025.

Son Yeol, Lee Ha-yeon, [EAI Issue Briefing] "Mutual Affinity Driven by Consumption of Popular Culture: Can it be a Breakthrough for the Stagnated Korea-Japan Relations?" 2021.

Lee Yong-hee, "The Spiritual Issues of Korea-Japan Relations: Regarding the Conflict of Changing Cultural Consciousness," <New Dong-A> August 1970.

Choi Eun-mi, [EAI Issue Briefing] "The Future of Korea-Japan Relations Driven by the 20s and 30s: A New Opinion Landscape on Korea-Japan Relations Based on the First Korea-U.S.-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey." 2025.

■ Son Yeol_Chair Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute, Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University; Lee Ah-rim_PhD candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University.

■ Responsible and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher
Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr