[North Korea and the World] The Outcome of the US-China Summit and Its Implications for the Korean Peninsula

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEtkFCuIttc

■ Author: Park Won-gon _Director, EAI Center for North Korean Studies. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Contact & Editing: Lim Jae-hyun_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Background of the US-China Summit and China's Strategic Demands

Hello. Thank you for watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. On May 14th and 15th, a summit between the United States and China was held. The US-China summit has a significant impact on the entire world, and particularly on the Korean Peninsula. In a situation where the world order is undergoing major changes, closely observing the strategies each side brought to this meeting is crucial, as it is directly linked to the future of the Korean Peninsula.

To get straight to the point, much like a much-hyped banquet with little to offer, the summit did not yield significant results. I believe China gained considerably more from the US-China summit than the US did. We can find meaning in many of China's actions during the summit, which solidified its position as a G2 nation. The world was watching as this was the first visit to China by a US president in nine years since 2017. On the first day, after a 135-minute summit, they visited the historic Temple of Heaven, and the day concluded with a banquet at the Great Hall of the People. On the second day, May 15th, they engaged in five agenda items, including a tea ceremony, before the US delegation departed.

The visit was for one night and two days, and instead of a joint statement or press conference, both sides opted to announce their respective outcomes. Here, I will explain what the US under Trump and China under Xi Jinping gained and how they approached the summit. First, regarding China, President Xi Jinping made remarkably bold statements towards the US. His remarks included three key themes and important concepts. The first is the 'Thucydides Trap.' The Thucydides Trap is a concept devised by Professor Graham Allison of Harvard University.

It describes the structural tendency for a rising power challenging an established hegemonic power to clash. Its origins trace back to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who analyzed the Peloponnesian War. At that time, Athens, a rising power challenging Sparta, the existing hegemon, was perceived as a threat to Sparta's dominance, leading to war. Thucydides' analysis suggested that the cause of the war was not the conflict itself, but rather a shift in the balance of power. Professor Graham Allison has modernized this concept, arguing that a rising power's confidence, feeling the existing order is disadvantageous, leads it to demand more from the hegemonic power.

A rising power, feeling its position threatened, preemptively seeks to suppress it. When these two forces clash, they are drawn into war, even if neither desires it. This is the fundamental argument. Professor Allison analyzed 16 instances of power transitions in the past 500 years; 12 of these resulted in war. He stated that the current US-China power struggle is the 17th case that could fall into the Thucydides Trap. Crucially, Xi Jinping's invocation of the Thucydides Trap signifies a clear message: the US and China are currently in the Thucydides Trap.

Historically, falling into this trap leads to war. Therefore, to avoid this trap, the US must recognize China as a partner. In other words, the US should not fear China's rise but accept it, demanding recognition of China's status. Secondly, President Xi Jinping highlighted the concept of achieving the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' and stated that it can coexist with 'Making America Great Again.' The 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' that President Xi speaks of refers to the realization of the 'China Dream,' the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, by 2049.

This means making China prosperous and powerful, positioning it at the center of the world stage. 'Making America Great Again' implies a selective isolationism where America focuses on its own affairs and ceases intervention in regions not vital to its interests. The Trump administration has stated its focus on North America and the Western Hemisphere. This has been a core element in the National Security Strategy released in November last year and the National Defense Strategy released in January this year. These remarks are an extension of Xi Jinping's consistent rhetoric. Since 2013, President Xi has been saying, 'The vast Pacific Ocean is wide enough to accommodate both China and the United States. Let us divide the spheres of influence.'

This appears to mean that the United States should maintain its sphere of influence in the East Pacific and acknowledge the West Pacific as China's sphere of influence. It can only be seen as having a considerable strategic significance. The third point is the proposal of a 'constructive strategic stability relationship' as an experimental measure to concretize this. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained this in detail, referring to positive stability centered on cooperation, sound stability accompanied by fair competition, enduring stability with manageable disagreements, and lasting stability that promises peace. This is interpreted as a call for the United States to recognize China as an equal partner and compete within an established framework. These Chinese claims are distinct from previous ones. There was the 'new type of major power relationship' proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2012. I believe this represents a step further from that new type of major power relationship, precisely because the United States did not accept it.

America's Strategic Deficit and Trump's Personalized Diplomacy

However, this time, the 'constructive strategic stability relationship' implies a desire to de-escalate and manage the ongoing competition between the US and China. It signifies a call for the US to recognize China as an equal competitor, and as mentioned earlier, to acknowledge its spheres of influence. This is all encompassed within the 'constructive strategic stability relationship.' Unlike the previous 'new model of major power relations,' this concept is explicitly included in the fact sheet released by the US after the summit. The fact sheet states that 'the US and China must jointly pursue a constructive relationship for strategic stability.' The US statement includes the phrase 'constructive relationship of strategic stability,' with the exact wording used by China in its 'constructive strategic stability relationship' proposal.

This suggests that the US has essentially adopted China's proposals. It appears that, to a significant extent, the US has accepted many of China's desired strategic directions without much deliberation. This forces us to reconsider what Trump's strategy towards China truly is. While the US has presented various frameworks for its relationship with a powerful China, it has lacked a clear, consistent perception or policy direction and strategy. Of course, from the outset, this summit was on an uneven playing field.

This was disadvantageous for Trump. The economic difficulties in the US, coupled with a decline in Trump's domestic approval ratings, and his tendency to approach international relations in a highly personalized manner, all contributed to the absence of significant achievements or strategic direction at this summit. To elaborate further, President Trump's approval ratings had dropped to a low of 34%, and his economic policies were at an all-time low of around 30%. If this trend continues, it is widely believed that the Republican Party is likely to lose the House of Representatives in the November midterm elections.

and there are concerns that even the Senate could be at risk. Therefore, Trump needed to present this US-China summit as a success and a personal victory to the American electorate. Consequently, using his characteristic rhetoric, he claimed to have secured a 'fantastic trade deal' from the summit, which is also reflected in the fact sheet. For instance, it states that China agreed to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft and at least $17 billion worth of agricultural products. He promoted these outcomes as aligning with US economic interests, such as the full resumption of agricultural imports. The issue is that this information is absent from the Chinese official statements. While discussions may have occurred, and China has not raised objections, it is clear that these specific details are not in their official announcements. President Trump significantly softened his aggressive stance on seeking concessions from China. Of course, when on a state visit, it is inappropriate to attack the host country,

The Taiwan Issue and the Realization of 'Korea Passing'

but his demeanor was markedly different from previous encounters. While he has often referred to President Xi Jinping as 'my friend,' he also called him a 'great leader' and a 'warm person.' In the early days of the Trump administration, after initiating a full-blown competition with China in 2018, President Trump referred to Xi as the 'Communist Party leader of a bankrupt socialist country,' even vowing not to use the title 'President' but rather 'General Secretary' to emphasize his role as a Communist Party leader and the nature of the country. The contrast with his treatment of Xi at this summit is striking. Another issue that has caused concern in South Korea is the Taiwan issue. Just before traveling to Beijing for the US-China summit, President Trump told reporters that 'President Xi Jinping does not like us selling arms to Taiwan, and I will discuss this issue,' a statement with potentially significant repercussions.

The US has a policy, established under President Ronald Reagan in 1982, known as the Six Assurances, which includes not consulting China in advance regarding arms sales to Taiwan. President Trump's statement directly contradicts this principle. Furthermore, Trump stated that he had an in-depth discussion with President Xi Jinping about arms sales to Taiwan and, after the summit, announced that the decision on arms sales to Taiwan would be put on hold, with China's response determining the outcome, causing considerable stir.

This refers to a $14 billion arms package that was announced by the Department of Defense in January but subsequently delayed. The prospect of using this to negotiate with China is inherently concerning for us, as the US, which acknowledges significant responsibility for Taiwan's defense, has abandoned its core principle of not discussing arms sales to Taiwan with China. Applying this logic to the Korean Peninsula, it could mean that the US might negotiate with North Korea's Kim Jong Un and reach agreements without South Korea's involvement.

The Issue of North Korean Denuclearization and the Imbalance in US-China Strategy

This is what is referred to as 'Korea Passing.' It implies that negotiations on the nuclear issue could occur without reflecting our interests, and then South Korea would be expected to accept the outcome. Given the nature of the Trump administration, this scenario cannot be entirely ruled out. This situation is a cause for significant concern for the Republic of Korea. However, the issue of North Korean denuclearization was indeed discussed at the US-China summit. The US fact sheet states that 'the US reaffirmed the common goal of North Korean denuclearization,' but this is absent from the Chinese official statement. The Chinese announcement merely states that 'the two heads of state exchanged views on major regional and international issues such as the situation in the Middle East, the Ukraine crisis, and the Korean Peninsula.' China has not discussed the issue of North Korean denuclearization for several years. This is because, given North Korea's strong opposition and China's supportive stance, China avoids provoking North Korea by refraining from such discussions.

China's Long-Term Strategy and the Narrowing of South Korea's Options

Nevertheless, it is fortunate that the US mentioned it in the fact sheet, and China did not express opposition, indicating that the discussion did take place. Particularly, the phrase 'North Korean denuclearization' appears to have been used accurately. As I mentioned, this US-China summit could mark a historical turning point, signifying China's official ascent to the G2 status alongside the US. China operates with a long-term perspective. Unlike the US or South Korea, where leaders are changed through democratic elections, Xi Jinping, serving his third term, can lead for an extended period and establish long-term relationships. China aims to manage its relationship with the US with a long-term strategy, whereas President Trump's approach is characterized by a focus on short-term, material, economic, and domestic political interests. If the two countries have different approaches, it is natural to assume that the side with the longer-term perspective will ultimately achieve a more advantageous outcome. While the side with the longer-term perspective might make concessions in the short term, in the medium to long term, the outcome will inevitably align with their strategic direction.

This is a cause for concern. President Trump's term has less than three years remaining, and with ongoing meetings and a high probability of a second US-China summit in September, Xi Jinping is likely to advance step by step with each encounter. In contrast, if Trump continues his personalized diplomacy without clear principles, he will inevitably appear to be retreating. If the US loses its strategic consistency, South Korea's options, as demonstrated by the Taiwan issue, will continue to narrow. Reflecting on this US-China summit, I find myself with a profound sense of unease. Given the significant impact of US-China relations on the Korean Peninsula, I will continue to analyze future summits and major agenda items. Thank you for watching.