Signals of US-North Korea Dialogue Ahead of the November APEC Summit: How Can South Korea Participate in Agenda Setting?
Executive Summary
Although the National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessed the probability of US-North Korea dialogue around the November APEC summit at 50%, this is a neutral figure—neither optimistic nor pessimistic—and is difficult to use as a basis for policy decisions. Washington's signaling toward North Korea is dual-tracked through Trump's personal channel and the State Department's official line. Meanwhile, North Korea excludes the denuclearization agenda itself and insists on the recognition of its nuclear-weapon-state status as a prerequisite. Therefore, even if a summit takes place, the likelihood of substantive progress on denuclearization remains low. The precedent of the August 16 announcement on scaling down military exercises, which was made without prior consultation with South Korea, highlights the structural risk of South Korea being excluded from agenda setting. President Lee Jae-myung's remarks in New York represent an attempt to secure active engagement, but securing agenda-setting power remains a future task. The government should separately monitor the Trump channel and the State/Defense Department channels while seeking to reaffirm extended deterrence. For businesses, it is rational to defer investment decisions regarding inter-Korean economic cooperation until substantive changes in the sanctions regime are confirmed.
I. Issue Analysis
Signals of Resuming the US-North Korea Summit and the Deadlock in Denuclearization Negotiations: Issue Analysis
1. Background and Progress of the Issue
On August 16, President Trump ordered a reduction in the scale of the joint South Korea-US military exercise "Ulchi Freedom Shield" on its start date [3]. Through Truth Social, he mentioned having a "very good relationship" with Kim Jong Un [3]. The justification for the reduction was that North Korea had shown a "non-threatening and respectful attitude" during his presidency [3]. This announcement was made without prior consultation with the South Korean government [3]. The People Power Party protested, defining it as "South Korea passing" [3].
Subsequently, developments diverged into two tracks. President Trump continued to escalate his rhetoric, emphasizing his personal friendship with Kim [3][9]. Conversely, North Korea maintained its stance of excluding denuclearization discussions from the agenda altogether [9]. Kim Jong Un put forward the recognition of North Korea's nuclear-weapon-state status as a prerequisite [9]. In a statement on August 31, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly took issue with the US State Department's reaffirmation of the denuclearization principle [3]. It also warned of a tough response to South Korea-US arms deals [3]. In effect, North Korea maintained its hardline stance, separate from the efforts to create a favorable atmosphere for a summit [3].
On September 22, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, President Lee Jae-myung requested President Trump to support the resumption of US-North Korea dialogue [12]. President Trump reaffirmed his willingness to talk with Kim Jong Un [12]. Around the same time, during the US-China summit held at the White House from September 23 to 25, the Korean Peninsula issue was on the agenda, but the specific joint goal of "North Korea's denuclearization"—which had been confirmed during the May US-China summit—was omitted from the announcement of the outcomes [7]. The White House only stated in its factsheet that they "discussed ongoing international issues, including Russia, North Korea, and Iran" [7]. Whether the two leaders discussed the resumption of US-North Korea dialogue was not disclosed [7].
2. Current Situation
In a report to the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee on September 30, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessed the probability of US-North Korea dialogue around the November APEC summit in China at approximately 50% [1][10]. Representative Yoo Yeong-ha of the People Power Party disclosed this NIS assessment immediately after the committee meeting [1]. The NIS judged that North Korea "appears unwilling to miss this opportunity" [1][10].
The diplomatic schedule surrounding APEC is not limited to the Korean Peninsula issue. The Kremlin raised the possibility that President Xi Jinping might arrange a trilateral summit between President Trump and President Putin on the sidelines of APEC [13]. Yuri Ushakov, the Kremlin's foreign policy advisor, stated, "If the US President is also present, it is highly likely that President Xi, as the host, will take steps to hold a trilateral meeting" [13]. President Trump's diplomatic schedule for November is not occupied solely by the Korean Peninsula issue but overlaps with the Russia-Ukraine variable.
In the US political landscape, an unusual signal of bipartisan support also emerged. On September 29, Democratic Representatives Brad Sherman and Judy Chu issued a joint statement welcoming President Trump's efforts to resume dialogue with Kim Jong Un [4]. They stated, "Despite North Korea's rebuffs, serious dialogue and diplomacy remain the most effective means to protect US national security interests in the region, address proliferation concerns, and achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula" [4]. Public support from opposition lawmakers ahead of the midterm elections deviates from the usual pattern [4].
However, no official response from North Korean media has been confirmed. While some have raised the possibility of considering an invitation for Kim Jong Un to the December G20 summit in Miami, North Korea has repeatedly maintained that it has no intention of engaging as long as denuclearization remains a policy goal [6]. North Korea did not show enthusiasm even for President Trump's gesture of scaling down the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise [6].
3. Key Actors and Positions
North Koreahas not completely closed the door on the possibility of dialogue, but it is not lowering its prerequisites. It maintains its demands for the recognition of its nuclear-weapon-state status and the withdrawal of hostile policies [9]. It immediately reacted against the State Department's reaffirmation of the denuclearization principle with a foreign ministry statement and warned of a tough response to South Korea-US arms deals [3]. There is a likelihood that North Korea is adopting a conditional wait-and-see strategy, anticipating a more favorable situation after the US midterm elections [9].
President Trumpis the key driver of personal conciliatory gestures. This track includes his directive to scale down military exercises, his Truth Social posts, and his reaffirmation of his willingness to engage in dialogue to President Lee Jae-myung [3][12]. He has a clear incentive to leverage his personal friendship with Kim Jong Un into a foreign policy achievement following his reelection [9].
Working-level officials in the US State and Defense Departmentsmaintain a separate track of reaffirming the principle of denuclearization [3]. The mismatch in signaling between Trump's personal channel and the working-level channel has served as a basis for North Korea's backlash [3].
The South Korean governmentis known to have not been consulted beforehand during the process of announcing the reduction of military exercises [3]. President Lee Jae-myung is seeking a mediator role to resume dialogue through a private meeting in New York [12]. The NIS is officially tracking the situation, reporting its 50% probability assessment to the National Assembly [1][10].
Chinaas the host of APEC, is building its own diplomatic agenda independently of the Korean Peninsula issue, as exemplified by the potential arrangement of a Trump-Putin trilateral meeting [13]. The omission of North Korea's denuclearization from the joint goal language during the September US-China summit at the White House [7] suggests that the priority of the Korean Peninsula agenda between the US and China may have decreased.
Some Democrats in the US Congresshave shown an unusual move by offering bipartisan support for resuming the summit [4]. This is a factor that reduces the likelihood of US-North Korea dialogue escalating into a domestic political issue.
4. Key Issues
The first issue is whether Washington's dual-tracked signaling can be reconciled by November. Trump's personal conciliatory gestures and the State Department's reaffirmation of principles have run parallel without coordination [3]. North Korea is using this discrepancy as a justification for delaying negotiations [3].
The second issue is whether North Korea's prerequisites will actually be relaxed at the negotiating table. Recognition of its nuclear-weapon-state status is an unacceptable condition for the United States. As long as North Korea adheres to this, the path from a 50% probability of "dialogue" to a "summit" and ultimately to an "agreement" remains unclear [1][9].
The third issue is whether South Korea will participate in agenda setting. An instance of exclusion from prior consultation has already occurred during the announcement of the reduction in military exercises [3]. Concerns are raised that if a summit actually takes place, a 2019-style exclusion of South Korea could recur [9].
The fourth issue is the competition among multiple agendas surrounding APEC. With the possibility of a Trump-Putin trilateral meeting and US-China issues pending simultaneously [13], it remains uncertain how much weight the North Korean issue will carry in President Trump's priorities.
II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue
Signals of Resuming the US-North Korea Summit and the Deadlock in Denuclearization Negotiations: In-Depth Analysis
1. Root Cause Analysis
The deadlock in this phase is not merely a lack of communication. It stems from the fact that Washington and Pyongyang want to bring entirely different agendas to the negotiating table. North Korea has repeatedly made clear its position that it has no intention of accepting denuclearization as a negotiating agenda [9]. Kim Jong Un presented the recognition of North Korea's nuclear-weapon-state status as a prerequisite for dialogue [9]. This aligns with the conclusion North Korea internally reached after the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi summit. North Korea has publicly stated its assessment that "negotiations with the United States have already gone as far as they can go" [9].
Conversely, the US State Department maintains its official position of reaffirming the principle of denuclearization [3]. It is no coincidence that President Trump's personal conciliatory remarks and the State Department's policy line emerged conflictually at the same time. President Trump's approach is a top-down method based on personal friendship and political legacy management. The State Department's working-level officials are bound by institutional responsibilities of maintaining the non-proliferation regime and managing allies. As these two tracks operate simultaneously without coordination, the signals transmitted to Pyongyang have become dual-tracked [3]. The fact that North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly took issue with the State Department's reaffirmation of principles in its August 31 statement [3] indicates that North Korea is accurately capturing this mismatch in signaling.
2. Structural Context
Political Structure
The South Korean government cannot help but be conscious of the risk of structural exclusion in this phase. The case of the August 16 announcement on scaling down military exercises, which was made without prior consultation with the South Korean government, demonstrates this [3]. The People Power Party's characterization of this as "South Korea passing" [3] is closer to pointing out an actual gap in the decision-making structure rather than an exaggerated political offensive. President Lee Jae-myung's direct request to President Trump in New York on September 22 to support the resumption of dialogue [12] can also be read as an attempt to fill this gap. However, there is no guarantee that President Trump's reaffirmation of his willingness to talk with Kim Jong Un [12] will translate into South Korea securing agenda-setting power.
The US domestic political landscape is also a variable. The fact that Democratic Representatives Brad Sherman and Judy Chu welcomed President Trump's efforts to resume dialogue [4] is an unusual bipartisan signal ahead of the midterm elections. This suggests the possibility that the North Korean issue may not be consumed as a partisan agenda in US domestic politics. At the same time, there is a political incentive for President Trump, who needs visible foreign policy achievements. The tension between the motivation to pursue a summit for personal legacy and the State Department's non-proliferation principles is highly likely to persist as long as this political incentive remains unresolved.
Economic and Security Structure
Whether there will be substantive changes in the sanctions regime remains a key variable. Thus far, in a cooling-off phase characterized by rhetorical statements, no concrete signals leading to sanctions relief or the resumption of economic cooperation have been confirmed. North Korea's warning of a tough response to South Korea-US arms deals [3] shows that military tension management is proceeding simultaneously, separate from the creation of a summit atmosphere. The issue of the credibility of the extended deterrence commitment is also inherent in this structure. If the pattern of recycling the reduction of military exercises as a card to create conditions for dialogue is repeated [9], it will accumulate precedents where the alliance's security commitment itself is consumed as a bargaining chip.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparison of Similar Cases
The 2019 Hanoi summit is the most direct reference point for understanding the current phase. At that time, North Korea proposed exchanging the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility for sanctions relief, but the summit collapsed as the United States rejected it. Subsequently, North Korea shifted its stance, showing no further willingness to make concessions in negotiations with the United States [9]. In the current phase, North Korea's exclusion of denuclearization itself from the agenda and its insistence on the recognition of its nuclear-weapon-state status as a prerequisite [9] can be seen as a learned outcome of the Hanoi collapse. From North Korea's perspective, this means that a negotiation framework predicated on denuclearization is no longer an acceptable starting point.
There are assessments that even during the 2018–2019 Singapore and Hanoi phases, South Korea played only a limited role in the agenda-setting stage of the summits. The possibility of a similar structure recurring this time is being raised. The case of the August announcement on scaling down military exercises without prior consultation [3] can be interpreted as an early signal supporting this concern. However, unlike during President Trump's first term, the current phase is difficult to view as an identical pattern, given that the State Department is publicly reaffirming the principle of denuclearization and acting as a brake [3].
A contrast with the Iranian nuclear negotiations is also worth noting. For Iran, President Trump is adopting a conditional approach, offering sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets predicated on "concrete steps" [18]. This contrasts with his approach to North Korea. In the case of Iran, concessions regarding its nuclear program are premised first, whereas for North Korea, a meeting between leaders without the premise of denuclearization is being discussed first. This asymmetry demonstrates that President Trump is applying different negotiation designs on a case-by-case basis.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
Competition with Multilateral Diplomatic Schedules on the Sidelines of APEC
The November APEC summit is not a stage solely for the Korean Peninsula issue. The Kremlin raised the possibility of President Xi Jinping arranging a trilateral summit between Trump and Putin on the sidelines of APEC [13]. If President Trump's diplomatic schedule overlaps with the Russia-Ukraine variable, the political resources and protocol time he can allocate to US-North Korea dialogue may be constrained. The background of the NIS's assessment of a 50% probability for US-North Korea dialogue around APEC [1][10] likely includes such scheduling conflicts.
Reflection of the Korean Peninsula Agenda in US-China Relations
The omission of the specific joint goal of "North Korea's denuclearization" from the announcement of the outcomes of the September US-China summit at the White House [7] is an important signal. The omission of the goal, which had been confirmed during the May US-China summit, indicates that the level of US-China cooperation on the Korean Peninsula issue has decreased compared to before, or has at least been deprioritized in terms of public announcements. Whether the resumption of US-North Korea dialogue was discussed was also not disclosed [7]. What role China will play regarding North Korea as the host of APEC remains an unclear variable.
North Korea's Internal Calculations and Rhetorical Intensity
How North Korea's response, currently at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' August 31 statement [3], develops in the future will determine the short-term trajectory. While the cooling-off remains at the rhetorical level, low-intensity communication channels may remain active. However, if the warned tough response to South Korea-US arms deals translates into actual action, the atmosphere for dialogue itself could rapidly cool down. The NIS's assessment that North Korea "appears unwilling to miss this opportunity" [1][10] suggests a judgment that North Korea's strategic interests are not entirely tilted toward rejecting dialogue. However, given that this assessment does not imply acceptance of the denuclearization agenda, the possibility of a summit leading to substantive progress on denuclearization must be evaluated separately, even if the summit takes place.
III. Recommended Final Responses
Signals of Resuming the US-North Korea Summit and the Deadlock in Denuclearization Negotiations: Recommended Final Responses
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Responses
The 50% probability presented by the NIS is a neutral figure—neither optimistic nor pessimistic [1][10]. It is difficult to use this figure itself as a basis for policy decisions. Regardless of whether a summit is held, two facts have been confirmed. First, Washington's signaling toward North Korea is dual-tracked through Trump's personal channel and the State Department's official line [3]. Second, North Korea excludes the denuclearization agenda itself from the negotiating table and adheres to the recognition of its nuclear-weapon-state status as a prerequisite [9]. Unless these two positions are reconciled, the likelihood of a summit leading to substantive progress on denuclearization remains low.
The recommended response for the South Korean government should focus on preventing its exclusion rather than placing bets. The precedent of the August 16 announcement to scale down military exercises without prior consultation [3] represents a structural risk that could recur. President Lee Jae-myung's request to President Trump in New York on September 22 to support the resumption of dialogue, and his reconfirmation of Trump's willingness to engage [12], is evaluated as an attempt to secure a minimum level of involvement. However, it must be clearly recognized that this does not guarantee securing agenda-setting power. For businesses, there is currently no basis to rush investment decisions related to inter-Korean economic cooperation. It is rational to withhold judgment until substantive changes to the sanctions regime are confirmed through official documents or actions.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-Term (Around the November APEC Summit)
The government must separate its responses to Trump's personal channel and the working-level channels of the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense. Rather than being swayed by President Trump's personal remarks, the government needs to operate a dual-track monitoring system that separately tracks changes in the official positions of the State and Defense Departments. At the same time, it should secure a separate reaffirmation of the extended deterrence commitment through U.S. Department of Defense channels. This must be accompanied by efforts to reaffirm the commitment through public channels so that the scaling down of military exercises is not interpreted as a sign of a weakening alliance. The possibility of a U.S.-China-Russia trilateral summit on the sidelines of the APEC meeting, as mentioned by the Kremlin [13], is also a variable. Considering that President Trump's diplomatic agenda in November will not be occupied solely by Korean Peninsula issues, the possibility cannot be ruled out that U.S.-North Korea dialogue could be sidelined by other agendas and limited to mere formal contact.
Medium-Term (3 to 6 Months)
The baseline scenario presented in previous EAI analyses—namely, a cooling-off period at the level of statements—is the most likely [3]. During this period, South Korea should simultaneously pursue the minimal restoration of inter-Korean working-level channels. Regardless of whether a summit takes place, South Korea and the United States need to establish a prior consultation mechanism to prepare for a potential recurrence of the 2019-style dynamic, where agendas were decided while South Korea was excluded. For businesses, it is advisable to focus on preparing response plans for multiple scenarios rather than finalizing investment plans during this period.
Long-Term (6 Months or More)
If a summit actually takes place and agenda negotiations begin in earnest, the issue of whether to recognize North Korea's nuclear-weapon-state status will emerge as a key point of contention. The stance the United States takes on this issue will determine the future direction of the overall sanctions regime. At this stage, the South Korean government should use the potential hollowing out of the denuclearization principle as its yardstick for judgment, and must be prepared to immediately raise concerns through ROK-U.S. coordination channels if signals of a substantive retreat from this principle emerge.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The indicators to be tracked can be narrowed down to four. First is whether there is any change in the phrasing of the denuclearization principle in official U.S. State Department briefings. Any softening or deletion of this phrasing would serve as a primary trigger indicating a shift in the State Department's stance. Second is a change in the tone of statements from North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The key observation point is whether the frequency and intensity of references to its nuclear-weapon-state status are toned down. Third is whether a U.S.-North Korea bilateral contact is actually reflected in the official schedule of the APEC summit. Fourth is the operation of prior consultation channels between South Korea and the United States—specifically, whether President Trump's remarks or measures regarding North Korea are coordinated with the South Korean government beforehand. It is reasonable to upwardly adjust the likelihood of a summit actually taking place only when both the third and fourth indicators are met simultaneously.
4. Summary and Conclusion
The current situation is characterized by a dual-track state where President Trump's personal conciliatory gestures coexist with the U.S. State Department's principled stance [3]. North Korea is accurately capturing these dual signals and has not withdrawn its precondition of being recognized as a nuclear-weapon state [9]. The National Intelligence Service's (NIS) assessment of a 50% probability [1][10] is a figure reflecting uncertainty itself, not a ground for an optimistic outlook. Rather than betting on either signal, both the government and businesses should maintain a dual-track response, withholding judgment until substantive changes to the sanctions regime are confirmed through official documents and actions. South Korea's policy priority should not lie in predicting whether a summit will take place. Instead, it should focus on separately tracking the Trump and State Department channels, and preemptively blocking a recurrence of the 2019-style exclusion dynamic by minimally restoring inter-Korean working-level channels and securing a reaffirmation of the extended deterrence commitment.
References
[1] [NK News] 50% chance of US-North Korea talks around APEC summit: report - https://www.nknews.org/2026/09/50-chance-of-us-north-korea-talk-around-apec-summit-report/
[2] [Brookings Institution] What did the Trump-Xi summit actually accomplish?
[5] [Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)] The Limits of Trump and Xi’s Photo-Op Summit
[11] [Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)] Ten Issues to Watch at the Trump-Xi Summit in Washington
[12] [The Diplomat] Lee Asks Trump to Help Revive North Korea Talks During New York Trip
[13] [JoongAng Ilbo] Kremlin: 'Xi Jinping May Seek Trilateral Summit with Trump and Putin at APEC'
[14] [South China Morning Post] Trump expects new Iran talks despite rejecting deal offer
[15] [Al-Monitor] Trump expects new Iran talks despite rejecting deal offer
[16] [Gulf News] Trump expects talks with Iran to resume in coming week
[17] [Jamaica Observer] Trump expects new Iran talks despite rejecting deal offer
[21] [TASS] Trump says US to hold more talks with Iran next week
[23] [The Diplomat] Trump-Xi Meet Again: A Summit Without Substance?
[24] [Hürriyet Daily News] Iran, US send mixed signals over talks to end war
[25] [Daily Sabah] Trump reportedly open to Iran sanctions relief for nuclear progress
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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