Blocking Resupply at Second Thomas Shoal and the Militarization of the Gray Zone: Analysis and Implications
Executive Summary
On September 24, the resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal was disrupted by the simultaneous intervention of the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), effectively neutralizing the verbal understanding that had managed tensions between the two countries since 2024. The crux of this incident lies not in the disruption itself, but in the shift of China's gray-zone tactics from relying primarily on the coast guard and maritime militia to fully exposing naval assets. Immediately following the incident, joint maritime and air exercises were conducted near Scarborough Shoal, signaling a transition to actual combat readiness. A deadlock has hardened as the Philippines frames the mission as a lawful humanitarian resupply within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while China characterizes it as an illegal attempt without prior approval—a structural impasse stemming from the lack of enforcement of the 2016 Hague arbitral ruling and the unwritten nature of the 'provisional agreement.' The United States' statement-level response and ASEAN's limitations in collective action demonstrate the restricted deterrence of regional multilateral frameworks amid US-China strategic competition. South Korea should reflect the lesson of this case—that verbal understandings are ultimately reinterpreted based on physical superiority on the ground—in designing the text and reviewing implementation procedures for similar provisional agreements, including those concerning West Sea issues.
I. Situation Analysis
Blocking Resupply at Second Thomas Shoal and the Militarization of the Gray Zone: Situation Analysis
1. Background and Developments
Second Thomas Shoal (known as Ren'ai Jiao in China and Ayungin Shoal in the Philippines) is a feature where the Philippines has maintained effective control since 1999, using the BRP Sierra Madre—a World War II-era warship intentionally grounded there—as its outpost. Philippine Marine personnel reside on this aging vessel, using it as a symbol of sovereignty. China has characterized the grounding of the ship itself as 'illegal' and has targeted regular resupply missions for interdiction [3].
In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled that China's 'nine-dash line' claim has no legal basis under international law [2][4]. The tribunal also determined that none of the features in the Spratly Islands can generate an EEZ or a continental shelf [4]. China has refused to recognize this ruling [2][4]. Since then, as physical clashes over resupply missions recurred in 2024, the two countries attempted to manage tensions through a so-called 'provisional agreement.' However, this agreement was closer to a verbal understanding rather than a documented treaty. The two nations have maintained differing interpretations regarding the necessity of prior notification and approval for resupply missions.
From the Philippine perspective, as the area lies within its EEZ, the resupply mission is an exercise of its sovereign rights. From the Chinese perspective, since the BRP Sierra Madre is an illegal occupation, resupply is treated as an exceptional activity requiring prior approval [3]. This fundamental difference in perception lies at the heart of the current incident.
2. Current Situation
On September 24, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) announced that the resupply mission to the grounded warship was disrupted due to dangerous maneuvers by the China Coast Guard. PCG spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela stated, 'There was no collision and no injuries, but the dangerous maneuvers of the China Coast Guard created a serious risk of collision' [1]. The PCG specifically noted that both CCG and PLAN vessels intervened simultaneously [1].
China's state-run Global Times framed the incident entirely differently. In a report on September 25, the Global Times stated that 'the Philippines ignored China's warnings and sent a supply vessel to the illegally grounded warship at Ren'ai Jiao,' emphasizing that this resupply attempt 'did not receive prior approval from the Chinese side' [3]. In other words, China frames the incident as 'interdiction' rather than disruption, and characterizes the Philippine action as a 'provocation' [3][9].
Just three days after the incident, the Chinese military conducted joint maritime and air exercises near Scarborough Shoal [5][7]. In a statement on WeChat, the PLA Southern Theater Command defined the exercises as a necessary response to actions by 'a certain country' that undermine regional peace [5]. Citing experts, the Global Times reported that the exercises demonstrated that the military is 'ready to transition from training to actual combat,' confirming the deployment of the Type 908 replenishment ship Qinghaihu and the WZ-7 unmanned aerial vehicle [11]. In a separate article, the Global Times claimed that since 2023, the Philippines has engaged in a 'series of infringements and provocations,' including attempts to enter waters near Chinese islands and reefs, colliding with Chinese vessels, and maintaining an illegal presence, framing this incident as an extension of those actions [10].
During the same week, the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Joint Exercise, co-hosted by the Philippines and Japan and involving 11 vessels from eight countries, took place in the West Philippine Sea [6]. China attended only the opening ceremony and avoided the maritime exercise phase [6][12]. The fact that this exercise was conducted in parallel with the Philippine-China standoff near Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal highlights a dynamic where the symbolism of multilateral exercises and physical tensions on the ground escalate simultaneously [6].
3. Key Actors and Positions
Philippine Government and Coast Guard: Since taking office in 2022, the Marcos administration has consistently pursued military modernization and the expansion of security partnerships [6]. The PCG responded by publicizing the incident to the international community and maintains a regular briefing system through Commodore Tarriela [1]. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, who has maintained a hardline stance on South China Sea issues, has been directly criticized by Chinese state media as an 'ominous sign for the national destiny of the Philippines' [15]. This indicates that China is wary of the political rise of anti-China hardliners within the Philippines.
Chinese Government, Coast Guard, and PLA: China raised the level of its response by simultaneously deploying the coast guard (law enforcement) and the navy (military force). According to the Global Times, the joint coast guard-navy exercises are 'highly combat-oriented' and represent a 'readiness to transition from training to actual combat' [11]. This suggests a shift from previous gray-zone tactics centered on the coast guard and maritime militia toward a posture where naval assets are fully exposed on the front lines. China is also pressuring the Philippines by linking the issue to Taiwan. Separately, the China Coast Guard has intensified patrols in waters near Taiwan, demanding that the Philippines adhere to the One-China principle and cease military contacts with Taiwan [17]. The Taiwan Affairs Office of China's condemnation of Taiwan's transfer of decommissioned patrol vessels to the Philippines through an NGO as 'despicable' falls within the same context [8].
United States: The US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty marked its 75th anniversary during this period [6]. While the United States criticized China at the statement level, whether the incident constitutes an 'armed attack'—the trigger for the treaty's automatic invocation—remains ambiguous. This incident, which confirmed the direct involvement of naval vessels, can be evaluated as a case testing the threshold for the treaty's application.
ASEAN: Although eight countries participated in the joint exercise led by the Philippines and Japan under the ADMM-Plus framework, local media pointed out that the actual participation and voice of Southeast Asian regional states were limited [12]. This reaffirms the structural limitations of ASEAN, which lacks a collective response mechanism and instead relies on the bilateral responses of individual member states.
4. Key Issues
The first issue is the clash over how the incident itself is defined. The Philippines defines it as a lawful humanitarian resupply within its EEZ, while China characterizes it as legitimate law enforcement against an illegal resupply attempt [1][3]. This divergence converges into a legal dispute over whether to recognize the binding force of the 2016 arbitral ruling, as well as the distinction between prior notification and prior approval under the 'provisional agreement.'
The second issue is the shift in the method of interdiction. The involvement of naval combatants and missile boats directly blocking the mission alongside the coast guard indicates that the center of gravity of gray-zone tactics is shifting from paramilitary forces to regular military forces [1][11]. The Global Times report, which openly proclaimed readiness for actual combat immediately after the exercises, is an instance where the Chinese side itself publicly supported this shift [11].
The third issue is the effectiveness of the provisional agreement. A verbal understanding without a written text leaves room for reinterpretation whenever the balance of power between the parties shifts on the ground. This incident should be viewed as a case where such vulnerability was exposed in practice.
II. In-Depth Analysis
Blocking Resupply at Second Thomas Shoal and the Militarization of the Gray Zone: In-Depth Analysis
1. Root Cause Analysis
The superficial issue of this clash is whether the resupply mission was disrupted. However, the more fundamental cause lies in the legal nature of the 'provisional agreement' itself. This agreement was a verbal understanding reached by both countries in 2024 to mitigate recurring clashes. It was not documented in the form of a treaty or a joint statement. From the outset, both countries maintained interpretations regarding prior notification and approval of resupply missions that favored their respective positions.
The Philippines understood notification as a 'courtesy notice,' whereas China interpreted it as a 'request for prior approval.' The Global Times repeatedly emphasized that this resupply 'did not receive prior approval from the Chinese side' [3][9]. This demonstrates that China defines the provisional agreement as an approval-based system. Meanwhile, the Philippine Coast Guard defined the mission as a lawful humanitarian resupply within its EEZ [1]. This structure allows the clash over definitions itself to be mobilized as grounds for claiming non-compliance with the agreement.
A deeper cause lies in the enforcement vacuum of the 2016 Hague arbitral ruling. The ruling declared that China's nine-dash line claim has no legal basis under international law [2][4]. It also determined that none of the features in the Spratly Islands can generate an EEZ or a continental shelf [4]. However, no enforcement mechanism exists to compel compliance with this ruling. China has refused to accept it, characterizing the ruling as 'null and void' and having 'no binding force' [2]. This is the background against which the asymmetric structure between the Philippines, which holds legal legitimacy, and China, which possesses physical power on the ground, has persisted for a decade.
2. Structural Context
Security Structure: Step-by-Step Escalation of Gray-Zone Tactics
China's coercive measures in the South China Sea have traditionally been operated by placing the coast guard and maritime militia on the front lines while keeping the navy in the background. In this incident, however, this structure was disrupted. The Philippine Coast Guard specifically noted that both CCG and PLAN vessels intervened simultaneously [1]. In the joint maritime and air exercises conducted by the PLA Southern Theater Command three days after the incident, the Type 908 replenishment ship Qinghaihu and the WZ-7 unmanned aerial vehicle were deployed [11]. Citing experts, the Global Times reported that these exercises demonstrated that the military is 'ready to transition from training to actual combat' [11]. This indicates a shift from low-intensity pressure centered on the coast guard to a stage where naval assets are fully exposed on the front lines.
A similar expansion into airspace was also observed over Scarborough Shoal on September 2. The PLA Southern Theater Command used JL-10 trainer jets equipped with PL-5 missiles to expel three Philippine light aircraft. This was evaluated as 'the latest phase of a step-by-step escalation of coercion, moving from effective control on the ground in 2012 and the declaration of territorial sea baselines in 2024 to airspace control' [4]. Looking at the Second Thomas Shoal incident and the Scarborough Shoal airspace incident together, it is possible to infer that China's coercive measures are being escalated simultaneously in both maritime and air domains.
Political Structure: The Marcos Administration's Security Stance and ASEAN's Limitations
Since taking office, the Marcos administration in the Philippines has consistently pursued military modernization and the expansion of security partnerships [6]. Around the 75th anniversary of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, it has increased the frequency of joint exercises and the number of accessible bases with extra-regional partners, including the United States and Japan [6]. The ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Joint Exercise, co-hosted by the Philippines and Japan in the West Philippine Sea during the same week of the incident and involving 11 vessels from eight countries, is an extension of this policy [6][12]. China attended only the opening ceremony and avoided the maritime exercise phase [6].
The choice of location for this exercise is highly symbolic. It was conducted in the waters between Zambales and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal), which is a high-tide feature 'located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, claimed by several countries, and under de facto Chinese control since 2012' [12]. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has repeatedly engaged in such multilateral exercises and external messaging, prompting the Global Times to express blatant hostility by labeling him an 'ominous sign for the national destiny of the Philippines' [15].
Conversely, ASEAN has failed to develop a collective response capability due to conflicting interests among its member states [2]. This is also demonstrated by the low level of substantive participation by Southeast Asian nations in the ADMM-Plus exercise [12]. A structure is hardening in which the Philippines effectively fills its security vacuum through bilateral and minilateral cooperation with extra-regional partners such as Japan and the United States.
Economic and Strategic Structure: SLOCs and Resource Access
The South China Sea is a critical segment of East Asian sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and a contested arena for fishing and energy resources. In the case of Scarborough Shoal, access for Philippine fishers has been effectively blocked through a 'nature reserve' established by China [2]. The current clash over Second Thomas Shoal is an extension of this same structure. Given that the core issue is control over the entire access route rather than the resupply itself, this should be viewed not as a simple logistical matter, but as an attempt to effectively establish control over the maritime area.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Case Analysis
The clash over Second Thomas Shoal is not unprecedented. The Global Times claimed that since 2023, the Philippines has continued a 'series of infringements and provocations,' such as attempting to enter waters near Chinese islands and reefs, colliding with Chinese vessels, and maintaining an illegal presence, framing this incident as an extension of those actions [10]. This framing demonstrates that China treats each incident not as an isolated, spontaneous event, but as part of a cumulative pattern.
The closest precedent is the July 2026 clash between the coast guard and the navy. This served as the basis for the assessment that 'there is a persistent risk of accidental escalation in the process of operating coercive measures' [2]. The fact that actual collisions were avoided in this incident despite repeated dangerous maneuvers suggests that both sides maintain a pattern of raising pressure to the brink of physical contact while avoiding escalation. However, this case, where naval assets were directly exposed, can be read as a signal that the margin of safety in this pattern is narrowing.
The case of effective control over Scarborough Shoal is also a significant reference point. Since seizing control of the area in 2012, China has blocked Philippine access while avoiding accusations of violating international law through the indirect method of declaring a nature reserve [2]. This is evaluated as 'a roundabout strategy of effective control adopted by China after the 2016 Hague arbitral ruling stripped the "historical rights" argument of its basis under international law' [2]. At Second Thomas Shoal, the physical outpost of the BRP Sierra Madre makes it difficult to apply the Scarborough-style roundabout strategy directly. Instead, the two cases show tactical differences, with Second Thomas Shoal witnessing attempts to establish effective control through a different method—blocking the access route.
Cases in the East China Sea also serve as points of comparison. Japan has raised security concerns over the repeated survey activities of Chinese oceanographic research vessels within its EEZ near the Senkaku Islands [14]. It has been pointed out that these survey activities may be aimed at collecting seabed topographic data in preparation for a Taiwan contingency [14]. This demonstrates that China is conducting activities to secure information superiority prior to physical effective control not only in the South China Sea but also in the East China Sea. Near the Taiwan Strait, movements by the China Coast Guard to tighten control under the pretext of 'ensuring orderly navigation and activities' have also been observed [17]. What is commonly observed across all three maritime areas is a pattern of compensating for weak legal bases with physical power on the ground and administrative pretexts.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is the threshold for applying the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Thus far, the United States has limited its response to statement-level criticism [2]. Whether this case, in which naval assets directly engaged in interdiction, is deemed close to the trigger conditions of the treaty depends on Washington's judgment. The more ambiguous the criteria for judgment, the greater the incentive for China to sustain its gray-zone tactics below the threshold.
The second variable is the existence of high-level communication channels between US and Chinese leaders. The US-China summit held in Washington on September 24–25 yielded achievements such as the extension of the trade truce and the establishment of an AI crisis communication channel [6][13][16]. However, a standoff occurred in parallel in the West Philippine Sea during the same week [6]. This demonstrates that the macro-level management of US-China relations and coercive actions on the ground in the South China Sea operate on separate tracks. The fact that relationship improvements at the leadership level do not translate into deterrence on the ground increases the likelihood of similar incidents recurring in the future.
The third variable is whether the provisional agreement will be renegotiated. If the text is left ambiguous, it opens up space for the party holding physical superiority to reinterpret it to their advantage in every incident. China's repeated emphasis on the necessity of approval in this incident can be seen as part of such an attempt at reinterpretation [3][9]. Unless both sides transition to a written agreement, similar clashes over interpretation are highly likely to recur.
The fourth variable is the linkage with the Taiwan issue. Independent of this incident, China demanded that the Philippines cease official exchanges and military contacts with Taiwan [17]. There is also a case where Beijing strongly reacted to the transfer of a decommissioned Taiwan Coast Guard vessel to the Philippines through an NGO [8]. If the Philippines' practical solidarity with Taiwan deepens in the process of expanding South China Sea security cooperation, the possibility cannot be ruled out that China's pressure on the Philippines will transcend South China Sea issues and merge with the Taiwan Strait issue.
III. Policy Recommendations
Blocking Resupply at Second Thomas Shoal and the Militarization of the Gray Zone: Policy Recommendations
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Policy Recommendations
The essence of this incident is not a one-off friction over the disruption of a resupply mission. The core issue is that China has moved from its conventional gray-zone operational method of putting the coast guard and maritime militia on the front lines to a stage where it directly exposes its naval assets. The Philippine Coast Guard stated that both CCG and PLAN vessels simultaneously participated in this intervention [1]. In the PLA Southern Theater Command exercises conducted three days after the incident, a Type 908 replenishment ship and a WZ-7 unmanned aerial vehicle were deployed [11]. Expert commentary cited by the Global Times defined these exercises as a signal of 'readiness to transition from training to actual combat' [11]. The full exposure of naval assets is a development that structurally increases the risk of accidental escalation.
The way both sides define the incident has hardened into a structure where finding common ground is difficult. The Philippines defines it as a lawful humanitarian resupply within its EEZ, while China characterizes it as an illegal attempt without prior approval [1][3]. This gap stems from the lack of enforcement of the 2016 Hague arbitral ruling and the unwritten nature of the 'provisional agreement' [2][4]. As long as the text of the agreement remains ambiguous, the upper hand in interpretation will ultimately tilt toward the side with physical power on the ground. This is a point that South Korea must carefully consider when dealing with the West Sea Peace Maritime Zone (PMZ) or similar provisional agreements.
The United States once again limited its response to statement-level criticism [13][16]. The fact that China attended only the opening ceremony and avoided the maritime exercise phase of the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Joint Exercise held during the same week [6] demonstrates the limitations of US-led multilateral frameworks in directly deterring China's actions. A collective response at the ASEAN level is also unlikely to make substantive progress due to conflicting interests among member states [2][12]. Operating under these structural limitations, the South Korean government needs to establish a response system that separates public statements from practical risk management.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-Term (1–3 Months)
In its public statements regarding the South China Sea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) should maintain its existing stance of supporting the legal binding force of the Hague arbitral award in principle while refraining from directly intervening in specific incidents. Simultaneously, MOFA should activate a system to collect and report military activity trends near Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal through separate channels via the ROK Embassy in the Philippines and the ROK Embassy in China. The Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) and MOFA also need to update route risk advisories for domestic shipping companies transiting South China Sea sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and provide advance guidance on the possibility of bypassing the waters and airspace near Scarborough Shoal.
Medium-Term (3–12 Months)
If cases of Chinese naval assets being fully deployed in gray-zone responses accumulate, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) should reflect this in its assessment of the Indo-Pacific maritime security situation and recalculate the risk rating of South China Sea SLOCs. While reviewing the texts of inter-Korean and Korea-China consultations regarding the West Sea Peace Maritime Zone (PMZ), MOFA should learn from the "vulnerability of oral understandings to reinterpretation" exposed in this case, and establish a principle of documenting implementation standards and notification procedures to the greatest extent possible in future agreements. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) and MOF should identify raw materials and energy shipments transiting the South China Sea that have a low feasibility of being rerouted, and prepare a response manual for potential route blockade scenarios.
Long-Term (1 Year or More)
Based on the assessment that collective response at the ASEAN level is structurally limited [2], MOFA needs to consider reducing reliance on multilateral frameworks and concurrently establishing bilateral maritime security cooperation channels with individual countries such as the Philippines, Japan, and Australia. Reflecting the trend of US-China military competition expanding to both airspace and maritime domains in the South China Sea [4], MND should gradually re-evaluate South Korea's level of participation in regional maritime surveillance asset sharing and intelligence cooperation frameworks in Asia.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The primary indicator is whether the frequency of direct intervention by Chinese naval vessels near Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal increases. Whether the response remains centered on the coast guard or whether naval assets are repeatedly exposed as in this case serves as a criterion for assessing changes in the nature of gray-zone tactics [1][11]. It is also necessary to monitor whether China expands the distance of its resupply blockades further away from the shoals than before, which serves as an indicator of the intensity of its attempts to control the entire access route.
Regarding the threshold for invoking the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, whether the level of US response escalates beyond statements in the event of Philippine casualties or vessel damage should be set as a trigger point. Although incidents have ended without clashes or injuries so far [1][13], the point at which physical damage occurs through repeated similar incidents is highly likely to become the threshold for escalation risk.
At the ASEAN level, it is necessary to monitor changes in the level of participation by Southeast Asian countries in ADMM-Plus or similar multilateral exercises. The observation that Southeast Asian participation in this exercise was limited [12] highlights differing stances within ASEAN. Whether this gap narrows or widens will serve as a gauge of ASEAN's collective response capability. In addition, the frequency of Chinese statements linking the Taiwan issue with South China Sea issues needs to be closely watched. The case of the China Coast Guard strengthening patrols east of the Taiwan Strait while demanding that the Philippines adhere to the One China principle [17] suggests the possibility of South China Sea issues becoming entangled with the Taiwan issue.
4. Summary and Conclusion
This incident is a case demonstrating that China's gray-zone tactics, which previously centered on the coast guard and maritime militia, have shifted to a stage of fully exposing naval assets [1][11]. The ways in which the Philippines and China define the incident clash directly—as a lawful resupply within the EEZ versus thwarting an illegal attempt [1][3]—and this gap stems from the lack of enforcement power of the Hague arbitral award and the undocumented nature of the provisional agreement [2][4]. The US response remains limited to statements [13][16], and ASEAN's collective response capability also faces structural limitations [2][12]. South Korea needs to interpret this incident as a signal of a structural rise in South China Sea SLOC risks, while applying the lesson of the vulnerability of provisional agreements to its own relevant consultations, such as those regarding the West Sea PMZ. The focus of the response should be placed on managing shipping route risks and institutionalizing information collection systems, rather than issuing statements.
References
[3] [Global Times] Exclusive: China Coast Guard thwarts Philippine illegal resupply attempt around Ren'ai Jiao: source - https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/2026/09/1371326.shtml
[7] [The Edge Malaysia] China conducts naval, air exercise around disputed shoal in South China Sea
[9] [Global Times] PLA STC conducts joint naval-air exercise near Huangyan Dao; move to test and enhance troops' combat capabilities in safeguarding nation's territorial sovereignty - https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/2026/09/1371416.shtml
[10] [Global Times] PLA, CCG step up naval-air drills around Huangyan Dao; training exercises demonstrate firm resolve to safeguard sovereignty, regional stability: expert - https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/2026/09/1371436.shtml
[11] [Global Times] 'Qinghaihu' replenishment ship, WZ-7 drone join South China Sea military-coast guard drills 'as forces ready to shift from training to combat': expert - https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/2026/09/1371434.shtml
[12] [Rappler] It’s an ADMM-Plus joint sail, but where were the Southeast Asians?
[13] [Nikkei Asia] Trump-Xi summit: How the Chinese leader's trip to Washington unfolded
[14] [Kyodo News] Repeated surveys by Chinese research ship raise security concerns in Japan
[15] [Global Times] The rise of politicians such as Teodoro an ominous sign for the Philippines' national fortunes - https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/2026/09/1371499.shtml
[16] [Nikkei Asia] Trump-Xi summit: How the Chinese leader's trip to Washington unfolded
[17] [Global Times] China Coast Guard patrols waters east of Taiwan island; move signals warning to separatist forces, expert says - https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/2026/09/1371581.shtml
[19] [The Diplomat] Why Has the Maldives Inserted Itself Into the Chagos Sovereignty Dispute?
[20] [Foreign Policy] The U.S. and China Agree to Slash Tariffs
[21] [BusinessWorld (PH)] Renewed price pressures likely capped disinflation trend in September
[22] [Foreign Affairs] The Coming Taiwan Crisis
[23] [Cyprus Mail] China pushes back against US on Iran and Cuba in UN speech
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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