Xi Jinping's Rhetoric Towards the U.S. and the Narrative Gap in U.S.-China Relations: The Meaning of 'Competition'
Executive Summary
During his state visit after 11 years, Xi Jinping characterized U.S.-China competition as a 'healthy race rather than a wrestling match,' sending a crisis management message, while Trump emphasized 'great friendship' and focused on rhetoric for domestic political gains. The two statements targeted different audiences, and given the precedent of the May Beijing agreement being consumed without substantive policy changes, it is highly likely that this friendly rhetoric will not automatically translate into administration policy. Issues such as Taiwan and AI safety definitions have been excluded from negotiations from the outset, and the trade track and security-technology track are proceeding separately, meaning that progress in one does not guarantee concessions in the other. Beijing's modernization of nuclear capabilities and the establishment of self-reliant supply chains continue regardless of the diplomatic temperature, indicating that the South Korean government and businesses need a system to manage trade spillover benefits and security risks in a dual-track manner rather than downplaying risks based on the friendly atmosphere of the summit.
I. Issue Situation Analysis
Issue Situation Analysis: Xi Jinping's Rhetoric Towards the U.S. and the Narrative Gap in U.S.-China Relations
1. Background and Progress
During the Trump-Xi summit held in Beijing last May, Trump agreed to the expression 'constructive strategic stability relationship,' which linguistically patched the deadlock in defining U.S.-China relations that had persisted for over a decade. However, this frame started with the limitation that it does not entail substantive policy changes. Beijing has consumed this as a diplomatic achievement domestically while continuing to invest resources in reducing vulnerabilities to the U.S. through nuclear modernization and the establishment of self-reliant supply chains.
Ahead of the Washington meeting, both sides restored military leadership contacts. Discussions on tariff reductions were also conducted. However, the issues of Taiwan and AI safety definitions were likely to be excluded from negotiations from the outset. Beijing had previously maintained a red line by setting new arms sales to Taiwan as a reason for canceling talks.
2. Current Situation
At the White House welcome ceremony on September 24, Xi stated that U.S.-China competition should be 'a healthy race rather than a wrestling match.' He called for extensive cooperation to avoid the 'Thucydides Trap.' This statement came amid rising tensions surrounding artificial intelligence, trade, and Taiwan. President Xi presented the condition that both countries could move away from the path of military conflict towards mutual benefit.
At the same event, President Trump emphasized 'tremendous progress' and 'great friendship.' He focused on highlighting his long personal relationship with Xi. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei) reported that Xi emphasized the importance of cooperation and stability in his remarks at the White House after 11 years. The Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) contrasted Trump's mention of 'great friendship' with Xi's much drier reference to 'respect.' The Hong Kong South China Morning Post analyzed that both Trump and Xi attempted to project stable images alongside military symbolic displays, including B-2 Spirit bombers and F-22 formations.
In a message released in advance through Xinhua News Agency, Xi stated that 'China and the U.S. should be partners, not rivals.' He added that 'the peoples of China and the U.S. have enjoyed friendly exchanges for a long time, and the interests of both countries are deeply intertwined.' The French-language media La Nouvelle Tribune reported that Xi warned Trump that 'in confrontation, we will all be losers.'
According to a report by Hankyoreh, Trump presented security, technology, and artificial intelligence as agenda items for the meeting. He stated, 'The decisions we make in these areas today can enhance peace and prosperity for decades to come.' Xi emphasized that cooperation should be chosen over confrontation, mentioning that both countries should work together to keep artificial intelligence under human control.
3. Positions of Each Side
Chinese Sidemaintained a consistently restrained rhetoric. Xi's language focused on stability-oriented expressions such as 'respect,' 'stability,' and 'peaceful coexistence.' This is not unrelated to domestic political calculations. The Brookings Institution analyzes that Beijing does not easily respond to Trump's personal gestures of goodwill. While Trump has publicly shown respect for Xi's priorities and concerns, Beijing remains cautious in interpreting this as a success.
U.S. SidePresident Trump employed a results-oriented rhetoric that emphasizes personal goodwill and visible achievements. However, skepticism runs deep within Washington policy circles and Congress, dismissing such agreements as 'empty words.' The Atlantic Council assesses that both sides have maintained an 'uncomfortable stalemate' rather than a genuine détente over the past year. Both sides are adopting a dual approach of testing each other's red lines while avoiding escalation.
Hardliners in the U.S. Congressact as a structural variable that pressures the administration to reduce its discretion. This adds vulnerability to the political sustainability of agreements between leaders. The U.S. Department of Defense separately estimates that China's nuclear warhead stockpile will reach 1,000 by 2030. In addition, regulatory agencies such as the FCC are accumulating measures to control Chinese technology, independent of the track of summit diplomacy.
4. Key Issues
The temperature difference in the language used by both sides foreshadows fundamentally different interpretations of the outcomes of the summit. Trump's 'tremendous progress' and 'great friendship' are heavily laden with the intention to appeal to domestic politics with immediate and visible results. In contrast, Xi's expressions of 'healthy competition,' 'respect,' and 'stability' emphasize long-term manageability. This narrative gap leaves uncertainty about whether superficial agreements will lead to substantive policy changes.
Military symbolic displays are also dualistic. Elements of military show of force, such as B-2 Spirit and F-22 formations, appeared simultaneously. This indicates that the underlying security dilemma has not been structurally resolved behind the superficial theme of 'managed competition.' The restoration of military leadership channels in the Taiwan Strait and discussions on AI at the summit may serve limited functions as crisis management pathways, but they are far from building fundamental trust. Ultimately, the narrative gap revealed in this summit suggests that the existing trend of parallel détente rhetoric and capability competition will continue for the time being.
II. In-Depth Issue Analysis
In-Depth Issue Analysis: Xi Jinping's Rhetoric Towards the U.S. and the Narrative Gap in U.S.-China Relations
1. Background
Xi Jinping's 'competition theory' is not an impromptu rhetoric. It is an extension of the attempts he has made since coming to power in 2012 to define relations with the U.S. Expressions such as 'new type of great power relations' and 'mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and mutually beneficial cooperation' have been proposed before but failed to gain U.S. agreement. The current 'healthy competition' frame also belongs to the same lineage. The difference is that during the May Beijing summit, Trump agreed to the expression 'constructive strategic stability relationship,' which somewhat alleviated the linguistic deadlock.
The reason this linguistic agreement does not guarantee substance is that the motivations behind the utterances of both sides are fundamentally different. Beijing's 'competition' frame acknowledges competition but conveys a crisis management message to prevent it from escalating into military conflict. Xi directly mentioned the 'Thucydides Trap,' presenting the condition that both countries can move away from the path of military conflict towards mutual benefit. This is a typical rhetorical structure where an emerging power seeks to secure a buffer space against an existing hegemon.
In contrast, Trump's statements of 'tremendous progress' and 'great friendship' are closer to rhetoric aimed at domestic political achievements. He devoted a significant portion of his remarks to highlighting his personal relationship with Xi. The Brookings Institution assesses that Trump is publicly showing respect for Xi's priorities and concerns. The reason Beijing does not respond substantively to this friendly gesture is due to the uncertainty of whether Trump's personal goodwill will lead to policy easing at the level of the U.S. administration. There is deep-rooted skepticism in Washington policy circles and parts of Congress that dismiss this agreement itself as 'empty words.'
2. Structural Context
Political Structure
Beijing's restrained choice of language is not unrelated to domestic political calculations. For Xi, the term 'competition' effectively defines the relationship with the U.S. as a regulated competition between two equal entities. The message from Xinhua that 'China and the U.S. should be partners, not rivals' is also in the same context. This forms a dual messaging structure that simultaneously conveys the goal of 'the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' and the warning that 'in confrontation, both sides will be losers.'
On the Washington side, there exists a gap between friendly gestures between leaders and the public policy of the administration and Congress. Regulatory agencies such as the FCC are accumulating measures to control Chinese technology, independent of summit diplomacy. Hardliners in Congress are pressuring the administration to reduce its discretion, creating a structural vulnerability that makes it difficult for agreements between leaders to sustain politically.
Economic Structure
Discussions on tariff reductions and rare earth issues were mentioned as potential partial agreements in this summit's trade agenda. However, progress in this area is separate from security-related agendas. Trump presented security, technology, and artificial intelligence as agenda items for the meeting. The structure is such that compromises in trade do not directly lead to a relaxation of technological hegemony competition.
Security Structure
The issues of Taiwan and AI safety definitions were excluded from negotiations from the outset. Beijing has maintained a red line by setting new arms sales to Taiwan as a reason for canceling talks. The restoration of military leadership contacts at this summit is significant as a crisis management pathway, but it does not constitute a measure to resolve the security dilemma itself. Xi's emphasis on cooperation regarding keeping AI under human control at the summit can also be seen as an example of extending the rhetorical structure that prioritizes cooperation over confrontation into the security realm.
3. Historical Background
The narrative gap in the language used by both sides during U.S.-China summits is not a new phenomenon. During the Biden-Xi summit in November 2023, a similar approach was adopted where both countries issued their own summaries without a joint statement after over three hours of talks. At that time, the U.S. emphasized the 'competition' frame, while China prioritized a 'complex' relationship definition. Domestic and international media assessed that the focus of that summit was on establishing 'common sense guardrails' to prevent deterioration in relations. The current 'race versus wrestling' frame can also be viewed as an attempt to set similar guardrails.
Comparisons with the May Beijing summit are also valid. At that time, Trump's agreement to the expression 'constructive strategic stability relationship' linguistically patched the deadlock in defining relations. However, this agreement did not halt the substantive capability competition, such as nuclear modernization or supply chain self-reliance. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that China's nuclear warhead stockpile will reach 1,000 by 2030. The rhetoric of 'competition' at this Washington summit is likely to repeat the pattern of symbolic patching and the continuation of substantive competition, just like the May agreement.
Trump's manner of reception also contrasts with the past. Xi's visit to the U.S. this time marks his first state visit in 11 years since 2015. Trump's direct welcome at the runway is considered an unusual gesture. Such a departure from protocol is a rare element in past U.S.-China summits. However, the elevation of protocol has not led to progress on substantive agendas, particularly on Taiwan and AI safety definitions, thus repeating the familiar pattern of a gap between protocol and substance.
4. Key Variables in Issue Development
The first variable is the independent trajectory of U.S. congressional and regulatory policies towards China. Regulatory agencies, including the FCC, continue to accumulate measures to control Chinese technology, regardless of the outcomes of summit diplomacy. If friendly language between leaders cannot reverse this trajectory, the 'competition' frame will remain at the symbolic level.
The second variable is whether the red lines related to Taiwan will persist. The red line set by Beijing regarding arms sales has not made it to the negotiation table in this summit. How this issue reignites in the future will be a litmus test for the actual durability of the 'healthy competition' frame.
The third variable is whether the military leadership channel operates effectively. Whether the restored military contacts actually function during crises will determine the effectiveness of the Thucydides Trap avoidance strategy mentioned by Xi.
The fourth variable is whether Trump's personal goodwill is institutionalized into administration policy. As the Brookings Institution points out, Trump has been unusually restrained in his public remarks about Xi. The degree to which this personal attitude aligns with the public strategy of national security departments will influence the substantive weight of Trump's rhetoric of 'tremendous progress.'
III. Final Recommended Response Measures
Comprehensive Recommended Response Measures and Implementation Plan
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Response Measures
Trump's rhetoric of 'great friendship' and Xi's language of 'respect and stability' can be seen as rhetoric targeting different audiences. Trump showcased achievements to his domestic supporters and the market. Xi sent restrained signals to both the party's internal members and Washington hardliners. This structure is likely to repeat in the future.
The core judgments can be summarized in three points. First, friendly language between leaders does not automatically translate into administration policy. The precedent of the May Beijing agreement, which did not entail substantive policy changes, supports this. Second, structural issues such as Taiwan and AI safety definitions are being excluded from the negotiation table from the outset. Third, the trade track involving tariffs and rare earths is proceeding separately from the security and technology track, meaning that progress in one does not imply relaxation in the other.
The implications for the South Korean government and businesses are directly derived from these three judgments. It is premature to downplay risks towards China based on the friendly atmosphere of the summit. At the same time, there are real opportunities for spillover benefits in the trade area. A dual-track response system that manages these two tracks separately is necessary.
2. Short-term/Mid-term/Long-term Implementation Plans
Short-term (1-3 months)
Prioritize confirming spillover benefits in the trade track. If discussions on tariff reductions and rare earth supply lead to partial agreements, it is necessary to examine how the status of South Korean companies' alternative supply chains is readjusted. Tracking changes in competitive conditions between South Korea and China in rare earth and semiconductor material procurement lines on a weekly basis is practically effective.
Simultaneously, monitor the independent progress of the security track. Measures for controlling Chinese technology by U.S. regulatory agencies such as the FCC are accumulating independently of summit diplomacy. The ripple effects of these measures on South Korea's technology exports to China and inclusion in supply chains to the U.S. should be evaluated separately.
Mid-term (6 months to 1 year)
Verify whether the restored military leadership channel and AI discussions at the summit operate effectively. Whether this channel actually performs crisis management functions or remains a symbolic gesture will change the dynamics of risk in the Taiwan Strait. Unless the channel's effectiveness is confirmed, supply chain diversification plans should be maintained based on scenarios similar to Taiwan.
Legislative trends of hardliners in the U.S. Congress are also a key variable during this period. If the administration's discretion is reduced due to congressional pressure, the political lifespan of agreements between leaders will shorten. In this case, it is necessary to reflect a policy uncertainty premium in negotiations for investment incentives for South Korean companies in the U.S.
Long-term (1-3 years)
Beijing's modernization of nuclear capabilities and the establishment of self-reliant supply chains will continue regardless of the diplomatic temperature. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that China's nuclear warhead stockpile will reach 1,000 by 2030. This trend shows the reality of capability competition alongside the rhetoric of 'healthy competition.' In the long-term horizon, a dual-track evaluation system that continuously tracks the linguistic easing of summit meetings and the structural persistence of military and technological competition should be established.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is whether new arms sales to Taiwan are announced. Beijing has maintained this as a red line for canceling talks. If this red line is actually activated, the managed competition framework itself will be shaken.
The second indicator is the frequency of hardline legislative proposals in the U.S. Congress. If attempts to reduce the administration's discretion materialize, the sustainability of agreements between leaders will decrease.
The third indicator is the number of measures taken by regulatory agencies such as the FCC to control Chinese technology. This track is accumulating independently of the outcomes of summit diplomacy, serving as a leading indicator to confirm the asymmetric structure where trade relaxation and technological tightening are occurring simultaneously.
The fourth indicator is changes in the scale of China's nuclear capabilities and supply chain self-reliance investments. This is a key variable to gauge whether the rhetoric of 'healthy competition' leads to substantive trust-building or is consumed as a means of parallel capability competition.
4. Summary Conclusion
Trump's 'great friendship' and Xi's 'respect and stability' are products of two domestic politics trying to consume the same summit differently. The fact that linguistic easing does not automatically imply policy easing has already been confirmed by the precedent of the May Beijing agreement. Structural issues such as Taiwan and AI safety definitions were again excluded from the negotiation table. South Korea's response should be based on a dual system that separates securing spillover benefits in the trade track from managing risks in the security track. The judgment to downplay risks towards China based on the friendly image of the summit is weakly supported.
References
[4] [The Irish Times] China’s Xi tells Trump: ‘Let’s not wrestle’ during White House summit
[5] [Brookings Institution] Why Beijing isn’t taking the bait with Trump
[7] [The Guardian] At Trump meeting, Xi Jinping lays out terms to avoid US-China military conflict
[8] [Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)] Ten Issues to Watch at the Trump-Xi Summit in Washington
[10] [Nikkei Asia] Xi urges limits on US-China rivalry, calls for stable ties
[12] [The Globe and Mail] Trump rolls out the red carpet for China’s Xi as both sides seek stability
[14] [Última Hora (PY)] Presidente Xi dice que China y EEUU deben ser “socios más que rivales”
[16] [Hankyoreh] U.S.-China Summit at the White House... Trump 'discusses security and AI with Xi'
[18] [United Daily News] 川習會開始 川普與習近平發言聚焦貿易、合作與AI
[21] [A Semana] Xi Jinping diz que China e EUA devem ser “parceiros, e não rivais”
[22] [Asahi Shimbun] 米中首脳会談開始 トランプ氏「安保やAI協議」習氏「パンダ来る」
[23] [South China Morning Post] Behind closed doors, Xi urges Trump to prevent AI ‘misuse and abuse’
[24] [Kuwait Times] Trump rolls out red carpet for Xi as leaders eye stability despite strains
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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