[EAI Issue Brief] Decoding the US-China Summit: US 'Competition' vs. China's 'Complexity'

[Editor's Note]

This Issue Brief summarizes the discussions from the US-China summit held online on November 13th, based on a presentation by EAI Chairman Ha Young-sun (Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University) and discussions with Professor Moon Yong-il (University of Seoul), EAI President Son Yeol (Professor, Yonsei University), Professor Lee Dong-ryul (Dongduk Women's University), Professor Lee Seung-ju (Chung-Ang University), and Professor Jeon Jae-sung (Seoul National University). Although the summit did not produce solutions to ease the tensions between the two countries, it provides crucial insights for forecasting future developments. This article analyzes key documents released by both governments before and after the summit, highlighting the fundamental differences in their perceptions of the US-China relationship, their approaches to major issues, and the implications for South Korea.

Amidst the ongoing deterioration of US-China relations without a breakthrough for improvement, the Biden-Xi summit held on November 15th garnered significant global attention. The meeting, which lasted over three hours, concluded without a joint statement, leaving only summary documents from each side. International media assessed that while the summit did not yield a dramatic de-escalation of tensions, it focused on establishing 'common sense guardrails' to prevent the relationship from spiraling into confrontation. However, this summit offers important clues for understanding the future trajectory of US-China relations, a critical variable shaping the global order, necessitating a deeper analysis beyond superficial observations. This article examines the domestic and international background of the summit, the fundamental differences in the two countries' perceptions of the US-China relationship, their approaches to key issues, and the implications for South Korea, based on key government documents released before and after the summit.

I. Background of the US-China Summit

The first US-China summit under the Biden administration was held online on November 16, 2021 (evening of November 15th, US time). While the March 2021 Alaska strategic dialogue was outwardly contentious, it was inwardly an exploratory exchange probing various possibilities for cooperation, competition, and conflict between the two nations. In contrast, this US-China summit served to clearly confirm the differing perspectives of the two countries on their bilateral relationship.

First, let us examine the background that led the leaders of these two great powers to engage in this summit. The United States has been pursuing a strategy to reverse its relative decline as the leading power that has guided the international order and to remain the leading power in 2050. The US views China, led by President Xi Jinping, as undermining the existing norms of the US-led order and attempting to alter the status quo through various means of pressure. Consequently, the US has made it clear that it will approach the US-China relationship strictly from the perspective of competition. In this process, the US strategy involves improving and securing domestic capabilities, securing cooperation with allies and partners, and intensely engaging in strategic competition with China across technological, normative, economic, and military arenas, while establishing guardrails to prevent excessive competition from escalating into conflict and, where possible, establishing rules of the road.

Conversely, China's Xi Jinping has made it clear that by 2035, when the goal of achieving socialist modernization in a new era is targeted, China will view and approach the US-China relationship not within the framework of competition as articulated by the US, but within the framework of a 'new model of great power relations' that pursues mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and cooperative prosperity. Specifically, China stated its intention to discuss issues where cooperation is possible and necessary in US-China relations, not competition, and to continue discussions on resolving global challenges that urgently require US-China cooperation. However, at the same time, China clearly expressed its unwavering resolve on issues of core national interest, such as Taiwan.

In the short term, the top priority for both leaders entering the summit was domestic affairs. The Biden administration has consistently emphasized that to restore US leadership in the international community, it must first restore its domestic capabilities. Amidst the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic recession, weakening middle class, racial issues, and domestic political polarization, the infrastructure bill, which the Biden administration had ambitiously pursued since its inception, was finally passed on November 6th after considerable difficulty. While this achievement solidified the Biden administration's political foundation and garnered bipartisan support, the fact that a key legislative bill for a new administration failed to pass the House of Representatives, where Democrats hold a majority, for several months inevitably placed a burden on the Biden administration, which is tasked with resolving numerous pressing issues such as the logistics crisis and inflation. Facing the upcoming midterm elections, the administration is compelled to strengthen domestic capabilities while simultaneously enhancing international capabilities through the US-China summit.

In China's case, President Xi Jinping's primary objective is to solidify the conditions for his re-election and to successfully conclude the 20th Party Congress scheduled for the latter half of next year. The 20th Party Congress in 2022 is the meeting where Xi Jinping's third term will be confirmed, and therefore, the Chinese government will prioritize the smooth convening of the Party Congress above all other immediate concerns until then. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which concluded on November 11th, adopted the third historical resolution in 40 years, following Mao Zedong's first in 1945 and Deng Xiaoping's second in 1981. This resolution outlined the goal of ushering in a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics centered around President Xi Jinping, achieving the modernization of socialism with Chinese characteristics by 2035, and becoming a leading global power in comprehensive national strength and international influence by 2050. This historical resolution clearly reflects President Xi Jinping's long-term vision as he attended the summit.

II. Competition vs. Complexity: Divergent Perspectives in US-China Views

A crucial point to note from this summit is the significant divergence in how the two countries perceive and approach the US-China relationship. Firstly, the United States views the US-China relationship strictly through the lens of competition. It emphasized that this summit, rather than being an effort to improve bilateral relations, was significant as a starting point for discussions on 'guardrails' to prevent the strategic competition between the two great powers from escalating into conflict (conflict).[1]In its post-summit briefing, the US government stated that it does not expect to unilaterally change China's future strategy and intends to pursue comprehensive competition in conjunction with allies, strategic partners, and the international community. The US, premised on the inevitability of strategic competition with China, views enhancing the stability of strategic crises through communication and reducing the possibility of miscalculation towards the other side as the core of the current US-China relationship, thereby establishing crisis management mechanisms. Furthermore, the Biden administration reaffirmed its lack of short-term expectations for China's change, but expressed the need to discuss 'rules of the road' to prevent conflict between the two countries.[2]It particularly emphasized that 'what is worse than intended conflict is unintended conflict.'

Conversely, China disagrees with the US perspective that frames the US-China relationship primarily as competition. A report by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) released shortly before the US-China summit clearly underscored this point.[3]This report, resulting from a joint seminar with the Brookings Institution conducted over two years starting in 2019, sufficiently reflects the Chinese government's views, given the nature of Chinese think tanks. The report strongly criticizes the US perspective, which emphasizes only the competitive aspects of the US-China relationship, as misleading, arguing that it misrepresents a relationship that also possesses cooperative dimensions. It contends that even if competitive aspects are present, the competitive structure of the US-China relationship is not inevitable and should not be the logical starting point for bilateral relations. Firstly, the term 'competition' itself reflects a biased perspective and prevents an objective view of the US-China relationship. Secondly, defining the relationship as competition increases the likelihood of confrontation and conflict. Thirdly, the US-China relationship is no longer solely bilateral but has global significance. Fourthly, framing the relationship solely as competition is perceived as a deceptive tactic to rationalize and conceal the US's hegemonic intentions to contain and suppress China. Finally, the US-China relationship, as viewed by China, is not a zero-sum or winner-take-all scenario, but rather one where win-win cooperation, benefiting both sides, is possible. Based on this perspective, the report emphasizes the complexity of the US-China relationship and the need for a 'new framework.'

What, then, is this new framework for the US-China relationship as viewed by China? During the US-China summit, President Xi Jinping emphasized the need for the US-China relationship to adhere to three principles: mutual respect, cooperative prosperity, and peaceful coexistence.[4]These are the principles highlighted in the CICIR report that argued for a new framework for the US-China relationship, not competition. This is also largely consistent with the 'new model of great power relations' that China has advocated since 2012. Firstly, regarding the principle of mutual respect, President Xi Jinping stressed that both the US and China must respect each other's social systems, development paths, and core interests, and treat each other as equals. This implies a rejection of US interference in China's internal affairs concerning issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, which are considered core interests. The second principle is peaceful coexistence. While the US views US-China relations as based on competition, albeit with efforts to avoid conflict, China emphasizes that coexistence must be peaceful. The third principle is cooperative prosperity. Given the deep entanglement of each other's interests, China stresses the need for a reciprocal relationship where both the US and China can benefit through cooperation, rather than confrontation based on zero-sum logic.

III. Divergent Approaches to Key Issues in US-China Relations

The difference in perspectives on competition between the US and China leads to differing approaches to resolving key issues in their bilateral relationship. Firstly, the United States categorizes the various issues in the US-China relationship into four main types for discussion.[5]The first category includes issues where the interests of both countries align and solutions are feasible, such as climate change and health cooperation like COVID-19. The second category comprises pressing issues that have been discussed but not resolved, such as the Iranian nuclear issue and the North Korean nuclear issue. The third category involves political and military issues that require effective management of differences between the US and China; Taiwan is a prime example. The US emphasizes the need to avoid miscalculation and misunderstanding through communication, as this is the most critical issue to prevent US-China competition from escalating into conflict. The final category includes economic issues where cooperation is possible, such as energy.

Conversely, China suggests the need to focus on four priorities moving forward.[6]First, the US and China need to cooperate to address issues requiring transnational responses. Second, exchanges and cooperation across the board should be based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit to foster a more positive direction in US-China relations. Third, sensitive issues and differences between the two countries must be managed constructively to prevent derailment of the relationship. Fourth, cooperation is necessary to safeguard world peace, global development, and a secure, fair, and equitable international order.

Furthermore, China proposes clarifying three 'basic lines' among the various issues in the US-China relationship.[7]The first basic line is 'no hot war.' This pertains to security issues such as the Indo-Pacific strategy, AUKUS, and the Quad. Specifically, to prevent hot war, China proposes not interfering in each other's core interests, clearly identifying the Taiwan issue, which was discussed in the summit, as a core interest of China. China also commented on AUKUS and the Quad, suggesting the establishment of communication and dialogue mechanisms with China to avoid misunderstandings and misjudgments of each other's actions, thereby preventing these US initiatives from developing into an anti-China front.

The second basic line is 'no cold war.' This concerns ideological and value-based issues. The US effort to frame the US-China competition not as a rivalry between two countries but as a confrontation between 'authoritarian states' and democratic nations is seen as not only increasing hostility between the US and China but also promoting bloc politics and alignment among other countries, potentially leading to a new Cold War. Therefore, to prevent this, China explains the need to encourage multilateralism centered around the United Nations.

The final basic line is 'no decoupling.' This raises questions about the feasibility and necessity of the US-led restructuring of global supply chains and also reflects China's vigilance. China points out that the economic interdependence between the US and China has already deepened to a point where complete decoupling is difficult, and emphasizes that the US must cease its plans to create exclusive supply chains.

IV. Implications for South Korea

Regarding the US-China summit, the US emphasized from the outset that the purpose of the meeting was not to reach agreements or tangible outcomes, but to initiate discussions on establishing crisis management protocols to prevent US-China strategic competition from escalating into conflict. Conversely, China highlighted President Biden's agreement with the 'One China Principle' as a key outcome of the summit, particularly concerning the Taiwan issue.

In conclusion, the summit confirmed a shared understanding between the two countries on the need to maintain the status quo regarding the Taiwan issue. China, following the high-level talks in Alaska, reiterated at this summit that Taiwan is an issue of core interest over which China has no room for compromise. At the same time, while directly criticizing Taiwan's authorities for 'seeking independence with US support,' China expressed its stance more cautiously towards the US, suggesting that certain US individuals, rather than the US government, are attempting to contain China using Taiwan, thereby minimizing the potential to unnecessarily provoke the US. Meanwhile, the US made it clear that it views issues such as Xinjiang and Hong Kong, which China insists are internal matters falling under the principle of mutual respect and non-interference, as universal rights and values that the international community must protect. Simultaneously, the US reaffirmed that the One China Principle is its fundamental diplomatic strategy and principle regarding cross-Strait relations, while also emphasizing that any attempt to alter the status quo of the Taiwan issue through non-peaceful means is unacceptable and that support for Taiwan will be consistently maintained. Both President Biden, who needs to focus on economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic, and President Xi Jinping, who must secure his third term at the 20th Party Congress next year, face challenges in resolving the Taiwan issue immediately. Therefore, domestic discussions regarding South Korea's involvement in the event of a Taiwan contingency require greater caution.

Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, both the US and China reaffirmed it as a pressing issue requiring cooperation, but specific methods of cooperation remain a future task. China views US-China cooperation on global challenges and pressing issues, such as climate change and health, as fundamentally reciprocal. However, the US draws a clear line on this. It clarifies that China's cooperation on global challenges is not a favor to the US but a natural responsibility as a member of the international community. The US will absolutely not agree to claims that cooperation on issues falling into the so-called 'cooperation bucket' should lead to concessions on bilateral issues in other categories, such as political and military matters. This also applies to the North Korean nuclear issue. If China indicates that it will only cooperate on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in exchange for certain concessions in other areas of US-China relations, the Biden administration cannot and will not accept this.

This US-China summit also has significant implications for South Korea's future strategy regarding the ROK-US alliance. In the CICIR report, China, while mentioning the Quad and AUKUS and assessing that the US is making multilateral deterrence efforts excluding China, demands the activation of notification and dialogue mechanisms between the US and China to prevent strategic miscalculations. The strong opposition to the existence of the Quad and AUKUS has relatively weakened, and the focus has somewhat shifted towards demanding US-China cooperation. In this trend, South Korea may be able to pursue broader cooperation with the Quad. The future vision of the ROK-US alliance should be sought in a way that expands South Korea's national interests, while carefully considering China's response to US-China cooperation mechanisms. However, it is crucial to fully consider the significant difference in the content and level of China's responses to a 'new model of great power relations' with the US and a 'new model of peripheral relations' with South Korea.

From an economic perspective, China strongly denied the feasibility of economic decoupling between the US and China at the summit, indicating China's strong vigilance against US-China decoupling and, by extension, against surrounding countries aligning themselves based on competition. In reality, the issue of US-China economic decoupling, particularly the restructuring of global supply chains, is a challenge that the US, still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic, cannot aggressively pursue at this moment. Notably, the recent logistics crisis and inflation issues have significantly shaken President Biden's approval ratings, and the underlying supply chain instability makes this a sensitive issue for the Biden administration.

The Biden administration's supply chain strategy proceeds in two directions: addressing short-term supply shortages and mitigating long-term structural vulnerabilities in supply chains. While short-term supply shortages arising from the economic recovery process due to COVID-19 are gradually being resolved, the Biden administration's supply chain strategy is expected to focus on mitigating structural vulnerabilities in the future. This policy direction can be inferred from the activities of Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai before and after the summit. Secretary Raimondo adopted a strong approach by requesting major information sharing from semiconductor companies in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, while also expressing a willingness to resolve issues related to steel and aluminum tariffs, thereby laying the groundwork for cooperation with allies such as the EU, Japan, and South Korea. Meanwhile, U.S. Trade Representative Tai visited South Korea, Japan, and India shortly after the US-China summit, clearly signaling the promotion of an economic framework to counter China.

From the perspective of external economic policy, the US faces a dilemma: it has lost direct means of economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region by not participating in the CPTPP, and with India's withdrawal from RCEP, it lacks effective indirect means to check China's growing influence. The economic framework represents the US's intention to pursue an economic alternative for its Indo-Pacific strategy. USTR Tai's agreement with Japan's Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Koichi Hagiuda, to launch a 'US-Japan Trade Partnership' during her visit to Japan, and her exchange of views on new labor standards with South Korea and Japan, clearly indicate that the economic framework the US intends to pursue focuses on setting new standards. This signifies that the Biden administration, having already devalued the TPP as a set of past rules and norms, is attempting to establish new standards that encompass the values and interests of the US with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, as the economic framework is a plan for the US to pursue regional multilateral cooperation, South Korea needs to proactively review and respond to the conditions and methods of cooperation. ■

[1] Whitehouse, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on President Biden’s Virtual Meeting with President Xi of the People’s Republic of China,” November 14, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/11/15/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-on-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/)

[2] Whitehouse, “Readout of President Biden’s Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” November 16, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

[3] CICIR, “CICIR Report: Mutual Respect, Equality, Mutual Benefit and Peaceful Coexistence – Exploring a New Framework amid Complexity for China-US Relations,” November 14, 2021. http://www.cicir.ac.cn/NEW/en-us/opinion.html?id=fe12030f-3cdd-4547-ae0e-d2301f191b8b

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Had a Virtual Meeting with US President Joe Biden,” November 16, 2021. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1919223.shtml

[5] Brookings Institute. “Readout from the Biden-Xi virtual meeting: Discussion with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” November 16, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/events/readout-from-the-biden-xi-virtual-meeting-discussion-with-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan/

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Supra note 4.

[7] CICIR. The above text.

■ Author:Ha Young-sun_Chairman of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington. He has served as Professor in the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, Visiting Fellow at the Princeton University Center for International Studies, Visiting Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Director of the Institute for Global Studies at Seoul National University, Director of the Center for American Studies, President of the Korean Peace Studies Association, Co-Chair of the Korean side for the Joint Research on the New Era of Korea-Japan Relations, member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council, and member of the Senior Advisory Council for the Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee. He is currently Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. His recent books and edited volumes include <The World Politics of Love: War and Peace>, <Revisiting Korean Diplomacy: Tradition and Modernity>, <The US-China Competition to Build the Asia-Pacific Order>, and <The International Politics of Four Voyages: Analysis of Joseon and Yeonheng Records from the 16th-19th Centuries>. He also wrote the

■ Author:Moon Yong-il_Assistant Professor at the University of Seoul. He received his bachelor's and master's degrees from the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, followed by a Ph.D. in Political Science from George Washington University. He then served as an Assistant Professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University before assuming his current position as Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul. His major research includes “Cause Lawyering and Movement Tactics: Disability Rights Movements in South Korea and Japan,” “The Drafting of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Frame Competition,” “South Africa’s Nuclear Norm Diplomacy,” “South Africa’s Denuclearization Implementation and Verification,” and “The Politicization of Bulgaria’s Political Polarization and the Bulgarian Constitutional Court.” He has also co-authored works such as <The New Northeast Asian Order and the Future of the Korean Peninsula>.

■ Responsible Person and Editor:Baek Jin-kyung_Director of EAI Research Center

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