The U.S.-China 'Strategic Stability' Framework and the Dual Dynamics of the Nuclear Arms Race: The Parallel Tracks of Détente Rhetoric and Capability Competition

Executive Summary

The 'constructive strategic stability relationship' framework, agreed upon at the May Trump-Xi summit, has verbally papered over a decade-long impasse in defining the U.S.-China relationship. However, its limitations are clear, as it does not entail substantive policy changes. While Beijing leverages this framework as a domestic diplomatic achievement, it continues to invest in reducing its vulnerability to the U.S. through nuclear modernization and building self-reliant supply chains. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates China's nuclear warhead stockpile will reach 1,000 by 2030. Deep-seated skepticism persists in Washington policy circles and parts of Congress, which dismiss the agreement as 'empty words,' making it uncertain whether Trump's personal friendly gestures will translate into an administration-wide policy relaxation. Although the military leadership channel across the Taiwan Strait and summit-level discussions on AI may serve a limited function as crisis management tools, the coexistence of détente rhetoric and capability competition is likely to remain the dominant trend without a structural resolution to the security dilemma. For middle powers, this calls for a dual-track approach that separately assesses the symbolic significance of the framework agreement and the reality of ongoing military and technological competition.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

The U.S.-China 'Strategic Stability' Framework and the Dual Dynamics of the Nuclear Arms Race

1. Background and Developments

The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing this past May marked a partial breakthrough in the decade-long impasse over defining the U.S.-China relationship. Since taking power in 2012, Xi Jinping had proposed various frameworks to successive U.S. administrations, including a 'new type of great power relations' and later 'mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation,' but failed to secure American agreement [2]. This time, however, President Trump agreed to the phrase 'constructive strategic stability relationship' proposed by Xi, and Chinese state media widely touted it as a major diplomatic achievement for their leader [2]. Foreign Affairs noted that this was the first time in over a decade that the two leaders had reached a broad agreement on defining the relationship [1].

This agreement did not emerge in a vacuum. In the lead-up to the summit, Xi Jinping engaged in intensive diplomacy across Eurasia and the Middle East. The South China Morning Post interpreted these moves as an effort to bolster Beijing's negotiating leverage by signaling to Washington that 'China has alternatives' [7]. In other words, even as it prepared for the summit, Beijing pursued a parallel strategy of accumulating negotiating chips by showcasing a diversified diplomatic portfolio, rather than adopting a U.S.-centric approach.

2. Current Situation

Follow-up engagements have continued since the summit. President Trump announced he would host a state dinner for Xi Jinping's visit to Washington on September 24 and has cautioned against over-interpreting U.S.-China tensions related to Iran [15]. On the cross-strait issue, the 28th Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference, held in Victoria, Canada, from August 31 to September 2, garnered attention. With Xi's autumn visit to the U.S. on the horizon as agreed at the May summit, the Global Times commented that Taiwan must 'correctly read the signals' from the meeting of U.S. and Chinese military leaders [17]. This can be read as an attempt by Beijing to interpret the 'strategic stability' framework as a signal of U.S. restraint on the Taiwan issue.

Brookings, however, remains skeptical about the substance of this détente. It notes that China's public statements and Xi's gestures toward Trump have been largely cautious and defensive, with Beijing taking care to avoid personally insulting Trump or causing him to lose face [2]. This leads to the assessment that while Beijing agrees to the 'language' of the relationship, it is not taking the 'bait'—the substantive incentives offered by the United States [2]. Meanwhile, the SIPRI Yearbook 2026 finds that nuclear weapons are re-emerging globally as instruments of national power, reversing decades of arms reduction efforts and increasing the risks of miscalculation and escalation [5][8]. This contradiction—the simultaneous pursuit of détente discourse and the buildup of nuclear and military capabilities—is not a phenomenon limited to U.S.-China relations but is intertwined with the overall trends of the international security order.

This dual track is also evident in the technology sector. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports that the United States and China are exploring summit-level discussions on AI safeguards amid ongoing technological conflict [10]. In contrast, Brookings assesses that a series of high-level AI discussions at the G7, UN, and other forums in the summer of 2026 actually highlighted the widening gap between the two countries [11]. On tariffs, observers have noted that the Trump administration's policy of using them as leverage against China is broad but entails structurally complex trade-offs [14].

3. Analysis of Key Actors

United States (Trump Administration): Trump appears to prioritize managing the relationship at the summit level, agreeing to the 'strategic stability' framework and even preparing a state dinner [15]. However, significant skepticism persists within Washington, where many dismiss the framework as empty rhetoric lacking substance [1]. This highlights the gap between Trump's personal desire for diplomatic achievements and the U.S. national security bureaucracy's traditionally hawkish stance on China. This domestic skepticism could constrain the consistency and sustainability of U.S. policy toward China going forward.

China (Xi Jinping Leadership): For the Xi leadership, U.S. agreement to the phrase 'constructive strategic stability relationship' is being touted domestically as the first major success in its long-running effort to redefine the relationship with Washington since 2012 [2]. Yet, while showcasing this achievement, Beijing remains cautious in its actual policy actions. It bolstered its negotiating leverage by strengthening diplomacy across Eurasia and the Middle East in the run-up to the summit [7], and it is waging a public opinion campaign to interpret signals from military leadership meetings in its favor on the Taiwan issue [17]. This can be interpreted as a dual strategy: leveraging the détente framework while resisting substantive U.S. demands for concessions, especially in technology and tariffs [2].

Washington Policy Circles (Think Tanks like Brookings): Brookings summarizes Beijing's cautious posture as 'not taking the bait,' arguing that China is focused on shoring up its own vulnerabilities by expanding its capabilities for nuclear and technological self-reliance [2][11]. This view serves as a warning that the Trump administration's conciliatory signals may not translate into actual policy shifts.

International Arms Control and Security Organizations (e.g., SIPRI): Irrespective of the détente discourse, these organizations present data showing a global trend of nuclear rearmament. They point out that the strategic calculus of nuclear-armed states, including the U.S. and China, is moving toward expansion, not reduction [5][8].

4. Key Issues

First, the key question is whether the 'strategic stability' framework will be institutionalized into substantive confidence-building measures or crisis management channels, or if it will remain mere summit rhetoric. Given the skepticism in Washington and Beijing's pattern of selective engagement, the latter possibility cannot be ruled out [1][2].

Second, a key point to watch is when the contradiction between détente discourse and the parallel buildup of nuclear and military capabilities will escalate into a security dilemma. If China's nuclear warhead expansion and the U.S. posture of maintaining its military capabilities continue, the gap between the leaders' verbal agreements and the reality of military competition could widen.

Third, communication between U.S. and Chinese military leaders regarding the Taiwan Strait will likely be a litmus test for the effectiveness of the 'strategic stability' framework. The Global Times' interpretation of signals from this meeting as a warning to Taiwan [17] suggests Beijing intends to use the détente framework as a tool to demand U.S. restraint on the Taiwan issue.

Fourth, for middle powers like South Korea, it is necessary to closely monitor the impact on regional security posture of this dual track, where the U.S. and China agree on a verbal framework for stability while continuing a substantive arms race. Whether the summit-level atmosphere of détente leads to a tangible weakening of extended deterrence or security commitments to allies is a matter that must be independently verified.

II. In-Depth Analysis

The U.S.-China 'Strategic Stability' Framework and the Dual Dynamics of the Nuclear Arms Race: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

At the root of this contradictory dynamic is the dual challenge facing both the U.S. and China: the need to simultaneously prevent the deterioration of the relationship and secure a competitive edge. For the Trump administration, accepting the 'constructive strategic stability relationship' framework is not a costly concession, as it is merely a verbal agreement that does not entail substantive policy changes. For Xi Jinping, however, this framework is the fruit of his long struggle to redefine the U.S. relationship since taking power in 2012 [2]. Xi had successively proposed concepts like the 'new type of great power relations' and 'mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation,' but the Obama, first Trump, and Biden administrations all rejected them [2]. This agreement is a political asset that can be leveraged domestically as a diplomatic victory for Xi.

The problem lies in the gap between the framework agreement and policy implementation. Brookings points out that Beijing is not responding to the substantive incentives offered by Trump [2]. This implies that Beijing is using 'strategic stability' merely as rhetoric for stabilizing relations, while in reality, it is investing resources in reducing its vulnerability to the U.S.—namely, by building self-reliant supply chains and strengthening its military capabilities. Xi's intensive diplomatic tour of Eurasia and the Middle East before and after the summit fits this context [7]. It is both a signal that China will not stake its fate on the U.S. relationship alone and a move to broaden its hand at the negotiating table.

The root cause in the nuclear domain is more structural. China has long adhered to a no-first-use policy and a strategy of minimum deterrence [12]. However, the U.S. Department of Defense's annual report estimates that China is undergoing a rapid buildup with the goal of possessing 700 nuclear warheads by 2027 and 1,000 by 2030 [9]. Previous EAI analysis has judged this not as an entry into a Soviet-style, all-out nuclear arms race, but rather as a defensive insurance policy against a deepening U.S.-China security dilemma [6]. In other words, separate from any détente at the framework level, the logic of shoring up one's own vulnerabilities will inevitably persist as long as mutual distrust is not structurally resolved.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: In Washington, the agreement was surrounded by skepticism from the outset. A significant portion of the U.S. political establishment dismisses the leaders' verbal agreement as 'empty words' [1]. This reflects the fact that a hawkish stance on China remains mainstream in American domestic politics. While Trump personally is making friendly gestures by preparing a state dinner for Xi [15], whether this will lead to a broader policy relaxation across the entire administration is a separate issue. In Beijing, by contrast, Xi has a clear incentive to present this framework as a domestic diplomatic achievement [2]. Both leaders are using the language of 'stability' for their domestic political needs, but this language does not bind the actual policies of their bureaucracies, such as the responses from their respective defense and commerce departments.

Military and Security Structure: Military tension in the Taiwan Strait is a structural variable that persists regardless of the framework agreement. The Global Times' warning to Taiwan to 'read the signals correctly' following the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference in Victoria, Canada, in late August [17] can be interpreted as a dual signal from Beijing: it will use communication through military channels as evidence of 'stability' while simultaneously maintaining its pressure campaign against Taiwan. The SIPRI Yearbook identifies this trend as a global phenomenon extending beyond the bilateral U.S.-China relationship. It notes a clear trend of states re-embracing nuclear weapons as instruments of national power, which in turn increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation [5][8]. The absolute disparity in nuclear forces—the asymmetric structure of roughly 6,000 warheads each for the U.S. and Russia versus about 350 for China [12]—acts as a structural pressure, compelling China to continue its buildup to narrow the gap even as it speaks of 'stability.'

Economic and Technological Structure: The Trump-style pressure on China using tariffs as leverage [14] is a factor that provokes Beijing's economic security posture. A similar duality appears in the AI domain. While the Trump-Xi meeting has opened the door to summit-level discussions on AI safeguards [10], a series of AI summits in multilateral channels like the G7 and UN have, on the contrary, highlighted the technological and approach gaps between the U.S. and China [11]. Supply chain pressures surrounding export controls on critical minerals like rare earths also continue [18], indicating that the language of 'strategic stability' has not been able to paper over the confrontational structure in the economic security sphere.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

Previous EAI analysis points to the 1972 U.S.-China détente as a reference point. The Nixon-Mao meeting at that time created an opportunity for strategic cooperation based on a shared perception of the Soviet threat [3]. The current situation, however, is different in nature. The source of conflict is not a common external threat but the bilateral power transition and competition itself. Therefore, the sustainability of this détente is fundamentally more fragile than the Cold War-era precedent.

A more direct comparison is the parallel pursuit of a nuclear arms race and arms control negotiations during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. At that time, even during periods of détente, the U.S. and the Soviet Union created institutional arms control mechanisms like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In the current U.S.-China relationship, however, a corresponding institutional arms control dialogue is absent. Concepts like the 'New New START Treaty' proposed by EAI [12] remain unrealized agendas, and nuclear arms control was not a prominent topic at the recent summit. In short, there is only a verbal détente without institutional arms control, a combination that can be seen as even more unstable than U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1970s and 1980s.

It is also worth recalling the precedent of the Obama administration's rejection of Xi's 'new type of great power relations' proposal [2]. At the time, the U.S. did not accept the phrase, fearing it could be interpreted as recognizing a 'sphere of influence' for China. Trump's acceptance of the similarly-natured phrase 'constructive strategic stability relationship' is closely related to his personal transactional diplomatic style. He has shown a tendency to place greater value on tangible outcomes, such as event-driven diplomatic achievements like state visits and summits, than on the wording itself [15]. This contrasts with the careful management of language by previous administrations.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the substantive outcome of Xi Jinping's September visit to the United States. If the autumn visit takes place as the Global Times has already anticipated [17], it will be a litmus test for the substance of the 'strategic stability' framework, depending on whether concrete progress is made on substantive issues like Taiwan, tariffs, and export controls. Apart from the ceremonial achievement of a state dinner, if no agreements are reached at the level of policy documents or joint statements, the skepticism voiced by Brookings will be reaffirmed [2].

The second variable is the direction of the policy debate on China within Washington. The key is whether the hawkish stance on China at the bureaucratic level, within agencies like the Departments of Defense and Commerce, is maintained, separate from Trump's personal conciliatory gestures. Brookings' point about the side effects of using tariffs as leverage [14] shows that the debate over the effectiveness of pressure tactics against China is ongoing within Washington. The outcome of this debate will determine whether the 'strategic stability' framework leads to a substantive policy relaxation or remains mere rhetoric.

The third variable is the effectiveness of military communication channels in the Taiwan Strait. The core issue is whether military leadership channels, such as the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference [17], can function as crisis management mechanisms. If Beijing actually uses these channels to moderate the level of its gray-zone provocations, 'strategic stability' will gain substance. However, if military pressure continues regardless of the channels' existence, the gap between the framework and actual behavior will become even more pronounced.

The fourth variable is the pace of China's nuclear buildup. The speed at which the targets estimated by the U.S. Department of Defense—700 warheads by 2027 and 1,000 by 2030 [9]—are actually reached is important, as is whether this buildup occurs within the framework of minimum deterrence or goes beyond it. This variable, intertwined not only with the bilateral relationship but also with the global trend of nuclear resurgence pointed out by SIPRI [5][8], will determine the feasibility of future arms control discussions.

These variables have direct implications for middle powers, including South Korea. As a country on the front line of a potential U.S.-China military conflict [3], South Korea needs to independently track the gap between the stabilizing effect of the high-level 'strategic stability' framework and the underlying reality of ongoing military and nuclear capability competition. For now, the more persuasive judgment is that it is premature to be complacent or optimistic about extended deterrence or the alliance posture based solely on the leaders' verbal agreement.