North Korea-China Military Cooperation and Kim Kang Il's Attendance at the Xiangshan Forum: The Nature of a Managed Restoration and South Korea's Response

Executive Summary

While the attendance of Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il at the Xiangshan Forum follows up on the military track of the June Pyongyang summit, it should not be seen as a full-scale restoration of military cooperation between North Korea and China. The reporting patterns of Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency, along with the emphasis in Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun's remarks, suggest that Pyongyang treats this as a matter of routine management, while Beijing views it as a secondary channel subordinate to its primary focus on relations with the United States. China's failure to either support or rebut Kim Kang Il's assertion of the irreversibility of North Korea's nuclear-weapon status on a multilateral stage indicates that the closer ties between Beijing and Pyongyang are a reactive measure by China to manage the deepening of North Korea-Russia relations. This has distinct implications for monitoring North Korea-China-Russia alignment on the Korean Peninsula, for the broader U.S.-China strategic competition, and for discussions on U.S.-ROK-Japan extended deterrence. South Korea needs a response that avoids exaggerating this asymmetric dynamic, while simultaneously tracking whether these exchanges become regularized and assessing their potential to catalyze the restoration of U.S.-China military dialogue.

I. Issue Analysis

Issue Analysis: The Resumption of North Korea-China Military Cooperation and Kim Kang Il's Attendance at the Xiangshan Forum

1. Background and Timeline

High-level exchanges between North Korean and Chinese military authorities effectively ceased around 2019 [3]. President Xi Jinping did not make his first visit to North Korea as leader until 2019, seven years after taking power in 2012 [3]. The subsequent resumption of summit diplomacy has also been irregular, coinciding with COVID-19 border closures and the intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition [3].

The recent dispatch is an extension of the trend of filling this gap. Summit diplomacy was restored with Kim Jong Un's attendance at the Victory Day celebrations in Beijing in September 2025 and Xi Jinping's reciprocal visit in June 2026 [3]. The attendance of Vice Minister of National Defence Kim Kang Il at the Xiangshan Forum is assessed as a military-channel follow-up to this restoration of summit diplomacy [3].

The Beijing Xiangshan Forum is the largest defense and security dialogue hosted annually by China to build a multilateral security discourse under its leadership [3]. North Korea only sent military attachés to the last two forums [1]. This marks the first time in seven years that a delegation led by a vice minister of national defence has officially participated [1].

2. Current Situation

A delegation from the Ministry of National Defence, led by Kim Kang Il, departed Pyongyang on September 15 [8][10]. Ministry of National Defence personnel and the defense attaché and staff from the Chinese embassy saw them off at Pyongyang International Airport [8][10]. This composition suggests a focus on managing working-level channels rather than on political symbolism.

The 13th Xiangshan Forum was held under the theme, "Building a Common Understanding of Stability and Jointly Promoting Security Governance" [7][9]. Delegations of representatives, experts, and scholars from over 100 countries, regions, and international organizations participated [7][9]. Kim Kang Il delivered a speech at the third plenary session on September 17 [7][9]. The delegation returned to North Korea on September 19 [4][6].

The reporting style of Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency is noteworthy. News of the delegation's dispatch, participation, and return was covered briefly at each stage and was placed alongside domestic news items such as economic organization work, the dispatch of a delegation to the Asian Games, and guidance for the defense industry in the daily newspaper summaries [14][17][21]. There is no mention of Kim Jong Un in relation to the Xiangshan Forum. This indicates that Pyongyang is treating this exchange as a manageable, routine diplomatic activity rather than a high-profile event [3].

In terms of substance, the picture is different. Kim Kang Il claimed that the “reckless politico-military confrontation maneuvers” by the United States and its allies are the “fundamental cause” of the 80-year-long confrontation on the Korean Peninsula [11]. He also stated that the U.S. military buildup provides a justification for expanding North Korea's own nuclear arsenal [12]. He asserted that North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state “will never be reversed” [12]. These remarks, made on a multilateral stage, can be read as an attempt to seek tacit international approval for its anti-U.S. narrative [3].

The Chinese reaction was a study in contrast. At the same forum, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun called for security dialogue and norm-setting in emerging domains such as AI, space, and the deep sea [13]. These remarks came ahead of the Trump-Xi summit [13]. This indicates an emphasis on restoring U.S.-China military dialogue rather than highlighting Kim Kang Il's anti-U.S. statements [3]. Indeed, China and the United States are reportedly discussing the expansion of military communication channels and the resumption of arms control talks—suspended over the 2024 arms sales to Taiwan—on the occasion of Xi Jinping's visit to Washington [15].

Working-level exchanges between North Korea and China also took place around the forum. A delegation of young Chinese cadres (led by Li Jingshan, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs) visited North Korea on September 14, attended a banquet for the 78th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK, and returned on September 18 [16][18][19][20]. Vice Foreign Minister Kim Myong Su met with them [16]. This shows that in addition to the military channel, party and government-level exchanges are also being managed simultaneously.

3. Key Actors and Positions

North Koreais employing a dual strategy: using this participation to militarily affirm the restoration of summit diplomacy while refraining from overemphasizing it domestically [3]. During the same period, Rodong Sinmun published an article with the message that "the United States, which actively encourages Japan and South Korea to possess nuclear submarines, is the absolute global disruptor of nuclear security" [14]. This can be seen as an effort to shape domestic public opinion in line with the rhetoric blaming the U.S. at the Xiangshan Forum.

Chinaaccepted the restoration of the military channel with North Korea as a follow-up to summit diplomacy, but on its own multilateral stage at the Xiangshan Forum, it prioritized a separate agenda: restoring military dialogue with the U.S. and discussing norms in emerging domains [13][15]. No explicit rebuttal or endorsement of Kim Kang Il's nuclear-weapon state remarks has been confirmed. This silence suggests that Beijing's interests are not perfectly aligned with Pyongyang's [3].

United Statesis understood to have participated in the same forum with a separate delegation, which enabled China's dual approach of allowing North Korea's anti-U.S. rhetoric on stage while simultaneously maintaining a channel for dialogue with the U.S. [13][15]. This is an instance where Korean Peninsula/North Korea issues and the U.S.-China strategic competition intersected on a single multilateral stage.

4. Core Issues

The first issue is the difference in tone. North Korean media reported the event briefly alongside domestic news [4][6][8][10], but Kim Kang Il's actual remarks were hardline, publicly declaring on a multilateral stage that the U.S. is to blame and that North Korea's nuclear-weapon status is irreversible [11][12].

The second is the scope of China's acquiescence. Despite North Korea reaffirming its nuclear-weapon status on a Chinese-hosted stage, China's Ministry of National Defense did not highlight this, instead focusing on dialogue in emerging domains like AI and space and on restoring military communication with the U.S. [13]. This suggests Beijing is taking a 'managed' approach, accepting the restoration of the military channel with North Korea but drawing a line at endorsing Pyongyang's nuclear justification narrative.

The third is the combined effect of North Korea-China-Russia alignment. While this specific case is limited in scale and symbolism compared to North Korea-Russia military cooperation [3], there is a possibility that the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea could be weakened if North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia exchanges proceed simultaneously [3]. South Korea's strategy toward North Korea and China should avoid exaggerating this contact as a full-scale restoration of a military alliance, but it needs to preemptively prepare for this combined effect [3].

II. In-Depth Issue Analysis

In-Depth Issue Analysis: Root Causes and Structural Context of the Resumption of North Korea-China Military Cooperation

1. Analysis of Root Causes

Before simplifying Kim Kang Il's attendance at the Xiangshan Forum as a sign of closer North Korea-China ties, one must ask why this exchange was restored in September 2026, “after seven years” [1]. The answer lies not in North Korea's intentions, but in China's calculations.

Beijing effectively neglected its military channel with North Korea after 2019 [3]. Xi Jinping's failure to visit Pyongyang during his first seven years in power can be seen in the same context [3]. This neglect was not a matter of indifference but a deliberate choice. As the U.S.-China strategic competition intensified, China had no reason to add another variable to its management of relations with the United States. It likely calculated that closer military ties with North Korea could send an unnecessary signal to Washington.

That calculation changed because North Korea-Russia relations moved first. As North Korea secured its own leverage through troop deployments and technology cooperation with Russia, China faced the risk of losing its exclusive influence over Pyongyang. Kim Jong Un's attendance at the Victory Day celebrations in Beijing in September 2025 and Xi Jinping's reciprocal visit in June 2026 should be seen as an attempt to restore this balance [3]. Kim Kang Il's attendance at the Xiangshan Forum is the military-channel version of that summit diplomacy [3].

In other words, the root cause is not North Korea's desire for rapprochement with China, but the pressure on China to fill the vacuum created by closer North Korea-Russia ties. This directly relates to the key monitoring point of “North Korea-China-Russia alignment” identified in the relevance assessment. The view that the resumption of North Korea-China military cooperation is not an independent event but a Chinese reaction to deepening North Korea-Russia relations offers greater explanatory power.

2. Structural Context

Security Structure: Asymmetric Interests

A difference in temperature is structurally inherent in North Korea-China military cooperation. The reports in Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency were brief at every stage, from dispatch to return, and were placed alongside news of economic organization work or defense industry guidance in the daily newspaper summaries [8][10][4][6][14][21]. There is no mention of Kim Jong Un anywhere. For Pyongyang, this exchange is not a political event but a routine diplomatic matter to be managed [3].

In contrast, on a multilateral stage, Kim Kang Il claimed that “reckless politico-military confrontation maneuvers” are the “fundamental cause” of the 80-year-long confrontation [11]. He declared that North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state “will never be reversed” [12]. These remarks were made not in a bilateral channel but on a multilateral stage watched by over 100 countries [7][9]. Pyongyang is using a dual strategy: downplaying the exchange domestically while seeking international endorsement for its anti-U.S. narrative externally.

China's response lays this asymmetry bare. At the same forum, Defense Minister Dong Jun called for security dialogue and norms in emerging domains like AI, space, and the deep sea [13]. These remarks came ahead of the Trump-Xi summit [13]. No separate expression of agreement with or support for Kim Kang Il's anti-U.S. remarks has been confirmed. China neither refuted nor endorsed North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state. This silence is both acquiescence and a way of keeping its distance.

Political Structure: U.S.-China Relations as the Primary Variable

Beijing's real priority lies in managing its relationship with Washington. On the occasion of Xi Jinping's visit to Washington, China and the United States are discussing the expansion of military communication channels and the resumption of arms control talks, which were suspended over the 2024 arms sales to Taiwan [15]. In a call with U.S. Secretary of State Vangco Rubio, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the two sides must prepare for the next stage of the relationship [15]. This trend coincides exactly with the timing of the Xiangshan Forum.

China's decision not to highlight North Korea's anti-U.S. remarks at its own forum should be understood in this context [3]. Beijing wanted to use the Xiangshan Forum as a stage for restoring military dialogue with the U.S., and North Korea's participation was merely incorporated as a sideline to that discourse-building effort. The overarching structure of U.S.-China strategic competition is defining the form and level of exposure of North Korea-China military cooperation.

Economic and Sanctions Structure

In addition to the military channel, multi-layered channels of North Korea-China exchange were simultaneously active, including reciprocal visits by youth cadre delegations and banquets by the association for friendship with foreign countries [16][17][18][19][20][22]. This shows that the restoration of summit diplomacy is not limited to the military domain but is being regularized across all party, government, and military sectors. Such multi-layered management channels could become a structural backdrop that weakens the effectiveness of North Korea sanctions implementation in the future.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents

It is difficult to make a simple comparison between the current situation and the period before 2019 when North Korea-China military exchanges were active. At that time, the U.S.-China strategic competition had not intensified to its current level, and the third variable of closer North Korea-Russia ties did not exist. In other words, this restoration is not a simple return to the past but is qualitatively different in that it is China's response to the new variable of North Korea-Russia relations.

Another point of reference is China's pattern of using multilateral stages to build its own discourse. The Xiangshan Forum itself is a platform China created to counter Western-led security dialogues [3]. The exposure of an anti-U.S. narrative on this stage, prompted by North Korea's participation, could serve as an example of the kind of friction that can arise if China does not actively manage such narratives and instead lets them be. However, it is characteristic that this time, China succeeded in shifting the focus toward U.S.-China dialogue instead of highlighting that friction.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The variables that will determine the future trajectory can be divided into three categories.

The first is the outcome of the Trump-Xi summit. If military communication channels and arms control talks are actually restored [15], China will have an incentive to continue to subordinate its military cooperation with North Korea to the management of U.S.-China relations. Conversely, if dialogue with the U.S. falters, the possibility that Beijing could pivot to using closer ties with Pyongyang as a pressure card against Washington cannot be ruled out.

The second is the progress of North Korea-Russia relations. The greater the military and technological benefits North Korea gains from Russia, the more pressure China will face to shift toward more active engagement to maintain its influence over Pyongyang. The pace of North Korea-China exchange is largely dependent on the pace of North Korea-Russia exchange.

The third is how often North Korea repeats its anti-U.S. narrative on multilateral stages. China's response may change depending on whether Kim Kang Il's remarks were a one-off rhetorical flourish or become a recurring pattern at similar venues in the future. If a point is reached where China can no longer simply ignore it with silence, there is potential for the difference in temperature between Beijing and Pyongyang to surface.

From South Korea's perspective, these three variables must be viewed not individually but as an interconnected system. South Korea must formulate its response strategy based on the premise that as U.S.-China relations, North Korea-Russia relations, and North Korea's multilateral diplomatic tactics all move at different speeds, North Korea-China military cooperation is more of a dependent variable—an outcome of these other factors.