AUKUS at Five and U.S.-China Strategic Competition: Reassessing Australia’s Security Strategy and Its Implications for South Korea

Executive Summary

Five years after the launch of AUKUS, an asymmetric structure has become entrenched. The U.S.-controlled Marine Rotational Force-Darwin and the SRF-West submarine base are being rapidly augmented, while the delivery of Virginia-class submarines, which would transfer control to Australia, is not guaranteed due to physical production constraints in the U.S. shipbuilding industry. This situation has sparked criticism within Australia that AUKUS is shifting from a framework for building sovereign capability to one for establishing U.S. forward bases. This has become a political issue, intertwined with controversies over the Hunter-class frigate budget and federal fiscal pressures. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s remarks on naval investment and the Chinese state media’s critique of them as subservience to the U.S. can be interpreted as attempts by each side to leverage these fissures. The most likely path forward is the structural entrenchment of this asymmetry. This should be seen not as a unique Australian case but as a precedent demonstrating the impact of U.S. shipbuilding constraints on its alliances more broadly. South Korea needs to preemptively secure channels for participating in U.S. defense and shipbuilding supply chains, re-examine the implementation timeline provisions of its extended deterrence consultative body using the AUKUS case as a cautionary tale, and monitor the debate in Australia as a reference point for managing the ROK-U.S. alliance.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

AUKUS at Five: Reassessing Australia’s Security Strategy Amid U.S.-China Strategic Competition

1. Background and Developments

On September 15, 2021, Australia canceled its $90 billion contract with France for conventional diesel-electric submarines [1]. Instead, it launched the AUKUS trilateral security partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom [1]. This decision was led by then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and the policy direction has been maintained even after the government changed to the Albanese Labor government.

AUKUS was designed with two pillars. Pillar 1 is Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. The pathway involves first receiving three U.S.-made Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s, then transitioning to the SSN-AUKUS class, to be jointly developed by the UK and Australia [6]. Pillar 2 involves sharing advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and cyber capabilities.

From its inception, there was debate within Australia. Some elder statesmen, including former Prime Minister Paul Keating, criticized Australia for becoming excessively subservient to the U.S. strategy toward China. Nevertheless, during the transition from the Liberal government to the Labor government, there were no moves to reconsider AUKUS itself. The expansion of the U.S. military posture, including the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin and the establishment of Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West), is a structure where AUKUS was added on top of existing trends that have continued for over a decade [3][8].

2. Current Situation

In September 2026, marking the fifth anniversary of the AUKUS agreement, fissures surrounding its practical implementation are becoming apparent. U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby has publicly stated that the delivery timeline for Virginia-class submarines to Australia cannot be guaranteed [6]. The assessment is that it is physically difficult for the U.S. shipbuilding industry to ramp up production to cover the transfer to Australia, given that the U.S. Navy's own attack submarine force is already well below required levels [6]. Figures within Australia, including former Prime Minister Turnbull, generally agree with this assessment [6].

In contrast, a different trend was confirmed at the Washington talks. Defense Minister Richard Marles and U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth agreed to expand the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin and augment SRF-West [3][8]. An asymmetric structure is becoming entrenched: the forward deployment of U.S.-controlled assets in Australia is accelerating, while the delivery of submarines, which would transfer control to Australia, is being delayed [3][8]. This is fueling growing criticism within Australia that AUKUS is "transforming from a framework for building sovereign capability into one for establishing U.S. forward bases" [8].

Around the same time, the Hunter-class frigate program also came under scrutiny. Citing budget documents, ABC News reported that $27 billion has been allocated for the construction of three Hunter-class frigates [Source Removed]. Debate continues in Australia over the cost-effectiveness of this investment in ships that have not yet been commissioned [Source Removed].

Amid this, remarks posted on social media by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd on September 13 sparked controversy. He wrote, "Australia needs a world-class navy. A world-class navy requires investments like AUKUS" [7]. The Global Times immediately took issue with this statement. Recalling that Rudd was seen as a relatively balanced figure in relations with China during his time in office, the paper argued that the fact even he was advocating for a naval buildup was proof that Australia was falling into a "U.S. trap" [7].

Remarks made in Tokyo on September 9 by Ashley Shearer, Australia's ambassador to Japan, also drew backlash from Beijing. In a speech at the National Press Club of Japan, Ambassador Shearer supported Japan's military buildup and defended plans to conduct hypersonic missile tests on Australian territory [9]. He also criticized China's "economic coercion" [9]. Citing a Chinese expert, the Global Times countered that Shearer's remarks were based on a Cold War mentality and aimed to justify Japan's military expansion by framing China as a common enemy [9].

On the U.S. side, remarks made in Honolulu by Adam Korzeniewski, the Trump administration's working-level official responsible for AUKUS, have belatedly gained attention. He explained that AUKUS is not a one-off deal but "a way of thinking" that could be applied to other partners, explaining why President Trump strongly supports the agreement [4]. The Sydney Morning Herald reported that he spoke with the intention of conveying confidence in Australia's firm commitment to the alliance [4].

3. Analysis of Key Actors

The Albanese Governmentis outwardly reaffirming its commitment to AUKUS, but its domestic political foundation is weakening. According to a Sydney Morning Herald poll, 74% of voters are concerned about the federal debt, and 48% demand cuts in government spending [13]. During the same period, former Prime Minister Rudd warned that Australia was "at risk of becoming a second-rate country," and former ACTU secretary Bill Kelty criticized Prime Minister Albanese and Treasurer Chalmers for fostering support for One Nation with an attitude that ignores voters [13]. A conflict is emerging between the pressure to expand the defense budget and the demand for fiscal responsibility.

Former Prime Minister Kevin Ruddpublicly advocated for increased naval investment shortly after stepping down as ambassador to the U.S. In a separate op-ed for the Australian Financial Review, he offered his assessment that China has changed under the Xi Jinping regime and discussed the implications for Australia's dependence on resource exports and its strategy for competing in artificial intelligence [10]. The very fact that Rudd, who was considered an expert on relations with China, urged a naval buildup demonstrates a shift in the center of gravity of Australia's security discourse.

The U.S. Department of Defense and the Trump Administrationare sending mixed signals. At the political level, through Korzeniewski, they express confidence in Australia and present AUKUS as a model for other alliances [4]. At the working level, however, Under Secretary Colby has stated that the submarine delivery timeline cannot be guaranteed [6]. This gap stems from the structural constraints of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. The assessment within Australia is that the construction pace for Virginia-class submarines, which is insufficient to meet even the U.S. Navy's own demand, makes it physically overwhelming to produce the units for transfer to Australia [6].

Chinese State Media Outlet Global Timeshas consecutively taken issue with Australia's naval buildup and its supportive statements for military cooperation with Japan [7][9]. In response to Rudd's remarks, it pushed a "trap theory," arguing that Australia is being used for the U.S. security agenda [7]. It framed Ambassador Shearer's remarks as a Cold War-era bloc mentality, criticizing Australia for providing a pretext for Japan's military expansion [9]. Both cases can be read as attempts to reinforce the narrative that Australia's close alignment with the U.S. exacerbates regional security dilemmas.

The Australian Department of Defence and Minister Marlesare demonstrating the alliance's implementation capacity by agreeing to the expansion of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin and the augmentation of SRF-West [3][8]. However, this involves the forward deployment of assets over which the U.S. retains control, not the transfer of assets that Australia would control itself [8]. The asymmetry between the costs Australia is paying and the military assets it is actually receiving is emerging as a central point of contention in defense policy debates.

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the uncertainty of the Pillar 1 implementation timeline. Due to the physical limitations of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, there is a high probability that the delivery of Virginia-class submarines will be delayed [6]. The more likely path is that the timeline will be pushed back by several years, rather than the agreement being scrapped altogether [6]. In this scenario, Australia would be in a position of having to simultaneously secure alternative capabilities and contribute to the expansion of the U.S. shipbuilding industry [6].

The second issue is the domestic backlash in Australia against becoming a U.S. forward base. A structure is becoming entrenched in which the forward deployment of U.S.-controlled assets in Australia is accelerating, while the transfer of assets to Australia is delayed [3][8]. This is leading to the criticism that this contradicts AUKUS's original goal of building Australia's sovereign capability [8].

The third issue is the conflict between expanding defense spending and the demand for fiscal responsibility. The controversy over the cost-effectiveness of the Hunter-class frigate program [Source Removed] and the erosion of public support driven by debt concerns [13] illustrate a political environment where the vision of a "world-class navy" urged by former Prime Minister Rudd will be difficult to back with actual budgets.

The fourth issue is China's discursive counter-strategy. The Global Times is targeting even the remarks of figures previously considered moderates on China within Australia to spread the "U.S. trap" narrative [7]. This can be seen as an attempt to stoke anti-U.S. alignment sentiment within Australian public opinion, thereby narrowing the Albanese government's room for maneuver on defense policy.

II. In-Depth Analysis

AUKUS at Five: In-Depth Analysis of Australia’s Security Strategy Reassessment Amid U.S.-China Competition

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The fundamental cause of the fissures in AUKUS is the gap between the political decision made at the time of the agreement and the industrial reality at the time of implementation. The Morrison government's 2021 decision to scrap the submarine contract with France and choose AUKUS was a strategic signal [1]. It was a declaration of intent to move deeper under the U.S. security umbrella. However, this decision did not sufficiently account for the actual production capacity of the U.S. naval shipbuilding industry.

The construction pace for Virginia-class submarines is insufficient to meet even the U.S. Navy's own demand [6]. This is the background to Under Secretary of Defense Colby's statement that he could not guarantee the delivery timeline to Australia [6]. This is not a matter of a lack of political will; it is a problem of physical constraints involving shipyard workforce, parts supply chains, and budget allocation. An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace points to the possibility that the commissioning of the SSN-AUKUS could be delayed until the 2040s or later [6]. This means that both components of Pillar 1—the stopgap transfer of Virginia-class submarines and the ultimate goal of commissioning the SSN-AUKUS—have become uncertain.

The Trump administration's approach to alliances adds another layer. Adam Korzeniewski, the senior official in charge of AUKUS, described it as "a way of thinking" [4], meaning a framework applicable to other partners. This remark suggests that AUKUS is not a bespoke agreement for Australia alone but a test case for a template the U.S. intends to apply to multiple allies. From Australia's perspective, this increases the risk that the logic of U.S. strategic resource allocation will take precedence over its own specific security needs.

2. Structural Context

Security Structure: The Asymmetry of Control

The Marine Rotational Force-Darwin and the SRF-West submarine base are assets over which the United States retains control [3][8]. In contrast, the transfer of Virginia-class submarines involves handing control over to Australia. What was confirmed at the Washington talks was an asymmetry: the acceleration of the former and the delay of the latter [3][8]. If this structure becomes entrenched, the nature of AUKUS will shift from a project to build Australia's independent deterrent capability to one for securing U.S. forward bases in the Indo-Pacific. Criticism from some quarters within Australia is aimed precisely at this point [8].

Political Structure: Fiscal Pressure and Declining Approval Ratings

The Albanese government's approval ratings are on a downward trend. Seventy-four percent of voters are concerned about the federal debt, and 48% demand cuts in government spending [13]. During the same period, former Prime Minister Rudd warned that Australia was "at risk of becoming a second-rate country," and former ACTU secretary Bill Kelty criticized Prime Minister Albanese and Treasurer Chalmers for fostering support for One Nation with an attitude that ignores voters [13]. Amid this fiscal pressure, the allocation of $27 billion for three Hunter-class frigates was revealed [Source Removed]. This large expenditure on ships that have not yet been commissioned, combined with the controversy over delays in the AUKUS submarine delivery, is escalating into a broader debate about the efficiency of the entire defense budget.

The situation where One Nation's leader Pauline Hanson is gaining support by pledging to cut immigration should be seen in the same context [Source Removed]. In a domestic political landscape where competition for fiscal allocation between defense spending increases and welfare/immigration policies is intensifying, AUKUS can no longer remain solely a matter of bipartisan security consensus.

Economic Structure: The Clash Between Trade Dependence on China and Security Alignment

Australia relies on China for a significant portion of its resource exports. Former Prime Minister Rudd is well aware of this fact [10]. That he called for a "world-class navy" and demanded AUKUS-level investment [7] shows that Australia is still tilting toward security in the balance between economic dependence on China and its security commitments to the U.S. The Global Times' immediate reaction, framing his remarks as a "U.S. trap" [7], signifies that Beijing interprets Australia's choice as participation in a U.S.-led containment network against China.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparison with Similar Cases

The implementation delays in AUKUS can be classified as a case where U.S. arms transfer commitments to an ally have run up against the limits of industrial capacity. It is structurally similar to the Cold War-era delays in transferring F-16s to Taiwan or the more recent delays in supplying Patriot systems to Ukraine. A common feature is that political approval is swift, but actual production and delivery are subject to the physical constraints of the industrial base.

However, the AUKUS case has a distinctive element: the nature of the asset itself, a nuclear-powered submarine, is extremely sensitive under control and non-proliferation regimes. The U.S. choice to rapidly expand forward-deployed assets over which it retains control while delaying the delivery of submarines that require a transfer of control sends a much clearer signal than past delays in conventional arms transfers. This is why concerns are being raised within Australia that the substance of the security partnership could be transformed from "capability transfer through cooperation" to "U.S. military forward deployment through base provision" [8].

A comparison with the NATO case is also valid. The expansion of the U.S. military posture in Australia coincides with the timing of a planned Pentagon report to Secretary Hegseth on a review of U.S. forces stationed in Europe [3]. A trend of "selective allocation is being confirmed, combining increased self-defense burdens for NATO members with a concentration of resources centered on AUKUS in the Asia-Pacific" [3]. This implies that in the process of reallocating its global alliance resources, the U.S. is pursuing a dual strategy: demanding greater burden-sharing from Europe while strengthening its direct forward presence in the Indo-Pacific. This is in line with past rebalancing attempts when the U.S. partially withdrew from Europe after the Cold War to shift its focus to Asia. However, the nature is different this time, as the forward deployment of U.S. assets is prioritized over supporting allies' own capability-building.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

Pace of U.S. Shipbuilding Industrial Expansion

The first variable is whether the construction pace of Virginia-class submarines substantively improves. According to a report by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the U.S. Navy is even considering procuring vessels built in allied countries like Japan and South Korea [Source Removed]. This is evidence that the U.S. itself acknowledges the structural limitations of its shipbuilding industry. If policy shifts toward allowing overseas procurement on the condition of domestic investment [Source Removed], it could indirectly affect the delivery timeline for Australia. However, whether this path would be applied to highly sensitive nuclear-powered assets like Virginia-class submarines is a separate issue.

Direction of Australian Domestic Politics

If the Albanese government's declining approval ratings and fiscal pressures worsen [13], political pressure for a review of AUKUS-related spending could increase. The controversy surrounding the Hunter-class frigate program is already a precursor [Source Removed]. However, considering the precedent that there were no moves to reconsider AUKUS itself even after the Labor government took office, it is more likely that budget cuts would result in a reprioritization of specific projects rather than shaking the foundations of AUKUS.

Intensity of China's Response

The key will be whether the level of criticism from Chinese state media, including the Global Times, translates into actual diplomatic and economic measures [7][9]. A Chinese expert's critique of Ambassador Shearer's hardline remarks on China as "Cold War thinking" [9] shows that Beijing is framing Australia as an entity being used to justify Japan's military expansion. Given Australia's dependence on resource exports to China [10], the possibility that China could use economic leverage to fuel skepticism about AUKUS within Australia cannot be ruled out.

U.S. Department of Defense Resource Allocation Priorities

The most critical long-term variable is how the United States prioritizes its resource allocation between NATO and the Indo-Pacific [3]. If the outcome of the review of U.S. forces in Europe contrasts with the expansion of the U.S. military posture in Australia, it would formalize the strengthening of the Indo-Pacific priority. In this case, Australia would more firmly take on the role of a U.S. forward base in Asia, but would in turn have to continue bearing the cost of delayed submarine deliveries.