Resumption of U.S.-China Military Communications: Implications of the Canada Talks and South Korea's Response

Executive Summary

The recent contact between Yang Zhibin and Samuel Paparo in Canada marks another activation of the U.S.-China theater commander-level military dialogue, which was severed in August 2022 and restored earlier in 2024. However, the fact that Chinese state media did not give the meeting significant coverage and that Beijing maintained a hardline stance on the Taiwan issue at the Pacific Islands Forum suggests that Beijing is operating on a dual-track approach, separating crisis management communication from its pressure campaign related to Taiwan. The likelihood of this contact expanding to include defense ministerial-level talks or the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement is limited, and there are no clear signs of a substantial de-escalation in gray-zone provocations in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. While this channel does not directly involve South Korea, its future direction is directly linked to contingency preparedness due to the interconnected systems of U.S. Forces Korea and the Indo-Pacific Command. This calls for sharing information on these developments through the ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group and separately reviewing contingency plans for the Taiwan Strait.

I. Issue Analysis

Resumption of U.S.-China Military Communications: Implications of the Canada Talks

1. Background and Developments

The meeting took place at a multilateral military conference co-hosted by the Canadian Armed Forces and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The event was attended by 32 senior military officials from 29 countries [1]. Within this framework, Yang Zhibin, Commander of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command, and Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, met separately. The Southern Theater Command is a key command responsible for operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Admiral Paparo is the U.S. military official in charge of overseeing deterrence in the region. This was the first direct communication between the two in two years [1].

This hiatus began in August 2022 after then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, when China unilaterally suspended U.S.-China military dialogue channels. Since then, the two countries have sought to restore military dialogue through summits and high-level diplomatic channels. According to an EAI analysis, at the November 2023 APEC Summit in San Francisco, the two sides "reached an agreement on strengthening communication and building trust through the resumption of high-level military dialogue, without compromising on pending issues" [3]. That agreement included the restoration of channels at various levels, including defense ministerial-level talks, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and theater commander-level calls. The recent talks in Canada are an extension of this trend. A key feature this time, however, is that the contact was made not through a bilateral U.S.-China meeting but through a multilateral security conference led by Canada and the United States [1]. In effect, a third country provided the physical opportunity for the face-to-face meeting.

2. Current Situation

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported the meeting as a working-level contact "to keep communication lines open" [1]. The meeting was only confirmed to have taken place, with no separate statements or joint announcements. Chinese state-run media outlet Global Times, however, did not give the meeting significant coverage. Instead, in its reporting on the U.S.-Canada trade dispute and the controversy over renaming Lake Ontario around the same time, it published an article claiming that "China was unfairly dragged into the dispute" [4]. This suggests that Beijing intends to manage the resumption of military dialogue as a restrained signal rather than highlighting it domestically as a dramatic turning point in relations with the United States.

Around the same time, China's diplomatic engagements unfolded on multiple fronts, including progress in working-level talks on the India-China border demarcation [7] and a meeting between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's Bishkek Summit [14]. In contrast, at the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Beijing maintained a hardline stance on the issue of Taiwan's participation, issuing a warning that "there will always be a price to pay" [10][12][13]. This indicates a pattern where managerial cooperation, such as restoring military channels, is proceeding in parallel with confrontational pressure over the Taiwan issue. While China is keeping communication channels open, there are no clear signs that it will soften its actual course of action on issues in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

3. Analysis of Key Actors

People's Liberation Army (Southern Theater Command): Commander Yang Zhibin's attendance can be interpreted as the PLA's intention to maintain crisis management communication without ceding the initiative. As the Southern Theater Command directly oversees operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the practical utility of this channel lies in preventing miscalculation during gray-zone provocations or close encounters. However, the fact that the Chinese side did not publicize the contact extensively at home [4] can be seen as a cautious approach, taking into account domestic public opinion and hardline anti-U.S. sentiment within the military.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command: From Admiral Paparo's perspective, the restoration of military channels is linked to the issue of a U.S. deterrence gap in the Western Pacific, as pointed out in a CFR report. The United States, facing a situation where it is "increasingly ill-equipped to deter or defeat a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan" [2], places a high value on communication channels to prevent accidental conflict. From Washington's standpoint, military dialogue is less a means of easing competition and more a risk management tool to keep competition at a manageable level.

Canada: The role of the Canadian Armed Forces in hosting this meeting is symbolic. Despite ongoing trade and territorial naming disputes with the United States [4], Canada maintained its role as the host of a multilateral Indo-Pacific security conference. This can be read as Canada's intention to manage its security cooperation axis with the United States separately from its broader framework of countering China.

Taiwan: Although not a direct party to these military talks, Taiwan cannot be disconnected from the situation in the Taiwan Strait, given that the commander of the Southern Theater Command was a participant. The case of Taiwan sending a delegation to the Pacific Islands Forum, which drew a strong backlash from Beijing [10][12][13], shows that pressure on Taiwan in the diplomatic arena continues, separate from the restoration of military channels.

4. Key Issues

The first issue is whether this contact represents the restoration of an institutionalized channel or is merely a byproduct of a one-off multilateral event. It is too early to determine its sustainability without confirmation of follow-up meetings, such as defense ministerial-level talks or MMCA working-level consultations.

The second issue is the gap between the restoration of communication channels and actual military behavior. A key indicator of this channel's effectiveness will be whether there is a tangible change in the frequency of close-in flights and navigation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, as well as gray-zone provocations.

The third issue is that U.S.-China military dialogue and diplomatic pressure over Taiwan are proceeding on separate tracks. While Beijing is engaging in crisis management through military channels, it continues to pressure and isolate Taiwan in diplomatic arenas like the Pacific Islands Forum [10][12][13]. This suggests that one should be cautious about over-interpreting the resumption of U.S.-China military communication as a sign of overall improvement in relations.

For middle powers in the region, including South Korea, this channel is a positive development as it can function as a minimal safety net to prevent escalation in a crisis. However, as EAI has pointed out, for South Korea, which is "on the front line of a potential military conflict between the U.S. and China" [6], it is necessary to maintain a posture of readiness based on the premise that the existence of this communication channel does not in itself signify a fundamental easing of military competition.

II. In-Depth Analysis

Resumption of U.S.-China Military Communications: Structural Context and Historical Precedents

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The immediate catalyst for this resumption was the multilateral military conference co-hosted by Canada and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command [1]. However, this was merely a trigger, not the root cause. The two-year hiatus in communication was itself a structural problem. Since China unilaterally suspended the channel in August 2022 on the pretext of Pelosi's visit, both sides have recognized the risk of miscalculation posed by this gap. The PLA's Southern Theater Command and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command are the operational actors exposed to daily close encounters in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The absence of communication is tantamount to leaving open the possibility of an accidental clash escalating into a crisis.

The root causes are twofold. First is a shift in China's strategic calculations. The fact that the Global Times did not give the meeting significant coverage and instead framed the U.S.-Canada trade dispute as China being "unfairly dragged into" it [4] shows Beijing's reluctance to politicize the resumption of military dialogue domestically. This can be read as an intention to clarify that restoring the communication channel is a practical crisis management measure, not a conciliatory gesture toward the United States. Second, on the U.S. side, there is a pragmatic motivation to secure the minimum crisis management infrastructure necessary to maintain deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. As a CFR report points out, the U.S. military lacks both the industrial capacity and the materiel to counter the PLA's expanding forces in the Western Pacific [2]. Given this quantitative disadvantage, there is little capacity to handle an accidental conflict. The restoration of communication channels aligns with the U.S. need to manage this structural vulnerability.

2. Structural Context

Security Structure: The South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait are areas where the military forces of both countries are constantly deployed in close proximity. The Southern Theater Command, under Yang Zhibin, is responsible for both Taiwan Strait operations and activities near islands in the South China Sea, while Admiral Paparo's Indo-Pacific Command oversees deterrence for the entire region. The communication channel between these two commanders is the only institutional mechanism to mitigate the risks created by this physical proximity. This underlying structure persists regardless of whether the channel exists. The problem is that even with the channel, it cannot change the nature of gray-zone provocations or freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

Political Structure: China's response is twofold. It keeps military channels open while maintaining a hardline stance on the Taiwan issue. This is demonstrated by its warning at the Pacific Islands Forum that "there will always be a price to pay" for Taiwan's participation [10][12][13]. This creates a structure where the restoration of crisis management channels proceeds in parallel with intensified diplomatic pressure on Taiwan. It suggests that China is managing communication and coercion on separate tracks. The restoration of the communication channel should be seen as a signal that it does not imply concessions on the Taiwan issue.

Economic Structure: Concurrently, trade disputes between the United States and Canada are intensifying [4]. While not directly related to the U.S.-China military dialogue, this shows that the United States must manage multi-layered conflicts even in its relationships with allies and partners. Against this backdrop, restoring the military channel with China serves as a stabilizing mechanism that the United States can secure at a minimal crisis management cost.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparison with Similar Cases

The November 2023 APEC Summit in San Francisco is the most direct precedent. At the Biden-Xi summit at the time, the two sides "reached an agreement on strengthening communication and building trust through the resumption of high-level military dialogue, without compromising on pending issues" [3]. While they failed to find common ground on key issues like Taiwan and advanced technology export controls, a pattern of restoring only communication channels—such as defense ministerial-level talks and theater commander-level calls—was repeated [3]. The Canada meeting is a recurrence of this pattern. It can be seen that a standard model for managing U.S.-China relations has emerged: restoring procedural communication while leaving substantive disagreements unresolved.

Going back further, there is the U.S.-China détente that formed after Nixon's 1972 visit to China [6]. An EAI report cites this as an example of creating an opportunity for cooperation "amidst intense competition over core strategic interests" [6]. However, the 1972 détente was a full-scale normalization of relations against the backdrop of a common strategic threat: the Soviet Union. The current resumption of military communication is different in nature. It is a limited measure that restores only a working-level crisis management channel while leaving the fundamental framework of strategic competition intact. In both scale and character, it is difficult to place it on the same level as the 1972 case.

The suspension following Pelosi's 2022 visit is itself a precedent. It showed that China can use political issues as a pretext to leverage military communication channels as a unilateral bargaining chip. This resumption also suggests that the channel is a fragile arrangement that could be suspended again at any time if a similar Taiwan-related incident occurs. In other words, this channel is less a permanent, institutionalized security cooperation mechanism and more a variable measure contingent on the political situation.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The Situation in the Taiwan Strait: Taiwan-related events, particularly visits by high-level U.S. officials or heightened tensions during Taiwanese election periods, are the most direct variables determining the channel's sustainability. As the 2022 precedent shows, China has used the immediate suspension of military communication channels as a tool in response to events with high political symbolism.

Gray-Zone Activities in the South China Sea: For the channel's restoration to have a real crisis management effect, it must be actively used during close encounters in the South China Sea and in friction-prone situations with countries like the Philippines and Vietnam. If the channel exists but is not utilized, it will remain a merely symbolic measure.

Continuation of High-Level U.S.-China Contacts: As seen in the 2023 case, the restoration of military channels has tended to be more stable when linked to summits or ministerial-level diplomatic talks [3]. Conversely, if diplomatic channels become strained, military channels are also likely to be destabilized.

China's Domestic Messaging: The Global Times' restrained coverage of this issue [4] shows that Beijing is wary of it being over-interpreted as a conciliatory signal toward the United States. Future changes in the reporting stance of Chinese state media could be an indicator of Beijing's true intentions.

U.S. Military's Materiel and Industrial Base Issues: The force gap in the Western Pacific pointed out by the CFR [2] is a background factor that gives the United States a stronger incentive to secure crisis management channels. As long as this gap does not narrow, the U.S. is likely to continue to feel the need to maintain these communication channels.