The US Signals Ground Operations Against Latin American Cartels and the Fracturing of the Region: Background, Repercussions, and Response Measures

Executive Summary

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, speaking at the A3C Forum in Panama, signaled that strikes on drug-trafficking vessels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific would be expanded into ground operations. This marks the third stage following the maritime airstrikes of September 2025 and the operation to capture Maduro in January 2026, and constitutes the implementation phase of the strategic orientation articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS)—namely, "securing resources for countering China in the Indo-Pacific by clearing the Western Hemisphere backyard." Colombia has authorized joint operations, and Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago have already been incorporated into cooperative frameworks, while Costa Rica and Ecuador have not clarified their level of participation, and Mexico has adopted its own independent framing—rendering the regional response non-uniform. This asymmetric configuration may open space for China's economic cooperation proposals to gain relative appeal, particularly among states withholding participation. The South Korean government and companies should differentiate their responses between countries incorporated into the cooperative framework and those withholding participation, while prioritizing exposure management at business sites and phased information verification, given the precedent of procedural omission revealed in the Maduro capture operation.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

The US Signals Ground Operations Against Latin American Cartels: Background and Regional Repercussions

1. Background and Developments

The 'Alliance of the Americas Against Cartels (A3C)' forum held in Panama City served as the direct stage for this development. At the forum, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced that strikes on drug-trafficking vessels currently underway in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific waters would be expanded onto land[1][4]. Prior to attending the forum, Secretary Hegseth held a separate bilateral meeting with Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino[13]. At the Hilton Hotel, the venue for the meeting, the two agreed on measures to strengthen cooperation in countering regional cartels[12].

This announcement is not an isolated measure. Since September 2025, the Trump administration has continued airstrikes against vessels suspected of drug smuggling in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific waters[1][7]. As of the time of this announcement, the death toll from these maritime operations has reached at least 215[4][9]. The ground operations policy represents an extension of these maritime operations.

This trajectory had already been foreshadowed in the US National Security Strategy (NSS) released in November 2025. According to EAI analysis, the United States has adopted as the strategic calculation underlying its involvement in this region the aim to "clear the Western Hemisphere backyard in order to secure the capacity to concentrate resources on countering China in the Indo-Pacific"[2]. In the same vein, in January 2026 the US military carried out an operation to directly capture Venezuelan President Maduro[2][10]. The time elapsed from infiltrating the safe house in Caracas to securing custody was a mere two hours and thirty minutes[10]. There was no prior consent from the Venezuelan government or approval procedure from international organizations[2]. The announcement of ground operations comes on top of this series of intensifying Western Hemisphere interventions.

2. Current Situation

The Colombian government has authorized joint operations with the United States. Uruguay's El País reported that this authorization was granted within the framework of a 19-nation coalition led by President Trump[1]. Mexico's El Economista named this coalition the 'Anti-Cartel Coalition' (Coalición Anticárteles) and covered the ground operations plan as an independent domestic story[7]. The Dominican Republic's Diario Libre specifically noted that the Dominican Republic itself is included among this 19-nation coalition[11].

Costa Rica's La Nación relayed Secretary Hegseth's remarks verbatim from the Panama dispatch, focusing on where its own country stands in this discussion[9]. Ecuador's El Universo likewise swiftly transmitted the news from Panama[4]. Both outlets placed the core of Hegseth's remarks on the phrase indicating that ground operations would be conducted "together with regional partner nations"[4][9]. This shows that the United States is framing this measure not as unilateral intervention but as a coalition operation premised on the participation of regional states.

On the Caribbean side, Trinidad and Tobago has already activated a separate joint task force. Trinidad Express reported that the United States has publicly commended Trinidad and Tobago's role in countering transnational crime since the establishment of this joint task force[14]. This suggests that small Caribbean nations are also being individually incorporated into this coalition framework.

Secretary Hegseth did not confine the scope of this operation to any particular country. Uruguay's El País directly quoted and reported Secretary Hegseth's statement that operational targets could be expanded to "wherever cartel organizations are active"[1][4]. This remark has triggered regional concern that, in addition to Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and others could be cited as future operational targets.

3. Key Actors and Interests

The US Department of Defense is the leading actor in this development. Secretary Hegseth, through his visit to Panama, publicly disclosed the ground operations policy while separately attending to bilateral cooperation with President Mulino[12][13]. The decision to expand the scope of operations from maritime airstrikes to ground operations is not solely a Department of Defense judgment; it should be understood as the execution phase of the Western Hemisphere-first strategy set out in the NSS[2].

The Colombian government has emerged as the most active cooperating country in this phase. The authorization of joint operations is a measure that substantially expands the scope of US military operational activity within Colombian territory. However, how this authorization will collide with anti-American sentiment within the leftist government domestically has not yet been dealt with concretely in local media coverage.

As a geographically strategic location, Panama simultaneously served as host country for the forum and as the counterpart in the bilateral meeting. The fact that President Mulino held a separate meeting with Secretary Hegseth[13] demonstrates the weight that Panama's geopolitical position, straddling the Panama Canal, carries in US regional strategy.

Costa Rica and Ecuador have not yet reached the stage of concrete operational authorization, but their domestic media are swiftly relaying the announcement from Panama in their own language, remaining alert as potential target countries[4][9]. Mexico's own media extensively covered this arrangement, even assigning it the name 'Anti-Cartel Coalition'[7], but no mention of the Mexican government's own participation or authorization is confirmed in the materials for this analysis. This suggests the possibility that Mexico is taking a relatively cautious stance toward military cooperation with the United States, given the sensitivity of the cartel issue within its own territory.

Trinidad and Tobago represents a case among the small Caribbean nations that has already institutionalized security cooperation with the United States through a joint task force[14]. The Dominican Republic is confirmed as an explicit member of the 19-nation coalition[11].

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the unbounded nature of the operational scope. Secretary Hegseth's statement that operations could extend "anywhere"[1][4] leaves open the possibility that operations could spread across the entire region, beyond countries like Colombia that have explicitly authorized them. This leads to concerns about the possibility of intervention without the prior consent of individual sovereign states.

The second issue is the qualitative shift from maritime airstrikes to ground operations. Unlike long-range strikes on unmanned vessels, ground operations entail the deployment of ground forces or close support within partner countries' territory. Colombia's authorization of joint operations is the first official instance of this qualitative shift[1].

The third issue is the continuity between this measure and the operation to capture Venezuela's Maduro. EAI analysis assesses the Maduro operation as an unusual case in which "the supreme power of a sovereign state was directly neutralized without explicitly presenting regime change as a stated objective"[10]. Whether the announcement of ground operations could, in a similar manner, target not merely cartels but a specific government itself is a matter that the region will need to watch closely.

The fourth issue is the asymmetry of responses among regional states. Colombia's explicit authorization, Panama's bilateral cooperation, and Trinidad and Tobago's operation of an existing task force reflect differing levels of engagement in the intervention. In contrast, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico remain at the level of media coverage, meaning that actual participation is highly likely to diverge depending on each country's future domestic political landscape.

II. In-Depth Issue Analysis

The US Signals Ground Operations Against Latin American Cartels: In-Depth Analysis

1. Root Cause Analysis

The surface justification for this announcement of ground operations is narcotics. However, Secretary Hegseth's remarks cannot be explained solely through the logic of drug enforcement. He stated that the scope of operations could be expanded to "wherever cartels are active"[1][4]. This means the response is not confined to a specific organization or a specific border region. It signifies that the boundaries of the target are effectively fluid, following the threat perception as defined by the United States.

The source of this fluidity lies in the November 2025 NSS. EAI analysis notes that the United States seeks to "clear the Western Hemisphere backyard to secure the capacity to concentrate resources on countering China in the Indo-Pacific"[2]. The cartel crackdown serves both as an instrument of execution and as a justification for this strategy. While the drug problem is a real policy agenda, it simultaneously functions as a tool to justify military presence within the Western Hemisphere. The expansion from maritime blockade to ground operations corresponds to the physical extension of this presence.

The format of a 19-nation coalition is also part of the root cause[1][7]. The United States has designed this measure not as unilateral invasion but as a coalition operation composed of the voluntary participation of regional states. Colombia's authorization of joint operations is the case in point of this execution. This coalition framing lowers the political cost of intervention while simultaneously offering participating governments the incentive of securing external resources to address domestic security problems. As the interests of both sides converge, the threshold for intervention is lowered structurally.

2. Structural Context

Security Structure: Southern Command has already established the 'Shield of the Americas' joint task force in response to the Venezuela crisis[2]. The operation to capture Maduro concluded in two hours and thirty minutes without prior consent or approval from international organizations[2][10]. This precedent has become a benchmark for gauging the extent to which individual states' sovereign procedures may be omitted in future ground operations. Given that Colombia's authorization of joint operations came after this precedent, it can be inferred that participating countries decided to cooperate having already absorbed lessons regarding the speed and manner of US-led operations.

Political Structure: Responses among participating countries are not uniform. Colombia explicitly authorized joint operations at the government level[1]. Panama's President Mulino held a separate bilateral meeting with Secretary Hegseth and even took on the role of host country for the forum[12][13]. Costa Rica and Ecuador, in contrast, swiftly relayed news from Panama while refraining from specific comment on their own level of participation[9][4]. Mexico maintained an independent framing by introducing this coalition under its own designation of 'Anti-Cartel Coalition'[7]. Small Caribbean states such as the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago have already advanced further into incorporation, in the form of operating individual joint task forces[11][14]. This shows that while regional states face identical pressure, they are calibrating the intensity of their participation according to their domestic political circumstances and the texture of their relations with the United States.

Economic Structure: In parallel with this announcement, the US Treasury Department released statistics indicating that strengthened border security is causing smuggling networks to contract[6]. The figures show that Bank Secrecy Act filings related to human trafficking declined by 62% in 2025[6]. This aligns with the administration's communications strategy of converting the achievements of security measures into economic indicators to present to domestic public opinion. This means that the response to cartels is combined not merely as a security matter, but with the narrative of the Trump administration's achievements in border and immigration policy.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparable Cases

The comparison with the process by which the United States established its Western Hemisphere sphere of influence in the late 19th century has already been raised in previous EAI analysis[2]. At the time, Britain effectively recognized US dominance over the Western Hemisphere through the Venezuela crisis, and in exchange transferred its burden in Asia via the Anglo-Japanese Alliance[2]. The announcement of ground operations this time bears a similar structure. Underlying it is the calculation of clearing the Western Hemisphere in order to concentrate resources in the Indo-Pacific[2].

A more direct precedent is the Maduro capture operation[2][10]. This operation was unusual in that it targeted a sitting head of state, but the methodology itself—intervention without prior consent—is on a continuum with this ground operations concept. There are, however, differences. Whereas the Maduro operation was a one-off special operation targeting a single objective, the announcement of ground operations this time aims for a standing coalition operation system with multiple participating countries, differing in its level of institutionalization.

The contrast with remarks made by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colby during his Asia tour is also instructive[8]. Colby demanded that Indo-Pacific allies such as the Philippines expand their own defense investment, codifying the premise that the US "cannot afford to respond to multiple threats simultaneously"[8]. The United States conducting direct ground operations in Latin America, while demanding expanded self-reliant burden-sharing from allies in the Indo-Pacific, appears on the surface to be a contradictory approach. However, both cases derive in essence from the same strategic calculation of reprioritizing resource allocation. The configuration is one in which the Western Hemisphere is swiftly cleared through direct intervention, while in the Indo-Pacific the burden is transferred through allied burden-sharing, so as to redeploy resources toward countering China.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

Whether Colombia's cooperation continues is the first variable. Colombia is the largest producer of narcotics and the only country in this development to have given explicit government-level authorization[1]. Should opposition from anti-American leftist factions within the Petro government surface, the political sustainability of the joint operations could be shaken.

Whether the operational scope actually expands is the second variable. Secretary Hegseth stated that operations could be expanded to "wherever cartels are active"[1][4]. The moment this statement is concretized into actual operations within a specific country's territory, controversy over that country's sovereignty violation is likely to erupt in earnest. The precedent set by the Venezuela Maduro operation will serve as the reference point for this controversy[2][10].

The gap in the level of cooperation among participating countries is also key. Whether the gap between the active participation of Colombia and Panama and the cautious stance of Costa Rica and Ecuador narrows, or whether the model of individual incorporation seen among small Caribbean states spreads across the whole continent, will determine the regional configuration going forward[9][4][11][14].

The rising trend in the death toll from maritime operations is also a variable that cannot be ignored. The figure of at least 215 already represents a substantial scale[4][9]. Should civilian casualties or controversy over misdirected strikes occur once ground operations commence, public opinion within participating countries could deteriorate sharply, potentially shaking the very foundation of cooperation.