US and China's Perceptions of the Western Pacific Space and Strategic Designs of the Maritime Self-Defense Force

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Sasebo Archives

Park Ye-jin

Major in Arabic and Political Diplomacy, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

I. Introduction

In contemporary international politics, the Western Pacific is the space where strategic competition between great powers unfolds most acutely. Both the United States and China define this region as their core security space, and military tensions repeatedly escalate, centered around the Taiwan Strait. The increasing frequency of military exercises around Taiwan, close proximity operations by naval and air forces, and the expanded security involvement of allies demonstrate that the Western Pacific is no longer a potential conflict zone but has transformed into a stage for active crisis management. However, this competitive dynamic raises a more fundamental question beyond a simple clash of power or military comparison: why is the same action in the Western Pacific interpreted as 'sovereignty defense' and 'defensive measures' by China, yet as 'changing the status quo' and 'challenging hegemony' by the United States?

Existing international political discourse has largely portrayed the United States as a status quo actor defending the liberal international order and China as a challenger seeking to revise that order. Within this framework, China's military buildup and the Taiwan issue are naturally interpreted as challenges to American hegemony, and American military and diplomatic engagement is justified under the pretext of defending allies and stabilizing the order. This dichotomous framework tends to simplify US-China competition into a matter of normative conflict or hegemonic transition. However, this approach has limitations as it carries the risk of interpreting China's strategic intentions and actions too deterministically.

In particular, the interpretation that directly equates China's plan for Taiwan unification or its potential use of force with an ambition for global hegemony across Asia has not been sufficiently examined. The question of how China itself perceives the Western Pacific as a space with sovereign meaning, and how this perception is reflected in its military strategy and threat perception, has been treated as a relatively secondary issue in existing discussions. Consequently, China's actions are often interpreted as direct products of 'offensive intentions,' with the underlying spatial perceptions and justifications not being fully illuminated.

This study begins with this critical perspective, focusing on the differing meanings the Western Pacific holds for each actor. For China, the Western Pacific is not merely an object of expanding influence, but rather a 'survival space' that combines sovereignty defense, national development, and regime stability. Conversely, for the United States, the Western Pacific is a 'space of management' where the credibility of its alliance network and the liberal order must be maintained,

- 64 - and it is perceived as a testing ground where any retreat from this region could lead to a weakening of its global leadership. When the same space is defined so differently, each country's actions are justified as defensive measures from its own perspective, but are interpreted as offensive threats by the other, creating a structural dynamic.

This asymmetry in perception necessitates understanding the US-China competition in the Western Pacific not as a simple military power confrontation, but as a process where perceptions of space and logics of justification collide. In other words, tensions in the Western Pacific are amplified not by military power itself, but by the meanings each actor assigns to that space and their methods of threat perception. In this regard, the Western Pacific can be considered not just a region of potential conflict, but a key stage where differences in perception and interpretation structure strategic anxiety.

Therefore, this study aims to comparatively analyze how the United States and China define and perceive the Western Pacific, and to elucidate how these perceptions function as logics of justification for intervention and deterrence. To this end, it examines threat perceptions and strategic narratives concerning the Western Pacific, focusing on official documents such as the defense white papers and national security strategies of both countries. Furthermore, by comparing the perspective that emphasizes the China threat with a cautious and restrained approach that seeks to manage competition within manageable limits, this study seeks to re-interpret the Western Pacific issue as a strategic space created by asymmetry in perception and interpretation. Through this, the study aims to contribute to understanding US-China competition in the Western Pacific from a more restrained and analytical perspective, moving away from a deterministic framework of hegemonic transition.

II. Comparative Analysis of US and China's Perceptions and Strategies in the Western Pacific

1. US Perception and Strategy in the Western Pacific The US perception of the Western Pacific can be summarized along three axes. First, the Western Pacific is a space directly linked to the security and economic interests of the US mainland. Second, the US perceives the Western Pacific as a space where the rules-based order can be maintained or challenged, and defines China as an actor gradually altering that order. Third, as a method of translating these perceptions into action, the US adopts a strategy of collective response and deterrence involving allies and partners, rather than unilateral intervention. The following examines the US perception and strategy in the Western Pacific centered on these three axes.

(1) Direct Linkage with US Mainland Interests The United States perceives the Western Pacific as a space linked to the security and economic interests of the US mainland. The "Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States," released in 2022, emphasizes the geopolitical importance of the Indo-Pacific region, which influences US national security and prosperity. Defining itself as a Pacific-rim nation leading the regional order, the US expands its scope from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, thereby incorporating the entire Indo-Pacific region, including the Western Pacific, as its core

- 65 - strategic area.

This perception is rooted in historical experience. Through the experience of World War II, the United States learned that security instability in the Asian region could spill over into threats to the mainland. Consequently, for the past 75 years, the US has built treaty alliances with countries such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, making the alliance system centered on the Western Pacific the institutional foundation of US security strategy.

The core of the US Indo-Pacific strategy lies in equating its own interests with regional stability and prosperity. The perception is that if the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) order is maintained, it will not only guarantee the sovereignty and freedom of regional countries but also directly contribute to US security and economy.

However, this perspective also faces the challenge of China's rise. The US assesses that China is expanding its sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region and is emerging as a great power that threatens its long-term position. In particular, while China's economic coercion and aggressive actions are evident globally, their manifestation and intensity are perceived as most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Western Pacific. The US views these actions as problematic because they impose substantial costs on allies and partner countries and undermine international norms such as human rights and freedom of navigation.

Within this perception, the goal of US strategy is not to change China itself, but to shape the strategic environment in which China operates in a way that is favorable to the US. This can be interpreted as an approach that seeks to manage the structure and conditions of competition rather than to completely block or contain China's rise.

At the same time, the US emphasizes that competition with China should not solidify into an all-out zero-sum confrontation. The Indo-Pacific Strategy document acknowledges the inevitability of cooperation with China on transnational issues such as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation, making it clear that bilateral conflicts should not hinder the resolution of global issues that exist.

The reason the US defines the current Indo-Pacific phase as a "decisive decade" lies in these complex challenges. In a situation where challenges such as China's rise, the climate crisis, and pandemics overlap, the US proposes the strengthening of "collective capacity" rather than a response by a single nation as the solution. Whether the rules and norms governing the region in the future will be replaced by a Chinese-style order or whether the existing rules-based order will be maintained depends on the joint response of the US and its allies and partner countries.

On the security front, the US emphasizes its role as a key actor that has maintained peace in the Indo-Pacific region for decades and pledges to continue and modernize this role in the 21st century. US Western Pacific security strategy focuses on protecting its own interests, deterring military attacks, and responding to coercion against allies and partner countries, proposing "integrated deterrence" and "counter-coercion" as key means. In particular, regarding the Taiwan issue, the US maintains the "One China" policy while emphasizing long-term consistency in supporting Taiwan's self-defense capabilities based on the Taiwan Relations Act and existing commitments. This perception does not significantly change even in a second Trump administration. The "National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2025" reaffirms the Indo-Pacific, especially the Western Pacific, as a core strategic space for the US, setting the maintenance of the FOIP order as the top priority. The document presents US goals in Asia along two axes: "securing economic future" and "preventing military confrontation," defining the Indo-Pacific region as a key battlefield for the 21st century and beyond.

Within this perception, the US describes its security strategy in the Western Pacific as "deterrence through strength," which is presented not as a means to prepare for war, but as a condition to prevent it. Notably, the second Trump administration explicitly emphasizes not only military power but also the economic and technological superiority held by the US as key elements of deterrence, demonstrating that Western Pacific security perception is based on comprehensive national capabilities beyond the military domain.

In this context, Taiwan occupies a central position in the US strategic design for the Western Pacific. Taiwan is located at the gateway connecting the first and second island chains and is closely linked to maritime transport routes through which about one-third of global maritime cargo passes. The US perceives the passage restrictions, economic costs, and supply chain disruptions that would occur if a specific actor controls or blockades the Taiwan Strait as serious strategic risks. Consequently, the US policy objective is not to respond after a conflict breaks out, but to prevent conflict itself and ensure the maintenance of the status quo. The US clearly opposes any attempt by one side to unilaterally alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and emphasizes building military capabilities to deny aggression along the first island chain. However, this denial strategy assumes it cannot be carried out by the US military alone, and the strengthening of a collective defense system with allies and partners such as Japan, South Korea, and India is repeatedly mentioned as a key condition for deterrence credibility.

(2) Perception of China and Maintenance of the Rules-Based Order The second axis of US perception of the Western Pacific is the understanding that this region is where the maintenance of the rules-based order is determined, and China is defined as an actor gradually altering that order. This perception places the question of which rules and norms will operate in the Western Pacific at the center, going beyond a simple balance of power issue. The US understands the FOIP not merely as a declaration of values, but as a key framework for maintaining the operational principles of the existing international order, such as freedom of navigation, respect for sovereignty, and compliance with international law.

Within this order perception, China is defined not as a short-term threat, but as a revisionist actor seeking to reshape the nature of the existing order in the long term. The "Military and Security Developments

- 67 - Involving the People’s Republic of China," published annually by the US Department of Defense, most directly reflects this perception. In its 2024 report, the US does not merely describe China as a rising great power but explicitly identifies it as an actor gradually altering the international and regional order. In particular, China's goal of achieving "world-class military power" is interpreted not as an imitation of the US military model, but as a strategy to pursue parity or superiority with the US in the long term through an independent military modernization path that aligns with China's national interests and evolving warfare.

A significant characteristic of the US perception of China is its focus on capability analysis rather than intentions. The report assesses that although the US expanded its engagement from the 2000s onward, hoping that China would transform into a responsible stakeholder that accepts international norms, China's aggressive actions have become increasingly prominent throughout the Indo-Pacific region. In this process, the US has come to fundamentally question China's willingness to comply with international law and norms, particularly noting that this perception has strengthened in the maritime and military domains. This approach explains the US-China relationship as a narrative of "expectations and disappointments" while interpreting the current strategic environment as a result of the capabilities and behavioral patterns China has already built, rather than China's choices.

Regarding naval power, the US presents a dual assessment. On one hand, it partially acknowledges China's expansion of naval activities in extra-regional areas as a means of protecting commercial and maritime interests. On the other hand, it strongly guards against the possibility that China's overseas military bases, port access rights, and logistics support networks could be utilized as forward-deployed infrastructure to monitor and counter US military activities, beyond purely defensive purposes. From the US perspective, the "bluewater navy" of China is perceived not as a simple increase in the number of warships, but as a structural change aimed at operations beyond the theater and long-term power projection.

In the case of Taiwan, this order perception is even more clearly revealed. The US Department of Defense report interprets China's "gray-zone" strategy not as maintaining status quo tensions, but as a signaling system that gradually escalates the possibility of using force. China's actions, combining military exercises, political pressure, and information warfare, are characterized as a "discrepancy between words and actions," and are assessed as indicators for gauging the will to use force. This perception indicates an understanding of China's actions not as isolated provocations, but as a phased approach toward changing the order.

The structural vulnerabilities of China in the Western Pacific that the US points to in the event of a military conflict are also linked to its order perception. The report repeatedly points out that China's energy security is vulnerable to the maritime control capabilities of the US and its allies due to its high dependence on sea lanes of communication. This is interpreted as one of the reasons behind China's efforts to expand land pipelines with Russia and Central Asia and diversify energy transport routes, and the US understands this as a signal that China is considering comprehensive strategies, including its war sustainability and rear stability. Furthermore, the area of Chinese military modernization that the US is most concerned about is self-sufficiency in its logistics and shipbuilding industries. The fact that China is integrating key components such as warship engines into its domestic production system is perceived as a structural change that could challenge the US naval superiority maintained in the Western Pacific in the medium to long term.

- 68 - In the 2025 report, the first year of the second Trump administration, this perception is further strengthened. The US interprets China's military activities in the Western Pacific not as short-term tactical movements, but as part of a long-term strategic shift. While acknowledging that China's current military focus is on the first island chain, the report warns of the possibility that China's military and economic power, if it continues to grow, could expand its influence beyond the Indo-Pacific region to a global level. In particular, by defining the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as a key tool for realizing China's ambition to replace the US as the world's leading power, it does not view China's military modernization as a purely defensive measure.

Nevertheless, the US repeatedly emphasizes that it has no intention of containing or humiliating China. The US goal is to ensure that no country in the Western Pacific has the ability to dominate the US or its allies, and to this end, it sets maintaining deterrence such that aggression is not even considered as an option as its core strategy. This perception is characterized by its focus on the combination of capabilities, industries, and theater strategies that China is already building, rather than definitively defining China's military intentions, as the core threat.

(3) Collective Response and Deterrence through Allies and Partners

The third axis of US perception of the Western Pacific ultimately boils down to the question of how to translate the spatial and order perceptions formed in the previous two axes into an execution strategy. Given that the US perceives China as a challenger to the Western Pacific order and defines the Western Pacific as a core strategic space, its response does not rely on unilateral intervention or one-off power projection. Instead, the US sets network-based collective response, integrating allies and partner countries, as the core execution principle of its Western Pacific strategy.

This approach means that the US no longer manages Western Pacific security as a fixed bloc-vs-bloc confrontation. The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy document explicitly states the need to manage regional security not as a rigid alliance-centric structure, but as a "latticework of coalitions" that is flexible and overlapping. This is interpreted as a plan for the US to accumulate collective deterrence by sharing roles according to each country's capabilities and interests, rather than demanding the same level of military commitment from regional countries.

The central concept of this execution strategy is "integrated deterrence." Moving away from the traditional thinking that deterrence can be achieved solely through military power, the US emphasizes multidimensional deterrence that combines diplomacy, economy, technology, and intelligence domains. Integrated deterrence does not presuppose the sole military superiority of the US and believes that credibility can only be achieved when the military power, economic influence, and technological strengths of allies complement each other. This reflects the perception that competition with China is not decided in a single theater or domain, but is cumulatively formed within the strategic environment of the entire Western Pacific.

- 69 - Along with this, the US presents "counter-coercion" as a key execution measure. This is a concept designed to respond to the gray-zone strategies and economic and political pressure that China employs in the pre-conflict phase, aiming to increase the cost of changing the status quo without triggering military conflict. The US perceives that strategic competition in the Western Pacific is unfolding not in the form of full-scale war, but through low-intensity pressure and erosion of norms, and is opting for strengthening joint response capabilities with allies, information sharing, and policy coordination to counter this. In the second Trump administration, this execution method is maintained and even more explicitly defined in some areas. The "National Security Strategy (2025)" emphasizes the sharing of responsibilities and burdens with allies and seeks to transition to a structure of jointly managing security burdens in the Western Pacific.

2. China's Perception and Strategy in the Western Pacific China's perception of the Western Pacific has developed within a relatively consistent logical structure through its defense white papers and strategic documents. While the emphasis has varied by year, China has maintained consistency in framing its military modernization and naval expansion as a matter of defensive justification and protection of national development, rather than hegemonic pursuit. These can be summarized along the following three axes: First, for China, the Western Pacific is a space directly linked to its national development environment and regime stability; second, it systematizes the justification for military modernization through discourse of anti-hegemony and active defense; and third, it identifies the causes of regional security instability in alliance politics and bloc formation logic, and in response, presents a comprehensive national security perspective.

(1) Intersection of National Development and Survival The "China's National Defense in 2010" (Information Office of The State Council, 2011) positions military modernization as a task subordinate to national development, emphasizing that the PLA's development contributes not only to domestic economic growth but also to world peace and regional stability. At this time, China perceived the Asia-Pacific (hereinafter referred to as "AP") region, particularly the Western Pacific, as a core space that needed to be maintained and protected for its development environment, and presented the purpose of strengthening its military power not as projecting influence outward, but as ensuring stable development.

Within this perception, the role of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) gradually expands beyond coastal defense. The 2010 white paper defines the PLAN's core mission as maintaining maritime defense and deterrence, while explicitly including offshore operational capabilities and response to non-traditional security threats. However, the offshore capabilities at this time were justified by defensive logic, such as protecting Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) and securing strategic buffer zones, rather than offensive power projection.

- 70 - (2) Anti-Hegemony Discourse and Active Defense Strategy "China's Military Strategy in 2015" (Xinhua, 2015) prominently features the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Chinese Dream) and the narrative of peaceful development, declaring that China will never pursue hegemony or expansion. At the same time, it institutionalizes the necessity of strengthening military power by defining robust national defense and building a strong military as essential conditions for national development and peace. The "Preparation for Military Struggle (PMS)" and "Civil-Military Integration (CMI)" presented as core directions for the PLA in this document indicate a further advancement in China's Western Pacific strategy. In particular, China attributes the deterioration of security in the AP region not to its own expansion, but to external factors such as the US "rebalancing" strategy, changes in Japan's security policy, and external interventions in the South China Sea. Within this perception, the protection of maritime rights and interests is elevated to a long-term national task, and the PLAN's mission is redefined to combine coastal defense with offshore protection.

In "China's National Defense in the New Era 2019" (The State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2019), this anti-hegemony discourse is further strengthened. The white paper repeatedly emphasizes that China has never pursued hegemony in history, while simultaneously defining the instability in the AP region as a result of the US's expanded military activities and strengthened alliances. The concept of "active defense" is presented as the core principle of China's military strategy, and the maxim "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will surely counterattack (不犯我者我不犯, 犯我者必犯)" functions as a logic that justifies active response while emphasizing defensiveness. In particular, maritime security and Taiwan unification are elevated to issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, making the expansion of offshore capabilities and strengthening of maritime readiness an indispensable choice.

(3) Criticism of Alliance Politics and Comprehensive Security Perspective The third axis of China's perception of the Western Pacific lies in identifying the causes of regional security instability in alliance politics and bloc formation logic, and in response, presenting a comprehensive national security perspective. "National Security in China in the New Era" (Xinhua, 2025) diagnoses the AP region as having already become the center of great power competition, and that some countries are structurally escalating regional tensions by strengthening military alliances and forming exclusive blocs. This framing is linked to a discourse strategy that shifts the security issue in the Western Pacific from China's expansion to a consequence of US-led alliance politics.

The comprehensive national security perspective presented in this document expands the scope of security beyond the military domain to include political, economic, technological, data, social, and ecological spheres. China presents a logic of pursuing Chinese-style modernization through a virtuous cycle of high-quality development and high-level security, positioning its Western Pacific strategy not as a mere military response but as a comprehensive strategy for regime stability and sustained development. At the same time, China emphasizes that US-China relations must be managed under the principles of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence,

- 71 - and explicitly rejects the narratives of a "new Cold War" and the "Thucydides Trap."

Synthesizing the above discussion, the Western Pacific can be understood not merely as a stage for power competition between the US and China, but as a strategic space where differing security perceptions and logics of justification collide. For the US, the Western Pacific is a space of order management that must be stably controlled through the maintenance of the liberal international order, the assurance of the credibility of its alliance network, and the management of the regional balance of power. Consequently, US strategy is structured around rules and norms, alliances and partnerships, integrated deterrence, and forward deployment, with China's rise perceived as a structural challenge to the existing order. Thus, the Western Pacific is positioned as a forward stage where US global leadership and the credibility of its alliances and partners are tested, and as a core strategic space where competition must be responsibly managed.

Conversely, for China, the Western Pacific is not simply an object of expanding influence, but rather a vital strategic space directly linked to the protection of national development, sovereignty, and regime stability. China frames its military modernization and naval expansion with the logic of defensive justification and protection of national interests, rather than hegemonic pursuit, and identifies US-led alliance politics and military intervention as the primary causes of regional security instability. Within this perception, the Western Pacific becomes a core space where China's maritime sovereignty and security interests are continuously projected.

Ultimately, while China perceives the Western Pacific as a vital strategic space directly linked to its sovereignty and security, the US constructs the necessity of its involvement through the mediation of alliance stability and regional order, setting it as an object of management. This asymmetry in perception and difference in justification methods extend beyond mere differences in strategic choices to a gap in the interpretation and evaluation of the same actions. That is, a structure is formed where the same military activities or strategic measures are read as defense and sovereignty protection by China, and as a challenge to the status quo and the rules-based order by the US. The following chapter will examine the discussion of how this interpretive gap leads to differing evaluations of the Western Pacific strategies of both countries, while also leading to convergence in certain aspects.

III. Asymmetry and Convergence in US-China Strategic Perceptions

1. The "China Threat" Emphasis Perspective The perspective that evaluates China as offensive shares the commonality of perceiving US-China competition as a long-term strategic competition aimed at structurally weakening the regional order that the US has led and replacing it. From this viewpoint, China is defined not as a defensive actor pursuing the status quo, but as a revisionist actor attempting to transition the order in a gradual and phased manner. This perspective can generally be summarized by the following three arguments:

- 72 - First, the offensive perspective defines China's strategic goal not as short-term expansion of influence, but as its rise to become a hegemonic power replacing the US in Asia. In this process, the US alliance system is perceived as an obstacle to achieving China's goals. Elbridge Colby (2021) focuses not on the increase in China's national power itself, but on the possibility that its rise will solidify into a new hegemonic balance of power in Asia. According to him, the core US concern is a scenario where China coalesces with regional countries to erode the US alliance network, ultimately forming a regional order unfavorable to the US. Consequently, the goal of US grand strategy focuses on "denial defense" to preemptively block the process of China's rise as a regional hegemonic power.

Meanwhile, John Mearsheimer (2021) points out that China has always had revisionist goals and criticizes allowing China's growth as the US's biggest mistake. Rush Doshi (2021) also analyzes China's rise as a phased strategy that challenges the world order beyond weakening the regional order, citing the construction of a blue-water navy as its core means. From this perspective, interpreting China's actions as mere defensive responses can lead to dangerous underestimation.

Second, China's defensive discourse is considered a means to conceal its actual offensive intentions. This interpretation is most starkly revealed in the Taiwan issue, where Taiwan is perceived not simply as a disputed territory of sovereignty but as a strategic linchpin for order transition. Kevin Rudd (2025) analyzes China as an actor systematically preparing for the use of force to achieve its national goal of unification. He warns that while war may not be the preferred option, the Chinese leadership is prepared to take calculated risks if the probability of success and the costs are deemed acceptable.

Matthew Pottinger (2024) also interprets the unification of Taiwan not as the endpoint of China's strategy, but as the starting point for greater power projection. He believes that the Xi Jinping leadership views Taiwan's unification as an essential condition for the Chinese Dream, and after securing Taiwan, China will project its military resources to a broader region based on its dominance in East Asia.

Third, there is criticism that the United States' lukewarm response is effectively aiding China's status quo alteration. Robert Blackwill (2020) defines the past U.S. expectation of co-opting China as a status quo power through economic integration as a strategic miscalculation. He argues that the U.S. has weakened its traditional geopolitical objective of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon by effectively allowing China's rise.

Furthermore, Jonathan Czin and Matthias Allie (2025) point out that the U.S. is failing to send consistent deterrence signals despite China expanding its military and political influence in the Western Pacific, taking advantage of the Trump administration's second term's focus being diverted by wars in the Middle East and Europe and increased protectionism. The accumulation of such inaction effectively condones China's gradual status quo alteration strategy, the 'salami-slicing tactic,' creating a vicious cycle that further strengthens China's assertiveness. This leads to concerns that China's attempts to alter the status quo will further expand and intensify without decisive U.S. intervention.

- 73 - 2. A Cautious and Restrained Approach Contrary to views that define China as aggressive, a cautious approach has been proposed within the U.S., advocating for the perception of U.S.-China competition not as an inevitable conflict or a hegemonic war, but as a manageable competition. This perspective does not underestimate China's military buildup and maritime activities but is wary of deterministic views that immediately link these to a hegemonic challenge or the inevitability of war. The core concern is not China's intentions themselves, but the misperceptions that accumulate as both sides interpret each other's actions in the worst-case scenario, and how these misperceptions can amplify the possibility of conflict. From this viewpoint, the U.S. strategy is not to subdue or contain China, but to manage competition, control crises, and prevent unnecessary military escalation.

The core argument of this perspective is, first, that China clearly recognizes its own military and economic constraints. From this viewpoint, China's military modernization is closer to a long-term capacity-building process pursued selectively within limited resources, rather than an offensive means to achieve hegemony. Eric Heginbotham notes that while China recognizes the narrowing military gap with the U.S., it does not overconfidently assume absolute superiority. Concerns about technological limitations and structural flaws persist within China, and the Xi Jinping administration's continuous pursuit of ambitious military reforms, including anti-corruption measures, is an extension of this critical awareness. Notably, China's management of defense spending at around 1.5-2% of GDP demonstrates its caution regarding the burden that a full-scale arms race would impose on economic growth and regime stability. Ultimately, China's goal of a 'world-class military by 2050' is interpreted as a product of selective competition aiming for qualitative parity and efficiency in specific domains, rather than an intention to completely overwhelm the U.S. This suggests the need to re-examine simplistic hawkish discourse that unconditionally regards China as a hegemonic pursuer.

Second, the perception that the deterministic frame of viewing U.S.-China competition as an inevitable conflict obscures the essence of the issue. This perspective criticizes the mechanical application of Thucydides's Trap to U.S.-China relations, viewing the outcome of competition as determined by policy choices and mutual perceptions, rather than structural destiny. Chinese scholars Ling Shengli and Lv Huiyi (2019) systematically raise this concern. They emphasize that the Peloponnesian War was not solely caused by Sparta's fear of the rising power Athens, but was a result of complex interactions between the international system, state strategies, and leaders' choices. They argue that a one-to-one correspondence to contemporary U.S.-China relations lacks explanatory power. At the international system level, China has not yet reached comparable hegemonic capabilities to the U.S., and at the state level, countries in the Asia-Pacific region maintain ambiguity by cooperating with the U.S. for security and with China for economy, thus playing a role in buffering tensions between the two powers. Ultimately, for them, U.S.-China competition is not an inevitable war, but a competition that can be managed and controlled.

- 74 - Michael O’Hanlon (2021), while acknowledging China's rise, also cautions against the discourse that directly links it to the collapse of American hegemony. He analyzes that China itself perceives actions like an invasion of Taiwan as a “gamble of cosmic proportions” and an extreme act that would invite strong international retaliation, arguing that U.S. authorities should refrain from excessive threat rhetoric and maintain a cautious and restrained posture.

Third, misperceptions and excessive threat perceptions by both the U.S. and China pose a greater existential risk than China's military realities. Michael Swaine and Andrew Erickson (2023) criticize the U.S. strategy toward China for being tilted towards a zero-sum threat perception based on worst-case scenarios, proposing 'responsible restraint' as an alternative. According to them, China lacks the capability or intention to threaten the existence of the U.S., and its nuclear weapons are operated as a deterrent, not an offensive tool. While conventional military power may cause limited concern in parts of the Western Pacific, it has not reached a level to seize regional hegemony at a tremendous economic cost. Therefore, the most significant risk is not China's intent to attack, but the possibility of accumulating misperceptions amidst mutual distrust. This fundamentally contrasts with the hawkish view that defines China as an agent of inevitable order transformation, demonstrating that the U.S.-China confrontation in the Western Pacific is a battle of interpretation and justification beyond a power struggle.

3. Changes in U.S.-China Military Relations and Convergence of Perceptions Over the past two decades, the military relationship between the U.S. and China has undergone fundamental structural changes. In particular, China's military modernization has begun to pose a substantial challenge to the overwhelming U.S. military superiority that has persisted since the end of the Cold War. Currently, the U.S. and China implicitly or explicitly recognize the reality of a narrowing military gap and agree on the necessity of managing the resulting instability. This convergence of perceptions can be summarized along three main axes.

First, the acknowledgment of the substantial reduction in the U.S.-China military gap. China has become the world's second-largest military spender after the U.S. Since President Xi Jinping took office in 2013, China's defense budget has more than doubled by 2024. In 2024, the official defense budget increased by 5.2% year-on-year to $231 billion, but the actual total defense expenditure is estimated to be between $304 billion and $277 billion (The White House, 2025). China's defense spending, which was about 1/6 of the U.S. in 2012, has narrowed to about 1/3 by 2024 (Funalole & Hart, 2025). This signifies a considerable reduction in the gap between the U.S. and China based on defense spending over the past decade.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense has adopted a strategy of defending the motives behind its military buildup, rather than directly denying the claim of a narrowing military gap. In response to the U.S. Department of Defense's 2025 report on China's military power, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense issued an official statement criticizing it for distorting China's military intentions and exaggerating its threats (Xinhuanet, 2025). This mode of expression can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid international criticism by acknowledging the objective fact of increased military capabilities while emphasizing their defensive nature.

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Second, despite the narrowing gap, the U.S. still maintains absolute superiority on a global scale. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), U.S. military expenditure is approximately $997 billion, about 3.2 times that of China (approximately $314 billion). Christopher S. Chivvis (2024) argues that the threat posed by China's military expansion to U.S. global military power should not be exaggerated. He states that building a global navy with combat capabilities comparable to the U.S. and expanding its base network would take decades and enormous resources. Therefore, even if the Chinese navy grows, it is unlikely to reach the level the U.S. has built over the past 75 years in the short term.

The Belfer Center also identifies the core of U.S. superiority in structural factors. The U.S. has established collective defense systems with over 50 allied nations worldwide and possesses unparalleled power projection capabilities. Notably, in terms of nuclear warheads, the U.S. with approximately 3,700 warheads significantly outnumbers China (approximately 600) (Alison & Unterman, 2021). Therefore, the possibility of China's military buildup leading to a global military reversal is low, suggesting that U.S. superiority will be maintained system-wide, even if challenged regionally.

Third, China's expansion of its nuclear arsenal and increasing influence within the First Island Chain. Regardless of global superiority, the military balance at the Western Pacific regional level is shifting in China's favor. The U.S. Department of Defense's 2025 report projects that China's nuclear warhead count has surged from approximately 200 in 2020 to about 600 in 2024, and is expected to reach 1,500 by 2035.

[Figure 1. China's Nuclear Warhead Stockpile Status and Outlook]

(Source: CSIS(2025))↵

- 76 - Alongside quantitative expansion of its military power, China is enhancing its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and joint operational capabilities to block the intervention of the U.S. and its allies. In particular, as PLA training is increasingly focused on scenarios involving Taiwan, its practical influence within the First Island Chain is expanding. This raises the cost of U.S. intervention during crises, leading to a military balance in the Western Pacific that favors China.

Grostad (2025) analyzes that the strengthening of China's A2/AD capabilities within the First Island Chain is leading to increased operational costs for the U.S. in the region, indirectly contributing to Japan's decision to increase its defense spending in 2022. Indeed, according to the Lowy Institute's 2024 Asia Power Index, China has surpassed the U.S. for the first time in military posture in the Asian region, and U.S. military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region has decreased to about two-thirds compared to 2012 as of 2025 (Lowy Institute, 2024). John Culver, a Chinese military expert at the Brookings Institution, has also pointed out that U.S. forces stationed in the Western Pacific have reached a point where they can no longer reliably function as a deterrent against China (Culver & Czin, 2025). This suggests that the military balance in the Western Pacific is no longer a stable state based on unilateral U.S. superiority, but is transitioning to a competitive balance that entails costs and risks.

In summary, the perspective emphasizing the China threat understands U.S.-China competition as a conflict over order transformation. From this viewpoint, China is not merely a status quo defender but a revisionist actor systematically and calculatedly undermining the U.S.-led regional order and seeking to replace it. China's military modernization, naval expansion, and assertive stance on the Taiwan issue are interpreted not as isolated incidents but as parts of a long-term strategy, with Taiwan particularly seen as a turning point for order transformation and a key space for testing U.S. strategic credibility. This perspective views China's defensive rhetoric as a concealment of its true intentions and criticizes the U.S.'s lukewarm response or strategic ambiguity for having effectively condoned China's gradual status quo alteration. Consequently, this approach leads to the policy implication that only through strong, clear deterrence and a commitment to intervention can China's assertiveness be controlled.

Conversely, the cautious and restrained approach, while not underestimating China's military buildup and maritime activities, is wary of deterministic interpretations that directly link these to the inevitability of war or a hegemonic struggle. This perspective highlights that China clearly recognizes its structural constraints and costs, and its willingness to bear the political and economic burdens of a full-scale military conflict is limited. In particular, China's internal military reforms, its limited defense spending, and the deterrent nature of its nuclear arsenal are interpreted as indicators that China prefers manageable competition over unlimited pursuit of hegemony. In this view, the core risk of U.S.-China competition lies not in China's intent to attack itself, but in the misperceptions and excessive threat perceptions that accumulate as both sides interpret each other's actions in the worst-case scenario. Therefore, the objective of the strategy is not to subdue or contain the adversary, but to manage competition, control crises, and prevent military escalation.

- 77 - Importantly, these two perspectives are not merely a dichotomy of optimism and pessimism; each carries different risks. The perspective emphasizing the China threat, while highlighting the importance of deterrence by warning against underestimating China's capabilities and intentions, also harbors the potential to trigger excessive responses and a cycle of security dilemmas. Conversely, the cautious and restrained approach has the advantage of reducing the risks of misperception and accidental conflict, but faces criticism that it may contribute to the establishment of strategic fait accomplis if it fails to sufficiently deter China's gradual status quo alteration. In other words, the two perspectives should be understood not as mutually exclusive, but as competing interpretive frameworks that illuminate different dimensions of risk.

Despite these differing perceptions, a certain degree of convergence has been observed in recent U.S.-China military relations. While both countries do not deny the substantial reduction in the military gap over the past two decades, they also share the reality that the U.S. still maintains absolute superiority on a global scale. Furthermore, China's expansion of its nuclear arsenal and its increased military influence within the First Island Chain are recognized as key factors demonstrating the changing military balance in the regional context of the Western Pacific. These changes pose challenges of increased intervention costs and weakened deterrence credibility for the U.S., while simultaneously serving as a basis for China to strengthen its need for defensive measures.

Ultimately, the analysis in this chapter suggests that the U.S.-China competition in the Western Pacific cannot be reduced to a simple military confrontation or a question of hegemonic succession. Both countries perceive themselves as defensive actors, yet share a common cognitive structure of interpreting the other's actions as offensive. This asymmetry in perception harbors potential risks of miscalculation and management failure in crisis situations, while also demonstrating that both sides are adjusting and converging their perceptions to some extent amidst the structural reality of a changing military gap.

IV. Conclusion and Outlook

This study focused not on reducing the U.S.-China competition unfolding in the Western Pacific to a mere military standoff or a result of hegemonic competition, but on how both countries perceive and justify this space. The analysis confirmed that while both the U.S. and China share the common ground of the Western Pacific being a crucial strategic space that neither can afford to concede, their respective understandings of its meaning and function are constructed through different logics. In other words, despite competing over the same space, the two countries understand the Western Pacific through entirely different problematics and strategic languages.

For China, the Western Pacific is akin to a 'space of survival,' where maritime sovereignty, national development, and regime stability converge. Within this perception, military modernization and naval expansion are justified not as means of external expansion or power projection, but as defensive measures to protect national security and development. The Taiwan issue also falls within this framework of perception. For China, Taiwan is not merely a strategic foothold but is constructed as a sovereign and historical issue that requires the completion of unfinished unification, making it a core interest where external

- 78 - intervention is unacceptable. This narrative functions to frame China's military actions as unavoidable and legitimate choices for itself.

Conversely, for the U.S., the Western Pacific is perceived as a 'space of management' where the credibility of its alliance network and the functioning of the rules-based international order are tested. The U.S. views stability in this region as directly linked not only to regional order but also to the maintenance of global leadership and international norms. In this context, China's military actions are interpreted not as isolated incidents but as structural challenges to the regional order as a whole. Consequently, deterrence and intervention are justified not as optional policy choices, but as essential responses for maintaining order. Thus, the U.S. perception of the Western Pacific frames China's actions within a broader order, operating to expand the scope of threat.

This asymmetry in spatial perception leads to differing evaluations of U.S.-China strategy. The perspective emphasizing the China threat interprets China's rise as a long-term strategy to transform the existing order and tends to view the Taiwan issue as an existential threat to U.S. strategic credibility. From this viewpoint, China's military buildup is read not as a mere regional phenomenon but as a structural challenge that could erode the entire U.S.-led order. Conversely, the perspective wary of exaggerated interpretations of the China threat focuses more on the structural constraints and limited strategic objectives facing China. It warns that China's actions do not necessarily lead to a full-scale pursuit of hegemony, and that failure to manage competition within controllable limits could instead amplify security dilemmas.

Importantly, these two perspectives are not simply a matter of right versus wrong, but each entails different risks. The approach emphasizing the China threat carries the potential for miscalculation and overreaction by overestimating the adversary's capabilities and intentions. Conversely, the approach wary of exaggerating the threat carries the risk of underestimating the structural impact of China's military changes. These contrasting evaluation methods amplify the uncertainty in policy choices surrounding U.S.-China competition.

However, despite these differences in perception, a certain degree of convergence has been observed in recent U.S.-China military relations. As examined earlier, both countries explicitly or implicitly acknowledge the substantial reduction in the military gap over the past two decades, while also sharing the fact that the U.S. still maintains its superiority on a global scale. Furthermore, China's expansion of its nuclear arsenal and its increased military influence within the First Island Chain are increasingly accepted as undeniable realities. This suggests that the issue of how to manage the changed military environment, rather than the existence of competition itself, is gradually emerging as a common concern.

In this context, the fundamental issue in the Western Pacific lies not in a dichotomous judgment of whether China is 'pursuing hegemony' or whether the U.S. is 'overreacting,' but in how the structure, where both sides consider themselves defensive actors while interpreting the other's actions as offensive, can lead to miscalculations and failures in crisis management. In other words, the source of crisis is less about the intentions of a single actor and more about the structural tension created by the accumulation of mutual perceptions and interpretations. In this regard, recent discussions on strategic stability and the restoration of military communication channels should be understood not as a sign of competition ending, but as a pragmatic response to manage the changed

- 79 - reality within manageable limits.

Ultimately, the issue of the Western Pacific boils down to how the U.S. and China manage their mutual perceptions amidst the structural change of a narrowing military gap. Both the U.S. and China tend to define themselves as defensive actors while interpreting each other's actions as offensive, and they are increasingly recognizing the potential for miscalculation in crisis situations stemming from this cognitive structure. Competition is inevitable, but the nature and outcome of that competition can vary depending on how mutual perceptions are managed. In this sense, the Western Pacific is positioning itself as both a front line of strategic competition between the U.S. and China, and a space where their perceptions are partially converging and being adjusted.

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