North Korea's "Institutional Irreversibility" of Nuclear Armament: A Shift in North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine and ROK-US Response After Hanoi

The Young People of Sarangbang Wander in Search of True Scenery: The Young People of Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

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Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: May 18, 2026

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Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

Kim Chae-rin

Master's Candidate, Department of Diplomacy, Seoul National University

I. Introduction

1. Research Background What are the fundamental motivations driving North Korea's sustained nuclear armament? Over the past 30 years since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the 1990s, North Korea has fully legalized its nuclear possession by adopting the "Law on the DPRK's Nuclear Force Policy" in 2022. According to this law, enacted at the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on September 8, 2022, "the nuclear force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a powerful means to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, its fundamental interests, prevent war on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and ensure global strategic stability." The law further stipulates the mission of North Korea's nuclear force as "the basic capability for national defense that defends the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and the lives and safety of the people from external military threats, aggression, and attacks" (Choson Sinbo, 2022). In other words, North Korea's nuclear force is both a 'powerful means' to realize the territorial integrity of the Korean Peninsula and its 'mission'.

There are differing interpretations of this new development in North Korea. Some scholars characterize North Korea's nuclear armament as a 'revisionist' behavior aimed at fundamentally transforming the power balance on the Korean Peninsula, while others understand it as a 'survivalist' choice to maximize regime survival within a constrained structure. The perception of North Korea's nuclear armament has itself become a litmus test for political orientation. However, such dichotomized interpretive frameworks tend to exclude 'North Korea's perspective' itself from policy considerations.

This paper argues that North Korea's nuclear armament is not an attempt to break the status quo stemming from ideological extremism, nor a mere temporary measure for survival, but rather a process of institutionalization leading to irreversibility. To this end, it borrows concepts from the path dependency of historical institutionalism (HI). According to HI,

- 4 - institutions are characterized by path dependency, and as resistance to change increases over time—that is, as stability increases—it becomes increasingly difficult to achieve path switching or reversal of an institution, and ultimately the institution may experience a lock-in state (Rixen et al., 2016, 27). In other words, irreversibility at the institutional level is possible.

This study proposes the concept of 'institutional irreversibility' to observe the process by which the policy choice of nuclear possession becomes locked into a 'structure that cannot be reversed' through law, discourse, and doctrine. From this approach, the study aims to capture the macro-level characteristics of nuclear policy becoming a structural element across various layers of national strategy, rather than focusing on the motives or nature of nuclear armament itself.

2. Review of Previous Research

Existing research has interpreted North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons using realism, idealism, constructivism, deterrence theory, or the madman theory (Kwon 2022; Cheung and Haggard 2021; Park 2022; Alexandrova and Lee 2021), explaining North Korea's nuclear pursuit through four pillars: international status, leader psychology, elite composition, and enhancement of external security (Kim 2021). However, these explanations largely converge excessively on the single driver of 'response to external threats,' thus weakening their explanatory power for why North Korea does not abandon its nuclear weapons despite the possibility of receiving security guarantees from other patron states (Kim 2021).

In revisionist interpretations, North Korea is positioned as a status-breaker that "seeks to fundamentally transform the power balance on the Korean Peninsula through the use of force" (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2023). These scholars primarily cite North Korea's persistent nuclear development despite prolonged economic sanctions and humanitarian costs as empirical evidence, interpreting it as a signal of a long-term goal to "dominate the political and military situation" on the Korean Peninsula and reverse the balance of military power between the North and South (Woo Seung-ji, 2013; Yoon Duk-min, 2019). Conversely, survivalist interpretations understand North Korea's nuclear development not as a product of inherent regime aggression, but as a pragmatic choice to maximize survival within a constrained structure. The fact that North Korea has consistently avoided a complete overthrow of the status quo and has instead repeatedly engaged in managing a 'sustained crisis level' suggests that nuclear capabilities have functioned as a 'diplomatic tool' in its external strategy. In other words, nuclear armament serves as a means to not only guarantee regime survival but also to enable 'selective disruption' that combines negotiation and pressure, thereby adjusting and guiding the options of South Korea and the United States in a direction favorable to North Korea (Park Jin-hwi, 2013; Lee Soo-won & Ha Sang-seop, 2023).

However, attempts to understand North Korea's nuclear armament solely through the dichotomy of status quo disruption versus non-disruption fail to adequately focus on North Korea's unique governance system and its modes of expression. Since declaring itself a 'nuclear-weapon state' in 2005, North Korea has explicitly incorporated 'nuclear possession' and 'nuclear force' into the normative frameworks that form the basis of its governance system, such as party lines, the constitution, and relevant laws. Under the Kim Jong Un regime, nuclear armament has solidified its political and institutional character, moving beyond a mere military or security tool to become a core state operating mechanism that supports regime maintenance and the legitimacy of its rule (Hong Min, 2015).

- 5 - explicitly incorporated. Under the Kim Jong Un regime, nuclear armament has solidified its political and institutional character, moving beyond a mere military or security tool to become a core state operating mechanism that supports regime maintenance and the legitimacy of its rule (Hong Min, 2015).

Meanwhile, the great power-centric international non-proliferation regime has continuously imposed pressure and sanctions on North Korea, which has pursued nuclear weapons for over 30 years. International sanctions under the horizontal nuclear non-proliferation system, including those from the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), have led to North Korea's diplomatic and economic isolation, negatively impacting the humanitarian situation. However, these 'costs' have not ultimately triggered North Korea's abandonment of nuclear weapons. Instead, North Korea has shown a tendency to adapt to the 'isolation' triggered by sanctions and 'utilize' it as part of its national strategy, such as by refusing humanitarian aid to North Korea and demanding the unilateral withdrawal of its diplomatic missions abroad.

Another noteworthy point is that North Korea's official nuclear policy was only publicly announced in 2022, after 30-40 years of nuclear development had already been carried out. The Kim regime first concentrated national resources on advancing nuclear capabilities in the absence of a robust nuclear strategy and external nuclear policy, and then designed its strategy and policy once external stability was secured (Kim Jin-ha et al., 2024). This demonstrates that North Korea perceives the necessity of nuclear strategy as a matter of existential importance directly linked to the survival of its state system. The nuclear strategy of 2022 effectively replaced the policy of 'Byungjin' (parallel development of economy and nuclear weapons) announced in 2013 and served as an occasion to formalize a new national identity as a nuclear-weapon state.

II. North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine and the Theory of Two Hostile States After the Collapse of Hanoi

1. The Collapse of Hanoi: Diplomatic Rupture and Strategic Readjustment The collapse of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit likely served as a catalyst for North Korea's subsequent policy shift. In 2018, the situation on the Korean Peninsula underwent rapid changes. Inter-Korean dialogue resumed with the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, followed by the Panmunjom Declaration in April and the Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit in June. During this period, North Korea declared an end to the Byungjin line and a focus on economic construction at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in April 2018 (Kim Chang-hee, 2019). Superficially, this could have been interpreted as North Korea's forward-looking stance on denuclearization talks.

However, the situation changed dramatically with the 'No deal' outcome of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit in February 2019. As the summit ended in failure despite South Korea's active mediation and diplomatic efforts, Kim Jong Un's distrust of the South likely became irreversibly entrenched. Following this event, North Korea can be seen as having effectively abandoned its previous negotiation stance of 'conditional denuclearization' and shifted its path towards the institutional consolidation of its identity as a nuclear-weapon state. Notably, Kim Jong Un's personal letter to Trump dated August 5, 2019, sent after the summit's collapse, is significant for capturing the lingering affect and perceptions left by the Hanoi breakdown, as it is the last personal letter exchanged between the two leaders to date.

- 6 - breakdown, is significant for capturing the lingering affect and perceptions left by the Hanoi breakdown, as it is the last personal letter exchanged between the two leaders to date.

Who are the joint military exercises conducted in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula targeting?

And who are the targets they seek to blockade, repel, and attack?

It is unlikely that the South Korean army is discussing the issue of wartime operational control with a tribe on the other side of the globe or the Iranian army 70,000 kilometers away.

Conceptually and hypothetically, the main target of war preparation exercises is our military.

This is not our misunderstanding. ... Setting aside the difference in military strength,

I have no intention of attacking South Korea or starting a war. I truly have no such intention. The issue is that while conducting these [ROK-US military] exercises,

why is it that no one considers the possibility of a brutal fratricidal war, which is so horrific to contemplate, and claims they are preparing for it (Lee Jeong-cheol, 2025, pp.

390-392).

The tension in these words itself suggests that the collapse of Hanoi was internalized by North Korea as a significant shock. Having sought to secure regime safety through direct negotiations with the United States, North Korea likely fundamentally readjusted its expectations regarding diplomatic channels after that attempt failed. The subsequent acceleration of nuclear capability development and the overhaul of nuclear-related laws and institutions can be understood as a direct consequence of this strategic readjustment. 2. The 2022 Nuclear Force Policy Law

The North Korean nuclear force doctrine has been solidified through a process of legal and institutional justification, beyond the accumulation of physical capabilities. In particular, the "Law on the Policy of the Nuclear Force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (hereinafter referred to as the "Nuclear Force Policy Law"), adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2022, is a symbolic document of this transition. This law presents multiple conditions for the potential use of nuclear weapons and includes a structure that defines the mission of the nuclear force in a dual manner. The first mission justifies the necessity of nuclear possession as a deterrent against the United States, while the second mission assigns an operational role for the tactical use of nuclear weapons in inter-Korean relations (Ha Young-sun, 2026).

This institutionalization is intertwined with discursive foreshadowing accumulated since before 2022. For example, in a report by the Rodong Sinmun on March 20, 2023, Kim Jong Un, while directing a simulated comprehensive nuclear counterattack drill, stated, "Possessing nuclear weapons alone is not enough to effectively deter war," and then added, "Only when we are fully prepared for a nuclear attack that can be launched quickly and accurately to make the enemy fear at any time can we fulfill the crucial strategic mission of war deterrence" (JoongAng Ilbo, 2023).

- 7 - can be launched quickly and accurately to make the enemy fear at any time can we fulfill the crucial strategic mission of war deterrence" (JoongAng Ilbo, 2023).

Particularly noteworthy is Kim Jong Un's mention of the 'second mission of the nuclear force' at the military parade celebrating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army on April 25, 2022:

The primary mission of our nuclear force is to deter war, but if a situation arises that we absolutely do not wish for, our nuclear weapons cannot be confined to the single mission of preventing war. If any force attempts to infringe upon the fundamental interests of our state, our nuclear force will not be able to avoid carrying out its unexpected second mission (Jaju Ilbo, 2022).

North Korea's nuclear armament line has become entrenched, moving beyond the accumulation of physical capabilities to a stage of legal and institutional justification. In particular, the 'Law on the DPRK's Nuclear Force Policy' (hereinafter referred to as the 'Nuclear Force Policy Law'), adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2022, is a document symbolizing this transition. This decree presents multiple conditions for nuclear use while also including a structure that dualistically defines the missions of the nuclear force. The first mission is to justify the necessity of possessing nuclear weapons for deterrence against the United States, and the second mission is to assign operational tasks that allow for the tactical use of nuclear weapons in inter-Korean relations (Ha Young-sun, 2026).

This institutionalization is intertwined with discursive foreshadowing accumulated since before 2022. For instance, in a Rodong Sinmun report on March 20, 2023, Kim Jong Un, while directing a simulated comprehensive nuclear counterattack drill, stated, 'The mere fact that our country possesses nuclear weapons cannot actually deter war.' He further emphasized, 'Only when we maintain a complete nuclear attack posture that can be rapidly and accurately mobilized at any time to instill fear in the enemy can we fulfill the crucial strategic mission of war deterrence.'

- 7 - (JoongAng Ilbo, 2023).

This statement foreshadows the core content of the Nuclear Force Policy Law, indicating that the purpose of the nuclear force has expanded beyond 'deterrence' to include the possibility of 'offensive use.' In other words, the Nuclear Force Policy Law signifies not merely a legal formalization but a substantial change in nuclear operational doctrine. It represents an attempt at 'legal codification,' elevating the policy choice to the realm of legal norms.

3. Formalization of the 'Theory of Two Hostile States'

The 'theory of two hostile states' first gained significant momentum in the report on the expanded meeting of the 9th plenary session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, published on December 31, 2023 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, 2023). However, it is noteworthy that this stance did not emerge suddenly but rather represented the formalization of a previously accumulated hardline stance at a specific point in time. For instance, North Korea's unusually strong reaction to the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises (late September-early November 2023) and its drone incursions into South Korean airspace had already signaled North Korea's hardened attitude towards the United States and Seoul (Lee, 2024).

In this context, the unusually limited mention of economic performance in 2022 and the restrained tone in presenting the 2023 goals—including the extremely lukewarm expression that "2022 was by no means a meaningless year, and we have clearly advanced"—suggest that North Korea found it difficult to present clear economic growth achievements and sought to manage expectations in the economic sphere. Conversely, the fact that a significant portion of the report focused on security situations and defense plans, combined with factors such as the confidence gained from the successful launch of a reconnaissance satellite (Lee Seung-yeol, 2024), can be interpreted as reflecting North Korea's intention to sustain and strengthen its hardline policy (Carlin and Lee, 2023).

Furthermore, Kim Jong Un diagnosed the current international order in his plenary meeting report as having "clearly transformed into a 'new Cold War system'" and repeatedly mentioned 'multipolarization,' which aligns with his remarks on a 'multipolar world' in his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2022. This perception implies a long-term shift in foreign policy aimed at justifying the pivot towards China and Russia, as well as re-evaluating (or readjusting) the strategic value of the United States in ensuring North Korea's regime security (Carlin and Lee, 2023). Indeed, the plenary meeting report proclaims solidarity with 'anti-imperialist self-determination' states and international joint struggles:

The General Secretary emphasized the task of focusing on developing relations with the ruling parties of socialist countries, further expanding and strengthening the country's external sphere, and in accordance with the changing international situation, further developing relations with anti-imperialist and self-determination-oriented countries that defy the hegemony strategy of the United States and the West, thereby further solidifying our country's support and solidarity base and boldly undertaking anti-imperialist joint actions and joint struggles on an international scale.

- 8 - thereby further solidifying our country's support and solidarity base and boldly undertaking anti-imperialist joint actions and joint struggles on an international scale:

- 8 - The General Secretary emphasized the task of focusing on developing relations with the ruling parties of socialist countries, further expanding and strengthening the country's external sphere, and in accordance with the changing international situation, further developing relations with anti-imperialist and self-determination-oriented countries that defy the hegemony strategy of the United States and the West, thereby further solidifying our country's support and solidarity base and boldly undertaking anti-imperialist joint actions and joint struggles on an international scale:

was presented (Rodong Sinmun, 2023).

This reveals the perception of a 'multipolar world order,' which was selected as the future course for the Kim Jong Un administration. North Korea positions itself as a subject of a 'joint struggle on an international scale' that defies hegemonic strategy, and these phrases are repeated within the extension of the 'anti-imperialist independence' discourse accumulated previously. For instance, the expression in the report on the North Korea-Russia summit in June 2024, which reaffirmed the North Korea-Russia relationship on the ideological foundation of 'anti-imperialist independence,' reflects the intention to transplant the ideological basis of 'anti-imperialist independence,' conventionally attributed to North Korea-China relations, to North Korea-Russia relations. The discourse of anti-imperialism became visible in North Korea-Russia relations after Shoigu's visit in July 2023, and the official use of 'based on anti-imperialist independence as an ideological foundation' for the first time after the summit in September of the same year aligns with the context in which Kim Jong Un defined 'anti-imperialist independence' as the 'unchanging, consistent primary national policy' in his parliamentary speech and called for 'joint actions and joint struggles against imperialism on an international scale' (Han Ho-seok, 2024a).

Concurrently with these external perceptions, the 'hostile two-state theory' as an institutional reconfiguration of perceptions toward South Korea is more overtly surfaced through the following language.

Reflecting on the long-standing inter-Korean relations, the overall conclusion reached by our Party is

Our unification policy based on one nation, one state, two systems,

contrasts sharply with the "unification by absorption,"

"regime unification" adopted as a national policy by the South Korean authorities, and therefore, unification can never be achieved with them.

Because of the rhetorical expression that we are of the same
people, it is undignified for our national standing and status to discuss the issue of unification with such bizarre tribes who are merely lackeys of American imperialism.

it is undignified for our national standing and status to discuss the issue of unification with such bizarre tribes who are merely lackeys of American imperialism.

not.

- 9 - Another noteworthy rhetorical device is the term "South Korean things." If the term "puppet" previously used mainly by the Kim siblings, while meaning 'puppet,' did not completely exclude them from the category of 'compatriots' within the Korean nation, an interpretation is presented that "South Korean things" functions to designate 'objects excluded from the compatriot category' (Han Ho-seok, 2024b). Furthermore, the observation that Kim Yo Jong first used the national title "Republic of Korea" in her statement on July 11, 2023, and subsequently began using "Republic of Korea" without the quotation marks, is linked to an interpretation that North Korea, while not recognizing South Korea as a de jure state, treats it as a de facto state, implying a subtle shift (Han Ho-seok, 2024b). This rhetorical boundary-setting constitutes another dimension of institutional irreversibility. By dismantling existing national and unification discourses, a new framework justifying nuclear armament is being constructed.

However, North Korea constantly makes rhetorical efforts to shed the image of being an "unilateral aggressor." It also emphasizes that its nuclear capabilities are not for "unilateral" preemptive attacks. On January 16, 2024, a few days after the "two states theory" was made public, Kim Jong Un delivered the following corrective speech:

The strongest absolute power we are cultivating is not a preemptive strike weapon for 'unilateral armed unification,'

but rather a self-defense right that we must absolutely cultivate

to protect ourselves, and we reaffirm that it is a legitimate self-defense capability.

… There is no reason to choose war, and therefore, no intention to unilaterally initiate it.

However, should war become a reality before us, we will not seek to avoid it.

and we will act with perfect and swift execution to defend our sovereignty, protect the lives of our people,

and secure their right to survival (Choson Sinbo, 2024).

Securing safety and the right to survival, we are perfectly prepared for thoroughly planned actions.

On the surface, this is a statement justifying the necessity of nuclear armament with the logic of 'survival' and 'self-defense.' However, Kim Jong Un immediately follows up by reinforcing the crisis narrative by shifting the responsibility for military conflict to external actors:

Considering the special environment where the greatest enemy, the Republic of Korea, coexists in our immediate vicinity,

and the reality of increasing regional instability due to escalating military tensions under the leadership of the American imperialists,

the risk of war escalating due to physical conflict is significantly heightened and has reached a dangerous level

(Choson Sinbo, 2024).

- 10 - and reinforces the crisis narrative by shifting the responsibility for military conflict to external actors.

In this context, North Korea's military threat narrative has become more direct since its announcement. For example, in a report on January 8-9, 2024, concerning Kim Jong Un's inspection of a factory assembling the Hwasong-11 type short-range tactical nuclear missile erector launcher, he declared the following:

If the Republic of Korea dares to attempt the use of force against our state or threatens our sovereignty and security,

should such an opportunity arise, we will, without hesitation, mobilize all available means and capabilities to completely

annihilate the Republic of Korea. We have the will, capability, and capacity to do so, and we will continue to steadfastly expand and strengthen them going forward (Yonhap News, 2024).

The term "annihilate" clearly indicates a nuclear strike. North Korea reveals that it prioritized a strike to "instantly neutralize (the enemy) with overwhelming strategic deterrence." Ultimately, the breakdown of the Hanoi summit and the announcement of the "two states theory" should not be seen as a single turning point, but rather as an event that officially verbalized the "de facto two-state reality" implicitly assumed for a long time in practice, and institutionalized the strategic independence pursued thus far in the form of a "frontal breakthrough" (Lee Jung-gu, 2024). In a situation where even minimal arms control discussions predicated on denuclearization have effectively lost their function, North Korea appears convinced that solidifying its identity as a nuclear-armed state and establishing corresponding military doctrines will yield far greater strategic benefits than adhering to defunct negotiation frameworks (Lee Jung-chul, 2025).

Another notable point is that, following the announcement, North Korean state-controlled media showed a tendency to gradually reduce mentions related to South Korea. For instance, on December 16, 2024, the Korean Central News Agency reported that the South Korean National Assembly had passed a motion to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol two days prior, but minimized any interpretative commentary. This restrained tone stands in stark contrast to the case in 2016 when North Korean media reported on the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye swiftly, approximately four hours after the parliamentary vote, indicating that North Korea is intentionally maintaining a distance in its references to South Korea (Ko Yu-hwan, 2024).

III. South Korea-U.S. Response: Adaptation to Institutional Irreversibility

The responses of South Korea and the United States were shaped by the perceptions of and threat assessments regarding North Korea, as well as domestic political constraints, of the governments in power during the period when the "hostile two states theory" was fully articulated. As North Korea pursued institutional irreversibility, both South Korea and the United States sought to respond by strengthening the credibility of extended deterrence and refining alliance coordination mechanisms. Whether these responses constitute 'adaptation' to North Korea's irreversibility strategy, or still assume 'denuclearization' as a feasible

goal is a matter of significant analytical importance.

The culmination of the joint South Korea-U.S. response to North Korea's shift in policy is the "Washington Declaration" in 2023. The declaration stated that "the ROK-U.S. alliance is committed to engaging in more deeply cooperative policymaking on nuclear deterrence" and specified "enhancing communication and information sharing regarding the increasing nuclear threat." Furthermore, the two leaders agreed to discuss nuclear and strategic planning to strengthen extended deterrence and declared the establishment of a new Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to manage North Korea's threats to the non-proliferation regime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023).

Since its launch in 2023, the NCG has operated not as a one-off event, but as a continuous track focused on 'principles-procedures-exercises' at least through 2025. Specifically, ① following the inaugural meeting (1st) in Seoul on July 18, 2023, ② a second meeting was held in Washington D.C. on December 15, 2023, ③ a third meeting took place in Seoul on June 10, 2024, and ④ on July 11, 2024, the ROK-U.S. "Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations" were signed. ⑤ A fourth meeting was held in Washington D.C. on January 10, 2025, and ⑥ a fifth meeting was scheduled for December 11, 2025.

Additionally, the Washington Declaration included cooperation enabling "joint execution and planning of U.S. nuclear operations in case of contingency," enhanced combined education and training related to the application of nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, and the introduction of a government-wide table-top simulation to "strengthen a common approach to nuclear contingency planning." President Biden reaffirmed that extended deterrence toward South Korea is "enduring and ironclad" and that any North Korean nuclear attack against South Korea would face a "swift, overwhelming, and decisive response." The U.S. also announced the regular visibility of strategic assets, including port calls by nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Concurrently, the two leaders juxtaposed the pursuit of "dialogue and diplomacy without preconditions" as a means to advance the common goal of "complete denuclearization" of the Korean Peninsula.

At the time, CSIS evaluated the Washington Declaration as a document that specifies the meaning and implementation of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, placing it on par with the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. It pointed out that the NCG's activities could include (i) joint nuclear planning and execution related to U.S. nuclear operations in case of contingency, (ii) exercises with the U.S. Strategic Command, (iii) regular deployment of air- and sea-based nuclear-capable assets, and (iv) education and training on nuclear deterrence for South Korean military personnel (Cha, 2023).

What is noteworthy here is that the text of the Washington Declaration itself repeatedly places "cooperation" and "commitment" at the forefront, thereby prioritizing the "political credibility" of extended deterrence and the "alliance coordination mechanism." The most frequently appearing keywords in the joint statement/declaration are cooperation and commitment, with additional focus on alliance, nuclear/denuclearize, and deterrence.

- 12 - (Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2023). The establishment of the NCG holds significance as an attempt to institutionalize (or regularize) information sharing, operation of nuclear assets, and discussions on force and strategic planning related to nuclear capabilities between South Korea and the United States. In other words, the NCG can be understood as a mechanism to establish a procedural basis for connecting extended deterrence to consultation, planning, and exercises, rather than leaving it as a "declaratory commitment."

However, questions have been raised about the binding force of the Washington Declaration. Based on the absence of handwritten signatures from the two leaders, it is argued that the Washington Declaration is difficult to guarantee legal enforceability and is consequently closer to a political document with "no obligation to implement" (Han Ho-seok, 2023). Furthermore, a close examination of the declaration's wording reveals phrases such as the U.S. "making every effort to consult" with South Korea regarding the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. This is more akin to a "best-efforts" clause than a mandatory provision, raising the issue that its coercive power as a form of double-binding commitment is limited.

From the perspective of this study's analytical framework, the operation of the Washington Declaration and the NCG can be interpreted as South Korea and the U.S. "adapting" to North Korea's institutional irreversibility. Despite the declaration still stipulating the goal of "complete denuclearization," the practical policy focus on strengthening deterrence and refining alliance coordination mechanisms suggests that South Korea and the U.S. acknowledge the reality of having to manage a de facto nuclear-armed North Korea. In other words, while maintaining denuclearization as a goal at the declarative level, the policy focus is shifting at the operational level to managing deterrence against a nuclear North Korea. This discrepancy serves as evidence that North Korea's institutional irreversibility strategy is achieving a certain effect, while simultaneously revealing the policy dilemma faced by both South Korea and the U.S.—the tension between officially maintaining the goal of denuclearization and practically adapting to the nuclear reality.

Regardless, the Washington Declaration served as the "cornerstone of the response" to North Korea's assertiveness, and the NCG, established at that time, continues to operate to this day. This indicates that both South Korea and the U.S. perceive North Korea's nuclear threat as a long-term, structural reality and are building an institutional foundation to respond to it. The future challenge lies in how this deterrence mechanism will respond to North Korea's further advancement of nuclear capabilities and its rhetorical boundary-setting, and how the gap between the declarative goal of "complete denuclearization" and the operational necessity of "managing the nuclear reality" will be reconciled.

IV. Conclusion: Institutionalized Structural Constraints and the Limits of 'Event Politics'

Through legalization in 2022, codification and rhetorical boundary-setting in 2023, and activation in 2024-25, North Korea's nuclear policy has entered the path of complete 'institutional irreversibility.' The implications of this structural transformation for future North Korea diplomacy need to be examined at this juncture, when the possibility of a 'rapprochement phase' is being raised with the potential return of Trump to power.

- 13 - Kim Jong Un directly expressed his perception of the U.S. in a statement to the Korean Central News Agency around the time when the possibility of resuming North Korea-U.S. dialogue was being discussed immediately after Trump's re-election:

We have already gone as far as we can go with the United States as a negotiating partner, and what we are certain of is not the intention of the superpower to coexist, but a position of absolute strength and an invariably aggressive and hostile policy toward North Korea. ... Even now, the doctrine that U.S. politicians habitually utter, that the United States is never hostile, has long sounded like a bizarre, heretical theory to the people of the world.

We are mistaken. ... All realities are the strongest national defense capability that can overwhelm the enemy,

this is the only way to safeguard peace and guarantee stable development.

This is what we are made to realize every day, every hour (Lee Jeong-cheol, 2025, p. 335).

Furthermore, on September 22, 2025, Kim Jong Un responded once again to Trump's overtures, acknowledging the "good memories" between the two leaders, while asserting that "peaceful coexistence" could be possible if the United States "abandons its absurd obsession with denuclearization" (Sokolin, 2025). The aforementioned remarks concisely reflect Kim Jong Un's conviction that establishing relations with the United States is impossible as long as the U.S. maintains its hegemony in its current form. Therefore, North Korea's current policy toward the U.S. can be interpreted as an attempt to project superiority despite relative conventional inferiority, and as part of a complementary strategy where the desire for diplomatic recognition by a great power is intertwined with vigilance against subordination (Lee Jeong-cheol, 2025). For North Korea, achieving status parity with the United States—that is, being recognized as an equal dialogue partner—has now become a core element of its strategic ambitions.

Several grounds can be presented for North Korea's ability to adopt such a stance. First, the discourse that positions North Korea as a 'strategic state' is coupled with a self-perception that places it as a 'strategic fulcrum' within the geopolitical chain of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Second, contrary to the assessment that North Korea would be frustrated by the Hanoi 'no deal' outcome, it is possible to interpret that North Korea was readjusting its diplomatic coordinates towards the achievement of 'restoring northern diplomacy.' In other words, during the period of 2018-2019, North Korea can be seen as having secured an opportunity to 'hedge' (risk diversification) between North Korea-U.S. and North Korea-China relations (Lee Jeong-cheol, 2025). By rebuilding North Korea-Russia relations to a level 'beyond restoration to normalcy,' the tendency to project a future as a military state has continued to the present in 2025.

For instance, in September 2025, the countries attending the Chinese military parade effectively conveyed their intention to resume and expand diplomatic exchanges with Pyongyang in terms of symbolic politics. In this context, the reason Trump repeatedly mentions contact with North Korea is not unrelated to the judgment that North Korea has become an actor that incurs increased costs if it does not function as a 'strategic fulcrum' in the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, thereby becoming an object of negotiation and management. Therefore, the repeatedly raised 'North Korean collapse theory' has limited explanatory power and policy effectiveness, and rather

- 14 - fails to adequately capture the reality of North Korea's regime sustainability, nuclear armament, and external cooperation restructuring occurring simultaneously.

Unlike the leadership in the early Kim Jong Un era, which invoked the 'unification legacy' of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and (nominally) maintained the functions of front organizations for inter-Korean affairs such as the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, it is also pointed out that prior to the 2018 inter-Korean summit, such rhetorical continuity did not materialize into substantive policies and sustained cooperation, and the discourse of national unification had largely become ritualized (Lee Ji-seon, 2025). From this perspective, North Korea's advocacy of the 'two hostile states theory' and its subsequent alignment with like-minded countries should be interpreted not as an expression of revisionist intent to subvert the Korean Peninsula order, but rather as a 'pragmatic readjustment' to adapt to environmental changes such as the breakdown of the Hanoi summit, the strengthening of the ROK-U.S.-Japan security alliance, and the rise of alternative international orders. The concept of 'institutional irreversibility' proposed in this paper aims to capture precisely this process where such readjustment is not a one-time policy choice but becomes a structural fixation that is difficult to reverse at the levels of law, institutions, and discourse.

At the current stage, based on maintaining the status quo in its relations with the United States, North Korea tends to redefine its relationship with the U.S. not as an asymmetric structure of 'subordination-reward' but as a negotiation between equal negotiating parties. In this context, negotiations with the U.S. are no longer treated as a one-time decision involving the survival of the regime, but rather as a matter of managing and coordinating to maximize national interests, with nuclear possession being a fait accompli. A recent clue suggesting this is North Korea's strong condemnation of the U.S. military action in Venezuela on January 4, 2026, through a 'Korean Central News Agency Q&A' format by its Foreign Ministry spokesperson, referring to it as a "violation of sovereignty" and the U.S.'s "rogue and beastly nature." However, the fact that the initial response was presented in a Q&A format, rather than a formal 'statement,' even for the same content, can be interpreted as a signaling act to adjust the level and tone of external messages, thereby leaving room for future adjustments in messages to the U.S. (Hankyoreh, 2026).

However, even if the possibility of a North Korea-U.S. summit is raised in the future, the expectation that it will directly lead to substantive results is excessive. Particularly, if the demand for North Korea to effectively withdraw from the 'two hostile states theory' acts as a prerequisite for negotiations (Ha Young-sun, 2026), it may become difficult even to lure North Korea to the negotiating table.

In conclusion, while the recurrence of personal rapport between North Korea and the U.S.—the so-called 'bromance'—may be possible, considering such rapport itself as a panacea for problem-solving would be a significant analytical error. The key is not a change in the atmosphere between leaders, but the fact that as long as North Korea's institutionalized identity as a nuclear state and the 'two states theory' impose structural constraints on the negotiation space, and the asymmetry of mutual perceptions surrounding this persists, the effect of 'event politics' will inevitably be limited. Therefore, future North Korea policy should not focus on leader-level rapport or the success of one-off summits, but should seek a complex approach of deterrence, management, and gradual engagement, predicated on North Korea's institutionalized nuclear reality.

- 15 -

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*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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