Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait : Investigating the U.S., Taiwan, and China’s Views JMSDF Sasebo Museum TaeWoo Kang

Kyung Hee University

Introduction

Debates over the term “New Cold War” have frequently arisen in the past few years when describing the current international politics. In the midst of fear and instability, a competing Sino-US condominium centers on issues around the Taiwan Strait most fiercely. Due to the significance of the military and the prolonged conflictual context of the region, the focus has exclusively been on the military domain. However, it is not appropriate to be seen as a mere pessimistic fatalism of military conflict. The trilateral relations between the U.S., Taipei, and Beijing deal with more broad domains which are somewhat different from what the mainstream has focused on.

This paper argues the essence of the conflict in the region is not merely about military tension and suggests a more complex perspective. An alternative view of the Taiwan Strait is with a lower possibility of an open, direct, and overt military conflict. In this paper, following the definition suggested by Correlates of War Typology, I specify the term “war” as an inter-state war in which a territorial state that qualifies as a member of interstate system is engaged in a war with another system member. Here, this war must be involved in combat between stakeholders’ regular armed forces with more than 1,000 battle-related fatalities. As the basis for this argument, I will investigate official documents and statements from each state. It is not, however, to deny either the possibility of war or the significance of the military domain. Plus, it is not to assume the status quo in the region is not conflictual. What the paper wants to conclude is that, despite the conflictual feature, war is not imminent as opposed to mainstream pessimism.

The remaining parts of this paper consist of five sections. Each section will cover Taiwan, the U.S., and China’s views on the security issues of the Taiwan Strait. The last section provides a summary with the comparison and contrast of the three states' positions on the issue, thereby suggesting implications to describe the conflict of the region. 41 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum

Taipei’s Focus on Gray and Hybrid Aspects in the

Conflictual Region

1. Military Invasion Is of Secondary Importance

The ROC National Defense Report 2023 systemically delineated Taipei’s perspective on the Chinese threat imposed on the Strait. While it recognizes the possibilities of actual military invasion by Beijing, the report puts equal weight on deliberating security challenges other than direct military conflict. Also, this is noteworthy despite the fact that it had a much greater emphasis on military conditions as a driving force of the security landscape of the region. Taipei views the imminent threat in the region Beijing has been unfolding takes the form of hybrid warfare and actively exploits gray zone characteristics.

Consequently, it switched to using new means, inciting

grey zone conflicts, to manipulate its ambiguous

characteristic between war and peace to increase the risks

of conflict and constrain the freedom of action of our

forces in peacetime.

This recognition has important implications in that one of the widely agreed-upon characteristics of gray zone coercion is ambiguity.

42 Ambiguity indicates a passive stance of adversaries over direct and open interstate military conflict. Thus, the report is not caught up in the widespread terror of overt military conflict in the region and sees different aspects of the conflict.

Furthermore, another distinct feature of gray zone coercion is a diversification of actors, beyond military agencies. Hoffman (2016) identified the involvement of both national and subnational instruments in gray zone coercion. In the report, there are several Chinese aggression that were categorized in this feature:

(4) dispatching civil aircraft UAVs, and weather balloons

to fly close to our offshore islands and even the Taiwan

proper, (5) using marine survey vessels and hydrographic

survey ships as a “cover” for the military to improve its

battle management around Taiwan, (6) initiating

cyberattacks on our governmental agencies, critical

infrastructures, important business enterprises, and (7)

assigning maritime paramilitary force to join the PLAN

and the Coast Guard to conduct joint training, so as to

increase the workload on the part of our naval force.

The report explicitly acknowledged the non-military threat existence 43 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum and the difficulties in responding to these aggressions. Although these series of aggressions are to be considered for further direct military threat, this shows Taipei’s complicated view on security issues in the Strait, which does not stay merely in a military domain.

The second feature of the threat in the region Taipei distinguishes is that it has much to do with hybrid warfare. Together with gray zone characteristics, it explains Beijing has been implementing diverse tactics other than military operations. Phrases on the mixture of “traditional and non-traditional,” and “conventional and non-conventional means” further broaden the spectrum of conflicts in the region. Moreover, it contains the gray zone feature in that diverse domains are linked to the diversification of actors involved, as delineated above, to a certain extent.

PRC’s hybrid warfare against Taiwan has been a mix of

traditional and non-traditional, and conventional and non-

conventional means, and it may go with asymmetrical

tactics in political, diplomatic, legal, psychological,

propaganda, informational, and even criminal domains

with multi-channel, highly informatized, flexible, and

highly concealed features.

44 Lastly, the report organized threats in multiple domains into four categories; each refers to psychological, opinion, legal, and cognitive warfare. It directly interrelated with what the ROCMND has recognized as “political warfare,” which is the extension of hybrid warfare. The report points the severity of their negative impacts on society overall.

Politically, it has been using its propaganda organs from its

party, political, and military circles to inflict cognitive

warfare and “three warfares,” namely opinion,

psychological, and legal warfare against Taiwan. Focused

on using opinion manipulation, psychological threats, and

legal actions as means, … The political and psychological

impact, caused by its MO, on our people, has vindicated

that the PRC’s strategy against Taiwan has blended the

tactics of cognitive warfare in its “three warfares,” united

front, and national security and intelligence tasks, focusing

on manipulating the will, value, belief, mindset, and logic

of thinking in personal, organizational, military, and

national domains. Such a strategy has become more

diversified and complex and is trying to paralyze the

opponent spiritually and defeat it psychologically.

45 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum This also contains one of the most important parts to be revisited. By imposing equal weight on so-called political warfare, this publicly shows not only does Taipei see the imminent threat as military but also as political. Aggressive means adopted are listed as follows:

(1) Hacking and infiltrating the internet, (2) disseminating

controversial messages, (3) extravagant propaganda and

infiltration by means of a united front, and (4) using the

methods of “deliberately distortion, direct falsification,

wedge-driving and provocation, and threat and

intimidation to modify and distort the essence of issues

with Taiwan, aiming at creating a division among our

society and driving wedges among our people.

Integrating features of a gray zone with hybrid warfare and explicitly stating the existence of political warfare, the report provides a sophisticated view of Taipei on security undertakings of the region. While acknowledging the danger and significance of direct military conflict, it also considers multifaceted threats other than direct military conflict seriously.

The gray zone hybrid conflict recognition is also seen in various evidence. In the 2023 Taipei Security Dialogue, President Tsai explicitly

46 mentioned “escalating gray-zone activities” caused by Beijing. She also pointed economic and cyber attacks, elaborating on Chinese hybrid threats to deplete Taiwanese confidence and capacity. In regard to this, she announced the will to fight against non-conventional threats such as cognitive warfare and disinformation. Notably, Tsai’s public remark of gray zone threat was not the first time. Tsai has consistently used the phrase “gray zone” in her opening remarks for Ketagalan Forum from 2021 to 2023. In the latest opening remarks did she add “information and cognitive warfare.” In an administrative statement regarding Washington’s additional military equipment sales successive right after the support for Ukraine, presidential office spokesperson Chang reiterated Beijing’s linkage with confrontational gray zone tactics.

Jyun-yi Lee, who specializes in gray zone hybrid threats and non- traditional security at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, (2023) contended that by exploiting the non-military characteristics of “quarantine,” Beijing has diversified the actors involved ranging to cost guards and maritime militias. He identified the current blockade by Beijing is close to gray zone activities, in that it keeps the use of force below the war threshold. In successive research (Shu, 2024), the broader concept of A2/AD including domains of a network, cyberspace, and outer space was explicated, with the mention of its diverse outlet of disrupting commercial, civilian, and even 47 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum defense-related network infrastructure. This also showed Beijing’s active pursuit of hybrid warfare.

Reflected in the organizational structure of the Ministry of National Defense, Taipei has established a Political Warfare Bureau in Defense Agencies and retains Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command(ICEFCOM). Additionally, Ya-Chi Huang, a major in the ROC army and the leader of the Psychological Warfare Group, (2023) expressed concerns about Chinese “content farms,” which refer to websites and associated entities that churn out massive amounts of propaganda. The article reaffirmed the existence of cognitive warfare and other three warfares, categorizing Beijing’s approaches toward Taiwan as internal conflict creation, social resentment build up, and social polarization deterioration. She concluded the article by calling for whole-of-government cooperation against Bewijing’s political warfare.

What this eventually tells us is, thus, Taipei’s focus on gray zone hybrid threats, which go parallel with other military threats such as incursion, annexation, or coercive unification. When observing as a whole, Beijing’s current threat is not an invasion of Taiwan, but Taipei sees this as a process of forming favorable conditions for later strategic pursuit from a longer-term perspective. After all, a direct military conflict and invasion is not an imminent threat, although it could be in the future.

48 2. Further Understanding of Gray Zone Coercion and Hybrid Warfare

The term gray zone first appeared in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report in 2010. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review mainly described gray zone as a new security ground that could not be dealt with by the conventional U.S. security framework. Thus the concept of gray zone coercion started as a new challenge to conventional deterrence.

Despite a good deal of discourses, however, there has been no universally accepted definition. Due to the very variety of the definition and typologies, one needs to describe it with its characteristics. The most widely agreed characteristic of gray zone coercion is ambiguity, as explained above. The gray zone is that domain where the distinction between war and peace becomes impossible to draw with certainty due to the ambiguity of the tactics employed (Azad et al., 2023). It consists of activities below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war (Brands, 2016). Also, Amy Chang and colleagues (2015) contended that the definition should be security competition between peace and war. Furthermore, Echevarria (2015) mentioned the tendency to refer to gray zone wars as the usage of military force that falls short of actual war but which definitely does not qualify as peace. All these definitions consider ambiguity to a certain degree.

49 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum

Since ambiguity indicates a tendency for adversaries to avoid direct and open interstate military conflict, this implies the expectation of a lower possibility of war. Taipei sees that Beijing is reluctant to conduct a war in that the concept of ambiguity prohibits an active use of kinetic means against one’s adversary. It is worth noting, however, that the adoption of gray zone tactics does not mean a total abortion of kinetic means. Therefore, Taipei’s perception of gray zone coercion should be explicated in ways Beijing regards direct and open military conflict as a last resort, while trying to manage its strategy below the threshold of it.

In fact, the report sees most of Beijing’s aggression are designed to facilitate and/or support its ultimate goal of annexation of Taiwan. To conclude, an eclectic evaluation is to be proposed; although the series of aggression Beijing has been implementing against Taipei can be appraised as preliminary steps for its ultimate goal of military invasion, the imminent threat Taipei is facing is rather complicated one beyond a mere military focus. That is the very reason this paper stipulates that Taipei is not caught up in the widespread terror of overt military conflict in the region and sees different aspects of the conflict.

Gray zone operations are connected with hybrid warfare to some extent, which was well depicted by the report. It should be noted, however, that the terms gray zone coercion and hybrid warfare are not

50 synonymous. Taipei does not list gray zone tactics and hybrid warfare unintentionally.

Unable to use these terms interchangeably, this paves the way for us to regard Taipei’s understanding of the sophisticated strategy of Beijing targeting the region (Fitton, 2016). The report described Beijing’s grand strategic structure as one that goes beyond gray zone operations; it tried to capture the mixture of gray zone tactics combined under a hybrid strategy.

Characteristic Gray Zone Conflict Hybrid Warfare

Tactical,

Level Tactical and operational

operational, strategic

Used alongside

Use of Used alongside

non-conventional operations. conventional non-conventional

Usually the dominant military operations operations

element.

Used standalone

Use of

or alongside Used alongside conventional non-conventional

conventional operations as auxiliary tactics military operations

operations

Protracted One of the dominant

May be protracted or short engagement characteristics

51 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum Global

Out of scope as the concept and/or regional One of the dominant

pertains to operational and revisionist characteristics

tactical levels

ambitions

Used under

Symmetry both symmetric and Largely used under between opponents asymmetric asymmetric conditions

conditions

Table 1. Comparison between gray zone and hybrid warfare

characteristics

Carment, D. and Belo, D., 2018. War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-

Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare. Excerpted.

The relationship between gray zone and hybrid warfare is identified in ways hybrid warfare is a more broad and all-encompassing term, whereas the gray zone concept does not cover such a wide range (Arquilla, 2018). Plus, hybrid warfare adopts various military tools, making it more violent compared to gray zone conflicts (Mazarr, 2015). Drawing from there, the difference between gray zone and hybrid warfare in terms of kinetic centrality makes gray zone tactics subordinated to hybrid warfare.

As hybrid warfare is centered on kinetic means, gray zone

52 operations are to be included in the greater concept of hybrid warfare (Azad et al., 2023). Since the series of aggression can be appraised as preliminary steps for its ultimate goal of military annexation, the central focus of Beijing's aggression is relevant to kinetic means. Therefore, it has to be described gray zone tactics are adopted in a broader strategic hybrid warfare. Taipei identified that the difference and drew a picture of a strategic hybrid-gray zone structure. Political warfare is also interrelated both with hybrid strategy and gray zone tactics. And as seen, psychological operations, legal intimidation, manipulative espionage, and cyber warfare do not have many things to do with direct and open military conflict.

This implies that Taipei views that Beijing’s primary goal is not military invasion, though its ultimate goal might be the one. It sees Beijing’s primary objective as countering Taipei politically. One observation supporting this argument (Lee, 2023) pointed Beijing’s maritime harassment conveys political messages to influence the perceptions of Taiwanese society. In other words, Taipei regards Beijing’s military invasion not as an imminent threat but as an ultimate outcome of continuous preliminary aggression, combined greatly with political aspects. A well-organized report (2022) from the Hague Center for Strategic Studies stipulates:

53 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum

Instead of saying that the Taiwanese people are nonchalant

about China’s military threat, it is more accurate to say

that they in fact have been engaged in a form of political

warfare against China for decades. Political warfare in the

Chinese context generally means “the continuation of

armed conflict by other means.” It seeks to induce the

adversaries to think and act in a manner that favors

China’s objective through such means as persuasion,

subversion, intimidation, and coercion, so as to achieve the

goal of “winning without fighting.” Deterring China in this

sense inherently requires a multi- or even cross-domain

approach.

3. The Upcoming Presidential Election Makes No Great Difference There had been a number of debates in Taiwan regarding the status quo and Taipei’s China policies. In particular, as tensions between the Strait have been escalating, this inclination had been pacing. Furthermore, in the face of the 2024 January presidential election, partisan polarization came at its peak. And policy toward China is always a significant issue in Taiwan’s presidential campaigns. Considering the current instability between Taipei and Beijing, investigating the presidential run is important in that it has a direct influence on security issues in the region.

54 The 2024 Taipei’s presidential election will be led by the two main parties; the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) and Kuomintang(KMT) party. They stand against each other on their China policy. DPP perceives Beijing as an adversary seeking to annex Taiwan, and if necessary, by force, whereas KMT believes that Beijing is willing to resume political negotiations and reinvigorate economic cooperation, reaffirming the 1992 Consensus (Grossman, 2023). Thus, the two parties diverge between “engagement” and “confront” with China. In fact, after President Tsai met with McCarthy and Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Beijing increased the level of aggressive actions against Taiwan. Therefore, there exists a fear of a linkage between the DPP’s win and a cross-strait war.

However, Bush (2023) denies a widespread fear that the winning of DPP in the upcoming presidential election will trigger a cross-strait war. He argued that Lai, a presidential candidate of DPP, has claimed to protect the status quo. Moreover, Bush pointed a lack of PLA’s war- fighting capability and contended that Beijing will resort to a low-risk approach of displaying military force but with non-military pressure and intimidation. It seems clear Beijing will ease coercive measures when KMT wins, but it is unclear if Beijing goes to a war when DPP wins.

Moreover, there was no concrete evidence that the DPP will even make it to the presidential office. Although a public opinion poll 55 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum conducted on February 2023 revealed that over two-thirds of respondents regarded Beijing as a serious threat, Hille (2023) confirmed that young generations, the most important voters, do not seem to lean toward one side due to the disillusionment and sense of disappointment with the DPP. Batto (2023) suggested that the most likely outcomes are either where DPP holds the balance or KMT possesses the outright majority. This implies that even when considering the DPP’s win actually results in a war, in an extreme case, it is not likely to happen if the DPP cannot hold the outright majority.

Neither the DPP nor the KMT is regarded as one considering an actual war with Beijing in mind. Even though the DPP has repeated alarming phrases against Beijing and called for an active stance on security, the optimal policy coordination of the DPP is and will be the status quo protection. Similarly, the KMT has claimed a Taiwan-China engagement in order to avoid cross-strait tension and kept framing China question as a choice between war and peace. In addition, the widespread fear of DPP leading to a devastating war is overestimated for several reasons. In sum, despite the controversy between them, both parties are taking the form of avoiding war with Beijing.

As of January 13, 2024, Lai Ching-te, a candidate from the DPP, became president-elected. Lai led the election with over 40% of the votes. As delineated above, Lai has consistently argued for the

56 protection of the status quo for months. He repeated this stance in his statement right after the election and mentioned that he prefers more exchange and dialogue than conflicts, calling for peace and stability with China. After Lai’s win, a released statement reaffirmed the CCP wanted peaceful reunification, even though it did not rule out the possibility of using force. Thus, this shows as well that Taiwan’s presidential election would not bring a significant difference in the cross-strait situation, despite the DPP’s win.

Beijing’s Vigilance toward Domestic Sovereignty

Intervention

1. Regional Focal Point the “New Type of Major-Country Relations” and “the Chinese Dream” Has Suggested

Investigating Beijing’s consideration of the regional tension and the Taiwan Strait issues has to be dated back to February 2012 on which Xi addressed a famous remark of “New Type of Major-Country Relations” during his visit to Washington with then-president Hu Jintao. Few months later, visiting the exhibition “The Road to Rejuvenation,” Xi addressed that the Chinese Dream is realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In the speech, Xi announced a roadmap for the 57 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum Chinese Dream. Xi promised to construct a prosperous society comprehensively by the time of the 100th anniversary of the CCP, and to achieve the status of a modern Socialist country that is rich, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious by the time of the centenary of the foundation of the PRC.

This Major-Country Relations serves as a bedrock for Chinese diplomatic policy in accordance with the Chinese Dream. Within its frame of the Sino-US condominium as a vital and foremost component in the region, it implies that the two states have an obligation of compliance with mutual cooperation in dealing with regional issues. What should be taken carefully is that Beijing demands Washington to respect China’s region-related interests (Cha, 2014). In this regard, Beijing has tried to deliver the message that issues regarding Taiwan are domestic affairs. Thus, it is to not be interfered by external forces in the Chinese view.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi’s speech on U.S.-China relations provides a more specified version of the major-country relations. He divided the major-country relations into two components; one is diplomacy between Washington and Beijing and the other is diplomacy with its neighboring countries. However, unlike the two power relations, Wang Yi’s remarks about diplomacy with its neighboring countries show a firm stance. In relations with neighboring

58 countries, Beijing seems not to concede its core interests. Combining these two types of diplomacy, it can be said that Beijing avoids direct military conflicts with Washington while taking an assertive stance against conflicts with neighboring countries (Ha, 2019).

Together with this, he explicitly set out in another remarks that the Taiwan question is about China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and requested Washington not to stand against its efforts for peaceful reunification. Hence, by emphasizing the two power relations, Beijing has averted international attention to Taiwan away. The very framework of international relations, suggested eagerly by Beijing, centered Taiwan issues on domestic sovereignty matters.

This concept has been maintained for over a decade, along with the contention of non-intervention in domestic sovereignty. In a symposium on the international situation and China’s foreign relations in 2022, there were several references to the major-country relations, addressing Beijing has acted in accordance with the concept. Wang Yi’s mention of “major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” shows Beijing’s constant view on Taiwan as domestic affairs. In the same year, the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China defined the current Taiwanese government as separatists and reiterated its willingness to resolve the sovereignty and territorial integrity issues. Maintained and repeated, views on Taiwan as domestic affairs have also 59 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum been widely shared among a number of scholars of Chinese School (Feng et al., 2019). Figure 1 visualizes survey results on expected challenges in the bilateral relations, postulating Taiwan issues are sovereignty matters.

Figure 1. Percentages of respondents, Which is a major challenge in US-

China relations?

Feng, H., He, K., and Li, X. 2019. How China Sees the World. Excerpted.

The aforementioned definition of the current Taiwanese

government led by Democratic Progressive Party as separtists can also be seen in other documents. Words such as reunification, separatists, or “One China Two System,” again, show Beijing’s view on Taiwan as domestic affairs. In 2019 China’s National Defense in the New Era, for

60 instance, it says:

The fight against separatists is becoming more acute. The

Taiwan authorities … refuse to recognize the 1992

Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle. They

have gone further down the path of separatism … and

borrowing the strength of foreign influence. The “Taiwan

independence” separatist forces and their actions remain

the gravest immediate threat to peace and stability in the

Taiwan Strait and the biggest barrier hindering the

peaceful reunification of the country.

Therefore, it can be said Beijing’s security and defense posture in response to the trilateral tension in the Taiwan Strait lies in the domestic sovereignty protection that should not be interrupted at all costs. Under the New-Type of Major-Country Relations, Beijing doesn’t consider Taipei’s interests while trying to avoid direct military confrontation against Washington.

2. Beijing’s Avoidance of an Open and Direct Military Conflict Beijing also acknowledges the possibility of open and direct military conflict. The degree to which Beijing describes its willingness and 61 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum openness of war is somewhat greater than that of Taipei. China’s National Defense in the New Era published in 2019 says:

Meanwhile, China resolutely opposes any attempts or

actions to split the country and any foreign interference to

this end. … We make no promise to renounce the use of

force, and reserve the option of taking all necessary

measures. This is by no means targeted at our compatriots

in Taiwan, but at the interference of external forces and

the very small number of “Taiwan independence”

separatists and their activities. The PLA will resolutely

defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China

and safeguard national unity at all costs.

This hard-line stance has numerous invaluable implications. As well as an emphasis on sovereignty integrity, uses decisive expressions the document about the possibility of engagement with open military conflicts and wars. It is notable that the document not only assumes Taiwan but also brings in any external force as its adversary. Beijing’s centrality on the military domain can be substantially seen in other parts. Several paragraphs show that Beijing takes the conventional military domain as the foremost means for resolving Taiwan issues:

62 Aiming at safeguarding national unity, China’s armed

forces strengthen military preparedness with emphasis on

the sea. By sailing ships and flying aircraft around Taiwan,

the armed forces send a stern warning to the “Taiwan

independence” separatist forces.

…

Maintaining combat readiness is an important assurance of

effective response to security threats and fulfillment of

tasks. The Central Military Commission (CMC) and the

TCs’ joint operations commands perform combat readiness

duties strictly, and conduct regular inspections and drills to

ensure combat readiness at all times.

However, despite the acknowledgment of the possibility of war, there is no concrete evidence that Beijing will go to war. Beijing’s stance over Taiwan issues has not been changed dramatically, whereas Beijing’s threat perception of the issues is deteriorated. The annual State Council Government Work Report (GWP) states in 2023:

We should implement our Party’s overall policy for the

new era on resolving the Taiwan question, adhere to the 63 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum

one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, and take

resolute steps to oppose “Taiwan independence” and

promote reunification. We should promote the peaceful

development of cross-Strait relations and advance the

process of China’s peaceful reunification.

As we Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one

family bound by blood, we should advance economic and

cultural exchanges and cooperation across the Taiwan

Strait and improve the systems and policies that contribute

to the wellbeing of our Taiwan compatriots. We should

encourage people on both sides of the Strait to jointly

promote Chinese culture and advance China’s rejuvenation.

Phrases indicating the preference of peaceful development and the avoidance of direct military conflict are frequently used in other official documents. The above-cited Beijing’s defense white paper also postulates that “China adheres to the principles of “peaceful reunification”, and “one-country, two systems”, promotes peaceful development of cross- Strait relations, and advances peaceful reunification of the country.” Also, several statements of Xi are consistent with the basic stance. In 2021 speech at the General Assembly Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of the Revolution of 1911, he announced “we will adhere to the basic

64 policies of peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems, uphold the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, and work for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.” Recently 2023 speech at the first session of the 14th National People’s Congress, he repeated the stance.

Also, one report (2021) from China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR) stipulated that Beijing denies competition either as the conceptive core or as inevitable describing bilateral relations. Putting forward “complexity” in the bilateral relations, the report suggested a new framework, which presents rhetoric such as “constructive,” “cooperative,” “mutual respect,” “win-win,” or “non- conflict.” Furthermore, the report demanded that China-U.S. relations comply with Three Basic Lines, which inhibit hot war, cold war, and decoupling. Due to the nature of Chinese think tanks, this report fully reflects the views of the CCP. Thus, the arguments the report suggested can be seen as the same as those of Beijing for avoiding open armed conflict in the region.

In the same context, during the 2021 virtual meeting between Xi and Biden, both sides reaffirmed the need to maintain the status quo on Taiwan (Ha and Moon, 2021). Conversations had no significant implications, repeating rhetoric such as a statement that Washington would respect the One China principle or a promise of Beijing to do its 65 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum best for peaceful reunification. In the 2023 APEC summit, both sides agreed to maintain high-level military talks to prevent crises. During the meeting, Xi stuck to Beijing’s position that bilateral relations should be based on “mutual respect,” “peaceful,” and “cooperative” coexistence” coexistence. There was no development of Taiwan issues, as it was back in 2021. In this regard, the 2023 summit is also a tentative compromise based on the common interests of preventing bilateral relations (Sohn et al., 2023) and of maintaining the status quo on Taiwan.

Furthermore, there is no evidence showing Beijing pursues reunification with Taiwan as an imminent objective in the near future. There is no clear marks whether the Chinese leadership considers reunification as a task that must be completed by 2049, in that under Xi, no authoritative Chinese source has explicitly linked the 2049 “national rejuvenation” with reunification to form a clear deadline (Swaine, 2021). If showing active pursuit, conflict with Washington will be inevitable. For these reasons, despite the centrality of a military domain, it cannot be said that Beijing will wage a war in the foreseeable future. The 2023 DoD report also reaffirmed that Beijing aims to diminish international support for Taiwan and counter Washington’s activities in the Indo- Pacific, which is rather seen as part of political warfare as insisted by Taipei, not as directly related to military annexation.

Char (2022) estimated that Beijing tends to avert waging a war

66 against its neighbors with immediate risks, which would be the U.S. military intervention, and favors maintaining the status quo over the Strait. Another evidence of Beijing’s reluctance to stand explicitly against the U.S. is in its National Defense in the New Era 2019:

China resolutely opposes the wrong practices and

provocative activities of the US side regarding arms sales

to Taiwan, sanctions on the CMC Equipment

Development Department and its leadership, illegal entry

into China’s territorial waters and maritime and air spaces

near relevant islands and reefs, and wide-range and

frequent close-in reconnaissance. However, in China-US

relations, the military-to-military relationship remains the

generally stable one.

Lastly, there are observations in Taiwan as well implying Beijing’s avoidance of direct cross-strait armed conflict. Liang (2023) contended that Xi’s political logic of Taiwan-related policies follows the principle of peaceful reunification with persuasion and engagement, and even that the reunification is of secondary importance compared to its own development. Kuan-chen Lee (2023) suggested similar implications of the CPC’s Taiwan policy, alleging Beijing is expected to pursue 67 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum deepening and expanding cross-strait exchanges and integration in the process of promoting reunification.

3. Primordial Steps for Building Favorable Prelude: Why Beijing Exploits Gray Zone With Hybrid Approaches

Paragraphs in the previous section suggest an argument that there is a low possibility Beijing is pursuing waging a war against Taiwan, using several official statements. Beijing routinely repeats the basic stance in order to show its avoidance of an open and direct military conflict at least explicitly. Although not seeking an immediate war, however, a series of actions Beijing has been unfolding regarding Taiwan is enough to pose a massive threat to Taipei. Particularly these provocative measures are intense in the cross-strait maritime region.

Beijing has imposed a comprehensive and multifaceted security threat beyond military domains. These threats are in line with what Taipei recognizes as a gray zone hybrid threat where an adversary pursues security objectives below the threshold of war. As shown in the earlier paragraphs in the previous section, the delineation of Beijing’s firm stance against and a willingness to counter Taipei and external forces is allocated an equal amount of weight, despite its avoidance of direct military conflict:

68 People’s Armed Police Force (PAP) give greater priority to

combat readiness. Efforts are made to strictly act on relevant

regulations and procedures, fulfill readiness duties, conduct

targeted exercises and training, and maintain standardized

order, with a view to staying ready to act when required and

effectively carrying out readiness (combat) duties.

People’s Armed Police Force is a paramilitary organization under the Chinese Military Commission. Despite the actual top-down chain of command directly from President Xi, it takes the form of the dual command of both civil and military in accordance with its pursuit of Military-Civil Fusion(MCF) policy. The very feature of paramilitary organizations aims at deterring effective responses of the adversarial armed forces. Moreover, the dual command form prohibits one’s adversary from engaging with it militarily.

The PAP serves under the shared distinct characteristic of ambiguity that a lot of definitions of gray zone coercion possess. Staying under the radar, it fervently tries to avoid the threshold of open military conflicts. Another distinct feature of gray zone coercion is a diversification of actors, beyond military stakeholders. In cases of PAP are usage of non-military agencies dampens the opponent’s military response.

PRC coast guard ships and fishing vessels in the East and South 69 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum China Sea fit this description as well (Chang et al., 2015). The China Coast Guard, which was previously reported as civilian agencies, has been placed within the PAP and is thus now part of the military command structure (Wuthnow, 2017: 1). Plus, Chinese infiltration of Taiwan’s ADIZ, crossing the median line of the Strait, demarcating no-sail and no-fly zones, and deploying civil aircraft and balloons for intelligence gathering are categorized as gray zone coercion. These again prove that Beijing currently holds onto gray zone tactics in order to postpone open military conflicts with its expected adversaries such as the U.S.

A recent provisional guidelines announced by PLA, the Military Operations Other Than War(MOOTW), as well explicitly serve as additional evidence for Beijing’s tendency to resort to gray zone tactics, paving the way for a legal framework for conducting non-war military operations (Siebens and Lucas, 2022). Enabling both combat and non- combat activities, the guidelines leave rooms for campaigns Chinese military implements to be classified as MOOTW, thereby externally disguising any hostile intention. Many of the current military maritime engagements are classified as below-threshold operations for national security and interests (Gaoyue and Char, 2019).

Together with considerable weight on gray zone tactics, Beijing has also emphasized elaborating hybrid characteristics in its unfolding campaigns. Beijing expands the existing fields of national interests

70 beyond the economy and the military, securing baselines for comprehensive involvement in multiple domains. For instance, the following paragraphs in 2019 defense report are postulating outer space and cyberspace as two of the most important national interest areas:

Outer space is a critical domain in international strategic

competition. Outer space security provides strategic

assurance for national and social development. In the

interest of the peaceful use of outer space, China actively

participates in international space cooperation, develops

relevant technologies and capabilities, advances holistic

management of space-based information resources,

strengthens space situation awareness, safeguards space

assets, and enhances the capacity to safely enter, exit and

openly use outer space.

…

Cyberspace is a key area for national security, economic

growth and social development. Cyber security remains a

global challenge and poses a severe threat to China.

China’s armed forces accelerate the building of their

cyberspace capabilities, develop cyber security and

defense means, and build cyber defense capabilities 71 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum

consistent with China’s international standing and its

status as a major cyber country.

As shown above, diverse security areas stipulated such as outer space, cyberspace, and economic prosperity show Beijing’s multifaceted purview in dealing with Taiwan issues, encompassing the mere military domain gray zone tactics are centered on. The expansion of interest areas has turned into aggressive engagements with those interest areas, resulting in the same consequence in the context of the Taiwan Strait.

In addition, the aforementioned Three Warfares(opinion, psychological, legal, and cognitive) fit this case of hybrid tactics. Since the Three Warfares can be combined with other methods of unrestricted warfare, including political, economic, negotiation, diplomatic, cultural, and military efforts (Lee, 2014: 205), they have to be considered beyond the geographical landscape of maritime disputes. In this context, Beijing has implemented a wide range of hybrid tactics ranging from foreign propaganda and public opinion creation in favor of China, through legal legitimization of maritime claims, to public diplomacy focusing on foreign citizens (Tunstall, 2019).

In this chapter, I have covered three aspects Beijing has possessed so far; the perception of Taiwan issues as domestic affairs, its hard-line stance in military terms, and its conduct of gray zone tactics

72 with a multifaceted hybrid approach. In this regard, the evaluation must be similar to that of Taiwan to some extent. Beijing’s hostility against its opponents is aligned with its position of domestic integrity. Since Taiwan is to be within its national boundaries, Beijing has to take a hard-line stance against any external force trying to dampen its territorial integrity.

Recognizing that it is domestic affairs, considering the lack(or a total absence) of binding forces that can control the affairs and a geographical limitation divided by the Strait, it is plausible to anticipate Beijing has come up with the idea of military incursion for means of coercive control. Beijing’s remarks for active defense and maintenance of an Anti-Access/Area Denial(A2/AD) strategy can be explained in this terms.

With this, several activities conducted by Beijing can be explained. For instance, consistent remarks for military preparedness and incremental military buildups are the case. Provocative amphibious exercises as well as developing various ranges of missiles that cover the whole area are for preparing military annexation. The series of actions are not to be shown as just for arms race aimed at the U.S., in that a significant portion of these activities have been focused on the South China Sea and near shorelines rather than another rivalry theater of the East China Sea.

73 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum

However, its pursuit of gray zone hybrid warfare adds complication. The mixture of gray zone and hybrid warfare has to be seen gray zone tactics adopted in a broader strategic hybrid warfare. Furthermore, due to the characteristics should be regarded Beijing’s intention reluctant to engage in an open and direct military confrontation. Hence, Beijing’s current strategic direction is not for an immediate war. Then, this is a prep phase for a later potential war.

Active pursuit of unrestricted warfare, so-called the Three Warfares, aforementioned such as propaganda work, intelligence espionage, and aggressive public diplomacy are appraised in this case. Plus, operations unfolded in cyberspace(in the case of content farm) have also contributed to the establishment of favorable conditions for Beijing to later exploit the situation. PLA’s discussion of Multi-Domain Precision Warfare and the following network-information-system of systems which incorporates big data and artificial intelligence technology are other examples of Beijing’s active cyberspace operations. The recent development of kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within their field of view and enable counter-space actions (Department of Defense, 2022) directly shows Beijing’s outer space preparation for a later potential war against Taiwan and probably the U.S. Recent mobilization of

74 commercial satellites for military use in the Ukraine War has inflicted Beijing to fiercely take advantage of it, whereas condemn the versability of cyber and space corporates in the U.S. such as Starlink and Microsoft.

In sum, under its pursuit of domestic territorial integrity, Beijing wants to achieve ultimate reunification with Taiwan. However, it cannot reasonably be estimated that Beijing will wage a war considering repetitive official statements that indicate the avoidance of an open and direct military conflict. Yet, at the same time, the current series of Beijing’s movements are primordial steps for a potential war(or a favorable prelude for later annexation) in that it takes the form of a gray zone hybrid threat which exploits the opponent’s weak point so as to achieve security objectives while operating below the red line. The next section will discuss why Beijing has fundamentally relied on gray zone hybrid warfare that avoids an open direct war.

4. Risks of Strategic Ambiguity and Incomplete Military Modernization

The Hague Center’s report, which was quoted in a chapter covering further understanding of both gray zone and hybrid threats, provides a highly reasonable account of why Beijing resorts to gray zone tactics; Beijing’s lack of capabilities to annex Taiwan and military dominance of the U.S. The account in this section and the previous section develop 75 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum similar logic to that of Hague’s report.

Among other things that are related to Beijing’s inclination to rely on gray zone hybrid warfare, two factors are worth investigated in this trilateral dimension; the risks of strategic ambiguity and unfinished business of military modernization. Both in terms of the macro-scope of hegemonic rivalry in the theater of Sino-US condominium and micro- scope of security compeition in the trilateral relations, the presence of the U.S. poses serious setbacks to Beijing’s security policies in the region. Washington has a number of leverage means to use against Beijing, which are mainly derives from its relative supeirority. Even worse, incomplete modernization contributes to Beijing’s relative inferiority.

Considering expected military conflicts between China and the U.S. are to be developed in maritime theater, carrier strike groups will be the main battle-carrying sizable forces. Although the U.S. primacy has come to an end, its military might is still formadable that China cannot defeat. US LA-class SSN and Chinese Shang-class have no significant performance difference in numbers. However, the quality gap between their SONAR system creates is considerable. Whereas US LA- class SSNs are considered to have the world's finest SONAR tech, Chinese Shang-class SSNs have a dismal record; detected by Japan Self- Defense Force and the British Queen Elizabeth fleet. In destroyers and

76 cruisers, Beijing cannot be confident for assured triumph. The U.S. operates a variety of ships compared to China, and the radar and missiles mounted on each ship are also superior to China. Considering the difference in precision electronics, the gap in this fleet-to-air capability will be even wider.

Aircrafts show no difference. While the U.S. operates F/A- 18E/Fs and F-35Cs equipped with AESA radar and LRASM AI-based hypersonic missiles, China only operates J-15 series for its carrier. Even worse, because Chinese aircraft carrier takes the Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery(STOBAR) system, Chinese aircraft is bound to suffer from fuel loss and a decrease in the weight of their armed payloads when launched. Moreover, the U.S. Nimitz-class carrier uses the Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery(CATOBAR) system, which enables four aircraft to take off simultaneously. This means a one- fourth ratio of aircraft take-offs, in favor of the U.S. in dog fights. In addition to this, the fact that the U.S. operates E-2C Hawkeyes whereas China uses J-18 helicopters for their AWACS system widens the gap in Max Combat Radius.

Identifying the very inferiority, Beijing has fiercely devoured progress along with its military modernization by 2050. The 2023 China military power report covers these in detail. According to the report, China has increased the number of its navy vessels by thirty ships and 77 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum manufactured several fourth- or fifth-generation fighter jets. Also, the report captured recent trials for a CATOBAR-operated Fujian aircraft carrier. Pointing the increased number of nuke arsenals, the report changed the estimated stocks of current nuclear warheads and those in 2030. Together with arms acquisition, Beijing has been pursuing improvements in logistics, defense science, weapon system research, and strategic capacities; particularly, hypersonic missiles, AI-utilization. However, Beijing’s military modernization process is way far from completion. In other words, the lack of overwhelming firepower served as an inhibitor for Beijing to engage in overt military conflicts.

Beijing also shows weaknesses in war-fighting and organization-managing capabilities. The PLA highlights self-assessed shortcomings publicly. In particular, under Xi slogans such as “Two Inabilities,” Two Big Gaps,” “Three Whethers,” and “Five Incapables” were made and frequently used, which take issue with a quality lack of leadership and command, lack of combat experience and quality exercises, and a lack of other war-fighting or organization-managing capabilities. These slogans have been repetitive via various outlets from authoritative to non-authoritative, which demonstrates the intensity of awareness of PLA’s shortcomings.

Also, China, sharing most of its borders with several countries, has been struggling from chronical conflicts with its neighboring states.

78 Conflicts with India has been eventually deteriorated into firing- engagement, causing multiple casualties. Around dam constructions, friction with Southeast Asian countries downstream also poses a significant level of risk. The water scarcity is indeed a serious problem for China, leaving no room for plausible ease with other countries in the near future. Last, the instability of the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region(XUAR) counts. As seen in CPC’s condemnation against U.S.’ retreat from Afghanistan, geographical proximity between XUAR and other islamic states and prolonged grievance accumulated in XUAR can turn into the existential threat to Beijing at the time of war. In other words, the geographical proximity and an immediate threatening impact an onshore land power can pose will force itself to struggle from its neighboring states (Mearsheimer, 2014). Moreover, the U.S. forward bases that can deploy sizable armed forces in the regional contingencies outnumber in various strong points, whereas Beijing has recently been increasing the number of bases along the shoreline. Lastly, without the capacity to take full control within the First-Island Chain, Beijing has found difficult to manage its relative inferiority in maritime military preeminence.

Without accountable leverage against Washington, Beijing found it hard to pursue its national strategy regarding maritime security in the region. What makes things more complicated is Washington’s 79 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum strategic ambiguity stance in the region. Since Washington’s “one China policy” was enshrined in the three US-China communiques and the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act was in effect, Washington has maintained strategic ambiguity over the tension between Taipei and Beijing (Chang- Liao and Fang, 2021). Strategic ambiguity refers to the condition where the United States does not state explicitly whether it will come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack by the PRC (Bush, 2005).

Complying with this strategic ambiguity, Washington has provided autonomy to Taipei, while avoiding the charges of promoting Taiwan's independence. At the same time, Washington retained the possibility of military intervention in the region, while cooperating with Beijing in other sectors. Therefore dual deterrence was possible; Washington has been able to provide security to Taipei without the risk of being entrapped in an undesirable war against Beijing. Strategic ambiguity and the following uncertainty of Washington’s engagement are posing a serious restriction to Beijing.

It would not be a problem if the U.S. did not have considerable power. Yet, as mentioned above, Beijing does not possess any accountable leverage in economic, military, or alliance terms. Hence, uncertainty about whether Washington will intervene in the situation when an open and direct military conflict occurs is fatal to Beijing. However, for the same reason, Beijing cannot completely abandon its

80 goal toward Taiwan because it is unsure of Washington’s intervention. As a result, a strategy must be pursued to prevent the U.S. intervention, and the gray zone tactics fit in.

Washington’s Circumspect on Defining Security Challenges

1. A Key Troika in the Foreign Policy Establishment: Competition over Cooperation, but without Confrontation

Ahead of investigating Washington’s position, it is important to revisit the key troika in Washington’s Asia policy establishment. Kurt Campbell, the National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo- Pacific, Jake Sullivan, the National Security Advisor, and Antony Blinken, the Secretary of State are this troika. Altogether, the three are the most influential figures among others, so it is crucial to identify their thoughts of China in that their understandings directly influence strategies. Some sources provide insight into their thought.

It is widely held that the China policy of the Biden administration is described with the so-called “3C,” referring respectively to competition, cooperation, and confrontation. An article contributed to Foreign Affairs in 2019, Campbell and Sullivan prepared shows how they think of and how they will treat China, which is 81 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum reflected in the current U.S. strategy toward China. Calling for a brand new approach to Beijing, which should definitely be estranged from that during the Cold War, Campbell and Sullivan alleged Washington has to deal with Beijing between the two pillars of competition and cooperation.

Campbell and Sullivan focused on the possible coexistence of competition and cooperation, with vigilance toward mutual exclusivity:

Going forward, China policy must be about more than the

kind of relationship the United States wants to have; it

must also be about the kinds of interests the United States

wants to secure. The steady state Washington should

pursue is rightly about both: a set of conditions necessary

for preventing a dangerous escalatory spiral, even as

competition continues.

…

The best approach, then, will be to lead with competition,

follow with offers of cooperation, and refuse to negotiate

any linkages between Chinese assistance on global

challenges and concessions on U.S. interests.

In the background of this premise, there was a thorough investigation of

82 China in its relations within and status in the international community, compared with the Soviet Union. They assume a lower security instability following through a complex interdependence between China and the U.S. and delineate potential impacts Beijing has different from those of the USSR. For these reasons, they concluded Washington has to pursue simultaneous functions of competition and cooperation and to avoid the Cold War logic of existential struggle. Foremost, however, they insisted on the priority of competition over cooperation:

The best approach, then, will be to lead with competition,

follow with offers of cooperation, and refuse to negotiate

any linkages between Chinese assistance on global

challenges and concessions on U.S. interests.

In particular, the article contended the Taiwan Strait would be one of the most conflictual areas in bilateral relations. Important to note, however, that the article maintains refusing the inevitability of conflict and explains the pathway to competition in a manageable level of instability. In their core concept, Taiwan affairs should be confined within the status quo and the imminent procedures Washington should take is to contain Beijing’s autonomy in the region to a certain degree and to search for possible cooperative grounds with Beijing. The very section on 83 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum sustainable deterrence directly shows Campbell’s and Sullivan’s perspectives on the Taiwan issues and the maritime security affairs involving Beijing. Their approach to the military domain in the region is also well delineated in the section, which fundamentally influenced later US’ integrated deterrence. Some contents worth revisited are as follow:

Effective U.S. strategy in this domain requires not just

reducing the risk of unintentional conflict but also

deterring intentional conflict. Beijing cannot be allowed to

use the threat of force to pursue a fait accompli in

territorial disputes. Yet managing this risk does not require

U.S. military primacy within the region.

…

To ensure deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Washington

should reorient its investments away from expensive and

vulnerable platforms, such as aircraft carriers, and toward

cheaper asymmetric capabilities designed to discourage

Chinese adventurism without spending vast sums. … the

United States should embrace long-range unmanned

carrier-based strike aircraft, unmanned underwater

84 vehicles, guided missile submarines, and high-speed strike

weapons. …

Blinken’s view of Beijing is generally in line with that of the former two. In his 2022 address at George Washington University, many of the lines indicate the same perception of Beijing and argue Washington’s policy direction which shares several common grounds with Campbell and Sullivan. In addition, Blinken’s recent visit to China in June 2023 focused on “competition (Sohn et al., 2023).” His remark of “compete vigorously” also showed the priority of competition over cooperation. Campbell’s remark, during the teleconference, specifically represented the Troika’s thoughts. Mentioning an impossibility of full cooperation, he said that Washington would not concede any of its interests in competition. At the same time, however, he also emphasized the need to manage competition in order to avoid confrontation.

Based on this troika, Washington’s China policy has basically pertained to “competition over cooperation, without confrontation.” They share the concept of vigilance toward conflict against Beijing, while retaining the urgency for omnidirectional competition in advance of cooperation and the focus on the Taiwan Strait. Thus, Washington’s avoidance of an open and direct military conflict against Beijing can be 85 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum inferred. Washington’s priority is not to confront Beijing militarily, but to secure its eminence in the region as much as possible and restrict Beijing multi-dimensionally. Although there have been continuous doubts about the three figures (Overholt, 2021; Kurtner, 2023), it is clear that their views significantly influenced the current Washington position. 2. Washington’s Reserved Stance: Complex Beijing and Complicated Security Chllenges

Washington has pertained to a reserved stance on confrontation in the region. Here in this section, I suggest two reasons; Washington’s perception of Beijing as complex and of changed security challenges as complicated. The first reason is in line with the account of the previous section to a certain extent. It is because Washington’s China policy is greatly influenced by the troika, mainly due to a shift in its threat perception of Beijing. Washington intentionally maintains the distance from rhetoric indicating direct confrontation with Beijing.

Approximately a year later since Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s remark at the ceremony for a change of INDOPACOM command, the White House announced integrated deterrence as its bedrock strategic keynote in the region. With integrated deterrence, the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy report is generally in line with the framework of the coexistence of cooperation and competition, averting a

86 direct confrontation against Beijing:

Our objective is not to change the PRC but to shape the

strategic environment in which it operates, building a

balance of influence in the world that is maximally

favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and

the interests and values we share. We will also seek to

manage competition with the PRC responsibly. We will

cooperate with our allies and partners while seeking to

work with the PRC in areas like climate change and

nonproliferation. We believe it is in the interests of the

region and the wider world that no country withhold

progress on existential transnational issues because of

bilateral differences.

In the sense of Beijing as complex counterpart, the report explains the main stance of Washington over Beijing in the Indo-Pacific region is to shape the strategic environment in favor of itself, not to engage in confrontation directly with Beijing, while it leaves room for possible cooperation.

Together with the reserved stance on a direct confrontation, the report allocated a few paragraphs to directly cover Taiwan issues. The 87 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum paragraphs as well show its reserved stance in that it stipulates that Washington will stick to coordinated trilateral resolutions, maintaining dual deterrence:

We will also work with partners inside and outside of the

region to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,

… As we do so, our approach remains consistent with our

One China policy and our longstanding commitments

under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint

Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.

Afore-delineated, Washington’s resort to the One China Policy and Taiwan Relations Act shows that Washington sticks to its basic stance of strategic ambiguity, which also contributes to the explanation of Washington’s circumspect over military confrontation with its counterpart. Thus, the report repeats the possible coexistence of cooperation and competition, while at the same time it describes the Taiwan situation as complicated, thereby shows a complex approach toward the issues.

National Security Strategy report released in October of the same year also gives a similar account of the comprehensive situation. The report stipulates Beijing as the only competitor, calling for

88 acknowledging that competitors’ strategies operate across non-military domains as well as unconventional deterrence domains. However, at the same time, it repeats the intention of cooperation.

The reason Washington repeats the existing strategies on Taiwan issues and holds a reserved stance against confrontation with Beijing shares commonalities in perspectives with what Campbell and Sullivan’s article showed. Since it is based on a complicated calculation, it implies Washington perceives Beijing not merely as the belligerent needed to be destroyed but as a complex counterpart. On Taiwan, the troika has shown similar moves. Blinken “underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and reiterated there has been no change to the U.S. one China policy (Department of State, 2023).” Sullivan also emphasized peace and stability across the Strait, pointing the importance of maintaining U.S.-China “strategic channel of communication” and pursuing “high-level engagement and consultations (White House, 2023).”

Secondly, together with its perception of Beijing as a complex counterpart, Washington avoids an open and direct military conflict against Beijing because it calculates the security challenges in the Strait as complicated beyond mere military ones. As of the Biden administration, Washington’s national security functions under the framework of integrated deterrence, which refers to a response to an 89 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum integrated threat. Here the term “integrated” implies the diversity of different threats and does not exclusively stand for conventional military or nuclear deterrence domains.

Lloyd Austin mentioned, during his remark in 2022, integrated deterrence and called for “a new vision of what it means to defend our nation.” He pointed dangers of advanced technologies in potential conflictual domains, including outer space and cyberspace as newly developed conflictual areas. With this speech, a new deterrence field was set; an unconventional threat. The rising recognition of unconventional threats calls for an integrated deterring posture beyond a mere military domain.

Therefore, Washington has faced an entirely new situation in which it cannot simply resort to its military might when countering various security threats, requiring a circumspect against military confrontation. Washington's current position in the region is attributed to this recognition, in that expanded threat domains each distributed along with significant weights serve as a demanding condition against unconditional military defense centrality. This keynote contribution continued to the remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue two months later.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy diversifies threats posed by its counterpart beyond conventional deterrence domains, which also explains Washington’s circumspect due to the need for intricately

90 integrated deterrence posture. By diversifying security threats from Beijing into several domains, it shows that Washington does not focus solely on military calculations and views the security challenges between the Strait as more complicated:

The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military,

and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence

in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most

influential power. … on Taiwan and bullying of neighbors

in the East and South China Seas, our allies and partners in

the region bear much of the cost of the PRC’s harmful

behavior. In the process, the PRC is also undermining

human rights and international law, including freedom of

navigation, as well as other principles that have brought

stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.

The U.S. Defense White Paper published in 2022 stipulates that Beijing’s coercive and malign activities currently unfolded as gray zone tactics and that it is aggressively pursuing hybrid powers. In addition, it clarifies in countering those kinds of threats resorting to military solution has to be estranged:

91 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum

Competitors now commonly seek adverse changes in the

status quo using gray zone methods – coercive approaches

that may fall below perceived thresholds for U.S. military

action and across areas of responsibility of different parts

of the U.S. Government. The PRC employs state-

controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and

economic coercion against the United States and its Allies

and partners.

…

The Department will be judicious in its use of defense

resources and efforts to counter competitors’ coercive

behaviors in gray zone operations, as traditional military

tools may not always be the most appropriate response.

Lastly, the annual report to Congress on recent developments regarding Beijing pointed Beijing suggested the Multi-Domain Precision Warfare(MDPW) and a C4ISR network that incorporates big data and AI technologies as a new core operational concept, which were designed to exploit U.S. military weaknesses. With this, the report said the series of Beijing’s activities are carried in gray zone:

The PRC employs the CMM in gray zone operations, or

92 “low- intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a

level designed to frustrate effective response by the other

parties involved. The PRC employs CMM vessels to

advance its disputed sovereignty claims, often amassing

them in disputed areas throughout the SCS and ECS. In

this manner, the CMM plays a major role in coercive

activities to achieve the PRC’s political goals without

fighting and these operations are part of broader Chinese

military theory that sees confrontational operations short

of war as an effective means of accomplishing strategic

objectives.

As in line with the complicated security challenge evaluation of Taiwan issues, the recognition of Beijing’s activities as gray zone hybrid warfare serves as evidence showing Washington views Beijing is pursuing rather political goals and it is not its objective to initiate military confrontation and to annex Taiwan.

3. Prospects Inside the Beltway on A Low Chance of Armed Conflict There have been multifaceted and numerous arguments and debates over the estimation of the Strait contingency and foreign policy recommendations for Washington as the tension of Sino-US 93 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum condominium has escalated. They range from pessimistic and hawkish grounds to positive and engagement-favored grounds. Among other things, this section deals with cases that argue a low possibility of armed conflict in the region.

In one report from the Council on Foreign Relations (Gordon et al., 2023), it says the positive prospect of resolving cross-strait issues is unforeseen and the possibility of dismal power game between Washington and Beijing will be increasing as time goes. Pointing Taiwan’s strategic importance and Washington’s expected loss after the annexation, the report fervently insists that Washington needs to actively pursue effective deterrence measures in all rounds, while sustaining the current position in the Strait.

In response to this report, several experts refuted foreign policy establishment’s unilateral but not contemplated approach to the issue. Werner and his colleagues (2023) argued that the aforementioned view ignored Beijing and Taipei’s view not sincerely, overestimating Taiwan’s strategic importance, thereby opposing any potential peaceful attempt from Beijing in accordance with the One China Policy. In addition, they warned of a serious misguided context that translates the status quo as Beijing’s unilateral aggression and criticized that the recommendations suggested by the view would rather incite conflict. The debate (2023) over the interpretation of the situation and aligned policy

94 recommendations continued to the next month.

Despite numerous disagreements, they show some commonalities with the former view in crucial terms. They do not view Beijing’s military engagement as imminent threat. Although Gordon et al. alleged an increase in the possibility of armed conflict with Chinese beligerence and the need of immediate deterrence of Washington, they perceives the current stage as Beijing’s primordial for favorable conditions. The report as well identifies Beijing’s course of action as under gray zone tactics, thereby insisting Taiwan prioritize countering the gray zone aggression. Werner as well do not expect Chinese military incursion in the foreseeable future in that they take the possibility of a peaceful unification into account. He and his collegues argued Washington should acknowledge the possibility of peaceful unification, criticizing distorted speculation of Xi’s mindset and selection bias against credible reassurance, and that current Beijing’s activities cannot be seen solely as for war preparation.

Heath (2023) suggested that the ongoing Chinese military modernization is for numerous political and military purposes. Those purposes include enhancing national prestige, solidifying basic security, securing Xi’s political power, and avoiding military corruption and lethargy, none of which imply any intent to actually wage a war. Similarly, one report (Cozad et al., 2023) suggested a potential situation 95 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum where Washington and Beijing avoid war in that they have concluded Taiwan contingency will likely be highly costly in various perspectives.

Stokes (2023) suggested various purposes for Beijing’s gray zone intimidation that provide an alternative explanation far from expecting immediate military conflict between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing. Stokes sees Beijing’s gray zone aggression as preliminary steps for triumph in a later potential war. Particularly worth pointing, one of the main purposes, he argued, is to pressure Taiwan and increase the sense of vulnerability in the minds of Taiwanese people, while signaling its decisive position to external forces such as Washington.

Another group of experts (Lin et al., 2023) captured Beijing’s various diplomatic and military measures based on complicated approaches. According to them, Beijing’s diplomatic measures have shown a two-way approach, holding overall pressures on Taipei while easing some agenda. In military measures, the report says provocative activities from the 2022 exercise such as launching missiles over Taiwan and establishing exclusion zones around the island were not carried out in 2023. And several signals for Beijing’s assertion of sovereignty integrity seem to be implied in many of military measures.

O’Hanlon (2022) concluded that, through a simple military modeling and path-dependent scenario analysis, the inconsistency of results in predicting the winning side inflicts serious uncertainty. This

96 uncertainty, he argued, will act in ways that neither Beijing nor Washington and Taipei expect a triumph, thereby implying neither side prefers an actual war in the region. Hass (2023) expected, despite the absence of any convergence around key issues and the continuity of communication without concessions, possible stability in the U.S.-China relationship in the foreseeable future. Based on alignment in expectations and the benefit of capping tensions at current levels, they set up diplomatic channels regarding strategic concerns. This shows there can be a mutual consensus on maintaining the status quo in the face of the upcoming Taiwan election.

As this section delineates, a considerable portion of experts and scholars do not fear an imminent war and expect a situation in which there is a lower possibility of an open, direct, and overt military conflict. And also they suggest a rather complex approach in interpreting the status quo. Considering the impact the foreign policy establishment in the Beltway can wield on Washington, these views have the potential to develop their own path-dependent results on tensions in the Strait.

4. A Change in The Office May Bring a Remarkable Difference in Trilateral Relations

2024 is a year marked by elections worldwide. Just like Taiwan, the United States is also going to face its presidential election in November. 97 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum However, the United States election may bring a difference in the trilateral tension, thereby causing a change in the status quo. The Democratic Party announced Biden as its candidate for the upcoming presidential election. Since it is a re-election race for a sitting president, it is hard for any other significant candidate to emerge from the Democratic Party. Therefore, it would be the repetition of the current administration’s policy keynote, only with minor adjustments.

Yet, unlike the Democratic Party, the Republican Party has several candidates for the presidential race. Among others, Donald Trump and Nikki Haley are close to the Party’s candidate. Definitely Trump has been leading in the Republican presidenal race. And there have been a number of anticipates that Trump will actually win his second term. Thus, reviewing Trump’s China and Taiwan policy is important.

In one interview, Trump expressed dissatisfaction with the Taiwanese semiconductor industry, calling for the tariff retaliation (MSNBC, 2023). Also in the same interview, he took a reservation about protecting Taiwan in case of contingency. On the other hand, in his support camp, he praised Xi that he controls 1.4 billion people with an iron hand (CNN, 2023). If Trump wins the election the tension between Washington and Beijing will be deteriorated as well as there is a high chance to trade off Taiwan (Han, 2023).

98 Haley left a good impression on voters, particularly among moderate conservatives by resolving the Charleston Church shooting incident in 2015 at the time of a governor of South Carolina. Also, she was supported by the Americans For Prosperity, a conservative political advocacy group affiliated with the Kochs. Even, according to a recent poll, Haley has slashed Trump’s lead in New Hampshire with nearly two weeks to go until the national primary (The Hill, 2024). Amid her rise, it is important to remember that Haley is hawkish in foreign policy as shown in the case where she took the lead in terminating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran under the Trump administration. Moreover, she has declared that she would implement a hard-line policy against China when becoming president, criticizing China “as an enemy.” The only difference with Trump’s foreign policy stance is with Russia, suggesting that whoever the Republican presidential nominee is, in turn, could adversely affect tensions in the Strait.

In sum, if Biden wins the election, there would be no significant change in the cross-strait situation. On the other hand, if any of the promising Republican candidates wins the election, there would be a high likelihood of a negative effect on the trilateral tension. However, it is important to remember that the outcome of the presidential election is generally unpredictable, and even if Biden fails 99 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum to win re-election, the possibility that the aforementioned Republican candidates will have a different policy stance toward China than what they are currently seen cannot be ignored.

Conclusion

Throughout the paper, I have covered each perspective of Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, thereby suggesting implications on how to view the current Strait issue. In so doing, a dynamic commonalities and differences between those three perspectives had created was captured.

Taipei perceives a series of Chinese aggression as gray zone hybrid threats. Particularly, from politicians to the ruling party, the opposition party, and even military officials, Taiepi has stipulated Chinese threat and gray zone and hybrid warfare in public several times. Attributed mainly to the characteristics of both gray zone and hybrid warfare concepts, many sources from Taiwan indicate that Chinese aggression is designed to support and facilitate its ultimate goal of annexation. In addition, Taipei’s account of Beijing’s political warfare is also in line with its anticipation. Altogether, Taipei does not see Beijing’s military invasion as an imminent threat. Rather, it sees a military invasion as an ultimate outcome of continuous preliminary

100 aggression, combined greatly with political purposes. Furthermore, the upcoming 2024 presidenital election would make no great difference on the status quo, in that both parties tries to avoid direct military conflicts.

Xi Jinping’s The Chinese Dream and the Following New Type of Major-Country Relations has insisted that the Taiwan issue is about domestic affairs, thereby demanding Washington not interfere in its internal affairs. With this claim, several documents show Beijing’s hard stance against the issue and also leave room for overt military conflicts. However, no concrete evidence has appeared to suggest an imminent war. A number of authoritative and semi-authoritative sources have expressed Beijing’s resort to peaceful measures and that the basic stance has not changed. Yet, at the same time, the current activities Beijing has been unfolding pose a massive threat to Taipei, which can be seen as what Taipei perceives as gray zone hybrid threats.

This Beijing’s contradictory moves are due to the strategic ambiguity Washington has maintained and an incomplete business of military modernization. Without any reliable leverage against Washington in every term, Beijing does not possess significant relative superiority when waging a war.

Moreover, since Beijing cannot be certain of Washington’s intervention in the case of a war, it works in a way that Beijing pursues its strategic objectives while preventing the U.S. intervention; gray zone hybrid 101 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum tactics fit in. Altogether, based on vigilance toward domestic sovereignty intervention, Beijing is building favorable conditions for later strategic objectives in a longer-term perspective.

Washington believes that Beijing is a complex counterpart, rather than a belligerent adversary to be defeated. Strongly denying conflicts, Washington’s China Policy is within the framework of coexistence of cooperation and competition. While retaining an omnidirectional competition in advance of cooperation in the Strait, Washington avoids rhetoric indicating direct confrontation with Beijing. Several official sources show a reserved stance against armed conflict in the region. In addition, as Washington perceives security challenges to become diverse and multifaceted, threats Beijing has been posing are seen as multi-dimensional and complicated. Therefore, Washington cannot simply resort to military solutions. Moreover, as in line with the complicated security challenge evaluation of Taiwan issues, the recognition of Beijing’s activities as gray zone hybrid warfare serves as evidence showing Washington views Beijing is pursuing rather political goals and it is not its objective to initiate military confrontation and to annex Taiwan.

Lastly, considerable amounts of voices inside the Beltway do not fear an imminent war and expect a situation in which there is a lower possibility of an open, direct, and overt military conflict. And also

102 they suggest a rather complex approach in interpreting the status quo. Considering the impact the foreign policy establishment in the Beltway can wield on Washington, these views have the potential to develop their own path-dependent results on tensions in the Strait.

Taipei, Beijing, and Washington all have inclinations to avoid a direct and overt armed conflict with each other. Also, although the reasons and intentions are different from one another, all three parties do not consider a cross-strait war as imminent. In deciding whether open armed conflicts as not imminent, perceptions of and backgrounds of gray zone hybrid threat served a crucial role. Most importantly, several sources show that all of the three favor the protection of the status quo. However, as shown throughout the whole paper, neither party denies the possibility of war nor the significance of the military domain. And it is worth noting that the status quo is essentially conflictual. The paper captured that, despite the conflictual feature, there have been several sources showing the three parties’s avoidance of open and direct armed conflict and the perceptions of a war as not imminent. Thus, this paper concludes that the Taiwan Strait situation should be perceived with a lower possibility of an open, direct, and overt military conflict than with a mere pessimistic fatalism of military conflict.

103 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum References

Altman, D., 2015. Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion

and Crisis. Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

--------------, 2018. Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game

around the Use of Force. Security Studies, [e-journal] 27 (1),

Available through: Taylor & Francis database [Accessed

November 2023].

Arquilla, J., 2018. Perils of the Gray Zone: Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes

Regained. PRISM, [e-journal] 7 (3), Available through: JSTOR

database [Accessed November 2023].

Azad, T. M., Haider, M. W. and Sadiq, M., 2023. Understanding Gray

Zone Warfare from Multiple Perspectives. World Affairs, [e-

journal] 186 (1), Available through: Sage Journals [Accessed

November 2023].

Brands, H., 2016. Paradoxes of the Gray Zone. [omline] Philadelphia,

PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute Available at: <

https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/>

[Accessed November 2023].

Bush, R. C., 2006. Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution Press.

--------------, 2023. Explaining Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election.

Brookings Blog, December 18. Available at:

104 < https://www.brookings.edu/articles/explaining-taiwans-2024-

presidential-election/> [Accessed December 2023].

Campbell, K. M. and Sullivan, J., 2019. Competition without

Catastrophe . Foreign Affairs, [e-journal] 98 (5),

Available through: JSTOR database [Accessed December 2023].

Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2022. Analyzing the 2022

National Defense Strategy. Press release, 27 October 2022. Cha, C. H., 2014. An Interpretation on China’s Proposal of A New Type

of Great Power Relationship: Contents, Contexts, and

Assessment. Korea Political Science Review, [e-journal] 48 (4),

Available through: KCI database [Accessed November 2023]. Chang, A., FitzGerald, B., and Jackson, V., 2015. Shades of Gray:

Technology, Strategic Competition, and Stability in Maritime

Asia. [pdf] Washington D. C.: Center for a New American

Security. Available at:

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/shades-of-gray-

technology-strategic-competition-and-stability-in-maritime-

asia> [Accessed November 2023].

Char, J., 2022. Understanding China’s Military Operations Other Than

War. [online] Available at:

<https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/understanding-chinas-

military-operations-other-than-war/>[AccessedNovembe 2023]. 105 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum CICIR, 2021. Mutual Respect, Equality, Mutual Benefit and Peaceful

Coexistence – Exploring a new framework amid complexity for

China-US relations. China Institutes of Contemporary

International Relations.

CSIS, 2023. Analyzing China’s Escalation after Taiwan President Tsai’s

Transit through the United States. [pdf] Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: < https://www.csis.org

/analysis/analyzing-chinas-escalation-after-taiwan-president-

tsais-transit-through-united-states> [Accessed December 2023]. CSIS, 2023. Previewing Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election. [video]

December5. Available at:

<https://www.csis.org/events/previewing-taiwans-2024-

presidential-election> [Accessed December 2023].

Davis, E., 2023. Nikki Haley says she views China ‘as an enemy’ in

pointed rebuke. The CNN [online] Available at:

<https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/10/politics/nikki-haley-

china-cnntv/index.html>[Accessed January 2024].

Department of Defense, 2021. Secretary of Defense Remarks for the U.S.

INDOPACOM Change of Command. Press release, 30 April

2021.

----------------------------, 2021. Remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue by

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III. Press release, 11 June

106 2021.

----------------------------, 2022. Military and Security Developments

Involving the People’s Republic of China. Washington D. C.:

Department of Defense.

----------------------------, 2022. National Defense Strategy of The United

States of America. Washington D. C.: Department of Defense ----------------------------, 2023. Military and Security Developments

Involving the People’s Republic of China. Washington D. C.:

Department of Defense.

Department of National Ethnic Affairs Commission, 2012. Achieving

Rejuvenation Is the Dream of the Chinese People. Press release,

29 November 2012.

Department of State, 2022. The Administration’s Approach to the

People’s Republic of China. Press release, 26 May 2022. -------------------------, 2023. Deputy Assistant to the President and

Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell and

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J.

Kritenbrink On the Secretary’s Upcoming Travel to the

People’s Republic of China and the United Kingdom. Press

release, June14 2023.

-------------------------, 2023. Secretary Blinken’s Visit to the People’s

Republic of China (PRC). Press release, 19 June 2023.

107 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum Echevarria, A. J., 2015. How Should We Think about “Gray-Zone”

Wars?, Military Strategy Magazine, [online] Available at:

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article /how-

should-we-think-about-gray-zone-wars/> [Accessed August

2023].

Embassy of PRC in Malysia, 2021. President Xi Had a Virtual Meeting

with US President Joe Biden. Press release, November 16. Feng, H., He, K., and Li, X. 2019. How China Sees the World. Singpore:

Palgrave McMillan.

Fitton, O., 2016. Cyber Operations and Gray zones: Challenges for

NATO. Connections, [e-journal] 15 (2), Available through:

JSTOR database [Accessed November 2023].

Fuxian, Y. et al, 2023. How Bad Is China’s Economy? [online] Project

Syndicate. Available at:

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/how-bad-is-china-

s-economy>[Accessed December 2023].

Gaoyue, F. and Char, J., 2019. Introduction to China’s Military

Operations Other Than War. [pdf] Singpore: S. Rajaratnam

School of International Studies. Available at:

<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/PR19022

5_Introduction-to-Chinas-Military-Operations-Other-than-

War.pdf > [Accessed November 2023].

108 Gordon, S. M., Mullen, M. G., Sacks, D. et al., 2023. U.S.-Taiwan

Relations in a New Era – Responding to a More Assertive

China. [online] New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Available at:

<https://www.cfr.org/task-force-report/us-taiwan-relations-in-a-

new-era?gclid=Cj0KCQjw8NilBhDOARIsAHzpbLDiW9Mou

dR13Zx1Gpn_PMPlc2sRChpqenPYicdg96aCdasuC8ivxWgaA

iUQEALw_wcB> [Accessed December 2023].

Green, M., et al., 2017. Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia. [pdf]

Center for Strategic & International Studies. Available at:

<https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic

/publication/170505_GreenM_CounteringCoercionAsia_Web.p

df> [Accessed August 2023].

Ha, Y. S., 2019. World Politics of Love: War and Peace. Paju-si: Hanul

Academy.

Ha, Y. S., and Moon, Y. I., 2021. How to Read U.S.-China Summit: U.S.’

“Competition” Vs. China’s “Complexity.” EAI Issue Briefing.

Seoul: East Asia Institute.

Han, Y. H., 2023. Trump will be more dangerous than the Taiwan Strait

in 2024? ThinkChina, [online] December 8. Available at:

<https://www.thinkchina.sg/trump-will-be-more-dangerous-

taiwan-strait-2024> [Accessed January 2024].

109 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum Has China Peaked? A Deate, 2023. [online broadcasting] Foreign Policy,

FP Live, 14 July 2023.

Hass, R., 2023. Is progress possible when Biden and Xi meet?

Brookings Blog, October 23. Available at:

<https://www.brookings.edu /articles/is-progress-possible-when-

biden-and-xi-meet/> [Accessed December 2023].

Heath, T. R., 2023. Why Is China Strengthening Its Military? It’s Not

All About War. The RAND Blog, March 24. Available at:

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/why-is-

china-strengthening-its-military-its-not-all.html>

[Accessed December 2023].

Hoffman, F. G., 2016. The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict:

Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War.

[online] The Heritage Foundation. Available at:

<https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-

10/2016_IndexOfUSMilitaryStr

ength_The%20Contemporary%20Spectrum%20of%20Conflict

_Protracted%20Gray%20Zone%20Ambiguous%20and%20Hy

brid%20Modes%20of%20War.pdf> [Accessed August 2023]. Huang, Y. C., 2023. The Officer Review, Military Order of the World

Wars, [pdf] Available at:

<https://moww.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Officer-

110 Review_July-August-2023-New-web-edition2.pdf> [Accessed

November 2023].

Huaxia, 2021. Xi, Biden pledge to steer China-U.S. relations back on

right track. Xinhua News Network, [online] November 16.

Available at:<http://www.news.cn/english/2021-11/16/c_

13103 15008.htm> [Accessed January 2024].

---------, 2022. Eight major achievements of China’s major-country

diplomacy in 2022: FM. Xinhua News Network, [online] 25

December 2023. Available at:

<https://english.news.cn/20221225/369d9b2a7e244ac7bffc7dd

651db3402/c.html> [Accessed November 2023].

Hwang, W. J., 2021. The Strategy of Revising Status Quo in the Gray

Zone: Salami Tactics and Fait Accompli. Korean Journal of

Military Art and Science, [e-journal]. 77 (2), Available

through: Dbpia database [Accessed August 2023].

Lee, S., 2014. China’s ‘Three Warfares’: Origins, Applications, and

Oganizations. Journal of Strategic Studies, [e-journal] 37 (2),

Available through: Taylor & Francis database [Accessed

November 2023].

---------, 2022. Strengthening Taiwan’s integrated deterrence posture:

Challenges and Solutions. [online] The Hague Center for

Strategic Studies.

111 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum Lee, J., 2023. The Legal (Warfare) Implications of China’s Naval

Blockade of Taiwan, Institute for National Defense and

Security Research, [online] Available at:

<https://indsr.org.tw/en/respublicationcon?uid=18&resid=1960

&pid=3988> [Accessed January 2024].

Lee, K., 2023. The Continuity and Changes of the CCP’s Discourse on

Taiwan from the Press Releases of the Taiwan Affairs Office of

the State Council. [online] Institute for National Defense and

Security Research. Available at: <

https://indsr.org.tw/en/respublicationcon?uid=16&resid=

1939&pid=3735&typeid=3> [Accessed January 2024].

Liang, S., 2023. What direction for resolving Taiwan question in Xi era?

[online] Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

Available at: < https://indsr.org.tw/en/respublicationcon?uid

=16&resid=1939&pid=3734&typeid=3> [Accessed January

2024].

Mazarr, M. J., 2015. Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a

Changing Era of Conflict [pdf] Available at: <

https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1

4 27&context=monographs> [Accessed August 2023].

Mearsheimer, J. J., 2014. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 2nd ed.

New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

112 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2013.

Exploring the Path of Major-Country Diplomacy With Chinese

Characteristics. Press release, 27 June 2013.

Ministry of National Defense of R.O.C., 2023. ROC National Defense

Report 2023. Taipei: MNDROC Office of the President ROC,

2022. Presidential Office Thanks US for announcing 5th

military sale to Taiwan this year. Press release, 3 September

2023.

MSNBC, 2023. Trump says Taiwan ‘took our business away,’ Morning

Joe. [video] July 2023. Available at:

<https://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/trump-says-

taiwan-took-our-business-away-188614213513> [Accessed

January 2024].

Nazzaro, M., 2024. Haley cuts Trump lead to 7 points in New

Hampshire: Survey. The Hill [online] Available at:

<https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4397082-haley-

cuts-trump-lead-in-new-hampshire-survey/>

[Accessed January 2024].

Office of the President, ROC, 2023. President Tsai Attends Opening of

2023 Taipei Security Dialogue. Press release,8November 2023. O’Hanlon, M., 2022. Can China Take Taiwan? Why no one really knows.

[pdf] Brookings Institute. Available at: <https://www.brookings. 113 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum

edu/articles/can-china-take-taiwan-why-no-one-really-knows/>

[Accessed December 2023].

-----------------, 2022. Integrated Deterrence: An excuse to spend less on

defense? The Hill, [online] 15 November. Available at:

<https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3732302-

integrated-deterrence-an-excuse-to-spend-less-on-defense/>

[Accessed November 2023].

RAND Corporation, 2023. Gaining Victory in Systems Warfare –

China’s Perspective on the U.S.-China Military Balance.

[online] RAND Corporation. Available at:

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1535-1.html

> [December 2023].

------------------------, 2023. Upcoming Presidential Election Will Clarify

Taiwan’s China Policy. The RAND Blog, May 19. Available at:

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/05/

upcoming-presidential-election-will-clarify-taiwans.html>

[Accessed January 2024].

Shepard, W., 2020. How China’s Belt And Road Became A ‘Global Trail

of Trouble.’ Forbes, [online] 29 January 2020. Available at:

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2020/01/29/how-

chinas-belt-and-road-became-a-global-trail-of-

trouble/?sh=6f7cc5a8443d> [Accessed December 2023].

114 Shu, H., 2024. 反制中共 A2/AD：美國在印太區域的 戰略部署.

[online] Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

Available at: < https://indsr.org.tw/respublicationcon?uid=16

&resid=2989&pid=5287&typeid=3 > [Accessed January 2024]. Siebens, J. and Lucas, R., 2022. Military Operations Other Than War in

China’s Foreign Policy. [pdf] Washington D. C.:The Henry L.

Stimson Center. Available at: <https://www.stimson.org/2022/

military-operations-other-than-war-and-chinas-foreign-policy/>

[Accessed November 2023].

Sohn, Y., et al. 2023. Between ‘Managed Competition’ and ‘Securing

Development Rights’: 2023 APEC U.S.-China Summit Seeking

Cooperation. Special report on APEC U.S.-China Summit.

Seoul: East Asia Institute.

Stokes, J., 2023. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on

Taiwan. [online] Center for a New American Security.

Stockholm International Peace Research Center, 2023. SIPRI. [online]

Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/> [Accessed December

2023].

Swaine, M. D., 2021. Recent Chinese Views on the Taiwan Issue,

Chinese Leadership Monitor, [online] Available at:

<https://www.prcleader.org/post/recent-chinese-views-on-the-

taiwan-issuedownload> [Accessed December 2023].

115 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum The Brookings Institute, 2013. Wang Yi: Toward a New Model of

Major-Country Relations Between China and the United

States. [online] The Brookings. Speech translated. Available

at:<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/wang-yi-toward-a-

new-model-of-major-country-relations-between-china-and-

the-united-states/> [Accessed November 2023].

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2023. The Debate on US

Strategy in Taiwan-China Relations, Deep Dish on Global

Affairs Podcast. [podcast] July 2023. Available at:

<https://globalaffairs.org/commentary-and-analysis/podcasts/

debate-us-strategy-taiwan-china-relations>

[Accessed December 2023].

The National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative

Conference, 2021. Full text of President Xi’s speech at meeting

marking 1911 Revolution. Press release, 9 October 2021.

The State Council Information Office, 2019. China’s National Defense

in the New Era. Beijing: The State Council Information Office. The State Council Information Office, 2023. Speech at the first session

of the 14th NPC. Xinhua News Network, [online] 13 March.

Available at: <http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/topnews/2023-

03/15/content_85168965.htm> [Accessed December 2023]. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2023. Report on

116 the Work of the Government. Beijing: The State Council of the

People’s Republic of China

The White House, 2022. Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.

Washington D. C.: The White House.

---------------------, 2022. National Security Strategy of the United States

of America. Washington D. C.: The White House.

---------------------, 2023 Readout of National Security Advisor Jake

Sullivan’s Meeting with Chinese Communist Party Politburo

Member, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs

Commission, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Press release,

September 17.

Tunstall, A., 2019. China’s Use of Hybrid Tactics in the Maritime

Domain. [online] scholastic document submitted to the

Canadian Forces College. Available at:

<https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/22/305/Tunstall.pdf>

[Accessed December 2023].

United States Navy, 2023. America’s Navy. [online] Available at:

<https://www.navy.mil/> [Accessed December 2023].

United States Special Operations Command, 2015. U.S. Special

Operations Command White Paper: The Gray Zone. Florida:

MacDill Air Force Base, Headquarters of U.S. SOCOM

Werner, J., Swaine, M. D., and Park, J., 2023. How a reckless report 117 2. Revisiting the Trilateral Tension in the Taiwan Strait_JMSDF Sasebo Museum

could increase the chance of a crisis with China. [online] (29

June 2023) Available at: <https://responsiblestatecraft.org

/2023/06/29/how-a-reckless-report-could-increase-the-chance-

of-a-crisis-with-china/> [Accessed December 2023].

Wingfield-Hayes, R., 2024. William Lai: Taiwan hust chose a president

China loathes. What now? BBC News, [online] January 14.

Available at:

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67920530>

[Accessed January 2024].

Wolf, Z. B., 2023. Biden on China vs. Trump on China. The CNN,

[online] Available at:

<https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/14/politics/biden-trump-

china-what-matters/index.html> [Accessed January 2024]. Wuthnow, J., 2020. China’s Other Army: The People’s Armed Police in

an Era of Reform. Independently published.

Yu shenfang, 2012. 楊潔篪就習近平訪美向中方媒体作總结吹風.

Xinhua News Network, [online] 19 February. Available at:

<http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-

02/19/c_111542269.htm> [Accessed November 2023]

.

118