President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and Its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations Museum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Jongeun Seong
사랑방의 젊은 그들 베이징을 품다
The University of Sydney
1. Introduction
Prior to the emergence of President Xi Jinping’s so-called “New Type of
International Relations(新型国(cid:41068)关系),” China’s foreign policies were
based upon three main principles(Chung 2015). The first principle was
called “不当(cid:25435),” meaning that China will not pursue leadership both
regionally and internationally. The second principle was “不称霸,”
meaning China will not seek hegemony. Finally, the third principle was
“不搞(cid:27792)(cid:26951),” which means that the Chinese government will not
implement territorial expansion. The three principles of China’s foreign
relations mentioned above were introduced by the third paramount leader
of China, Deng Xiaoping, under the concept of “(cid:41491)光养晦,” which
6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party
describes China’s “era of strategic modesty”(Chung 2015). However, since
2012, Deng Xiaoping’s first principle, “不当(cid:25435),” started to fade away
(Chung, 2015) due to President Xi Jinping’s different approaches to Chinese
foreign policy called the “New Type of International Relations.”
In 2013, during the 12th National People’s Congress(NPC), the
then General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered a speech that clearly showed
the main objectives of the New Type of International Relations. For
instance, Xi Jinping mentioned one of the primary goals of the PRC such
as, “(cid:26053)(cid:32215)全面建成小康社会”(Wilson Center 2013) in his speech. Xi
Jinping meant that the PRC government’s goal is to successfully establish
the so-called “Xiaokang society”(小康社会) by 2021, which describes a
“moderately prosperous society” for the Chinese people(Cho 2019).
Moreover, Xi Jinping especially emphasized
“中(cid:23925)民族(cid:22854)大复兴的中国梦” during his speech, which is the “Chinese
Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese people”(Goldstein 2020).
The first part of this research essay will provide thorough
scrutiny of President Xi Jinping’s two main principles of New Type of
International Relations: 1) Periphery Diplomacy of the New
Era(新(cid:28701)代周(cid:39392)外交) and 2) New Type of Great Power
Relations(新型大国关系). Second, this essay will provide detailed analyses
of how the principles of New Type of International Relations have shaped
the PRC’s course of action in the twenty-first century. Finally, the last
part of this essay will discuss how the principles of the New Type of
International Relations have been explicitly applied for cross-strait
relations since Xi Jinping’s inauguration as the fifth General Secretary of
the CCP in 2012.
2. President Xi Jinping’s New Type of International Relations
(新型国(cid:41068)关系): a Miscalculation? Or a Success?
Since Xi Jinping became the fifth General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party in 2012 and the seventh President of China in 2013, he
has shaped not only China’s domestic politics but also China’s foreign
policies through his strong leadership. President Xi Jinping has been well-
aware of the significant improvement of China’s economic and military
circumstances, which is why he came up with the principles of “New
Type of International Relations” during the 19th Central Committee of
the CCP in 2017(Goldstein 2020). However, China’s implementation of the
"New Type of International Relations,” such as the 1) Periphery
Diplomacy of the New Era and the 2) New Type of Great Power
Relations, collided with the values of the United States-led “rules-based
liberal international order.”
6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party
Notwithstanding the PRC’s emphasis on “peaceful
development”(和平(cid:24056)展) that outwardly refrains potential conflicts with its
peripheral states, the United States started to actively suppress the PRC’s
attempts to gain global hegemony since the Trump Administration. Such
a strategic competition between the PRC and the United States caused by
the emergence of the New Type of International Relations can be
explained by Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap.” The presumption of
the “Thucydides Trap” is that when the hegemon or the “ruling power”
that led the international order weakens, the war between the “rising
power” and the “ruling power” is inevitable(Allison 2017). President Xi
Jinping himself indeed acknowledged that there is “no such thing as a
Thucydides Trap in the world.”(Allison 2017); however, President Xi
Jinping added that “major countries might create such traps…if they make
the mistakes of strategic miscalculation.”(Allison 2017). Thus, in order to
determine whether China’s implementation of New Type of International
Relations is a “strategic miscalculation,” understanding the Periphery
Diplomacy of the New Era and the New Type of Great Power Relations
is crucial.
2.1 Scrutiny of the Periphery Diplomacy of the New Era(新(cid:28701)
代周(cid:39392)外交)
In order to alleviate territorial and economic disputes with neighboring
states, the PRC came up with the so-called “Periphery Diplomacy of the
New Era”( 新 (cid:28701) 代周 (cid:39392) 外交 ) a decade ago. The word “periphery” first
appeared in former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s official report at the
18th National Congress of the CCP(中国共(cid:22734)党全国代表大会) in 2012. For
instance, President Hu Jintao remarked, “…区域次区域开放合作，加
快 (cid:26053) 施 自 由 (cid:38751) 易 区 (cid:27711) 略 ， 推 (cid:23759) 同 周 (cid:39392) 国 家 互 (cid:35451) 互 通 。 ”(Central
People’s Government 2012), which promoted PRC’s “connectivity” with its
neighboring states. However, President Hu Jintao did not specify the
goals of China’s Periphery Diplomacy in his report, which is why the
examination of President Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2013 Peripheral
Diplomacy Work Conference is also necessary.
President Xi Jinping remarked in his speech, “…我国周(cid:39392)外交
的(cid:27711)略目(cid:29230)，就是服从和服(cid:23752)于(cid:26053)(cid:32215)“两个一百年”(cid:25458)斗目(cid:29230)、(cid:26053)(cid:32215)
中(cid:23925)民族(cid:22854)大复兴,…”(People’s Daily 2013). It means that Xi Jinping had
set up the goals of Periphery Diplomacy under the “two centenaries”
timeframe and aimed to achieve the “great revival of the Chinese people.”
President Xi Jinping also explicitly stated that “巩固睦(cid:39650)友好，深化互
利合作,…(cid:35099)(cid:27851)国家主权、安全、(cid:24056)展利益，努力使周(cid:39392)同我国政
治关系更加友好…”(People’s Daily 2013), which is to pursue a friendly
relationship with neighboring states, mutually beneficial cooperation,
protection of national sovereignty, security, and development interests.
6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party
In addition, Michael Swaine’s analyses are also worthwhile in
understanding China’s periphery diplomacy. Swaine defined the goals of
China’s periphery diplomacy in three main points: 1) enhance political
goodwill; 2) deepen regional economic integration; 3) increase China’s
cultural influence(Swaine 2014). To be specific, based on the second goal
of China’s periphery diplomacy, it is clear that the PRC has been
endeavoring to strengthen its regional economic influence by the
implementation of the “Belt and Road Initiative” under two main slogans.
The first slogan is called, “Community of a Shared Future for Mankind”
(人类运命共同体) and the second slogan is called, “One Road, One Belt”(
一(cid:26701)一路). Through the promulgation of such slogans, PRC has been
propagandizing its economic influence for its periphery states as the
“mankind’s shared future.” The PRC’s initiatives, such as the installation
of oil pipelines and signing of energy agreements(Swaine 2014) with its
periphery states in Asia and beyond, are appropriate examples of
“deepening regional economic integration.” In addition, the
establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB), which
has its headquarters in Beijing, and the Contingent Reserve
Arrangement(CRA) - BRICS(IMF competitive) are also appropriate
examples of China’s regional economic influence(Gu 2017).
Albeit the fact that President Xi Jinping continuously
emphasized: “friendly relationship with neighboring states” and
“peaceful development”(和平(cid:24056)展) in several speeches, it does not
necessarily mean that the PRC will never go to war with its opponents
when it comes to safeguarding its “core interests”(核心利益). Hence,
through the implementation of the principles of periphery diplomacy, it is
possible to speculate that China will primarily strive to consolidate its
regional hegemony through multiple channels and eventually challenge
the United States-led security order in the Asia-Pacific region(Swaine
2014). Although there are a plethora of research reports that simply
conclude China’s ultimate goals of periphery diplomacy to gaining
regional hegemony, however, the actual intentions of the PRC still need
further scrutiny of the academia.
2.2 Scrutiny of the New Type of Great Power Relations(新型
大国关系)
Unlike the former presidents of China, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, who
focused more on China’s domestic politics, President Xi Jinping
emphasized the importance of foreign policy issues during his
term(Shambaugh 2020). From Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy principle
that does not pursue China’s global leadership, “不当(cid:25435),” Xi Jinping
changed the direction of China’s diplomacy based on the so-called New
Type of Great Power Relations with Chinese
characteristics(中国特色大国外交). In the past, under the slogan of
6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party
“peaceful development,”(和平(cid:24056)展) China used to pursue peaceful
relations with other states for its economy; however, China started to
expand its global influence under Xi Jinping’s New Type of Great Power
Relations(Shambaugh 2020). In order to successfully implement the New
Type of Great Power Relations, Xi Jinping promoted idealistic and moral
values such as the “Community of a Shared Future for Mankind”(人类运
命共同体).
The incumbent Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi,
delivered a speech at the Brookings Institution that stated the goals of
China’s New Type of Great Power Relations. Wang Yi remarked,
“(cid:26144)第一个(cid:40981)(cid:41663)，(cid:22663)近平主席已(cid:35062)用三句(cid:38404)作了非常精辟的概括，
第一句是“不冲突”，不(cid:26144)抗，第二句是“相互尊重”，第三句是“合
作共(cid:38793).”(People’s Daily 2013). The first goal, “不冲突，不(cid:26144)抗,” means
that China will prevent any potential conflicts or confrontations with
foreign countries. The second goal, “相互尊重,” means mutual respect
between states, and the last goal, “合作共(cid:38793),” is the so-called win-win
cooperation. Although China has been pursuing win-win cooperation
with other states, under the second goal of “mutual respect,” China
maintained its assertive stance when the United States attempted to raise
objections regarding China’s internal affairs.
For example, Yang Jiechi, the Director of the Central Foreign
Affairs Commission General Office, remarked,
“世界上(cid:35076)大部分国家并不承(cid:38347)美国的价(cid:23139)就是国(cid:41068)价(cid:23139)，不承(cid:38347)
美国(cid:38427)的就是国(cid:41068)(cid:35885)(cid:38369)…”(Xinhua News Agency 2021), which means
that the “values of the United States are not necessarily equivalent to the
international values,” thus implying that China has a right to implement
its values. Yang Jiechi also added,
“美国有美国式的民主，中国有中国式的民主.”(Xinhua News Agency
2021), meaning that the United States has its own style of democracy,
while China also has its own style of democracy. At the same time, Yang
Jiechi continuously emphasized that the PRC supports peaceful
development, “中国(cid:24961)持走和平(cid:24056)展道路,” which shows that the goal
of the New Type of Great Power Relations is not to provoke the ruling
power, the United States.
Until the size of China’s gross domestic product(GDP) becomes
similar to the United States by 2049, which is the year of the 100th
anniversary of the PRC’s establishment of New China(新中国), it is
anticipated that China will prevent a direct military confrontation with the
United States. However, no one can assure us that China and the United
States will never go to war within the next few decades. If the PRC
achieves the so-called “Xiaokang society”(小康社会) by 2049, it is
possible that Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” might become a
reality. It is true that there are multiple hurdles for China to become the
6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party
new “ruling power,” which is why further research on China’s New Type
of International Relations is necessary.
3. Analyses of How the Principles of “New Type of
International Relations” Shaped PRC’s Course of Actions
3.1 PRC’s Application of “New Type of International
Relations” for Cross-Strait Relations Since 2012
PRC’s so-called “core interests”(核心利益) are classified under three main
aspects: (i) fundamental system and state security; (ii) state sovereignty
and territorial integrity; and (iii) stable development of the economy and
society(Zhou 2019). Since the Taiwan Strait is claimed as a territory of the
PRC under the “One-China principle”(一个中国原(cid:23616)), cross-strait relations
are classified as the PRC’s protection of its (i) fundamental system and
state security(Zhou 2019). Since the issues related to Taiwan are perceived
as a “national security” issue, the PRC has been maintaining its assertive
stance when a foreign country such as the United States attempted to
intervene in cross-strait relations. The 2021 U.S.-China summit in
Anchorage, Alaska between Antony Blinken, the U.S. Secretary of State
and Yang Jiechi, the Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission
General Office, is an appropriate example that shows the PRC’s
application of New Type of International Relations for cross-strait
relations.
Yang Jiechi remarked,
“中方主(cid:26951)和平、(cid:24056)展、公平、正(cid:22640)、民主、自由的全人类共同价
(cid:23139)，主(cid:26951)(cid:35099)(cid:27851)以(cid:35451)合国(cid:22625)核心的国(cid:41068)体系.”(Xinhua News Agency
2021), which means that China advocates peace, development, fairness,
democracy, and the common value of freedom for all mankind. Most
importantly, Yang Jiechi showed PRC’s assertive stance by clearly
stating,“台湾、香港、新疆都是中国(cid:41645)土不可分割的部分，中方(cid:24961)
决反(cid:26144)美方干涉中国内政行径，并将(cid:35086)(cid:35092)作出(cid:24961)定回(cid:26811).”(Xinhua
News Agency 2021) that the issues regarding the Taiwan strait are internal
affairs, therefore the United States does not have a right to intervene in
China’s internal affairs.
In 2022, the Chinese Defense Minister, Wei Fenghe, remarked at
the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies,“如果有人胆敢把台湾分裂出去，中国(cid:23490)(cid:41030)必将“不惜一(cid:27711)、
不惜代价.”(Xinhua News Agency 2022), meaning that China will not
hesitate to go to war with any country that tries to separate Taiwan and
the PRC. As shown in Director Yang Jiechi and Minister Wei Fenghe’s
speeches, the PRC has maintained its assertive stance when it comes to
safeguarding its “core interests”(核心利益). Even if China tries to avoid
any potential military conflicts with other states, the PRC publicly
6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party
announced that it would immediately take action if another state tried to
break the One-China principle. When it comes to analyzing cross-strait
issues, there might be a question of whether the principles of the
Periphery Diplomacy of the New Era and the New Type of Great Power
Relations contradict each other. The Periphery Diplomacy of the New Era
emphasizes the protection of China’s national sovereignty, whereas the
New Type of Great Power Relations pursues peaceful relations with other
states. However, China will still exercise its rights to safeguard the One-
China principle under the circumstance that they do not provoke the
United States.
Another reason behind the PRC’s emphasis on keeping Taiwan
under their control is due to their third principle of “core interests,” (iii)
stable development of the economy and society(Zhou 2019). In Taiwan,
there is the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company(TSMC),
which is one of the world’s foremost semiconductor companies. Suppose
the PRC successfully keeps Taiwan under the CCP’s control. In that case,
China will be able to make the TSMC a state-owned enterprise, which
significantly contributes to China’s core interests. If China nationalizes
the TSMC, many countries worldwide will be more dependent on China
in terms of semiconductor technology. TSMC’s semiconductor business
is lucrative and helpful for the PRC’s technological advancement, thus
strengthening China’s soft power in the long term.
3.2 Innermost Intentions of President Xi Jinping’s
Implementation of “New Type of International Relations”:
The Achievement of the Chinese Dream
Despite the outward stance announced by the political leaders of China,
what are Xi Jinping’s innermost intentions for implementing the “New
Type of International Relations?” From a historical perspective, China
has been the hegemon for centuries, maintaining the so-called “Zongfan
relations(宗藩关系)” or the tributary system with its periphery states under
the traditional cultural concept of “all under heaven”(天下). However,
starting from the Treaty of Nanjing, where the Qing Dynasty dropped to
its knees to the Western powers, China’s pride in its status as a regional
hegemon utterly shattered into pieces. In order to restore the traditional
cultural concept of “all under heaven”(天下), Xi Jinping’s innermost
intention is to implement the principles of the “New Type of International
Relations” to enjoy its hegemonic status both regionally and
internationally. Hence, Xi Jinping’s goal to achieve the “Chinese Dream
of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese
people”(中(cid:23925)民族(cid:22854)大复兴的中国梦) is the restoration of “all under heaven”
because he desperately desires China’s glory in the past.
6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party
4. Conclusion
The question of whether President Xi Jinping’s principles of “New Type
of International Relations” are strategic miscalculations requires further
scrutiny. However, from a future-oriented view of international relations
in the Asia-Pacific region, it is likely that the PRC will successfully
become the regional hegemon, notwithstanding the United States’ effort
to maintain its “rules-based liberal international order.” One reason is that
the unipolarity system led by the United States since the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1991 has been weakened. In terms of economic development,
China’s purchasing power parity(PPP) already surpassed the PPP of the
United States in 2013. Moreover, by 2049, under the condition that the
PRC maintains its 6% annual economic growth rate, China is expected to
succeed in achieving the so-called “Xiaokang society.” However, to
actualize Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the
Chinese people, several hurdles need to be overcome because China has
not proven itself its qualifications to become the so-called “responsible
stakeholder.” In order to become the global hegemon or the responsible
stakeholder, China must prove to the international community that
China’s “Community of a Shared Future for Mankind”(人类运命共同体) is
more beneficial than the values of liberal democracy.
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