President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and Its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations Museum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Jongeun Seong

The University of Sydney

1. Introduction

Prior to the emergence of President Xi Jinping’s so-called “New Type of

International Relations (新型国(cid:41068)关系),” China’s foreign policies were

based upon three main principles (Chung 2015). The first principle was

called “不当(cid:25435),” meaning that China will not pursue leadership both

regionally and internationally. The second principle was “不称霸,”

meaning China will not seek hegemony. Finally, the third principle was

“不搞(cid:27792)(cid:26951),” which means that the Chinese government will not

implement territorial expansion. The three principles of China’s foreign

relations mentioned above were introduced by the third paramount leader

of China, Deng Xiaoping, under the concept of “(cid:41491)光养晦,” which

6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party

describes China’s “era of strategic modesty” (Chung 2015). However, since

2012, Deng Xiaoping’s first principle, “不当(cid:25435),” started to fade away

(Chung, 2015) due to President Xi Jinping’s different approaches to Chinese

foreign policy called the “New Type of International Relations.”

In 2013, during the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC), the

then General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered a speech that clearly showed

the main objectives of the New Type of International Relations. For

instance, Xi Jinping mentioned one of the primary goals of the PRC such

as, “(cid:26053)(cid:32215)全面建成小康社会” (Wilson Center 2013) in his speech. Xi

Jinping meant that the PRC government’s goal is to successfully establish

the so-called “Xiaokang society” (小康社会) by 2021, which describes a

“moderately prosperous society” for the Chinese people (Cho 2019).

Moreover, Xi Jinping especially emphasized

“中(cid:23925)民族(cid:22854)大复兴的中国梦” during his speech, which is the “Chinese

Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese people” (Goldstein 2020).

The first part of this research essay will provide thorough

scrutiny of President Xi Jinping’s two main principles of New Type of

International Relations: 1) Periphery Diplomacy of the New

Era (新(cid:28701)代周(cid:39392)外交) and 2) New Type of Great Power

Relations (新型大国关系). Second, this essay will provide detailed analyses

of how the principles of New Type of International Relations have shaped

the PRC’s course of action in the twenty-first century. Finally, the last

part of this essay will discuss how the principles of the New Type of

International Relations have been explicitly applied for cross-strait

relations since Xi Jinping’s inauguration as the fifth General Secretary of

the CCP in 2012.

2. President Xi Jinping’s New Type of International Relations

(新型国(cid:41068)关系): a Miscalculation? Or a Success?

Since Xi Jinping became the fifth General Secretary of the Chinese

Communist Party in 2012 and the seventh President of China in 2013, he

has shaped not only China’s domestic politics but also China’s foreign

policies through his strong leadership. President Xi Jinping has been well-

aware of the significant improvement of China’s economic and military

circumstances, which is why he came up with the principles of “New

Type of International Relations” during the 19th Central Committee of

the CCP in 2017 (Goldstein 2020). However, China’s implementation of the

"New Type of International Relations,” such as the 1) Periphery

Diplomacy of the New Era and the 2) New Type of Great Power

Relations, collided with the values of the United States-led “rules-based

liberal international order.”

6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party

Notwithstanding the PRC’s emphasis on “peaceful

development” (和平(cid:24056)展) that outwardly refrains potential conflicts with its

peripheral states, the United States started to actively suppress the PRC’s

attempts to gain global hegemony since the Trump Administration. Such

a strategic competition between the PRC and the United States caused by

the emergence of the New Type of International Relations can be

explained by Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap.” The presumption of

the “Thucydides Trap” is that when the hegemon or the “ruling power”

that led the international order weakens, the war between the “rising

power” and the “ruling power” is inevitable(Allison 2017). President Xi

Jinping himself indeed acknowledged that there is “no such thing as a

Thucydides Trap in the world.”(Allison 2017); however, President Xi

Jinping added that “major countries might create such traps…if they make

the mistakes of strategic miscalculation.”(Allison 2017). Thus, in order to

determine whether China’s implementation of New Type of International

Relations is a “strategic miscalculation,” understanding the Periphery

Diplomacy of the New Era and the New Type of Great Power Relations

is crucial.

2.1 Scrutiny of the Periphery Diplomacy of the New Era(New Era Diplomacy)

In order to alleviate territorial and economic disputes with neighboring

states, the PRC came up with the so-called “Periphery Diplomacy of the

New Era” (New Era Diplomacy) a decade ago. The word “periphery” first

appeared in former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s official report at the

18th National Congress of the CCP (Communist Party of China National Congress) in 2012. For

instance, President Hu Jintao remarked, “…regional and sub-regional open cooperation, accelerate the

implementation of the free trade zone strategy, and promote connectivity with neighboring countries.”(Central

People’s Government 2012), which promoted PRC’s “connectivity” with its

neighboring states. However, President Hu Jintao did not specify the

goals of China’s Periphery Diplomacy in his report, which is why the

examination of President Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2013 Peripheral

Diplomacy Work Conference is also necessary.

President Xi Jinping remarked in his speech, “…the strategic goals of our periphery diplomacy

are to serve and subordinate to the struggle goals of the 'two centenaries', and the great revival of the Chinese nation,

…”(People’s Daily 2013). It means that Xi Jinping had

set up the goals of Periphery Diplomacy under the “two centenaries”

timeframe and aimed to achieve the “great revival of the Chinese people.”

President Xi Jinping also explicitly stated that “consolidate good-neighborly friendship, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation,... protect national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and strive to make the political relations with neighboring countries more friendly...”(People’s Daily 2013), which is to pursue a friendly

cooperation, protection of national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

relationship with neighboring states, mutually beneficial cooperation,

protection of national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

protection of national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party

In addition, Michael Swaine’s analyses are also worthwhile in

understanding China’s periphery diplomacy. Swaine defined the goals of

China’s periphery diplomacy in three main points: 1) enhance political

goodwill; 2) deepen regional economic integration; 3) increase China’s

cultural influence(Swaine 2014). To be specific, based on the second goal

of China’s periphery diplomacy, it is clear that the PRC has been

endeavoring to strengthen its regional economic influence by the

implementation of the “Belt and Road Initiative” under two main slogans.

The first slogan is called, “Community of a Shared Future for Mankind”

(Community of a Shared Future for Mankind) and the second slogan is called, “One Road, One Belt”(

One Belt, One Road). Through the promulgation of such slogans, PRC has been

propagandizing its economic influence for its periphery states as the

“mankind’s shared future.” The PRC’s initiatives, such as the installation

of oil pipelines and signing of energy agreements(Swaine 2014) with its

periphery states in Asia and beyond, are appropriate examples of

“deepening regional economic integration.” In addition, the

establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB), which

has its headquarters in Beijing, and the Contingent Reserve

Arrangement(CRA) - BRICS(IMF competitive) are also appropriate

examples of China’s regional economic influence(Gu 2017).}]} tanggung jawab saya untuk menerjemahkan teks dari publikasi kebijakan akademik Institut Asia Timur (EAI). Bahasa sumbernya adalah Korea; terjemahkan setiap nilai

Albeit the fact that President Xi Jinping continuously

emphasized: “friendly relationship with neighboring states” and

“peaceful development” in several speeches, it does not

necessarily mean that the PRC will never go to war with its opponents

when it comes to safeguarding its “core interests.” Hence,

through the implementation of the principles of periphery diplomacy, it is

possible to speculate that China will primarily strive to consolidate its

regional hegemony through multiple channels and eventually challenge

the United States-led security order in the Asia-Pacific region (Swaine 2014). Although there are a plethora of research reports that simply

conclude China’s ultimate goals of periphery diplomacy to gaining

regional hegemony, however, the actual intentions of the PRC still need

further scrutiny of the academia.

2.2 Scrutiny of the New Type of Great Power Relations

Unlike the former presidents of China, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, who

focused more on China’s domestic politics, President Xi Jinping

emphasized the importance of foreign policy issues during his

term (Shambaugh 2020). From Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy principle

that does not pursue China’s global leadership, “not to be the first to

act,” Xi Jinping

changed the direction of China’s diplomacy based on the so-called New

Type of Great Power Relations with Chinese characteristics.

6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party

In the past, under the slogan of “peaceful development,” China used to pursue peaceful

relations with other states for its economy; however, China started to

expand its global influence under Xi Jinping’s New Type of Great Power

Relations (Shambaugh 2020). In order to successfully implement the New

Type of Great Power Relations, Xi Jinping promoted idealistic and moral

values such as the “Community of a Shared Future for Mankind.”

The incumbent Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi,

delivered a speech at the Brookings Institution that stated the goals of

China’s New Type of Great Power Relations. Wang Yi remarked,

“President Xi Jinping has already made a very incisive summary with three sentences.

The first sentence is “no conflict,” no confrontation; the second sentence is “mutual respect”; the third sentence is “cooperation and win-win.”

The first goal, “no conflict, no confrontation,” means

that China will prevent any potential conflicts or confrontations with

foreign countries. The second goal, “mutual respect,” means mutual respect

between states, and the last goal, “cooperation and win-win,” is the so-called win-win

cooperation. Although China has been pursuing win-win cooperation

with other states, under the second goal of “mutual respect,” China

maintained its assertive stance when the United States attempted to raise

objections regarding China’s internal affairs.

For example, Yang Jiechi, the Director of the Central Foreign

Affairs Commission General Office, remarked,

Most countries in the world do not accept American values as national values, and do not accept them.

that what the United States advocates is international law…” which means

that the “values of the United States are not necessarily equivalent to the

international values,” thus implying that China has a right to implement

its values. Yang Jiechi also added,

“The United States has its own style of democracy, and China has its own style of democracy.” (Xinhua News Agency

2021), meaning that the United States has its own style of democracy,

while China also has its own style of democracy. At the same time, Yang

Jiechi continuously emphasized that the PRC supports peaceful

development, “China adheres to the path of peaceful development,” which shows that the goal

of the New Type of Great Power Relations is not to provoke the ruling

power, the United States.

Until the size of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) becomes

similar to the United States by 2049, which is the year of the 100th

anniversary of the PRC’s establishment of New China, it is

anticipated that China will prevent a direct military confrontation with the

United States. However, no one can assure us that China and the United

States will never go to war within the next few decades. If the PRC

achieves the so-called “Xiaokang society” by 2049, it is

possible that Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” might become a

reality. It is true that there are multiple hurdles for China to become the

6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party

new “ruling power,” which is why further research on China’s New Type

of International Relations is necessary.

3. Analyses of How the Principles of “New Type of

International Relations” Shaped PRC’s Course of Actions

3.1 PRC’s Application of “New Type of International

Relations” for Cross-Strait Relations Since 2012

PRC’s so-called “core interests” are classified under three main

aspects: (i) fundamental system and state security; (ii) state sovereignty

and territorial integrity; and (iii) stable development of the economy and

society(Zhou 2019). Since the Taiwan Strait is claimed as a territory of the

PRC under the “One-China principle”, cross-strait relations

are classified as the PRC’s protection of its (i) fundamental system and

state security(Zhou 2019). Since the issues related to Taiwan are perceived

as a “national security” issue, the PRC has been maintaining its assertive

stance when a foreign country such as the United States attempted to

intervene in cross-strait relations. The 2021 U.S.-China summit in

Anchorage, Alaska between Antony Blinken, the U.S. Secretary of State

and Yang Jiechi, the Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission

General Office, is an appropriate example that shows the PRC’s

application of New Type of International Relations for cross-strait

relations.

Yang Jiechi remarked,

“The Chinese side advocates peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom as common values for all mankind. It advocates the UN-centered international system.”(Xinhua News Agency

2021), advocating the UN-centered international system.

2021), which means that China advocates peace, development, fairness,

democracy, and the common value of freedom for all mankind. Most

importantly, Yang Jiechi showed PRC’s assertive stance by clearly

stating, “Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang are all inalienable parts of China’s territory, and the Chinese side firmly opposes the U.S. interference in China’s internal affairs and will make due and resolute responses.”(Xinhua

resolute responses.”(Xinhua

News Agency 2021) that the issues regarding the Taiwan strait are internal

affairs, therefore the United States does not have a right to intervene in

China’s internal affairs.

In 2022, the Chinese Defense Minister, Wei Fenghe, remarked at

the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by the International Institute for Strategic

Studies, “If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will not hesitate to fight at all costs.”(Xinhua News Agency 2022), meaning that China will not

hesitate to go to war with any country that tries to separate Taiwan and

the PRC. As shown in Director Yang Jiechi and Minister Wei Fenghe’s

speeches, the PRC has maintained its assertive stance when it comes to

safeguarding its “core interests”. Even if China tries to avoid

any potential military conflicts with other states, the PRC publicly

6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party

announced that it would immediately take action if another state tried to

break the One-China principle. When it comes to analyzing cross-strait

issues, there might be a question of whether the principles of

Periphery Diplomacy of the New Era and the New Type of Great Power

Relations contradict each other. The Periphery Diplomacy of the New Era

emphasizes the protection of China’s national sovereignty, whereas the

New Type of Great Power Relations pursues peaceful relations with other

states. However, China will still exercise its rights to safeguard the One-

China principle under the circumstance that they do not provoke the

United States.

Another reason behind the PRC’s emphasis on keeping Taiwan

under their control is due to their third principle of “core interests,” (iii)

stable development of the economy and society(Zhou 2019). In Taiwan,

there is the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company(TSMC),

which is one of the world’s foremost semiconductor companies. Suppose

the PRC successfully keeps Taiwan under the CCP’s control. In that case,

China will be able to make the TSMC a state-owned enterprise, which

significantly contributes to China’s core interests. If China nationalizes

the TSMC, many countries worldwide will be more dependent on China

in terms of semiconductor technology. TSMC’s semiconductor business

is lucrative and helpful for the PRC’s technological advancement, thus

strengthening China’s soft power in the long term.

3.2 Innermost Intentions of President Xi Jinping’s

Implementation of “New Type of International Relations”:

The Achievement of the Chinese Dream

Despite the outward stance announced by the political leaders of China,

what are Xi Jinping’s innermost intentions for implementing the “New

Type of International Relations?” From a historical perspective, China

has been the hegemon for centuries, maintaining the so-called “Zongfan

relations(宗藩关系)” or the tributary system with its periphery states under

the traditional cultural concept of “all under heaven”(天下). However,

starting from the Treaty of Nanjing, where the Qing Dynasty dropped to

its knees to the Western powers, China’s pride in its status as a regional

hegemon utterly shattered into pieces. In order to restore the traditional

cultural concept of “all under heaven”(天下), Xi Jinping’s innermost

intention is to implement the principles of the “New Type of International

Relations” to enjoy its hegemonic status both regionally and

internationally. Hence, Xi Jinping’s goal to achieve the “Chinese Dream

of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese

people”(中(cid:23925)民族(cid:22854)大复兴的中国梦) is the restoration of “all under heaven”

because he desperately desires China’s glory in the past.

6. President Xi Jinping’s “New Type of International Relations” and its Implications for Cross- Strait Relations_Museum of the Chinese Communist Party

4. Conclusion

The question of whether President Xi Jinping’s principles of “New Type

of International Relations” are strategic miscalculations requires further

scrutiny. However, from a future-oriented view of international relations

in the Asia-Pacific region, it is likely that the PRC will successfully

become the regional hegemon, notwithstanding the United States’ effort

to maintain its “rules-based liberal international order.” One reason is that

the unipolarity system led by the United States since the fall of the Berlin

Wall in 1991 has been weakened. In terms of economic development,

China’s purchasing power parity(PPP) already surpassed the PPP of the

United States in 2013. Moreover, by 2049, under the condition that the

PRC maintains its 6% annual economic growth rate, China is expected to

succeed in achieving the so-called “Xiaokang society.” However, to

actualize Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the

Chinese people, several hurdles need to be overcome because China has

not proven itself its qualifications to become the so-called “responsible

stakeholder.” In order to become the global hegemon or the responsible

stakeholder, China must prove to the international community that

China’s “Community of a Shared Future for Mankind”(人类运命共同体) is

more beneficial than the values of liberal democracy.

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