The New Taiwan Strait Crisis: A Projection of U.S.-China-Japan Naval Power Balance in 2030 Sasebo Naval Self-Defense Force Museum

Kim Sa-jun · Korea University

Introduction

Key Question

Currently, in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States, Japan, China, and various other countries including India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are in a standoff. Of particular note is the rapidly narrowing naval power gap between the U.S. and China due to China's swift development. To counter China's rapid growth, countries adjacent to the Western Pacific, led by the U.S. and Japan, along with India and Australia, are formulating Indo-Pacific strategies and utilizing the Quad framework. Nevertheless, on March 29, 2021, U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Philip Davidson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, predicting that China might attempt to unify Taiwan by force around 2030 (Shelbourne and Mallory, 2021). Economically, China's economic power is projected to catch up to that of the U.S. around 2030 based on GDP. Amidst this situation, this study seeks to answer the following question: "By 2030, towards which side will the naval power balance tilt between China and the U.S.-Japan bloc around the Taiwan Strait?"

Review of Prior Research

Existing studies on Indo-Pacific naval power have primarily focused on comparing the power of the U.S. and China. The RAND Corporation (Heginbotham et al., 2015) projects the naval power levels of the U.S. and China within the timeframe of 2017, focusing on Taiwan and the South China Sea. While China lags significantly behind the U.S. in overall naval strength, it is assessed that China does not necessarily need to match U.S. naval power to gain regional superiority due to geographical factors such as the distance between the mainland and the conflict area. Specifically, in a conflict around Taiwan, China is assessed to already possess parity or a slight advantage over the U.S.

The American think tank, The Heritage Foundation (Wood, et. al., 2021), evaluates whether the U.S. Navy is at an adequate level to protect U.S. core national interests in 2021, based on three criteria: capacity, capability, and readiness. The study concludes that while the U.S. Navy is barely maintaining an adequate level to defend the homeland and secure relative superiority over adversaries, there are concerns about its gradual weakening. In contrast, China, an adversary to the U.S., is exhibiting significantly aggressive behavior, and its capabilities are assessed to have reached a formidable level.

A U.S. Congressional Research Service report (O' Rourke, 2021) summarizes the changes and developments in China's major naval weapon systems. It details major weapon systems such as aircraft carriers, anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and submarines, as well as the power of naval aviation and the development levels of various warships. Furthermore, it suggests that while comparing naval power solely by the number and tonnage of warships is an overly simplistic method, indirectly gauging changes in naval power is possible by dividing and comparing the numbers of warships and their types between the two countries.

The American think tank, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Yoshihara, 2020), points out the limitation of existing studies that do not consider other major actors in the Indo-Pacific region besides the U.S. and China. Among these actors, it compares the Japanese navy with the Chinese navy, explaining how the Chinese navy assesses Japanese naval power. The author anticipates that based on metrics such as the number of ships, tonnage, firepower, and personnel, the Chinese navy has already surpassed or will soon surpass the Japanese navy. Chinese academia exhibits considerable confidence, and the author predicts that this physical and psychological advantage will drive China to act more aggressively and proactively.

Another American think tank, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Swaine et al., 2013), also includes Japan as a major actor, not just comparing the U.S. and China. It takes the U.S., China, and Japan as research subjects, projecting their military strengths by reflecting indirect factors such as economic growth, defense spending, and public opinion. Furthermore, it presents six scenarios for the future relationship between the U.S., China, and Japan, generally projecting the U.S.-Japan alliance to maintain a lead in military power over China, but also acknowledging the possibility of scenarios where a balance of power emerges, leading to an unstable future.

This Study

Existing prior research has largely compared only the U.S. and Chinese navies, excluding Japan as a major actor, or has compared the total naval power of each country without considering spatial constraints. This study aims to overcome these limitations by setting the timeframe to 2030 and the location to Taiwan, incorporating the naval powers of the U.S., China, and Japan as major actors to provide a more specific and realistic projection.

The primary subjects of this study are the naval powers of the U.S., China, and Japan. These are the three countries with the strongest navies in the region and are also actors whose major interests are tied to the Indo-Pacific region and Taiwan. By studying the naval power levels of each country in 2030, this study aims to predict changes in the regional power distribution.

Naval power levels were compared based on quantitative data (capacity) and specific performance (capability) for the three countries. Quantitative data research compares ship numbers, tonnage, and firepower as indicators. The units of analysis for the study were set as the subordinate units of each country and their total naval power, totaling two categories. Specifically, the warships of China's Eastern Theater Command and Southern Theater Command navies (东海舰队, 南海舰队), the U.S. Pacific Fleet of the Indo-Pacific Command, and Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force units responsible for the Sasebo and Kure areas (佐世保, 呉) were compared. This approach was taken to capture changes in power distribution over time and space.

Given the limitations of relying solely on quantitative research, a study was also conducted comparing the key weapon systems of both blocs based on a scenario where China attempts to unify Taiwan and the U.S. and Japan attempt to prevent it. Building upon the U.S. RAND Corporation's 2015 report, this study aims to predict the advancements in the naval forces and major weapon systems of both blocs by 2030 compared to the present. The study selected key weapon systems expected to be used by China in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy and by the U.S. and Japan to thwart China's unification of Taiwan, assuming a Taiwan contingency occurs. Specifically, it will cover U.S. aircraft carriers, Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and submarines. Subsequently, it will synthesize these findings to project changes in the naval power balance. Additionally, it will mention other variables that could influence naval power, which were not covered previously, and conclude the discussion.

The significance of this study lies in its projection of the future of the hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China within a broader context. If a conflict erupts over Taiwan, regardless of the outcome, the international order will face a major turning point. This is also a critical issue for South Korea, which is militarily allied with the U.S. but heavily reliant on China economically. In the event of a contingency requiring support from both sides simultaneously, South Korea must consider to whom and to what extent it will provide military and non-military assistance. Furthermore, in establishing relations with Japan and the alliance Japan seeks to lead against China, the projection of U.S.-China hegemonic competition is an unavoidable consideration.

Capacity: Ship Count, Tonnage, Firepower

There are various methods for measuring a nation's naval power. Broadly, these can be divided into two categories: comparison based on quantitative data (capacity) and comparison of the performance of their ships and weapon systems (capability). This study will first compare the naval powers of the U.S., China, and Japan based on quantifiable data, and then compare the performance of the major ships and weapon systems of each navy.

Representative quantitative metrics for comparing naval power include ship count, tonnage, and firepower (Yoshihara, 2020). Ship count is the simplest criterion used for comparing naval power and is employed to assess the size of a navy. However, the results can be distorted depending on which types of vessels are included. The U.S. Congressional Research Service report (O' Rourke, 2021) also points out the problems arising from comparing the sizes of the U.S. and Chinese navies using different criteria. Based on this awareness, this study compares each country using a unified standard. Referring to data on the naval sizes of the U.S., China, and Japan (O' Rourke, 2021; Pape, 2019; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021; Ministere armées, 2020; National Institute for South China Sea Studies, 2020; U. S. Navy, 2020), aircraft carriers, submarines, large surface combatants, small surface combatants, and amphibious warfare forces were used as comparison criteria. Excluded vessels include logistics support ships, coast guard vessels, and patrol boats.

However, comparing naval power solely by ship count can lead to distorted results, as the size, armor thickness, performance, and crew capacity of the same type of ship can vary significantly. To account for these differences, this study additionally compares tonnage and firepower. Tonnage is based on full load displacement tonnage, and where this data was unavailable, standard displacement tonnage was used as a fallback. Total tonnage was rounded to the nearest hundred, and average tonnage was rounded to the nearest unit. Firepower is a measure to assess the lethality of a vessel. In this study, the 'firepower index' is defined as 'the number of vertical launcher system cells + the number of missile launchers + the number of torpedo launchers.' A higher firepower index indicates greater destructive power.

Naval Power Levels of Subordinate Naval Units of the U.S., China, and Japan

To assess the naval balance around the Taiwan Strait, a comparison of the naval power of subordinate units operating in the vicinity of Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea is conducted first. In the case of the Chinese navy, the Eastern Theater Command (东海舰队) is responsible for the area around Taiwan, and the Southern Theater Command (南海舰队) is responsible for the South China Sea, but they operate jointly in the event of a Taiwan contingency. In the U.S., the U.S. Pacific Fleet of the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM U. S. Pacific Fleet) operates in the Indo-Pacific, and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces include naval units in the Sasebo and Kure (佐世保, 呉) areas.

In 2030, the Chinese Eastern and Southern Theater Command navies will have 238 ships, a total tonnage of approximately 1,657,000 tons, an average tonnage of about 6,960 tons, and a firepower index of 5,468. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command will have 148 ships, a total tonnage of 2,125,000 tons, an average tonnage of about 14,360 tons, and a firepower index of 7,239. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force units in Sasebo and Kure will have 42 ships, a total tonnage of approximately 299,350 tons, an average tonnage of about 7,130 tons, and a firepower index of 1,405. Combining the U.S. and Japanese navies results in a total of 190 ships, approximately 2,424,350 tons, an average tonnage of about 12,810 tons, and a firepower index of 8,578.

Ship Count Total Tonnage Average Tonnage

Country Firepower Index

(Ships) (t) (t) China

238 1,657,000 6,960 5,408 (Eastern/Southern Theater)

United States

148 2,125,000 14,360 7,239 (Indo-Pacific)

Japan

42 299,350 7,130 1,405

(Sasebo/Kure)

U.S.-Japan 190 2,424,350 12,760 8,644

U.S.-Japan/China 0.8 1.46 1.83 1.6 Table 1. Naval Power Levels of Subordinate Naval Units of the U.S., China, and Japan Total Naval Power Levels of the U.S., China, and Japan

Although this study limits its scope to the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, it also calculates and compares the total naval power of the three countries, considering the possibility of a full-scale conflict between the U.S., China, and Japan. In 2030, the Chinese navy will possess 310 ships, with a total tonnage of approximately 2,036,000 tons, an average tonnage of about 6,570 tons, and a firepower index of 7,824. The U.S. Navy will have 259 ships, a total tonnage of approximately 3,826,000 tons, an average tonnage of about 14,770 tons, and a firepower index of 13,342. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force will have 89 ships, a total tonnage of approximately 542,000 tons, an average tonnage of about 6,100 tons, and a firepower index of 2,752. Combining the U.S. and Japanese navies results in a total of 348 ships, approximately 4,368,000 tons, an average tonnage of about 12,550 tons, and a firepower index of 16,094.

Ship Count Total Tonnage Average Tonnage

Country Firepower Index

(Ships) (t) (t)

China

310 2,036,000 6,570 7,824 (Eastern/Southern Theater)

United States

259 3,826,000 14,770 13,342 (Indo-Pacific)

Japan

89 542,000 6,100 2,752

(Sasebo/Kure)

U.S.-Japan 348 4,368,000 12,550 16,094

U.S.-Japan/China 1.12 2.15 1.91 2.06 Table 2. Total Naval Power Levels of the U.S., China, and Japan

In terms of total naval power, China is weaker than the U.S.-Japan alliance. The U.S. and Japan have approximately double the total tonnage, average tonnage, and firepower index compared to China, and also lead in ship count. However, when comparing the three navies around Taiwan, the gap narrows, with China leading in ship count and the other metrics showing a gap of about 1.5 times. This means the U.S. and Japan hold a slight advantage over China in the Taiwan region. If China's coast guard and patrol vessels, which were not included in the comparison to standardize ship types, were added, the gap would narrow further.

When other variables are considered, the gap between the U.S.-Japan and China around Taiwan becomes even narrower. It is generally said that an attacking force needs to be at least three times larger than the defending force to have a reasonable chance of success. This rule, known as the "3:1 rule," applies to land forces and has several assumptions. It is applied when the defending force is prepared and the terrain is relatively enclosed, making defense easier. However, if the unit of analysis is expanded to a theater or larger, or if the assumptions are changed, the ratio shifts. Depending on the openness of the terrain, the mobility of the attacking force, and the deployment of the defending force, the attacker-to-defender ratio can be as low as '1.5:1' or even '0.8:1' before both forces deplete at the same rate (Davis, 1995). The maritime environment is more open than land. Therefore, even if China is numerically inferior, it can inflict significant damage on the U.S. and Japan.

Furthermore, Taiwan is located directly in front of China and Japan, but far from the U.S. mainland. Consequently, only a portion of the entire U.S. Navy is deployed forward in rotation. As the number of U.S. Navy ships gradually decreases, approximately three-quarters of its total fleet is currently deployed worldwide, with the remainder returning to the mainland. The transit time from the U.S. West Coast to Taiwan takes more than ten days (Callender, 2018). Therefore, the forces that China directly confronts in Taiwan are only the Pacific Fleet of the entire U.S. Navy, specifically those deployed forward, and a portion of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.

Capability: Major Weapon Systems

As mentioned earlier when discussing ship counts, it is not possible to accurately compare national naval power based solely on quantitative data. While larger tonnage generally indicates superior ship performance, the U.S. is currently considering a more-distributed fleet architecture, aiming to increase the number of relatively smaller tonnage ships (O’ Rourke, 2020). This is due to China's major weapon systems. With the new architecture, increasing the number of small surface combatants will inevitably lead to a decrease in total and average tonnage. The U.S. Navy is reducing tonnage to enhance its capability against China, which can lead to misunderstandings that its naval power is weakening based on superficial figures. Firepower is similar; while all weapon systems are treated with a value of '1' and counted, in reality, their destructive power, range, and accuracy differ, leading to discrepancies with actual ship firepower.

To overcome these limitations, this study addresses the capability of each navy. In actual warfare, numerous variables such as operations, tactics, strategies, troop training levels, combat experience, logistical support, morale, and weather influence victory or defeat. Some of these variables are beyond human control, while others are too numerous to quantify accurately. Considering this, the study compares naval power between the two blocs by focusing on the 'major weapon systems' that would be critical in the event of a Taiwan contingency in 2030, when a conflict erupts between the U.S., China, and Japan.

China has consistently shown a sensitive reaction regarding Taiwan. While it has pledged to pursue peaceful reunification with Taiwan, it has also expressed its consideration of using force in certain scenarios, such as 'Taiwan's official declaration of independence' (U. S. DoD, 2021). In its current foreign policy, the New Type of Great Power Relations, it has consistently emphasized that Taiwan is a core interest of China. As stated in recent U.S.-China summit meetings, in accordance with the New Type of Great Power Relations, China does not wish to clash with the U.S., but it has made it clear that it will respond proactively according to the New Type of Neighboring Country Relations if the U.S. encroaches upon its core interests (Ha Young-sun, Moon Yong-il, 2021). China has various options for unifying Taiwan, including air-naval blockade, show of force, coercion through limited use of force (compliance), or conquest through amphibious landing. Given the significant gap in military power, its capability to achieve this is sufficient (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021).

China is hesitant to act rashly due to the U.S.'s unofficial alliance with Taiwan. Therefore, to deter, impede, or defeat the intervention of third countries, including the U.S., in the future military unification of Taiwan, China has established an A2/AD strategy and developed related weapon systems (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021). The greatest threat to China from the U.S.-Japan alliance is aircraft carriers, and in response, China has developed ASBMs/ASCMs. Submarines are crucial assets for both China and the U.S.-Japan. For China, they are necessary to block the approach of enemy ships, including U.S. aircraft carriers, while for the U.S. and Japan, they are key means to attack Chinese ships and landing craft, thereby deterring the military unification of Taiwan. Therefore, this study selected 'aircraft carriers,' 'ASBMs/ASCMs,' and 'submarines' as the major weapon systems and analyzed the capabilities of each country in these areas.

In 2015, the RAND Corporation published a report on the major weapon systems capabilities of the U.S. and China in Taiwan and the South China Sea. Building upon the RAND Corporation's analysis, this study projects the changes in the major weapon systems of the U.S. and Japan surrounding the Taiwan region by 2030 compared to that time, and by adding Japan as a key actor, it forecasts which bloc the naval power balance will tilt towards (Heginbotham et al., 2015).

Aircraft carrier

The aircraft carrier is one of the most effective weapon systems for projecting power beyond national borders and is a core asset in modern warfare. The United States projects its military power globally through its carrier strike groups, which consist of aircraft carriers, their escort destroyers, cruisers, and submarines. The aircraft carrier deployed in the Western Pacific is the U.S. Navy asset that China most closely monitors, and a primary objective of China's major weapon systems, which will be introduced later, is to counter U.S. aircraft carriers.

In 2015, the U.S. Navy only had Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, but by 2030, it will have Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers in addition to the Nimitz class. The Ford class is a new type of aircraft carrier that is scheduled to replace the Nimitz class. Both aircraft carriers are nuclear-powered, with the Ford-class being slightly larger. The most significant difference between the two is the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) installed on the Ford-class carriers, which allows for a larger number of aircraft in the carrier air wing compared to the older launch system. While Nimitz-class carriers can carry over 60 aircraft, Ford-class carriers can accommodate more than 75 aircraft (U. S. Navy, 2021). This increased capacity enhances power projection capabilities and improves the overall effectiveness of the strike group, including enhanced reconnaissance and anti-submarine detection capabilities.

Furthermore, the United States is developing technologies to defend aircraft carriers from enemy attacks. One notable advancement is improved radar performance, with the U.S. Navy equipping Ford-class carriers with dual-band radar. This system integrates the six radars found on older Nimitz-class carriers into a single unit, reducing personnel requirements, increasing aircraft storage capacity, and minimizing the radar cross-section to reduce the risk of detection by the enemy (Thompson, 2020). Future Ford-class carriers, such as the John F. Kennedy, and existing Nimitz-class carriers will be equipped with the AN/SPY-6 air and missile defense radar. This radar is 30 times more sensitive than the SPY-1 radar used on Aegis destroyers. Its detection range is also twice that of the SPY-1, exceeding 740 km, and it is capable of detecting objects half the size (Raytheon Missiles & Defense, 2021). This surpasses the detection ranges of the AN/SPS-48 radar (over 320 km) and the AN/SPS-49 radar (over 480 km) currently installed on older carriers (U. S. General Accounting Office, 2000). 7. [New] Taiwan Strait Crisis: Prospects for U.S.-China-Japan Naval Balance in 2030_ Sasebo Naval Base Museum

Chinese and Japanese aircraft carriers are not covered in this study. China possesses the Liaoning, a modified Russian aircraft carrier, and the Shandong, its first domestically produced aircraft carrier. It is expected that China will continue to develop and deploy more advanced domestically produced aircraft carriers. However, Taiwan, the region of interest in this study, is located very close to mainland China, allowing for direct fighter jet sorties from the mainland in case of a military conflict with the U.S. and Japan, rendering the role of aircraft carriers minimal (O' Rourke, 2021). Japan currently has no aircraft carriers, only Izumo-class helicopter destroyers and Hyuga-class helicopter destroyers. While there are recent attempts to modify the Izumo-class helicopter destroyers, aircraft carriers are fundamentally perceived as offensive weapons capable of projecting power abroad. Therefore, under its pacifist constitution, Japan, which can only operate the Self-Defense Forces and not a regular military, has not developed or deployed aircraft carriers. With the growing threat from China, public opinion is shifting, and there is a possibility that Japan may amend its constitution or laws to begin developing aircraft carriers. However, even assuming the legal basis and resources are secured, the development and production of aircraft carriers take a long time. Consequently, Japan's aircraft carrier capabilities are not expected to significantly alter the maritime balance in 2030, leading to their exclusion from this discussion.

Anti-ship Ballistic Missiles, Anti-ship Cruise Missiles China has formulated an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy to counter U.S. aircraft carriers and other warships. In this context, the most notable weapon systems are China's anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Both missiles are considered game-changing weapons due to their long range and accuracy, attracting significant attention (O' Rourke, 2021).

The DF-21D, the first ASBM developed, is a modified version of the DF-21 with a range of 1,450-1,550 km. It is equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) capable of automatically tracking moving targets. With a circular error probability (CEP) of approximately 20 meters, it is a relatively accurate missile, sometimes referred to as a "carrier-killer" (Dahlgren, Masao, and Missile Defense Project, 2021).

While RAND initially focused only on the DF-21D, China has continuously researched ASBMs and has since developed and deployed the DF-26 and DF-17. The DF-26 is a multi-purpose missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, but its accuracy is a drawback, with a CEP of 150-450 meters, which is less precise than the DF-21D. However, it is a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 4,000 km, more than two to three times that of the DF-21D. It can reach U.S. bases in Guam from mainland China, earning it the nickname "Guam-killer" (Dahlgren and Masao, 2021). The deployment of the DF-26D allows China to threaten enemy navies beyond the first island chain and into the second island chain. Furthermore, China successfully hit moving ships at sea with the DF-21D and DF-26b in 2020, demonstrating improved accuracy. The U.S. Navy has no experience engaging adversaries with ballistic missiles accurate enough to hit moving ships, making China's ASBMs a significant threat to the United States (O' Rourke, 2021).

The DF-17 missile is a newly deployed system with a range of 1800-2500 km, classifying it as a quasi-medium-range ballistic missile. Its primary feature is the integration of a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), enabling it to fly at speeds between Mach 5 and Mach 10 (Shaikh et al., 2021). The advantage of hypersonic missiles lies in their difficulty to intercept. Hypersonic glide vehicles travel at such high speeds that current systems struggle to detect them. They also fly at low altitudes, allowing for detection only when they are close to the target. Moreover, they can maneuver during flight. Missile defense systems require time to detect incoming missiles and complete target processing; hypersonic missiles reduce this response window, making interception challenging. The United States has acknowledged that it is currently difficult to defend against China's hypersonic missiles (Sayler, 2019). Some experts suggest that the U.S. may not have defensive capabilities against hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s at the earliest (U. S. DoD, 2020). However, as both hypersonic weapon systems and their countermeasures are still in the development phase, predicting specific outcomes remains difficult. China has also invested in and developed ASCMs alongside ASBMs. ASCMs can be launched from various platforms, including fighter jets, bombers, destroyers, frigates, and submarines, and come in diverse types. Table 3 below summarizes the characteristics of previously deployed and recently developed ASCMs (Gormely et al., 2014; Heginbotham et al., 2015; Pape, 2019; Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2016).

* China's recently developed ASCMs

Range Speed Warhead Weight

Type Launch Platform

(km) (Mach) (kg) YJ-62,

Luyang II Destroyer 280 0.8 210 YJ-62a

YJ-82 Han, Yuan, Shang Submarine 40 0.9 165

Luda, Luhu, Luhai,

YJ-83,

Luyang I, Luzhou Destroyer,

YJ- 120-250 0.9 165

Jiangkai I/II Frigate,

83A/J

Jiangdao Corvette YJ-91 - 50 2.5 87-90 YJ-12* - 400 3 500 7. New Taiwan Strait Crisis: 2030 US-China-Japan Naval Balance Outlook_ Sasebo Naval Base Museum

Luyang Destroyer, Renhai

YJ-18*,

Cruiser, Song, Yuan, 540 3 300 YJ-18a*

Shang, Tang Submarine

Table 3. China's Major ASCMs

A notable aspect of recently developed ASCMs is the significant improvement in range, speed, and warhead payload. Longer range allows for striking targets while remaining outside the threat envelope, and a larger warhead can penetrate enemy ship armor for greater damage. The speed is noteworthy, as it is supersonic. When a missile flies at supersonic speeds, the US-Japan Aegis system has less time to react from detection to interception, making defense difficult. Furthermore, the YJ-12 can evade enemy defense systems by flying in corkscrew-like turns (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2016).

The US and Japanese navies are evaluated as being behind China's ASCMs. The Japanese navy currently uses Mitsubishi Type 90 SSM-1B and the US's Harpoon. The SSM-1B has a warhead weight of 260kg and a range of 200km (Naval Technology, 2011). The US Navy also uses the Harpoon, which flies at Mach 0.9 with a warhead weight of 227kg (Pape, 2019) and a range of approximately 130km (U. S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021). The US also uses the Raytheon-Kongsberg NSM (U. S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021), which can fly up to Mach 0.95, has a range of approximately 185km, and a warhead weight of approximately 227kg (Raytheon Missiles & Defense, 2021; Kongsberg, n.d.). It is currently considering using the Block V Tomahawk, a land-attack missile, which has a longer range than China's YJ-18, but there is no information on its ability to hit moving targets at sea or its related performance (U. S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021).

Submarines

Submarines are critical weapon systems for China, the US, and Japan. For China, submarines, along with ASBMs/ASCMs, are key assets in its A2/AD strategy. They can block enemy warships, particularly US aircraft carriers, from approaching the surrounding waters during a naval conflict. China has equipped its submarines with ASCMs to enhance destructive power and expand the area of denial. Conversely, the US and Japan can deter China from attempting a forceful unification with Taiwan by using submarines to interdict a potential amphibious assault. Furthermore, both US and Chinese submarines can carry SLBMs, enabling them to strike each other's homelands with nuclear weapons.

The most crucial factor for submarines, which can weaken an adversary's forces and determine the outcome of naval battles, is stealth capability (Heginbotham et al., 2015). The winner of underwater combat is determined by which submarine can strike first while evading enemy detection, and which can detect the enemy's submarine first. The factor determining stealth and detection is the submarine's acoustic performance. The quieter a submarine is while moving, the harder it is to find, and the easier it is to locate enemy submarines.

By 2030, China's submarine capabilities are expected to still not match those of the US and Japan. The US's representative submarines include the SSN-21 Seawolf-class, SSN-774 Virginia-class, and SSN-688i Los Angeles-class. China's representative submarines are the Jin-class (Type 094), Type 095, Shang-class (Type 093/A/B), Yuan-class (Type 039A/B/C), and Kilo 636. Japan possesses the Soryu-class and Taigei-class submarines. Table 4 presents a comparison of the noise levels of US and Chinese submarines.

Name / Country Decibels (dB)

Ocean Background Noise 90

SSN-774 Virginia-class / USA 95

SSN-21 Seawolf-class / USA 95

Kilo 636 / China 105

SSN-688i Los Angeles-class / USA 105-110

Yuan SS (Type 039) / China ?

SSGN (Type 095) / China 110 SSN Shang-class (Type 093) / China 110

SSBN Jin-class (Type 094) / China 120 Table 4. Noise Levels of US and Chinese Submarines

As can be seen in Table 4 (Collins, 2008; Lee, 2017), Chinese submarines generally produce more noise than US submarines. China's recently developed Type 095 SSGN nuclear submarine has a similar noise level to the US Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine, which was developed decades ago, and the diesel-powered Yuan is even louder. Although the overall noise level is expected to decrease by 2030 with the modernization of the Ming (Type 035) diesel-electric submarines and the deployment of new Type 095 submarines, replacing the older fleet as reported by RAND Corporation in 2015, it will still fall short of US standards.

Official noise level data for Japanese submarines, such as the Soryu-class and Taigei-class, are not publicly available, making it difficult to ascertain their precise noise levels. However, like the Chinese Yuan, which is also diesel-powered, the Soryu-class submarines utilize Air Independent Propulsion (AIP). More recently, new Soryu-class submarines equipped with lithium-ion batteries instead of AIP, and the new Taigei-class submarines are under construction (Roblin, 2020). Lithium-ion batteries offer shorter charging times, higher power output, and longer lifespans compared to conventional batteries. Both technologies enhance a submarine's stealth capabilities by extending its submerged endurance. While precise noise levels are influenced by various factors beyond the technologies mentioned, it can be stated that Japan's Soryu and Taigei are comparable to or slightly surpass China's Yuan in terms of stealth (Larson, 2021).

Distribution of Naval Power Among the US, China, and Japan

China vs. US/Japan

Based on the preceding analysis, this section projects the balance of naval power between China and the US/Japan in 2030. In terms of capacity, the US/Japan holds an advantage over China in terms of the number of vessels, total tonnage, average tonnage, and firepower index. When comparing regional naval forces, the US/Japan leads in total tonnage, average tonnage, and firepower index, while China leads in the number of vessels. However, it is important to consider the "3:1 rule," which states that not all of the US Pacific Fleet is stationed in the Indo-Pacific; some units are deployed elsewhere, and approximately one-quarter of the entire naval fleet undergoes maintenance and rest in home ports. To ensure a consistent comparison between the US, China, and Japan, we must also account for the fact that over 85 vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard, equipped with ASCMs, were not included in the 2030 Chinese naval projections in the quantitative analysis (O'Rourke, 2021).

Regarding the evolution of key weapon systems, while US aircraft carriers continue to advance, China is also developing and deploying ASBMs and ASCMs, surpassing the technological capabilities of the US and Japan in this area. In terms of submarines, although China's submarine technology has been rapidly advancing since 2015 and is expected to improve significantly by 2030, it is anticipated to be comparable to Japan's submarine level and still lag behind the US.

Considering all the above, China's naval power is expected to be very close to that of the US and Japan by 2030, sufficiently capable of effectively executing A2/AD strategies in Taiwan and its surrounding waters.

Further Discussion

Several variables, not covered in this study, warrant consideration when evaluating the naval power of the US, China, and Japan. Firstly, there is the issue of budget. The projected size of the US Navy is based on the goal set by the US Department of Defense's Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment (INFSA) of a 355-ship goal (O'Rourke, 2021). The US aims to possess more than 355 ships, but is facing budgetary challenges (O'Rourke, 2020). If the US Navy cannot secure additional funds or cut costs elsewhere, its naval power may be weaker than projected in this study.

Another challenge relates to actual operational execution. For China, the key issues are joint operations among the army, navy, and air force, and a lack of combat experience. To utilize major weapon systems like ASBMs, information gathering on enemy movements and a C4ISR system to process that information are crucial. It remains uncertain how effectively communication will occur among the different military branches, and it is unknown how well personnel with no actual combat experience will perform in real battles (Sweeny, 2020). For the US and Japan, interoperability is a concern. Unlike China, the US and Japanese navies must operate in coordination with forces from other countries. To compensate for this, the US and Japan continuously conduct joint exercises, but it is uncertain whether they will perform as expected in actual combat.

Furthermore, the US is currently devising new fleet architectures to counter China's major weapon systems. The so-called "more-distributed fleet architecture" involves reducing the overall size of vessels, as briefly mentioned earlier. Currently, the ratio of large surface combatants to small surface combatants in the US fleet is 2:1, and the aim is to change this to 1:2 (O'Rourke, 2020). Instead, various roles currently performed by large surface combatants will be distributed among unmanned surface vessels and unmanned aerial vehicles. Additionally, consideration is being given to carrier designs that are smaller and do not use nuclear fuel, compared to current large nuclear-powered carriers. Through this, the US aims to mitigate the threat posed by Chinese ASBMs and ASCMs, reduce production costs, and alleviate budgetary burdens. Finally, the concepts of Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) and Integrated Deterrence are crucial to watch in the US-China-Japan confrontation. Both are central to the future warfare envisioned by the US Department of Defense. JWC focuses on expanding the battlefield to cyber and space domains and overwhelming the enemy across all domains by utilizing artificial intelligence and other machines, thereby achieving deterrence by denial (A Warfighting Concept for Great Power Competition, 2020; Work, 2020). The US anticipates that future warfare will extend beyond land, sea, and air to include space and cyber domains. In this context, the US objective is not merely to excel in each individual domain but to collect and synthesize information from multiple domains for rapid and accurate decision-making. To process vast amounts of information, a collaborative human-machine system incorporating cutting-edge technologies, including artificial intelligence, is under consideration. The goal is to deter the enemy from using weapons that pose a threat to US forces, such as submarines and ASBMs/ASCMs. China and Japan are also preparing for cyber and space warfare in line with the future warfare environment (Ministry of Defense Japan, 2021; The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019). Integrated Deterrence focuses on enhancing the overall deterrence capability of the United States. It aims to prevent attacks by expanding the scope of deterrence targets, methods, and spaces, and integrating them into a single concept, rather than merely increasing military power. A key aspect of this is expanding exchanges and interoperability among allies. In the Indo-Pacific, the US intends to prevent China's fait accompli strategy by expanding participation in anti-China coalitions such as the Quad and AUKUS, and enhancing interoperability among allies through various joint exercises.

Conclusion

This study projected which side, China or the US/Japan, would have naval superiority in the Taiwan region in 2030. The assessment was based on two main criteria: capacity, related to naval size, and capability, related to the performance of key weapon systems. In terms of capacity, while China's overall naval power and the naval forces of its regional units around Taiwan are still inferior to those of the US/Japan, the gap is not substantial. Considering the rotational deployment of the US Navy and the inclusion of China's coast guard, the gap narrows further. In terms of capability, US aircraft carriers have continuously evolved, but China has also developed ASBMs and ASCMs to counter them, thus leading in this area. For submarines, China's submarines are expected to continue developing but will likely not catch up to the level of the US and Japan. Therefore, in the event of an accidental clash concerning Taiwan in 2030, the US/Japan naval forces will hold a slight advantage, but China's naval power will be very close, sufficiently capable of executing A2/AD strategies. References Ha Young-sun, Moon Yong-il. 2021. "Decoding the US-China Summit: US 'Competition' vs.

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