Li Hongzhang Confronts the "Sea and Mountain Mist" - Shimonoseki Treaty Museum Commemorating the Sino-Japanese War

Han Iim · Sungkyunkwan University

Introduction

Li Hongzhang as a "Han奸"

Li Hongzhang was a Qing Dynasty official in the late 19th century. In the context of the Sino-Japanese War, a singular event, he fought against Japan over Korea and was dispatched to the peace negotiations, ultimately signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki. He was a military leader and diplomat of China. Regarding his status as a military leader, Liang Qichao commented that Li Hongzhang's authority had diminished following the decisive defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. This assessment is considered well-founded given the outcome of the Qing Dynasty's defeat in the war (Liang Qichao 2013, 189). Meanwhile, his position as a diplomat is a subject of much debate among later generations. After his death, the general perception of him in China was strongly negative, characterized by the term "Han奸." Han奸 (Han奸) refers to a Han Chinese person who colluded with the Manchus during the Qing Dynasty, and by extension, a traitor who colludes with the enemy. Li Hongzhang was posthumously burdened with the disreputable label of traitor. The content of the "humiliating" Treaty of Shimonoseki, which he signed as a Qing official, including territorial cessions and indemnity issues, cannot be excluded from these evaluations.

His disreputable title of "Han奸" was partially offset as China underwent reform and opening up, leading to a re-evaluation of Li Hongzhang's Self-Strengthening Movement spirit, portraying him as a patriot who sought to enrich the country and strengthen its military through modernization. (Shin Dong-joon 2017, 350) However, despite this re-evaluation, questions remain as to whether his diplomatic standing can be restored, even within the single event of the Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Liang Qichao fiercely criticizes Li Hongzhang's diplomatic blunders but also assesses the era of Li Hongzhang as a period when China began to engage with the world and faced its most challenging diplomatic period. Specifically regarding the Sino-Japanese War, he stated that Japan fought against Li Hongzhang, not China (Liang Qichao 2013, 185-189). To analyze Li Hongzhang's negotiation process and strategy as the plenipotentiary representative for the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the verbal discussions documenting the treaty's conclusion and the words and actions of the Japanese representatives, Ito Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu, who confronted Li Hongzhang, will be crucial. However, before examining whether Li Hongzhang had any discretion or diplomatic strategy regarding the treaty's terms, it is necessary to determine whether the Sino-Japanese relationship at the time of the signing was hierarchical, horizontal, or relatively characterized. In other words, if the Qing Dynasty was objectively in a position of national inferiority to Japan at the time, Li Hongzhang would not have had much room for maneuver, making aggressive diplomatic strategies unlikely. In such a case, he would likely have adopted a defensive diplomatic strategy. Therefore, the following analysis will examine the wartime situation immediately preceding the Shimonoseki peace talks and the process leading up to the conference to determine which nation was more desperate for a ceasefire, thus placing it in a position of national disadvantage.

Background of the Treaty of Shimonoseki

The Qing Dynasty was defeated in all battles fought in Korea, including the Battle of Pyongyang, the Battle of Seonghwan, and the Battle of the Yellow Sea, as well as battles on the Qing mainland such as the Battle of Lushun and the Battle of Weihaiwei. The continuous defeats in the Sino-Japanese War prompted the Qing Dynasty to request a peace settlement from Japan, which, after the Hiroshima Conference, led to the signing of the treaty in Shimonoseki.

The process of concluding the Treaty of Shimonoseki can be broadly divided into negotiations for an armistice agreement and a peace treaty. Although the Treaty of Shimonoseki was not intended to assign responsibility after the war's outcome was decided, the disparity in influence over the treaty at the time of its conclusion was extreme, given that Japan, on the verge of victory in the Sino-Japanese War, agreed to the Qing Dynasty's request for a ceasefire. Furthermore, the fact that the Qing Dynasty offered to pay reparations simultaneously with proposing a ceasefire indicates that the Qing Dynasty was more desperate for the treaty's conclusion, thus inferring that the Qing Dynasty was in a position of national disadvantage.

Conflict, Strategy, and Collision

The Lingering Animosity Between Qing and Japan

As its name suggests, the Sino-Japanese War was a conflict between the Qing Dynasty and Japan. However, its essence lay in a dispute over influence in the Korean Peninsula. The Qing Dynasty, which considered Korea its tributary state, sought to preserve its traditional position against Western imperialist powers and Japan. Modernized Japan, turning its attention to the Korean Peninsula, aimed to share the influence that the Qing Dynasty held over Korea.

The conflict between the traditional hegemonic power, Qing China, and the rising power, Japan, continuously triggered disputes over the Korean Peninsula. Qing China, which gained an advantage through its active intervention in the Imo Incident of 1882, subsequently sought to exclude Japanese interference by actively assisting Joseon and Western powers in establishing diplomatic relations. Meanwhile, the Gapsin Coup of 1884 served as an opportunity for Qing China to reaffirm Japan's ambitions. Subsequently, both countries, due to the political turmoil following the Gapsin Coup, withdrew their dispatched troops and concluded the Treaty of Tianjin, which stipulated mutual notification in case of dispatching troops to the Korean Peninsula, thereby guarding against unilateral military action on the peninsula. When the Donghak Peasant Revolution broke out in Joseon in 1894, Joseon requested assistance from Qing China to suppress it. However, upon the dispatch of Qing troops, Japan, citing the Treaty of Tianjin, also dispatched its own forces, leading to another standoff between China and Japan on the Korean Peninsula. Subsequently, Japanese troops remained even after the suppression of the Donghak Peasant Revolution, abrogated the trade agreement between Joseon and Qing China, and revealed their ambitions towards Joseon. This situation led to an armed confrontation between the two countries, which soon escalated into the First Sino-Japanese War.

Strategic Thinking of Qing and Japan

Given its position of national disadvantage, the Qing Dynasty had a limited range of actions. The prolonged standoff over Korea would have resulted in the Qing Dynasty abandoning its sphere of influence in Korea on the eve of its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. Furthermore, as the Sino-Japanese War ostensibly originated from an internal conflict in Korea, the Qing Dynasty would have considered resolving the issue of Korea's status as an independent nation as the most fundamental and 'self-resolving' approach. Therefore, from a strategic perspective, the Qing Dynasty would have prioritized negotiating the indemnity issue, which had room for compromise, and reducing its amount, while setting aside the issue of territorial cession, which was less negotiable. In the case of territorial cession, the strategy would have been to refuse cession, and if refused, to negotiate the duration or region of cession.

Prior to the Qing Dynasty's proposal for peace talks, on November 6, 1894 (Meiji 27), the U.S. Minister to Tokyo, Dun, conveyed the U.S. government's willingness to mediate amicably between the two nations. This stance can be seen as an expression of America's concern over the unstable geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia. However, at that time, the Western powers that Japan needed to be wary of were not limited to the United States. For Japan, successfully concluding negotiations with the Qing Dynasty meant preventing third-party negotiations both before and after the talks (Mutsu Munemitsu 2020, 235).

Japan's continuous victories in the Sino-Japanese War stimulated domestic public opinion, and within Japan, the argument of the hardliners prevailed, advocating that the advance should not stop until the Qing Dynasty surrendered and sued for peace. In this context, when the Qing Dynasty proposed peace talks, Prime Minister Ito and Viscount Mutsu adopted a strategy of concealing their demands until the Qing Dynasty genuinely desired peace, limiting all developments to Sino-Japanese bilateral issues and leaving no room for third-party negotiations beforehand. However, when the Hiroshima talks broke down due to the Qing envoy's lack of proper credentials, Western powers began to suspect Japan's ambitions, questioning whether Japan had refused the talks on this pretext. As their attention intensified, Japan's policy of leaving no room for interference from third parties became precarious. Ito and Mutsu, believing it necessary to improve their image in light of international opinion, ultimately proceeded with the Shimonoseki peace talks for these reasons. (Mutsu Munemitsu 2020, 246)

At a point where interference became inevitable (Fujimura Michio 1997, 208), consideration of international opinion became a decisive factor in concluding the armistice agreement. Qing and Japan clashed fiercely over the terms of the armistice, and following the shooting incident involving Li Hongzhang, Japan ultimately accepted an armistice agreement that did not include favorable terms for either the Qing Dynasty or Japan.

It is said that after the shooting incident, Li Hongzhang instinctively felt that the blood he shed was for his country. And his intuition proved accurate. In Mutsu Munemitsu's "Kenkkenroku," the shooting incident involving Li Hongzhang is described as follows: "It was possible that our words and actions would be perceived as insincere by the public, leading to suspicion of our moderate stance, as we were excessively focused on outwardly exaggerating the incident." (Mutsu Munemitsu 2020, 260) In other words, Mutsu was primarily concerned about the unstable attitude of Western powers that would arise from the shooting incident. He saw the unconditional acceptance of the ceasefire, which Li Hongzhang earnestly requested, as the only practical way for Japan to appease international opinion and thus decided to conclude the armistice agreement.

Points of Contention at the Time of Treaty Conclusion

The most frequently mentioned and debated issues in the verbal discussions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the exchange of documents between Li Hongzhang, Mutsu Munemitsu, and Prime Minister Ito were Article 2 (Indemnity) and Article 4 (Territorial Cession) of the treaty. Regarding the former, Li Hongzhang argued that the amount was unmanageable given the Qing Dynasty's current economic situation. Regarding the latter, he argued that it was an excessive condition for the Qing Dynasty to bear, even with the payment of indemnity. The following will provide an in-depth analysis of how Li Hongzhang attempted to argue these two points of contention with his diplomatic strategy, given the Qing Dynasty's position of national disadvantage, and whether his efforts were ultimately reflected in the treaty's outcome.

Review of the Treaty of Shimonoseki Articles

Conflict and Non-Conflict

The criteria for establishing conflict in the process of finalizing the Treaty of Shimonoseki articles mentioned above are as follows. First, whether the treaty article was proposed by the Qing Dynasty, which was in a position of national disadvantage. If an article was proposed by the Qing Dynasty and accepted by Japan, reflecting it in the treaty, it could not be considered a conflict. However, if an article proposed by the Qing Dynasty continued to be debated with Japan during the process of finalizing its specific terms, it is difficult to argue that the article did not lead to conflict. Therefore, the second criterion for establishing conflict is when the article is continuously mentioned in the primary source, the verbal discussions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and in the documents exchanged between Li Hongzhang and the Japanese representatives, and the difference in the positions of the two countries is clearly evident. The Qing Dynasty proposed two conditions for the peace treaty: recognition of Korea's independence and payment of reparations. However, while the issue of reparations involved several debates until the treaty was finalized, there was no difference in the positions of the two countries regarding the recognition of Korea as an independent state, either in the verbal discussions or in Li Hongzhang's response to the peace treaty. The verbal discussions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki state that when the peace negotiations began, the Chinese representatives submitted agenda items only concerning reparations, territorial cession, and military occupation. This description confirms that the Chinese representatives did not raise any particular objections to the recognition of Korea as an independent state. (The Tientsin press 1895, 13) Furthermore, in his response to the peace treaty, Li Hongzhang stated, "The Qing Dynasty declared its intention to recognize Korea as a completely independent state several months ago, and has no objection to including this in the current peace treaty," indicating his acceptance of the article recognizing Korea as an independent state.

Therefore, the following will analyze Article 2 (Indemnity) and Article 4 (Territorial Cession) of the Treaty of Shimonoseki as areas of conflict, and Article 1 (Recognition of Korea as an Independent State) as an area of non-conflict. For the former, the analysis will focus on Li Hongzhang's diplomatic strategy, and for the latter, on the reasons for the absence of conflict. Article 2 and Article 4 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki

Reading the verbal discussions concerning the indemnity and territorial cession issues, which were the main points of contention in concluding the Treaty of Shimonoseki, reveals Li Hongzhang's desperate efforts to amend the provisions of these articles. In this process, he appealed to Ito's "past-masters in severity" (The Tientsin press 1895, 18) and showed desperation in appeasing Japan by pleading for mercy, stating, "I must at least save a hair," citing his domestic prestige. (The Tientsin press 1895, 18)

However, he did not attempt to appease Japan solely through appeals for sympathy. Li Hongzhang recognized that Japan's primary concern was to exclude the interference of Western powers and warned that Japan's unreasonable demands, particularly territorial cession, could attract the attention of Western powers and provide them with a pretext for intervention. Furthermore, throughout the negotiations, Ito and Li Hongzhang engaged in debates to prove whose logic better aligned with Western international law and customs. Although Li Hongzhang expressed frustration with the Western-centric international order and customs in the final meeting, he also acknowledged that to counter Japan's logic, he would have to follow the Western international legal logic that Japan employed. (The Tientsin press 1895, 26)

However, Li Hongzhang's diplomatic strategy ultimately failed to bear fruit. Prior to negotiating with Li Hongzhang, Japan had already decided on the treaty terms, anticipating Western intervention. Even when Li Hongzhang argued for reducing China's indemnity and refusing territorial cession based on Western logic, Japan maintained that the terms were the minimum it could demand and that any resulting Western interference would be manageable.

Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki

Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which recognized Korea as a sovereign and independent state, fundamentally undermined Qing China's interference in Korean domestic affairs and contributed to Japan's subsequent territorial expansion into Korea, thus historically confirming its clearly favorable nature to Japan. This raises the question of why Li Hongzhang did not demand revisions or object to this article during the treaty negotiation process. The answers could be: first, that he was ignorant of the contemporary international situation and thus failed to fully predict the future consequences of this article; or second, that Li Hongzhang considered the issue of recognizing Korea as an independent state to be a non-negotiable point and thus abandoned it early on.

First, Li Hongzhang was ignorant of the contemporary international situation and failed to predict the future consequences of this article. In "A Biography of Li Hongzhang," Liang Qichao points out Li Hongzhang's ignorance of international law. From the author Liang Qichao's perspective, Korea was a tributary state of the Qing Dynasty, but Li Hongzhang's ignorance of the concept of a "sovereign state" and his subsequent tacit acceptance of diplomatic relations with Korea became the cause of Japan's signing of the Treaty of Ganghwa with Korea, leaving room for Japan's full-scale advance into the Korean Peninsula. (Liang Qichao 2013, 183-185) Furthermore, Liang Qichao points out Li Hongzhang's arrogance and ignorance regarding the international situation by mentioning that when signing the Treaty of Tientsin, which triggered the Sino-Japanese War, Li Hongzhang said, "Even the great Western power France bowed its head to China first, so what great thing can the small Eastern nation of Japan achieve?" (Liang Qichao 2013, 199)

Extending this criticism, the signing of Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki by Li Hongzhang can be evaluated as stemming from his failure to grasp Japan's intention to advance into the Korean Peninsula and his inability to predict the consequences. Mutsu explains the Qing Dynasty's conditions for a ceasefire as follows: "These conditions were the cheapest they could offer." (Mutsu Munemitsu 2020, 217) In other words, at that time, the Qing Dynasty did not believe that recognizing Korea as an independent state would cause significant problems, as the status of Korea was the very issue that had triggered the Sino-Japanese War. Li Hongzhang likely painted an optimistic picture of the future resulting from establishing Korea as an independent state.

Examining the verbal discussions, the issue of Korea is mentioned once, alongside the issue of Taiwan's cession. Prime Minister Ito stated that Koreans were not suitable for labor, unlike the Taiwanese, and explicitly revealed his desire for Taiwan's territory, saying, "We are about to attack Formosa." (The Tientsin press 1895, 10) The continuous friction over Taiwan's territory made the Qing Dynasty perceive the territorial issue as more serious than the issue of Korea, which could be another factor contributing to Li Hongzhang's misjudgment. Second, the question arises whether Li Hongzhang abandoned negotiations because recognizing Korea's status as an independent state was included in Japan's vital interests, which Japan would not relinquish. The Sino-Japanese War was not the first conflict between Qing and Japan over the Korean Peninsula. The prolonged dispute over the Korean Peninsula between Qing and Japan, and the Qing Dynasty's position of national disadvantage, would have led Li Hongzhang to abandon Qing's traditional status and influence over Korea for strategic negotiations, even if he had accurately grasped the contemporary international situation. In other words, amidst the threats to Qing's economy in the indemnity issue and its security in the territorial cession issue, the status of Korea was relegated to a secondary concern.

Evidence that Li Hongzhang accurately grasped the contemporary international situation can be found in the fact that he requested mediation from Britain and Russia before proceeding with negotiations with Japan. Before going to Japan as an envoy after the war, he first spoke with various ministers, which can be seen as an effort to overcome the Qing Dynasty's position of national disadvantage or mitigate its consequences by involving Western powers. Furthermore, during the Shimonoseki peace talks, Li Hongzhang did not cease his analysis of Western powers beyond Japan. This is evidenced by his statement regarding the Japanese side's solicitous treatment of him while he was ill: "The Japanese officials and people expressing sympathy for my plight is merely a facade." (Shin Dong-joon 2017, 345-351)

Liang Qichao evaluates Li Hongzhang's diplomatic strategy primarily as forming alliances with other countries to balance against yet another country. (Liang Qichao 2013, p238) From this perspective, he likely expected to achieve his goals without direct conflict between Qing and Japan by provoking Western powers, who were wary of Japan's ambitions, thereby conceding the Korean Peninsula in the immediate negotiations. Indeed, after the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, the Triple Intervention occurred, and Japan returned the ceded Shandong Peninsula to China. These historical facts confirm that Li Hongzhang's foresight was correct to some extent.

Conclusion

The wartime situation of the Sino-Japanese War, on the verge of the Qing Dynasty's defeat, objectively proves that the Qing Dynasty was in a position of national disadvantage relative to Japan. Furthermore, the Qing Dynasty's request for peace talks, including discussions on indemnity, appears to be a decision made after relinquishing its position as the dominant power in East Asia and recognizing its state of national inferiority. This situation would have been fully shared with Li Hongzhang, the Qing plenipotentiary representative at the Shimonoseki peace talks.

The analysis above has classified the articles of the Treaty of Shimonoseki into conflict and non-conflict categories and examined the process by which each article was determined. Within the scope of articles where compromise was possible under a state of national disadvantage, the Qing Dynasty formulated a strategy to seek Japan's understanding for amendments and to prevent third parties from gaining excessive benefits from Japan, while Japan's overarching principle was to exclude third-party interference. Conflict thus arose only in the articles to which the Qing Dynasty raised objections. These "conflict" issues pertained to indemnity and territorial cession, where Li Hongzhang, by understanding Japan's "overarching principle," adopted appropriate diplomatic strategies. Meanwhile, the Sino-Japanese War was not an isolated event but part of a long history of power struggles between Qing and Japan over the Korean Peninsula. Li Hongzhang's ignorance of the term "sovereign and independent state," as pointed out by Liang Qichao, and his arrogance regarding Qing's national strength can be considered reasons for the conflict-free conclusion of Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which dealt with the issue of the Korean Peninsula. However, this explanation is deemed inappropriate given that Li Hongzhang recognized the East Asian international situation, where Western powers were constantly seeking opportunities for exploitation, and attempted to involve third parties, whom Japan most feared, in this matter. Furthermore, he wished to compromise on articles directly related to Qing's economic security and territorial integrity, such as indemnity and territorial cession, even if it meant a reduction in influence over the Korean Peninsula.

Overall, Li Hongzhang appears to have recognized the significant reduction in the scope of Qing China's diplomatic strategies due to its position of national disadvantage and attempted to compromise on articles where room for negotiation existed. However, the failure to reach a compromise through negotiations, despite Li Hongzhang's pleas, was because the situation of national disadvantage was beyond what his diplomatic strategies could overcome. Therefore, even with a diplomat possessing 100 times better diplomatic skills than Li Hongzhang, it would have been difficult to fundamentally alter the situation Qing China faced at the time. His posthumous evaluation as a "Han奸" warrants reconsideration, even in the context of the Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki. References Liang Qichao. 2013. A Biography of Li Hongzhang. Translated by Park Hee-sung and Moon Se-na. Prism. Mutsu Munemitsu. 2020. Translated by Kim Seung-il. Beomwoo Publishing.

Shin Dong-joon. 2017. Chinese Modern History Through Figures. Human & Books. Fujimura Michio. 1997. The Sino-Japanese War. Translated by Huh Nam-rin. Sohwa.

The Tientsin Press. 1895. “VERBAL DISCUSSION DURING

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PLENIPOTENTIARY VICERY LI HUNG-CHANG

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