Recalling the Korean War in Nagasaki: The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

Shim Yena · Seoul National University

Introduction

In 1945, Nagasaki was a peaceful and developed city with a population of 200,000 residents. Nagasaki had the largest Christian population in Japan, and thus, many Christian churches were located there. It was a Westernized city where steep hills and the harbor coexisted, and Eastern and Western cultures harmonized. Several valleys were formed by the Urakami River flowing from the north, and one of these valleys became an industrial complex accommodating 90 percent of the city's workforce.

As World War II neared its end in August 1945, the situation in Japan unfolded with great urgency. On August 7, 1945, U.S. President Harry S. Truman announced the dropping of the atomic bomb. The Emperor of Japan received an official report regarding the atomic bombing. A day later, on August 8, the Emperor of Japan ordered the termination of the war as soon as possible. On the same day, the "Bocks Car," carrying the second atomic bomb, took off.

Figure 1. Bocks Car (Source: BBC News, In pictures: Nagasaki bombing, 2015. 08. 09).

The following day, August 9, the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. Before the shock of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had even subsided, the second atomic bomb brought tragedy to Nagasaki.

While the United States announced the death toll as 35,000, Nagasaki's

officials announced it as 74,800.

(The Fall of the Japanese Empire: The Pacific War 1936-1945) According to the Japanese announcement, the death toll from the atomic bombing reached 74,800. Considering Nagasaki's population at the time was 200,000, this figure represents approximately 38%. Subsequently, Japan declared unconditional surrender on August 15, and World War II ended.

Figure 2. Nagasaki in ruins after the atomic bombing (Source: BBC News, In pictures: Nagasaki bombing, 2015. 08. 09).

Following the first use of an atomic bomb in Japan in 1945, the nuclear age officially began. The United States, which dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki, entered into a full-scale Cold War with the Soviet Union. International relations subsequently led to the Soviet Union's successful development of nuclear weapons in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

Focusing on the United States, which dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki, allows us to recall the Korean War. This is because five years after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, during the Korean War in 1950, the United States intended to use nuclear strategy. On November 30, 1950, amidst the Korean War, Truman stated in an interview that "all weapons, including nuclear weapons, can be used," and specific plans for nuclear attacks on North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union were considered. Truman, who had previously given a speech at a university after the end of the Pacific War stating that "nuclear weapons should no longer be used," effectively ordered the mass production of nuclear weapons.

However, nuclear weapons were ultimately not used in the Korean War. This paper aims to analyze the reasons and background for this, focusing on the United States' perception of threat from the communist bloc. In other words, it will examine how the security element of nuclear weapons and the conceptual element of threat perception operated.

This report analyzes the United States' perception of threat from the communist bloc and its corresponding nuclear strategy from the Soviet Union's nuclear development in 1949 up to the Korean War armistice agreement in 1951. In 1949, U.S. anxiety intensified. China was lost to the Chinese Communist Party, and the 50,000 U.S. Marines deployed to China after 1945 were expelled. The Soviet atomic bomb detonated years earlier than predicted by U.S. intelligence agencies. Therefore, the central question is how the increased U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc, starting in 1949, was reflected in U.S. domestic nuclear policy and its external nuclear strategy. This report analyzes U.S. nuclear policy and nuclear strategy from 1949 to 1951. It empirically studies the process by which the superpower United States utilized 'threat perception' in its military strategy without actually using nuclear weapons, serving as a case study for the analysis of conflict situations between nations.

Review of Existing Literature

Existing research can be broadly categorized into three main areas. First, studies that historically narrate the process of U.S. intervention in the Korean War. Second, longitudinal studies of the period from 1945 to the Cold War era. Finally, strategic military studies that analyze the 'technology' of nuclear weapons.

The first category focuses on 'factual description.' A representative example is the study on the debate within the U.S. leadership regarding the use of nuclear weapons during the Korean War (Glenn D. Paige). This report, however, focuses on the position of 'President Truman and the Department of State,' which approached the issue from a global strategic perspective, rather than the conflict between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. This is because President Truman held the actual decision-making authority for the use of nuclear weapons, and the Department of Defense could only exercise the authority to use nuclear weapons under Truman's command. 1. Recalling the Korean War in Nagasaki_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The second category, on the other hand, focuses on the 'process.' A representative study is one that examines the process of the U.S. perception of threat shifting from Japan to the Soviet Union (J. Swenson-Wright). However, existing research that systematically analyzes the transition of threat perception with a focus on nuclear weapons is insufficient. Therefore, this report aims to focus on the aspect of how the United States employed nuclear threat strategies by utilizing the threat perception of East Asian countries, with 'nuclear weapons' as the subject during the Korean War.

The third category focuses on 'technology.' This area of research is primarily dealt with in the field of security studies. However, this report intends to conduct research focusing on the political and strategic context in which nuclear weapons were used during the Korean War, rather than their technological aspects, within the framework of global strategy. Research Methodology

The core temporal scope of this study is from 1949 until the start of armistice negotiations in 1951. 1949 was a period of increasing U.S. threat perception towards the communist bloc, and with the intervention of the People's Republic of China in the Korean War in October 1950, the U.S. threat perception of the communist bloc reached its peak. The U.S. stance of refraining from a northward advance and avoiding direct confrontation with the Soviet Union shifted. In other words, the unexpected success of the Chinese forces, which had been underestimated, heightened the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc. Meanwhile, as armistice negotiations began in 1951, the threat perception, which had reached its peak, relatively decreased. This report analyzes the U.S. nuclear strategy in the Korean War to understand the changes in the perception of threat from the communist bloc.

To examine the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc and U.S. nuclear strategy, primary sources such as U.S. National Security Council (NSC) documents, public speeches by U.S. leaders, and U.S. media reports, as well as secondary research materials, were analyzed. Key reference materials included NSC 8/2 (April 1949), NSC 48/2 (December 1949), Dean Acheson's speech (January 1950), NSC 68 (April 1950), and NSC 81 (September 1950). Press conference materials regarding President Truman's use of nuclear weapons and subsequent U.S. media reports were also incorporated. For parts requiring further interpretation, President Truman's memoirs, South Korean diplomatic documents, and secondary sources were utilized.

The subsequent development of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 will examine the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc, focusing on the Soviet Union, prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. The Soviet Union's successful nuclear test in 1949 led the United States to more strongly incorporate containment of the Soviet Union into its future foreign strategy. During this period, the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc was increasing, and the United States sought to avoid direct confrontation with the communist bloc, particularly the Soviet Union. Consequently, U.S. nuclear strategy was pursued not for external use, but for domestic development of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. This domestically-oriented nuclear strategy manifested as a foreign strategy that localized the Korean Peninsula issue. 1. Recalling the Korean War in Nagasaki_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

Chapter 3 will examine the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc, focusing on China, after the outbreak of the Korean War. The intervention of Chinese forces in October 1950 was a pivotal moment when the United States experienced the power of the communist bloc in non-Soviet countries. During this period, the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc reached its zenith, and the United States was willing to accept full-scale confrontation with the communist bloc. Consequently, U.S. nuclear strategy manifested as a threat of nuclear use externally. This externally-oriented nuclear strategy coincided with a foreign strategy that globalized the Korean Peninsula issue.

Chapter 4 will explain that as both the United States and the communist bloc realized that the Korean War could not be resolved militarily, the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc entered a phase of relative mitigation, coinciding with the start of armistice negotiations. The subsequent meeting between British Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee and U.S. President Harry S. Truman serves as further evidence that the U.S. nuclear strategy ultimately remained a 'threat,' and the establishment of a U.S.-Soviet negotiation table can be interpreted as the United States and the communist bloc facing the limits of military resolution and beginning negotiations by easing mutual threat perceptions.

Before the Outbreak of the Korean War

U.S. Perception of Threat from the Communist Bloc: The Soviet Union's Successful Nuclear Test

The Soviet Union's successful nuclear test in 1949 led the United States to more strongly incorporate containment of the Soviet Union into its future foreign strategy. During this period, the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc was increasing, and the United States sought to avoid direct confrontation with the communist bloc, particularly the Soviet Union.

Following the end of World War II, the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified, and the international situation developed in a way that fueled U.S. anxiety. In particular, in 1949, the United States lost China to the Chinese Communist Party, and the 50,000 U.S. Marines deployed to China after 1945 were expelled. The Soviet atomic bomb detonated years earlier than predicted by U.S. intelligence agencies. The Soviet Union's successful nuclear development in 1949 further heightened U.S. anxiety. Through this series of events, a shift occurred in the U.S. perception of 'targets for nuclear attack' and 'superiority in nuclear capabilities.' In terms of targets for nuclear attack, the U.S. threat perception shifted from Japan to the communist bloc. Meanwhile, in terms of superiority in nuclear capabilities, the U.S. nuclear advantage was broken by the Soviet Union's nuclear development.

In the spring of 1950, Truman approved the development of the hydrogen bomb and ordered a comprehensive review of Soviet policy and foreign strategy plans, reflecting the context of the Soviet Union's possession of atomic bombs, the development of hydrogen bombs, and the success of the communist revolution in China. In response to President Truman's request, the National Security Council's decision (NSC 68) was submitted. The core of NSC 68 argued that fundamental differences in understanding existed between the United States and the Soviet Union due to ideological differences between liberalism and communism, and that rapid expansion of the free world's political, economic, and military strength was essential for negotiations with the Soviet Union, demanding a dramatic increase in defense budgets. The fundamental foreign policy perception underlying the NSC 68 document was that the liberal ideology was under attack worldwide, and in a situation where bipolarization of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had become a reality, defeat in a specific region would mean defeat for each bloc worldwide.

The release of NSC 68 can be considered a watershed moment marking the shift in U.S. perception of the communist bloc towards hostility. This is because NSC 68 served as a new U.S. foreign policy guideline after its release and became a manual for Cold War strategy for subsequent U.S. administrations. The U.S. perception of threat from the Soviet Union is well-reflected in the NSC 68 document. A detailed examination is as follows:

[April 14, 1950] NSC 68 _ VIII. Atomic Armaments

A. Military Assessment of Atomic Capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union

1. The United States possesses an atomic capability, including both the

number and delivery means, estimated to be sufficient to inflict

a serious blow upon the war-making capacity of the Soviet Union. (...)

2. As the atomic capabilities of the Soviet Union increase, they will

seriously interfere with the ability of the United States to execute

the attack described above. In the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union

will possess sufficient atomic bombs and sufficient means of delivery to

make questionable whether Great Britain, with its present inadequate air defenses, can be relied upon as a forward base for the attack of the United States.

An attack by the United States could be initiated.

If the Soviet Union launches a surprise attack and if there is no more effective opposition than at present, it is expected that the Soviet Union will acquire the capability to seriously damage the vital centers of the United States within the next four years. Such a blow could

seriously damage the United States to an extent that would greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential. (...)

seriously damage the United States to an extent that would greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential. (...)

seriously damage the United States to an extent that would greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential. (...)

seriously damage the United States to an extent that would greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential. (...)

(FRUS (1950), NSC 68. VIII. Atomic Armaments

A. Military Assessment of Atomic Capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union)

As indicated by the subheading 'A. Military Assessment of Atomic Capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union' in NSC 68, it can be understood that the United States was wary of the Soviet Union's atomic capabilities. Paragraph 1 states that the U.S. atomic capability is sufficient to inflict serious damage on the Soviet Union. This can be seen as an expression of confidence, indicating that while the U.S. perceived a threat from the Soviet Union, it assessed itself as having a relative advantage. On the other hand, paragraph 2 warns that as the Soviet Union's atomic capabilities increase, U.S. capabilities will be seriously hampered, and if containment of the Soviet Union is not effectively carried out, it could acquire the capability to seriously damage the vital centers of the United States within four years. In other words, from paragraph 2 onwards, the perception of containment against the Soviet Union is fully reflected in terms of nuclear capabilities.

4. For the present, our atomic retaliatory capability will be sufficient to deter the Kremlin from launching a deliberate direct military attack against ourselves or other free peoples. However, it is estimated that the Soviet Union will possess sufficient atomic capability to launch a surprise attack, and if there is no more effective opposition than at present, it is expected that the Soviet Union will acquire the capability to seriously damage the vital centers of the United States within the next four years. Such a blow could

seriously damage the United States to an extent that would greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential. However, the Soviet Union's ability to inflict a crippling blow on the United States would be greatly enhanced if it were able to develop and deliver atomic weapons in large quantities and with greater accuracy and range than is now estimated. In such a case, the United States would be vulnerable to a devastating attack, and its ability to retaliate effectively would be seriously compromised. The document also highlights the importance of maintaining U.S. superiority in atomic capabilities through continued research and development, as well as the need for effective air defenses to protect against Soviet attacks. The NSC 68 document underscores the escalating nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the growing threat of nuclear war during the early years of the Cold War.

will be sufficient. However, sufficient to launch a surprise attack on us

calculating that we possess nuclear capabilities, our nuclear superiority

If it can be nullified and a decisively advantageous military situation created, the Kremlin may

be tempted to strike swiftly and secretly. Thus, the existence of two large atomic powers in

such a relationship may act not as a deterrent to war, but as an incitement to war.

(FRUS (1950), NSC 68. VIII. Atomic Armaments

A. Military Appraisal of United States and Soviet Atomic Capabilities)

Paragraph 4 of NSC 68 mentions that the coexistence of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union has the potential to act not as a deterrent to war, but as an incitement to war. It shows that the United States predicted a negative scenario where the Soviet Union's nuclear weapon development, rather than bringing peace through the realization of a bipolar nuclear system, was rather leading towards incitement to war. 6. If the Soviet Union develops thermonuclear weapons before the United States, pressure on the entire free world

by the Soviet Union will greatly increase, or attacks on the United States will greatly

increase.

7. If the United States develops thermonuclear weapons before the Soviet Union, the United States should be able to increase pressure on the Soviet Union for the time being.

(FRUS (1950), NSC 68. VIII. Atomic Armaments

A. Military Appraisal of United States and Soviet Atomic Capabilities)

Paragraphs 6 and 7 of NSC 68 confirm that two scenarios are envisioned depending on which of the US and USSR succeeds first in developing thermonuclear weapons. In particular, paragraph 6 more actively reflects the perception of threat from the Soviet Union, stating that if the Soviet Union develops thermonuclear weapons before the United States, attacks by the Soviet Union on the United States and the free world will increase.

[1950. 04. 14] NSC 68 _ VIII. Atomic Armaments

B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons

2. As pointed out in IV, it is important that the United States use military force only when the necessity for the use of military force is clear and present and is the overwhelming

majority of our people (...)

In the event of general war with the Soviet Union, atomic weapons should be used by both sides in such a way as is believed to be best calculated to achieve their respective objectives. In view of the vulnerability of the Soviet Union to atomic attack, it may be argued that we should wish to retain atomic weapons solely for the purpose of retaliation against a Soviet

first use. Our atomic military capabilities and those of our allies should be fully developed and the Soviet political weaknesses should be fully exploited. But it is not certain that the Soviet Union can achieve its objectives without resort to atomic weapons in the event of war. We must have overwhelming atomic superiority and air

supremacy if we are to proceed toward the achievement of our objectives and prevent the Soviet Union from resorting to atomic weapons.

1. Recalling the Korean War in Nagasaki_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

It has been argued that we may wish to retain atomic weapons solely for the purpose of retaliation against a Soviet first use. Our atomic military capabilities and those of our allies should be fully developed and the Soviet political weaknesses should be fully exploited. But it is not certain that the Soviet Union can achieve its objectives without resort to atomic weapons in the event of war. We must have overwhelming atomic superiority and air supremacy if we are to proceed toward the achievement of our objectives and prevent the Soviet Union from resorting to atomic weapons.

(FRUS (1950), NSC 68. VIII. Atomic Armaments

B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons)

The section on Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons (B) in NSC 68 further reflects a concrete perception of threat from the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons development. Paragraph 2 discusses a scenario of full-scale war with the Soviet Union. While the first part of paragraph 2 warns against the potential misuse of military force by the United States, stating that it is important for the United States to use military force only when the necessity for its use is clear, present, and recognized by an overwhelming majority of the people, the latter part of the paragraph points out the possibility of the Soviet Union using nuclear weapons in the event of a full-scale war and emphasizes the need for the United States to possess overwhelming atomic superiority to deter such use.

3. It has been proposed that we announce that we will not use atomic weapons except in retaliation for their prior use by an aggressor. Such a declaration

would reduce the danger of atomic attack upon the United States and its allies.

(FRUS (1950), NSC 68. VIII. Atomic Armaments

B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons)

Meanwhile, paragraph 3 of section B of NSC 68 indicates that a proposal was made to limit the use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union to retaliatory actions. Recognizing the risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons, the policy objective was to confine their use to cases where the Soviet Union initiated a nuclear attack. In other words, amidst a growing perception of threat from the Soviet Union, while the policy aimed to enhance atomic capabilities to deter Soviet nuclear use, it also sought to adjust policy objectives to avoid preemptive nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, on September 24, 1949, The New York Times

reported, “President Truman has shown good judgment in sharing with the American people the government's information that an atomic bomb has been exploded in the Soviet Union in recent weeks.”

- New York Times. (1949). "RUSSIA AND THE BOMB". September 24. 1. Recalling the Korean War in Nagasaki_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum President Truman's public announcement of the Soviet nuclear test, rather than keeping it a state secret, can be seen as an expression of confidence that the United States already possessed nuclear capabilities to counter the Soviet nuclear development. In other words, while the US perception of threat towards the communist bloc at this time did increase due to the unexpectedly rapid success in nuclear development, the United States still possessed the world's leading nuclear arsenal. This suggests that the US displayed a certain confidence in its relative nuclear superiority, which did not escalate to an extreme level of perceived threat towards the communist bloc.

US Domestic Nuclear Policy and Localization of the Korean Peninsula Issue

It was proposed to announce that nuclear weapons would not be used except in retaliation for prior use by an aggressor. Such a declaration

has been argued to reduce the risk of atomic attack on the United States and its allies.

At this time, the US perception of threat towards the communist bloc had risen to the level of containing the Soviet Union. The United States avoided direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and aimed to avoid conveying a perception of threat to the Soviets. Therefore, the US sought to pursue its own nuclear technology development and thermonuclear weapon development domestically, rather than utilizing its nuclear strategy externally. This domestically-focused nuclear policy manifested as an external strategy of localizing the Korean Peninsula issue.

Following the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea in 1949, the Truman administration's policy towards Korea pursued both the military non-intervention policy advocated by the military and the economic and military aid to Korea advocated by the State Department. The Truman administration had the mission to prevent the expansion of communism on the Korean Peninsula by providing political and military assistance to the newly established Republic of Korea government under the authority of the United Nations. Despite congressional opposition and the military's passive stance, Truman and Dean Gooderham Acheson persistently pursued economic and military aid to Korea. The persistent pursuit of economic and military aid to the Korean Peninsula by Truman and Acheson can be interpreted as a manifestation of their will to maintain influence on the peninsula amidst a growing perception of threat from the communist bloc.

Concurrently with the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, the United States considered measures to strengthen and support the Korean Constabulary. These measures signified a policy of withdrawing US forces while continuing military assistance to Korea. The withdrawal of US troops from South Korea began with NSC 8 and was carried out through its revision, NSC 8/2. The core content of NSC 8/2, announced on December 30, 1949, was to provide minimal military support and maximum political support to Korea. In other words, NSC 8/2 expressed the US intention not to defend Korea by military force. Consequently, US military aid to South Korea can be seen as limited to the purpose of maintaining domestic public order.

Furthermore, Dean Gooderham Acheson's speech on January 20, 1950, was a continuation of the decisions made by the Security Council (NSC 48/2) adopted about two weeks prior. Acheson stated that in the event of military aggression, the first recourse would be a response through the spirit of the UN Charter. The establishment of the Acheson Line indicates that the United States had excluded military intervention in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

In essence, amidst a growing perception of threat from the communist bloc, the United States sought to maintain its influence on the Korean Peninsula through continuous economic and military aid. However, in conclusion, by withdrawing US troops from Korea and limiting military aid to domestic public order purposes, the United States attempted to localize the Korean issue. This can be assessed as a strategy for the Korean Peninsula aimed at avoiding full-scale confrontation amidst a growing perception of threat from the communist bloc.

Outbreak of the Korean War

US Perception of Threat towards the Communist Bloc: Chinese Intervention

The actions of US policymakers immediately following the outbreak of the Korean War differed in several aspects from their actions in the past, particularly during the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea in 1948-49.

US Domestic Nuclear Policy and the Localization of the Korean Peninsula Issue

At this time, the US perception of the threat from the communist bloc escalated to the extent of checking the Soviet Union. The US avoided direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and aimed not to give the Soviet Union the impression that the US was threatening. Therefore, the US sought to pursue the development of its own nuclear technology and nuclear weapons internally, rather than utilizing nuclear strategy externally. This domestically-focused nuclear policy manifested as an external strategy to localize the Korean Peninsula issue.

Following the withdrawal of US forces from Korea in 1949, the Truman administration's policy toward Korea pursued both the military non-intervention policy advocated by the military and the economic and military aid to Korea advocated by the State Department. The Truman administration had the mission to prevent the expansion of communism on the Korean Peninsula by providing political and military assistance to the newly established Republic of Korea government under the authority of the United Nations. Despite congressional opposition and the passive attitude of the military, Truman and Dean Acheson persistently pursued economic and military aid to Korea. The persistent pursuit of economic and military aid to the Korean Peninsula by Truman and Acheson can be interpreted as part of their determination to maintain influence on the Korean Peninsula amidst a growing perception of threat from the communist bloc.

Concurrently with the withdrawal of US forces from Korea, the US reviewed measures for the augmentation and support of the Korean Constabulary. These measures signified a policy of withdrawing US troops while continuing military aid to Korea. The withdrawal of US forces from Korea began with NSC 8 and was carried out through NSC 8/2, which amended it. The core content of NSC 8/2, announced on December 30, 1949, was to provide minimal military support and maximum political support to Korea. In other words, NSC 8/2 expressed the US's intention not to defend Korea by force. Through this, US military aid to South Korea can be seen as limited to the purpose of maintaining domestic public order.

Meanwhile, Dean Acheson's speech on January 20, 1950, was a continuation of the Security Council decision (NSC 48/2) adopted about two weeks prior. Acheson stated that if a military attack occurred, the first recourse would be a response through the spirit of the UN Charter. The establishment of the Acheson Line indicates that in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the US had excluded military intervention.

In essence, the US sought to maintain its influence on the Korean Peninsula through continuous economic and military aid amidst a growing perception of threat from the communist bloc. However, in conclusion, the US attempted to localize the Korean Peninsula issue by withdrawing its troops from Korea and limiting military aid to domestic public order purposes. This can be assessed as a strategy for the Korean Peninsula to avoid full-scale confrontation amidst a growing perception of threat from the communist bloc.

Outbreak of the Korean War

US Perception of Threat from the Communist Bloc: Intervention of Chinese Forces

The actions of US policymakers immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War showed differences in various aspects compared to their actions in the past, particularly during the withdrawal of US forces from Korea in 1948-49.

On June 25, 1950, the day the Korean War broke out, John Foster Dulles, then Ambassador to Japan, sent the following telegram to the US State Department headquarters.

“It is possible that Korea may be able to stop the North Korean invasion with its own strength, and if

so, that would be the best way. However, if that seems impossible,

then US military force would have to be used... If Korea is

overrun by an unprovoked armed attack, and we sit by and watch

On June 25, 1950, the day the Korean War broke out, John Foster Dulles, then Ambassador to Japan, sent the following telegram to the US State Department headquarters:

“It is possible that Korea can defend itself against the North Korean invasion, and if so, that is the best and wisest course. But if it appears that this is not possible, then United States military force must be used...... If we sit by and see Korea collapse as a result of an unprovoked armed attack, it will probably lead to a chain of disastrous events, possibly even to a world war (...)

-Harry S. Truman, Memoirs II: Years of Trial and Hope, p. 336.

At a time when the perception of threat from the communist bloc was increasing, the outbreak of the Korean War was an event that elevated the strategic value of Korea for the United States. This can be seen in the fact that the State Department and the Department of Defense, which had been in conflict over the strategy of withdrawing U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula, quickly reached an agreement within seven days of the outbreak of the Korean War and dispatched ground troops to the Korean front.

Meanwhile, NSC 81, announced in September 1950 before the intervention of Chinese forces, emphasized the gradual expansion of operations in North Korea while cautioning against the intervention of Chinese and Soviet forces. However, the execution and success of the Incheon Landing Operation in September 1950, which shifted the initiative of the war towards the liberal bloc, acted as a factor that spurred China's participation in the Korean War.

The intervention of Chinese forces in October 1950 was the occasion for the United States to experience the power of the communist bloc in non-Soviet states. During this period, the perception of threat from the communist bloc reached its peak, and the United States was willing to endure a full-scale confrontation with the communist bloc.

The United States' external nuclear strategy and the globalization of the Korean issue

Due to the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States sought to globalize the Korean issue within the framework of a struggle against the communist forces. In the process of globalizing the Korean issue, the U.S. nuclear strategy manifested externally as a threat of nuclear use.

Prior to the intervention of Chinese forces in October 1950, the U.S. strategy was to maximally suppress northward advancement. Although the decision for northward advancement was made after the success of the Incheon Landing Operation in September, there were still views that worried about escalation and viewed a full-scale confrontation with the communist bloc negatively before the intervention of Chinese forces. However, the United States underestimated the Chinese forces and did not believe they would intervene in an external war when their domestic system was not fully established.

However, China's participation in the Korean War caused the initiative of the war to tilt back towards the communist bloc. Following the intervention of Chinese forces, the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc was maximized.

On November 30, 1950, President Harry S. Truman issued a statement denouncing China at a regular press conference. In that document, Truman pledged that the United States would act within the framework of the United Nations Charter to take joint action to stop the aggression against Korea, and stated that the United States would strengthen its own defense and assist its allies in taking similar measures against the possibility of aggression elsewhere. During the subsequent press questioning about the Korean crisis, Truman mentioned the use of nuclear weapons. However, an analysis of Truman's remarks indicates that the United States did not actually intend to use nuclear weapons, as his statements can be seen as aimed at reducing the possibility of misinterpretation.

Figure 3. President Harry S. Truman announcing the statement (Source: Retronewser, President Truman threatens to use atomic bomb to win Korean War 70 years ago this hour, 2020.11.30.) 1. Recalling the Korean War in Nagasaki_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The statement made by President Harry S. Truman at the press conference and his interviews with reporters were available through '1950 United States Foreign Relations Documents FRUS (Volume 7) Document 909'.

“Truman: We will take all necessary measures to deal with the military situation, as we always have.

”

“Jack Daughter, New York Daily News: Does that include the atomic bomb?”

“Truman: It includes every weapon we have.”

“Paul Rich, Chicago Daily News: Mr. President, you said 'every weapon we have.' Does that mean you are actively considering the use of the atomic bomb?”

“Truman: Its use has always been actively considered. I do not wish to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used against innocent men, women, and children who have no connection with this military aggression.”

You said, 'all the weapons we have.' Does that mean you are actively considering the use of atomic bombs?

Are you actively considering their use?”

“Truman: The use of them has always been actively considered. I

(FRUS (1950), VOLUME 7. Document 909) In the interview, Truman stated that nuclear weapons are included in all measures to deal with the military situation and that the use of atomic bombs has been actively considered. Truman's mention of the use of atomic bombs was from the perspective that as long as nuclear weapons exist, consideration is inevitable. This is because as long as nuclear weapons are possessed, a plan for their use is naturally possible.

However, Truman's mention of the atomic bomb could be interpreted as the possibility of the United States using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. Although Truman later added in the interview that nuclear weapons are terrible and he did not wish to see them used, in a situation where attention was focused on the possibility of nuclear weapon use in the Korean War, such remarks could have been dismissed as mere diplomatic rhetoric. Aware of the possibility that his interview might be misunderstood as a declaration of the U.S. intention to use nuclear weapons, Truman subsequently released the following press statement through the White House.

“The President wishes to make sure that his answer to the question regarding the use of the atomic bomb at his press conference today is not misinterpreted. Of course, as our military forces consider the use of all military weapons whenever they are in combat, there has been consideration of this subject since hostilities broke out in Korea. (…) Consideration of the use of weapons is inherent in the possession of those weapons. (…) However, it must be emphasized that the use of the atomic bomb can only be authorized by the President by law, and no such authorization has ever been given. Only after such authority is granted does the field commander become responsible for the tactical delivery of the weapon. (…) In short, the answer given to the question at the press conference today does not indicate any change in this situation.”

1. Recalling the Korean War in Nagasaki_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

(FRUS (1950), VOLUME 7. Document 909)

Through the White House press release, Truman emphasized that the use of the atomic bomb can only be authorized by the President by law, and no such authorization has ever been given. In other words, he made it clear that the United States had no intention of using nuclear weapons from a political standpoint.

Furthermore, Truman stated that only after the President's authority to use the atomic bomb is granted does the field commander become responsible for the tactical delivery of the weapon. Here, the field commander refers to General Douglas MacArthur. In fact, General MacArthur was a strong advocate for dropping nuclear weapons on North Korea and Manchuria during the Korean War. By additionally stating that General MacArthur, a proponent of nuclear weapon use, did not have the authority to use nuclear weapons, Truman emphasized that the use of nuclear weapons would not be realized even from a military perspective.

Through the dismissal of MacArthur, Truman further solidified to the outside world that the United States did not actually intend to use nuclear weapons. General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the UN forces and a prominent military figure, requested authorization to use nuclear weapons against Manchuria and North Korea on December 9, 1950. MacArthur testified that the use of atomic bombs would not be for the proactive purpose of supporting UN forces' advance but rather for the passive purpose of preventing their retreat. Furthermore, on December 24, 1950, MacArthur submitted a list of 34 atomic bombs to be used against Manchuria and North Korea. However, MacArthur's proposals for the use of nuclear weapons on two occasions were ignored. Ultimately, in April of the following year, 1951, Truman dismissed MacArthur. This was because Truman did not trust MacArthur as a reliable individual responsible for nuclear strategy.

Meanwhile, Truman's 'Special Message to the Congress Requesting Additional Funds for Defense' reveals that the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc was centered on Chinese forces. Furthermore, although there was no intention to actually use nuclear weapons at the time, the will and determination to develop nuclear weapons were strengthened. 1. Recalling the Korean War in Nagasaki_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

I propose an additional appropriation of $1,050,000,000 to the Atomic Energy Commission. With this fund, the Commission can greatly expand its production capacity. New facilities will provide greater capacity for producing fissionable material and for manufacturing such material into atomic weapons. (...) The present attack of the Chinese Communists upon the United Nations forces is as unprovoked, deliberate, and indefensible as was the earlier invasion by the North Korean Communists. (...) The Chinese Communists appear to have acted with full knowledge of the terrible consequences which their actions might bring upon them. The Chinese have waged war in their own country for years, and in the process have seen their lands and factories devastated and their young men killed. Greater misfortune can only await the Chinese people if they continue on the road of reckless invasion which has been started by the Communists.

(Special Message to the Congress Requesting Additional Funds for Defense. December 1, 1950. Public Papers)

President Harry S. Truman proposes an additional appropriation of $1,050,000,000 to the Atomic Energy Commission, expecting that this fund will significantly expand production capacity for use in atomic weapons. Furthermore, the section mentioning 'Chinese Communists' reveals the perception of China. The target of threat perception is seen to have expanded beyond the Soviet Union to include China. In this document, Truman points out that China is engaging in deliberate acts of aggression, emphasizing the negative aspects of communism and thus perceiving China as an adversary.

The path to the armistice: The Anglo-American Summit

On July 10, 1951, representatives from both the U.S. and Soviet sides began armistice talks. With the commencement of armistice negotiations in 1951, both the United States and the communist bloc realized that the Korean War could not be resolved militarily. The U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc entered a phase of slight mitigation. The subsequent meeting between British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and U.S. President Harry S. Truman serves as further evidence that the U.S. nuclear strategy ultimately remained a 'threat,' and the establishment of a U.S.-Soviet negotiation table can be interpreted as the U.S. and the communist bloc facing the limits of military resolution and beginning negotiations with a softened mutual threat perception.

In the meeting between British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Britain, representing the voice of Western allies, strongly opposed the use of atomic bombs by the United States in the Korean War. Meanwhile, the United States, from the perspective of expected utility, judged that the costs of using atomic bombs in the Korean War would outweigh the benefits. Furthermore, voices within the U.S. became dominant, arguing that the use of atomic bombs would hinder joint action with the United Nations, potentially leading to the U.S. shouldering moral responsibility and becoming isolated. As a result, the possibility of actually using atomic bombs in the Korean War became highly remote. These positions of Britain and the United States can be seen as reflecting the concerns of the United States and its allies about escalation. 1. Recalling the Korean War in Nagasaki_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

According to the minutes of the fifth meeting between Attlee and Truman, President Truman stated:

“The atomic bomb is, in a sense, the joint property of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada,

and I do not intend to admit its use without prior consultation with the other two countries, except in

cases of extreme emergency.”

(U.S. Minutes, Truman–Attlee Conversations, Fifth Meeting,

The White House, Washington, Dec 7, 1950)

This once again demonstrates that U.S. nuclear strategy ultimately remained a 'threat.' In other words, the United States perceived nuclear strategy as a 'threat' factor and did not actually intend to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War. This implies that the United States approached the Korean War more politically than militarily. From a military cost perspective, using atomic bombs in the Korean War could have saved American and Western allied forces in terms of personnel and military supplies. However, from a political consequence perspective, using atomic bombs in the Korean War would have not only earned the United States the ignominious title of a nation that dropped nuclear weapons for the second time since 1945, but it could also have led to a further escalation of the nuclear arms race with the communist bloc, resulting in mutual annihilation. This can be inferred from the fact that Douglas MacArthur strongly advocated for the dropping of atomic bombs until the very eve of the Korean War armistice negotiations, indicating that the Korean War was more political than military.

Conclusion

This report analyzes U.S. nuclear policy and strategy from 1949 to 1951. For the United States, the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula shifted with the outbreak of the Korean War. However, this shift was underpinned by the U.S. perception of the threat posed by the communist bloc. Specifically, prior to the Korean War, the Soviet Union's successful nuclear weapons test led to an increased perception of threat from the USSR. However, this did not reach a level that threatened the fundamental interests and existence of the United States. Therefore, the U.S. designated the Korean Peninsula as a buffer zone to avoid direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, as evidenced in NSC 48/2 and the Acheson speech.

While existing research evaluates NSC 68 as a groundbreaking shift in U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union, this report re-examines U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union from the perspective of the perceived strategic value of the Korean Peninsula. From Korea's perspective, it was not NSC 68, but the outbreak of the Korean War that transformed the U.S. perception of Korea's value. Thus, the tragedy of a civil war paradoxically elevated Korea's strategic value. The intervention of Chinese forces in the Korean War also marked a period of rapid increase in Korea's strategic value, and at the same time, the U.S. perception of threat from the communist bloc formed a dual structure, adding the threat from China to the existing threat perception of the Soviet Union.

The sight of UN forces in disarray from the Chinese Communist Forces' attack, which had been underestimated, came as a great shock to the United States. Consequently, the U.S. brought out the strategic card of nuclear weapons and employed a threat strategy. Nevertheless, the communist bloc's attacks did not subside. This indicated that the communist bloc recognized that U.S. nuclear strategy was limited to 'threats.'

As a result, the U.S. promised to refrain from using nuclear weapons through discussions with British Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee. The United States itself recognized that the credibility of its threat strategy was not effective against the communist bloc.

This study empirically examines the process by which the United States utilized 'threat perception' in its military strategy without actually using nuclear weapons, and can serve as a case study for analyzing conflict situations between nations. In particular, it offers some insights into interpreting North Korea's current nuclear threat strategy. Of course, the relative power positions of the United States in 1950 and North Korea today are vastly different. However, if the focus is on the objective of 'threat,' the U.S. nuclear threat strategy during the Korean War can be helpful in understanding the intentions of the threat-maker when interpreting North Korea's foreign statements and analyzing its actions, such as nuclear tests.

Nevertheless, this report is limited in that it analyzes the perceptions of the communist bloc, namely China and the Soviet Union, only at the surface level of events and actions. It did not delve into the internal discussions within the communist bloc that resulted from the U.S. nuclear strategy. This is an area that needs to be addressed in future research.

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