What did they think as they watched the burning Yuanmingyuan?

Yuanmingyuan · Jeong Ho-seung · Seoul National University

Introduction: The Battle of Baliqiao

On September 21, 1860, a large-scale engagement was attempted by Qing forces, comprising numerous Manchu and Mongol Eight Banners cavalry, against the Anglo-French allied forces near Baliqiao (八里橋, Palikao or Eight-mile bridge), west of present-day Tongzhou, Beijing. The Qing forces were led by Sengge Rinchen, who had experienced victory in the Second Battle of Taku Forts, while the Anglo-French allied forces, though lacking unified command, were led by Montauban for the French and Elgin for the British. The Qing army numbered 30,000, with approximately 10,000 of them being Mongol Eight Banners cavalry. In contrast, the Anglo-French allied forces each consisted of about 4,000 British and French soldiers, with the French army taking the main offensive role, thus Montauban was arbitrarily appointed as the overall commander (de Saint-Amand, 1912).

Such a disparity in forces was so immense in pre-modern warfare that it could determine victory before the battle even began. This is because, whether in pre-modern or even in modern European armies equipped with firearms and established linear tactics, cavalry was an overwhelmingly important factor in battle. In the Hammer and Anvil tactic, considered the standard and perfection of pre-modern battle tactics, cavalry was the most crucial element in deciding the course of the battle. While the infantry, serving as the anvil, engaged or clashed with the enemy, the cavalry, responsible for flanking maneuvers, encirclement, and rear assaults, could determine the fate of the battlefield. In this regard, the Qing forces held an overwhelming advantage. Therefore, if the Qing army and the Anglo-French allied forces had been comparable in strength at the time, the outcome of this battle would have been undeniably a Qing victory.

Indeed, the outcome of the Battle of Baliqiao was extremely one-sided. 2 Hammer and Anvil is a set battle tactic established in Western military history, referring to a defensive and maneuver tactic composed of two army groups: the anvil, which pins down the enemy's attention and forces along the front line, and the hammer, which inflicts a fatal blow on the enemy's flank or rear through flanking maneuvers or similar movements (Gat, Azar. War In Human

Civilisation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 340) 4. What did they think as they watched the burning Yuanmingyuan?_Yuanmingyuan The one-sided victory of the Anglo-French allied forces is the key point. While at least over 1,200 Qing soldiers fell on the battlefield, the Anglo-French allied forces suffered only 2 deaths and 29 wounded from the British army, and 3 deaths and 19 wounded from the French army (de Saint-Amand, 1912). How could such a one-sided result occur?

This signifies not only a difference in the level of weaponry and technological disparity but also that European powers were overwhelmingly superior to Eastern pre-modern armies, represented by the Qing army, in terms of the art of war and tactics. The overall commander of the French forces, Montauban, who led the main offensive of the Anglo-French allied forces, claimed that the Qing cavalry launched a frontal assault after breaking through the Anglo-French allied forces' artillery fire. Testimonies from British officers who participated in the battle also suggest that the Qing cavalry launched a spontaneous charge amidst the confusion (Wolseley 1862, p.189). If these claims are true, it means that the Qing cavalry, in this battle, chose a frontal assault without coordination with the infantry, rather than the flanking maneuver based on the Hammer and Anvil tactic developed by Western commanders through long historical experience. Of course, the cavalry, which formed the core of the Qing army, 3 Although many Qing soldiers were armed with matchlocks or imported rifles, their armament and tactical utilization were not uniform like European armies, nor did they reach a level that could create tactical differences. Therefore, they are referred to as pre-modern armies in this text. The reason for such a choice might lie in the reality that the quality of the Green Standard Army, which constituted the majority of the Qing infantry, was very poor. Nevertheless, this can also be interpreted as the 20,000 Qing infantry soldiers being incapable of forming an anvil against less than half their number of Anglo-French allied forces. Consequently, due to their vulnerabilities and the disparity in technology and tactics, the Qing forces were unable to effectively utilize their advantages and were inevitably defeated one-sidedly by the Anglo-French allied forces.

The outcome of the Battle of Baliqiao thus proved that Western forces, represented by the Anglo-French allied forces, could suppress the Qing Empire, the center and strongest power of the East, without difficulty through their art of war. The Battle of Baliqiao was essentially the first large-scale engagement between the regular Qing army, comprising the elite Eight Banners, and Western armies. Therefore, the complete victory in this battle signified the overwhelming superiority of Western forces' physical power, symbolized by the Anglo-French allied forces. Upon hearing the results of the Battle of Baliqiao, the Xianfeng Emperor was forced to flee Beijing to the north, and Prince Gong, who remained in Beijing in his stead, had no choice but to appease the wrath of the Anglo-French allied forces, who were enraged by the subsequent incident of envoy detention and murder, and accept most of their demands.

Yuanmingyuan, the Anglo-French Allied Forces, and Elgin

4. What did they think as they watched the burning Yuanmingyuan?_Yuanmingyuan Construction of Yuanmingyuan began in the late Kangxi Emperor's reign in 1707 for Prince Yong (later Emperor Yongzheng), and through extensive expansion during the reigns of Emperor Yongzheng and Emperor Qianlong, it was completed into the Yuanmingyuan known before its destruction (Barme, 1996). Giuseppe Castiglione and Michel Benoist, Jesuit missionaries dispatched to Qing China, also participated in the construction of Yuanmingyuan. The Western-style gardens and fountains, widely known as remnants, are said to be their work. However, the misfortune that befell Yuanmingyuan, a product of this collaboration between Western and Eastern cultures, was that its location lay directly in the path of the Anglo-French allied forces advancing towards Beijing after the Battle of Baliqiao.

Despite the overwhelming victory at the Battle of Baliqiao and the disintegration of most Qing forces near Beijing, the Anglo-French allied forces did not immediately enter Beijing. This was because the path of the Anglo-French allied forces was not entirely clear even after their victory. The sporadic resistance from Qing forces under Sengge Rinchen and delays in the advance of the French forces, one of the allied parties, continued to be problematic. According to letters from Lord Elgin, the British commander, the allied forces advanced only about two miles on October 3.

We have moved about two miles, and are now lodged in a mosque—a

nice building, a good deal ornamented—which is for the nonce turned

to profane uses. The army was to have advanced to attack Sang-ko-lin- sin's force to-morrow, but now I am told the French are not ready. …

These delays give the Chinese fresh heart, and they are beginning to

send people to fire on our convoys, &c., coming up from

Tientsin.(Elgin, 1860)

In this situation, Elgin learned of Yuanmingyuan on Sunday, October 7. The issue was that he did not hear this news from directly seeing and hearing Yuanmingyuan himself, but rather from reports from the French forces that had advanced ahead and the British cavalry accompanying them. Furthermore, judging from the situation described in a letter to his wife, it appears that by the time Elgin arrived to see Yuanmingyuan himself in the afternoon, the initial looting had already taken place.

We hear this morning that the French and our cavalry have captured

the Summer Palace of the Emperor. All the big-wigs have fled, nothing

remains but a portion of the household. We are told that the prisoners

are all in Pekin. … Five P.M.—I have just returned from the Summer

Palace. It is really a fine thing, like an English park—numberless

buildings with handsome rooms, and filled with Chinese curios, and

handsome clocks, bronzes, &c. But, alas! such a scene of

desolation.(Elgin, 1860) 4. What did they think as they watched the burning Yuanmingyuan?_Yuanmingyuan

Elgin's impression of Yuanmingyuan in his letter was far from dismissive. What he described about Yuanmingyuan aligns considerably with the information we have from remaining records about the garden. Before seeing Yuanmingyuan in person, Elgin was deeply disappointed by reports that most of the Qing court officials had fled, leaving only the buildings behind. However, after seeing it himself in the afternoon and returning, he recorded in his letter that Yuanmingyuan was like an 'English park decorated with Chinese ornaments.' This impressive description of the garden was not unique to Elgin; other British officers who visited Yuanmingyuan at the time also left similar accounts (Wolseley 1862, M. Ghee 1862). At the same time, however, he expressed regret over the dilapidated state of the palace, which had been left unattended as its caretakers had fled, and had already been significantly looted by the French forces.4 This sentiment of regret is further evident at the end of the letter.

Plundering and devastating a place like this is bad enough, but what is

much worse is the waste and breakage. Out of 1,000,000 l. worth of 4 In another part of the letter, Elgin mentions that the French general stated he was preventing looting to ensure the fair distribution of spoils, and expresses deep distrust in his own troops' control.

property, I daresay 50,000 l. will not be realised. French soldiers were

destroying in every way the most beautiful silks, breaking the jade

ornaments and porcelain, &c. War is a hateful business. The more one

sees of it, the more one detests it.(Elgin, 1860)

Elgin did not take the unfortunate fate of the delegation lightly. He recognized it as a grave war crime and believed that the Chinese Emperor, who had fled after committing such a crime, deserved punishment. The decision to destroy Yuanmingyuan was made in this context. In other words, if one clarifies the timeline of Elgin's perception of Yuanmingyuan and his decision to destroy it, it becomes clear that his destruction of Yuanmingyuan was by no means because he considered it an insignificant place. 4. What did they think as they watched the burning Yuanmingyuan?_Yuanmingyuan

Rather, what should be noted here is that Elgin viewed the destruction of Yuanmingyuan as a means of retribution against the Emperor personally.

As almost all the valuables had already been taken from the palace, the

army would go there, not to pillage, but to mark, by a solemn act of

retribution, the horror and indignation with which we were inspired by

the perpetration of a great crime. The punishment was one which

would fall, not on the people, who may be comparatively innocent, but

exclusively on the Emperor, whose direct personal responsibility for

the crime committed is established, not only by the treatment of the

prisoners at Yuen-ming-yuen, but also by the edict, in which he offered

a pecuniary reward for the heads of the foreigners, adding, that he was

ready to expend all his treasure in these wages of assassination.(Elgin,

1860)

From this perspective, it is accurate to say that Elgin viewed Yuanmingyuan as the personal property of the Qing Emperor. He speaks of the destruction of Yuanmingyuan in a very decisive tone as a 'solemn act of retribution.' For Elgin, although Yuanmingyuan was a beautiful place that reminded him of gardens in his homeland, it was also the least unpleasant means available to inflict just punishment on the Emperor, given his promise not to enter or harm Beijing. Thus, the destruction of Yuanmingyuan was the only option left.

Geremie Barme describes the situation Elgin faced during the destruction of Yuanmingyuan as an 'irony,' stating that Elgin's decision was a means to punish the Emperor without harming the relatively innocent people of China. As seen in Elgin's personal records above, his perception of the destruction of Yuanmingyuan leans towards destroying the Emperor's private treasures without additional loss of life. Therefore, he also later mentioned that he personally did not wish for the destruction of Yuanmingyuan. The following year, upon returning to his home country, he stated at a Royal Academy banquet that he deeply regretted the destruction he carried out at Yuanmingyuan, yet at the same time, he confessed that the destruction of Yuanmingyuan was the only means available to adequately punish the Emperor for the crimes he had committed at the time.

I hope that I may be allowed to take one step more in the same

direction, and to assure you that no one regretted more sincerely than I

did the destruction of that collection of summer-houses…… But when 4. What did they think as they watched the burning Yuanmingyuan?_Yuanmingyuan

I had satisfied myself that in no other way, except, indeed, by

inflicting on this country and on China the calamity of another year of

war…… I felt that the time had come when I must choose between the

indulgence of a not unnatural sensibility and the performance of a

painful duty.(Elgin, 1861)

And who else saw it?

Among the European figures present at the destruction of the Yuanmingyuan who left records, there were several besides Elgin. Among these figures, perhaps the most famous is Charles George Gordon, later known as 'General Gordon' or 'Chinese Gordon.' He was a captain in the Royal Engineers of the British Army during the Anglo-French expedition in the Second Opium War. His records also reveal that despite the British army's victory in a large-scale field battle in September, they had not directly entered Beijing by mid-October. Simultaneously, he left behind records that support the fact that the British army's burning of the Yuanmingyuan was not simply because direct destruction or looting of Beijing was impossible.

On the 11th October we were sent down in a great hurry to throw up works and batteries against the town, as the Chinese refused to give up

the gate we required them to surrender before we would treat with

them…… the Chinese were given until twelve on the 13th to give up

the gate. We made a lot of batteries, and everything was ready for the

assault of the wall, which is battlemented, and forty feet high, but of

inferior masonry.(Hake 1884, p.31)

Gordon's records, being letters to his wife, supplement Elgin's records, which could not provide detailed military deployment information. The fact that the British army could establish artillery positions capable of attacking the city from the outskirts of Beijing at any time suggests that, despite sporadic resistance after the defeat at Baliqiao, the Qing imperial government in Beijing no longer had the capacity to organize a large field army to challenge the Anglo-French allied forces. This implies that the Qing army could not have prevented the British army from attempting direct looting of Beijing. This lends justification to the idea that Elgin's choice of the Yuanmingyuan as the target for destruction, rather than a direct attack on Beijing, might have had its own significance, even considering the potential negative political repercussions of looting Beijing.

Meanwhile, Gordon also left behind records of his direct impressions of the beauty of the Yuanmingyuan and its destruction. At the same time, an interesting point in Gordon's records is that, unlike Elgin, who was reticent about the matter, he clearly recorded that extensive looting by the British army had occurred. 4. What did they think as they watched the burning Yuanmingyuan? - Yuanmingyuan

The General ordered it to be destroyed, and stuck up proclamations to

say why it was ordered. We accordingly went out, and, after pillaging

it, burned the whole place, destroying in a Vandal-like manner most

valuable property, which could no be replaced for four millions.(Hake

1884, p.33)

Of course, Gordon, like Elgin, did not fail to mention that the French army was the primary perpetrator of the looting. Furthermore, Gordon expressed his regret over the burning of the Yuanmingyuan more directly than Elgin. This is understandable given the level of his appreciation for the splendor of the Yuanmingyuan and his feelings about its destruction.

You would scarcely conceive the magnificence of this residence, or the

tremendous devastation the French have committed. The throne and

room were lined with ebony, carved in a marvellous way…… as much

splendour and civilization as you would see at Windsor.(Hake 1884,

p.33) Gordon's praise for the beauty of the Yuanmingyuan can also be understood from his records as leading to sorrow over the situation requiring its destruction and self-criticism for his actions.

You can scarcely imagine the beauty and magnificence of the places

we burnt. It made one’s heart sore to burn them; in fact, these palaces

were so large, and we were so pressed for time…… It was wretchedly

demoralizing work for an army.(Hake 1884, p.33)

Gordon's attitude, as described above, appears noble on the surface and also shows that, unlike Elgin, he perceived the Yuanmingyuan and its destruction as the destruction of art and civilization. Of course, Gordon also expressed great sorrow over the fate of the diplomatic mission and acknowledged the need to take action to counter it. The difference in perception between Elgin and Gordon should be attributed to both their positions within the military at the time and their personal experiences.

However, the word 'demoralizing' used by Gordon when recording the destruction of the Yuanmingyuan warrants reconsideration. While the perceptions of Elgin and Gordon examined so far are based on their personal records, it is important to note that both individuals were intellectuals of considerable standing at the time, and they were either in need of justifying their actions or would later attain positions where such justification would be necessary. In that sense, it is crucial how Gordon's use of 'demoralizing' is interpreted, as it can lead to entirely different interpretations of his perception of the Yuanmingyuan's destruction. Generally, this word is used to mean 'to break morale,' and even if we interpret it as Gordon intended, there is no problem with the context. However, if it is linked to the meaning of 'moral corruption,' there is room to interpret that Gordon perceived the destruction of the Yuanmingyuan as a mentally unpleasant or inferior act. The reason for suggesting this direction of interpretation is that if used in the former sense, the description of the army's morale being broken by Gordon presents a stark contrast to the actual situation of the British army at the time.

Colonel Garnett Joseph Wolseley of the 90th Light Infantry Regiment recorded the destruction of the Yuanmingyuan in retrospect shortly after the war as follows:

It was the stamp which gave an unmistakeable reality to our work of

vengeance, proving that Lord Elgin's last letter was no idle threat, and

warning them of what they might expect in the capital itself, unless they accepted our proffered terms. The Imperial palace within the city

still remained untouched, and if they wished to save that last

remaining palace for their master, it behoved them to lose no time. I

feel convinced that the burning of Yuen-ming-yuen considerably

hastened the final settlement of affairs, and strengthened our

ambassador's position.(Wolseley 1862, p.279)

This perception, while not perfectly aligning with Elgin's, can be seen as generally moving in the same direction. According to Wolseley, the British army at the time was greatly angered by the hostage-taking and murder of the diplomatic mission, and they perceived the destruction of the Yuanmingyuan as an act that would hasten the end of the war and impress upon the Chinese the superiority of the British forces. Furthermore, even before the destruction of the Yuanmingyuan, the looted items from the Yuanmingyuan had already been distributed through auctions, so the soldiers and officers were quite satisfied with the spoils of war they had obtained. 5 This situation can be seen as contrary to Gordon's description of the general decline in British army morale. Rather, the burning of the Yuanmingyuan itself could be perceived as an act of revenge for the tragedy that befell the British envoy and a means of re-energizing the troops.

5 Of course, they were greatly angered by the fact that the spoils were ridiculously small compared to those obtained by the French army. 4. What did they think as they watched the burning Yuanmingyuan? - Yuanmingyuan

Wolseley also shows an interesting shift in perspective regarding the criticism of the Yuanmingyuan's burning.

Our allies, who had looted all and destroyed some of the buildings of

that place, objected to our putting the coup de grace to their work. It

was averred that the complete destruction of the palaces would be a

Gothlike act of barbarism. It seems strange that this idea did not occur

to the generally quick perceptions of our Gallic allies before they had

shorn the place of all its beauty and ornament, by the removal or

reckless destruction of everything that was valuable within its

precincts, leaving us, indeed, little more than the bare shell of the

buildings on which to wreak our vengeance for the cruelties practised

therein upon our ill-fated countrymen.(Wolseley 1862, pp.279-280)

Here, Wolseley expresses the view that the burning of the Yuanmingyuan was not significantly different from the extensive looting already carried out by the French army. The fact that he refers to the French army's criticism of the British actions as 'Gothlike' while calling them 'Gallic allies' even evokes a sense of wit. However, it is important to remember that, ultimately, Wolseley's pointing out that the French army's looting and the British army's burning were the same act of destruction does not absolve the British army's burning. Conversely, if we assume the British army arrived at the Yuanmingyuan before the French army, there is no guarantee they would not have engaged in looting, and in such a case, the British army's rhetoric of revenge and punishment for the envoy's suffering while burning the Yuanmingyuan would merely be seen as a pretext to conceal their own looting.

Additionally, there is an interesting record among the accounts of the British soldiers who entered the Yuanmingyuan. Robert James Leslie M.Ghee was in a rather unique position amidst the chaotic situation near Beijing, as he was affiliated with the British army but was not a formal soldier but a chaplain. He witnessed both the British army's entry into the Yuanmingyuan and its burning, and like Wolseley, he left records shortly after the war. His records about the Yuanmingyuan include a very direct description of it as an architectural work combining Eastern and Western elements.

Here were some exquisite boudoirs, fitted up with the perfection of

Eastern luxury and taste; and a spiral staircase, the only on in the

building, led to a similar suite of apartments overhead, a great part of

whose ornament consisted in the most rare and costly of Chinese

works of art, with a few, French in manufacture as in design and

taste.(M.Ghee 1862, p.209) 4. What did they think as they watched the burning Yuanmingyuan? - Yuanmingyuan

Of course, he mentions Western-style objects and buildings found in the Yuanmingyuan, speculating they might be French or left by a British missionary in the previous century, as he could not ascertain the Yuanmingyuan's origins precisely. Nevertheless, it is clear that the appearance of the Yuanmingyuan was significantly different from what he considered a typical 'Eastern' palace. He was even aware that parts of the Yuanmingyuan were built by Jesuit missionaries. His description of the Yuanmingyuan is among the most detailed of the eyewitnesses introduced here, and perhaps because he was not a soldier, it is filled with the most emotional descriptions and admiration.

Therefore, M'Ghee's sentiments regarding the burning of the Yuanmingyuan show similarities to Gordon's. He recognized the artistic and historical value of the Yuanmingyuan and, consequently, dedicated a significant portion of his record to expressing sorrow over it.

Yes, a good work, I repeat it, though I write it with regret, with sorrow;

stern and dire was the need that a blow should be struck which should

be felt at the very heart’s core of the Government of China, and it was

done. It was a sacrifice of all that was most ancient and most beautiful,

but it was offered to the manes of the true, the honest, and the valiant,

and it as no too costly, oh no! one of such lives was worth it all. It is gone, but I do not know how to tear myself from it.(M.Ghee 1862, p.289)

This lamentation by M'Ghee, filled with emotional rhetoric, simultaneously reveals his unique perception of the destruction of the Old Summer Palace. According to his perception, the ultimate cause was the Chinese government's disregard for justice, represented by Britain, and the Old Summer Palace was akin to a sacrificial offering to guide China, which disregarded Britain's sense of responsibility and justice in the world, toward a better path. He concludes his reflections on the burning of the Old Summer Palace with an expression that strongly reveals his identity as both a soldier and a pastor, hoping that the destruction of the Old Summer Palace would bring the Chinese government to its senses and allow Christian propagation within China to be revitalized by the success of endeavors like the Taiping Rebellion.6

Conclusion

The burning of the Old Summer Palace during the Second Opium War was condemned by European intellectuals at the time, and this condemnation has only intensified rather than weakened over time. Victor Hugo's expression, which likens the Anglo-French allied forces to thieves, has evolved into the modern appellation of 'liberal barbarian' by Erik Ringmar. The destructive acts perpetrated by the British army at the Old Summer Palace have been treated as barbaric. (Erik 2013) 4. What did they think as they watched the Old Summer Palace burn?_However, based on the records left by M'Ghee, it appears that he did not have a deep understanding of these 'rebels' or a clear awareness of their actions; rather, he merely recognized that the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom's claims were similar to Christianity. 4. What did they think as they watched the Old Summer Palace burn?

However, as this paper demonstrates, the burning of the Old Summer Palace was not an event stemming from ignorance of its artistic value or historical significance, nor was it initially a planned scene of barbaric looting and destruction. To understand the tragedy of the burning of the Old Summer Palace, it is necessary to first grasp the mindset of the perpetrators, the British army, who initiated this event. Therefore, this study attempts to understand the events on the scene from the perspective of the actors, based on the records left by various individuals belonging to the British expeditionary force at the time.

The records of various actors consistently point out that this event had a punitive character. Among the actors examined in this paper, with the exception of Charles George Gordon, it can be confirmed that the other individuals held the perception that the burning of the Old Summer Palace was a just judgment against the emperor who had committed war crimes. This is a matter that becomes more significant when understood from the perspective of the on-site actors as participants in the war. Regardless of the legitimacy of the Second Opium War, from the standpoint of the participants who were already engaged in the war, the fact that the emperor cruelly treated the envoys dispatched for peace negotiations, and then released them and fled when the war situation turned unfavorable, was sufficient to be perceived as an act that delayed the end of the war and simultaneously a crime of evading responsibility.

Secondly, a significant aspect of the actors' perceptions is that while they acknowledged the historical/artistic value of the Old Summer Palace to some extent, they fundamentally treated it as the emperor's private property. This perception, intertwined with the aforementioned recognition of the need for punishment against the emperor, played a crucial role in the British army's belief that they had acquired legitimacy for the destruction of the Old Summer Palace.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that behind the condemnation of the destruction of the Old Summer Palace, which has continued from Victor Hugo's time to the present, lay a form of 'Orientalism.' While their criticism included a self-deprecating nuance that the European armies had forfeited their status as civilized people by engaging in acts similar to barbarians, it can also be seen as an expression of pride, stemming from the awareness of their own civilization and the need to guard against such base actions. The premise of their own civilizational superiority already exists at the point where 'civilization' and 'barbarian' are distinguished.

Of course, this does not mean that we should sympathize with or defend the position of the British army in the burning of the Old Summer Palace. The criticism of the looting activities of the French army, mentioned by British Lieutenant Colonel Oliphant in this paper, can be seen as a poignant self-criticism. This is because it acknowledges that the looting activities of the French army and the burning activities of the British army take the form of vandalism in the same context. Ultimately, the burning of the Old Summer Palace, even if embellished through the study of the actors' mindsets, was merely a primary act of retaliation on the spot for the crimes of the other party. What this study aims to convey is not to justify past events through this primary study of mindsets, but to point out the dangers of understanding events simplistically through the mindset of modern people. Based on this understanding and insight into the parties involved in the event, we should be able to understand history more complexly and ask new questions. In that sense, let us return to the content mentioned at the beginning of the article. Does military superiority in warfare also imply so-called civilizational superiority? How about reflecting on a major event like the burning of the Old Summer Palace in this regard?

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