Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan

해상자위대 사세보 사료관 · 김상훈 · 고려대학교

Introduction

There seems to be a nation-wide consensus in the United States that China clearly is a revisionist power and is becoming increasingly assertive against its neighbors. Andrew Yeo (2019) found that the adjective “assertiveness” has been frequently attached to “China” since 2009 throughout the U.S. literature from news articles to academic writings. 1 In line with the prevailing opinion on China, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (2020) recently gave a speech at the 1 Also see, Adam Breuer and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Memes, narratives and the emergent US-China security dilemma,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 32, no. 4 (2019). 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 Nixon Library and referred to China as a “Marxist-Leninist regime” and Xi Jinping as a “true believer in a bankrupt totalitarian ideology.” The symbolic speech signals a break from engagement initiated by Nixon in his meeting with Mao Zedong in 1972. Donald Trump has long taken a wide-ranging adversarial stance against China—waging a trade war shortly after his inauguration in 2017, imposing travel bans on Chinese citizens, and recently publishing a report that stated China aims to revise the world order. (Office of the Secretary of State 2020) Trump (2020) also blamed China for the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and urged member states at the United Nations General Assembly to “hold China accountable for their actions.” In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) ‘2020 China Military Power Report’ clearly states that “China’s national ambitions and governance systems, coupled with growing means and opportunity, induce it to adopt more assertive and revisionist policies.” A more competitive U.S. stance towards China is not a unique feature of the Trump administration, but instead has become a “new consensus, encompassing both parties, the military establishment, and key elements of the media” (Zakaria 2020, 52).

The U.S. DoD report’s logic that a country will become more assertive and revisionist when they have the means and opportunity is problematic because it is mainly vested in an offensive realist understanding of international politics. For example, John Mearsheimer (2014, 379-380) argues that “if China continues its rapid economic growth, it will almost certainly become a superpower, which means it will build the power-projection capability necessary to compete with the United States around the globe.” The logic is simple: the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no central authority that can mediate conflicts of interest among states, and therefore has to act upon the mandate of self-help to ultimately ensure one’s survival in the system. For China, controlling the sea lanes of communication is a matter of survival because the maritime trade routes are crucial to maintaining economic growth (Wei 2017, 172). Naturally, for offensive realists, China becomes inevitably assertive in the form of rapid naval modernization to establish control over the sea routes which is currently dominated by the United States. However, the question remains: What exactly is an “assertive” foreign policy? On what grounds is China assertive against Taiwan?

The problem with offensive realist arguments is that it singularly provides conflictual prescriptions on state behavior—power maximization—based on given assumptions of state actors and the nature of international relations. As Kenneth Waltz (1996, 54-57) wrote resolutely, “international politics is not foreign policy.” In brief, the two are different because the ordering principles at the system-level (anarchy) is different from that at the state-level (hierarchy), and therefore, 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 explaining particularities of state behavior (foreign policy) relying on system theories is fundamentally erroneous. Accordingly, stipulating Chinese foreign policy as assertive based on offensive realism (theory of international politics) is deemed erroneous. Hence, if one demands elaboration on “what constitutes an assertive foreign policy?” towards offensive realists, the answer probably would be, “a theory at one level of generality cannot answer questions about matters at a different level of generality.” (Waltz 1979, 121) The point here is that explanations of Chinese foreign policy solely based upon exogenous variables are unwarranted and that complementary indicators must be factored in to the discussion.

The research question bears significance because as Iain Alastair Johnston (2013, 7-8) pointed out, “the new assertiveness meme could contribute to an emerging security dilemma in the U.S.-China relationship” and narrow down public discourse to adversely obstruct alternative perspectives from challenging conventional wisdom.” The unwarranted practice of attaching “assertiveness” to China can aggravate the already-intensifying mistrust and misconception between the two Great Powers. Several caveats need to be addressed before delving into the discussion. First, this article is not intended to argue that the sources of Chinese conduct at sea is rather benign as may have been suggested above. As a matter of fact, the article concludes that China is indeed assertive against Taiwan, but comes to the conclusion by evaluating the Chinese naval capabilities. Second, the article focuses on the maritime domain because “it is China’s maritime claims that best manifest its political determination and confrontational stances in recent years.” It is important to note that foreign policy has many facets, and it is impossible to generalize on what a country’s foreign policy looks like as a whole. Instead, a study of foreign policy “must rest content with mere “analyses” or “accounts,” which include whatever factors appear relevant to a particular case” (Rose 1998, 145). Here, the focus is on China’s policy towards Taiwan and aims at an “analysis” of the determinant of assertiveness. Considering that there are two policy instruments—instruments of persuasion and coercion—in a foreign policy strategy, the focus on the PLAN development is a necessary complement to other factors such as diplomacy. (Grieco, Ikenberry, Mastanduno 2015, 107). Finally, the article does not intend to present a “theory of foreign policy” or attempt to reconceptualize “assertiveness,” but to build on the existing definition as “a form of assertive diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than before” (Johnston 2013, 10).

The Motivations of PLAN Modernization

8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 The rapid economic growth and the subsequent modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has aroused debate in the academic and policy circles on what the motivations are for the recent developments. There have been three major perspectives: (1) the offensive perspective that emphasize China’s increasing assertiveness and intentions of revising the U.S.-led order, (2) the defensive perspective that is in line with the narrative of a peaceful rise within the existing international system, and (3) the domestic legitimation perspective that looks into the second-image variable to explain Chinese behavior. This section concludes that motivations are insufficient in characterizing China’s naval policy.

First, James Fanell (2019, 2) considers China’s naval modernization as part of a revisionist strategy to supplant the U.S. presence in the region. The basis of such assessment comes from China’s recent activities at sea—the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea; declaration of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ) in 2013; and resistance against the adjudication of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2016. Fanell finds China’s naval modernization project linked to the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation, and expects China to become increasingly aggressive, raising the danger of a “naval disaster, the likes of which we have not experienced since the early, dark days of World War II” (Fanell 2019, 3). His bleak prescription of the future is mainly based on the 1) increasing number of PLAN forces and 2) increasing far-seas deployments around the globe. First, Fanell (2019, 33) anticipates that the PLAN will likely have “twice as many warships and submarines as the US. Navy” over the next fifteen years. Also, referring to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) estimates, by 2030, China is anticipated to have 450 surface ships and 99 submarines, an increase from 330 surface ships and 66 submarines in 2015. Second, Fanell views China’s increasing presence in the far-seas as evidence of China’s bid for global hegemony. For example, China has been conducting anti-piracy operations since 2008 near the Gulf of Aden; Russia and China have been conducting combined naval exercises since 2012 in various venues including the Baltic Sea; and China has been investing in ports overseas, such as in Djibouti, used mainly for military purposes. In conclusion, the author urges the United States to take immediate action to counter growing Chinese influence in the global maritime domain, lest “expect to be seen as globally irrelevant, with all the negative consequences for our [the United States] national security interests and the defense of our values” (Fanell 2019, 40).

Contrary to Fanell’s view of understanding Chinese naval modernization in parallel with China’s growing hegemonic ambitions, 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 Michael Glosny and Phillip Saunders (2009, 166) argue that “the PLAN is much more likely to develop a limited [emphasis added] power- projection capability that increases China’s ability to defend regional interests in contingencies not involving the United States.” Glosny and Saunders argue that the purpose of developing naval power-projection capabilities such as the aircraft carriers are rather benign—for humanitarian assistance (via the hospital ship), naval diplomacy, and peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. It is true that China’s Navy has grown in size and quality, but the authors state that it simply reflects China’s greater responsibility to provide global common goods and to share international burdens against transnational threats at sea. Furthermore, Glosny and Saunders highlight the limited ability of Chinese naval technologies. For example, Chinese leaders acknowledge that their aircraft carriers are uncontestable (in a negative way) to the U.S. aircraft carriers in terms of size, quantity, propulsion, etc., but that the limitations are somewhat intended, to take a cautious approach not to provoke an arms race against the United States and at the same time, develop naval forces to protect its overseas interests.

Finally, Robert Ross (2009) looks within China and finds that “nationalism, rather than security, is driving China’s naval ambition.” First of all, he distinguishes land powers from sea powers and argue that categorization of a great power to either one depends on the enduring geographical circumstances rather than cultural/historical predispositions.2 China, therefore, can be classified as a land power because it faces “enduring and significant strategic challenges emanating from interior threats to their border security” (Ross 2009, 48). Looking back at the history of Great Power politics, case studies show that when land powers divert resources on developing naval assets to compete for naval supremacy with another rival, the land powers always end up in defeat. For example, Napoleon of France, despite being a continental power, increased its naval budget by more than 30 percent in the 1860s and built large capital ships, only to constrain the country’s finances and eventually lead to its downfall at Fashoda in 1899. The German Kaiser Wilhelm II also attempted to counter British naval primacy by investing in construction of dreadnoughts and spending approximately 20 percent of its budget on naval forces, only to find itself in blockade in which the British allocated almost 60 percent of the budget on the navy. In other words, Ross argues that geographical constraints are key determinants of optimal military strategies that a Great Power must depend on—land powers focusing on the army while 2 For more information on continental/maritime power distinction see, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books: 1987); Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” International Security 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010); and John K. Fairbank, “China’s Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 3 (April 1969): 449-463. 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 sea powers focusing on the navy. The failure to follow the dictums of inherited geographical circumstances leads to its downfall, just as France and Germany under the rule of Napoleon and Wilhelm II have experienced in the past. Then can an inefficient allocation of the defense budget to the navy by land powers be blamed upon the leaders solely? According to Ross (2009, 50), it is nationalism that drives states to seek prestige to bolster domestic popularity. Similarly, China’s naval buildup is driven by nationalism, “a widespread popular demand for construction of an aircraft carrier and a large blue-water navy, traditional symbols of great power status” (Ross 2009, 60).

Can motivations explain state behavior? Partly yes, but not fully so. Fanell believes that China has revisionist motivations and therefore has been increasing the number of battle ships and dispatching naval task groups further ashore. Glosny and Saunders, on the other hand, find peaceful motivations for Chinese naval modernization as modest attempts to prevent an arms race vis-à-vis the United States and contribute to international peace and security. The opposite interpretation of the same behavior mainly derives from prior assumptions on motivations without elaborating on what makes a state revisionist or status-quo in the first place. Ross finds nationalism to be the key variable of PLAN naval build up, reflecting domestic calls for heightened international status. The problem in all three perspectives is that motivations need not match the character of the behavior. Without much emphasis needed, even if China had peaceful or defensive intentions to modernize the Navy, others will perceive it as a threat (Jervis 1978). Absent of objective indicators that characterize Chinese behavior as assertive or non-assertive, the interpretation of Chinese foreign policy will always depend on the eye of the beholder. This is why China’s anti-piracy operations in the Middle East is seen as an attempt to increase global presence, reflecting China’s growing hegemonic ambitions, or as sincere contributions to international peace as a responsible stakeholder. Moreover, as Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu points out: “In multipolar and bipolar systems, balancing is the primary mechanism to preserve the status quo. Under unipolarity, in contrast, balancing becomes the very definition of revisionism: the goal of restoring a global balance of power requires the overthrow of the existing unipolar structure” (Schweller and Pu 2011, 44-45). In other words, if state behavior is simply derived from systemic understandings of polarity, then whatever China does in a unipolar world, every policy will be interpreted as revisionist. Blurring the assertive/non-assertive particularities into a single “revisionist” category is analytically unsound and carries the danger of “narrowing down public discourse.” Instead, as Charles Glaser opened up the possibility of a grand bargain or cooperation between the United States and China, assessment of the 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 military posture needs to be added to the analysis while accepting the fungible nature of state motivations (Glaser 2015). The next section takes stock of the Chinese naval modernization according to various types of naval forces. The examination will center around the aircraft carriers, nuclear-submarines, surface ships, amphibious ships, and related naval exercises to argue that China is increasing landing capabilities through acquisition of amphibious vessels and relevant training while aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are intended to deny U.S. access within the first island chain.

Evaluating China’s Naval Modernization

Aircraft Carriers The Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier commissioned in 2012, has a long history of acquisition that dates back to the 1970s. Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon, and Cortez Cooper (2015) summarizes the history of China’s development of an indigenous aircraft carrier in association with a prominent PLAN leader Liu Huaqing. The idea to build a blue- water-capable naval asset in China was first promoted by Liu when he proposed preparation plans for attaining an aircraft carrier to his military superiors in 1970. However, the idea was largely disregarded at the time by the People’s Liberation Army since the main threat to China originated from the Soviet army. After Mao Zedong’s death and the succession of Deng Xiaoping who partially opened up the closed economy since 1978, protecting international maritime trade routes became increasingly important, and thus, demanded a stronger naval presence at sea. Reflecting greater attention put on improving naval capabilities, Liu, being promoted to commander of the PLAN, soon established a naval institute to conduct research on the feasibility of acquiring an aircraft carrier. By the late 1990s, the Soviet Union had long been dissolved and greater emphasis has been put on developing advanced naval assets with a continued rapid economic growth. In 1998, a Chinese company had assumed a former aircraft carrier (the Varyag) from Ukraine in order to re-manufacture it into a floating casino near Macau. However, the business plan was soon found to be unrealistic as the waters near Macau was too shallow to stage a massive ship near the shores. Instead, it was sent to the northern port of Dalian in 2002. The Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC), a military body parallel to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally approved the plan to redirect the ship into an aircraft carrier in 2004. In sum, the history of China’s decision to acquire an aircraft carrier reveals unpopularity of the aircraft carrier until the 1980s, but gradually rising to demand with increasing 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 interests to protect the sea lines of communication (SLOC). Moreover, the CMC and the PLA in general, was disinterested enough in modernizing naval capabilities as to find the once-planned-casino-vessel as an initial aircraft carrier. As a matter of fact, the Liaoning has been considered as a “starter” aircraft, using it mostly for pilot training (O’Rourke 2020, 13). Compared to the U.S. Navy carriers, the Liaoning is conventionally powered (steam engine); carry less fixed-wing aircrafts (24 versus 55 of USS Ronald Reagan); smaller in size (60,000 tons versus 88,000 tons of USS Ronald Reagan); and use ski-jump racks to launch fighter jets from deck rather than the catapult system (CSIS China Power 2020). Five years after the commissioning of Liaoning, China launched the second-generation aircraft called the Shandong in 2017. Although, many features including the jet launch system from deck, weight, and length are similar to the previous model, there are some notable differences that make Shandong more advanced. First, the latest aircraft carrier can carry four more fixed-wing aircrafts or eight more helicopters depending on the decision to allocate aircrafts onboard. This was possible by enlarging the airwing and reducing the size of the island bridge by 10 percent, providing additional space on deck for more aircrafts (CSIS China Power 2020). However, the biggest limitation to the Shandong, as well as the Liaoning, is that the aircraft launch system hinders strategic utility of the fighter jets. While the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark jets can theoretically base 2 YJ-83K Eagle Strike antiship missiles; 2 short-range PL-8 air-to-air missiles; and 4 bombs, the Short Take Off Barrier Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) system of the aircraft carrier disallows the fighter jets to launch with full-load (Curnow 2020). In sum, the Chinese aircraft carriers are no match to the nuclear- powered carriers of the United States in terms of both quality and quantity (the United States currently operates 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers). Nevertheless, China’s aircraft carrier program is at the forefront at least in the Asia-Pacific region. India operates one aircraft carrier while the second is “already more than five years behind schedule”; Japan is in the initial stages of converting the Izumo DDH-183 into an aircraft carrier (Matheswaran 2020; Ortiz 2020); South Korea and ASEAN states possess none. Furthermore, China’s third aircraft carrier is under construction and is expected to launch in 2022. Although it is expected to be conventionally powered and feature similar capabilities to the preceding models, satellite imagery show that the third carrier will be bigger in size and possibly be equipped with electromagnetic catapults (Joe 2020). By 2035, reports estimate that China will have at least six operating aircraft carriers. The Liaoning is stationed in the North Sea Fleet and Shandong will presumably be stationed in the Hainan province considering a grand ceremony held there before moving back to Dalian for maintenance (Liu 2020). Overall, despite substantial improvements 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 since 2012, the utility of aircraft carriers for coercion is limited. As Ronald O’Rourke (2020, 16) stated in the CRS report: “Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, they are not considered critical for Chinese operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within range of land-based Chinese aircraft.” In addition, the absence of nuclear-powered propulsion system restricts Chinese projection of power beyond the second island and past the Malacca Strait to the Indian Ocean. If it were to increase presence in the South China Sea and to strategic choke points using the aircraft carrier, the lethal naval weaponry will do more harm than good in instigating heated protests from neighboring states. Finally, the artificial islands that China have been building are rarely suitable for docking aircraft carriers. Instead, China has been focusing on constructing airstrips for military purposes.

Nuclear Submarines China is one of the six countries that own and operate nuclear-powered submarines.3 There are 47 conventionally powered submarines which take up nearly 75% of the total number of submarines. The Han-class 3 Five other countries that operate nuclear-powered submarines are: The United States, Russia, Britain, France, India, and Brazil. (type-091) submarine was first commissioned in 1974 and it was the first nuclear-powered submarine that the Chinese produced indigenously. Despite being nuclear-powered that theoretically enabled the submarines to operate underwater for an unlimited time, the type-091 submarines appeared only in adjacent waters near the mainland, reportedly due to engineering issues. It took seven years to produce the type-091 submarine since the initiation of the development project in 1968, and only four more were added until 1991 (Mizokami 2020). As a matter of fact, the first indigenous nuclear-powered submarines struggled with numerous technical problems, including the high-level noise that the propulsion system emitted, reducing the utility of the submarines for strategic purposes beyond littoral waters. The Xia-class (type-092) submarine, first commissioned in 1987, was China’s first nuclear- powered submarine that had the capability to launch a ballistic missile underwater. This is why the type-091 submarines are labelled as SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines), while the type-092 submarines are SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines). However, only one Xia-class submarine was ever produced, which implies that the second- generation submarine also experienced severe engineering problems. In fact, the type-092 submarine had an identical design of type-091 but had been slightly enlarged to fit vertical ballistic tubes within the submarine (Larson 2020). It is therefore likely that the type-092 submarine had 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 similar issues with the propulsion system and had to be used for limited purposes, such as experimenting with the SLBM launch technology and using it as a symbol of achieving an underwater second-strike capability against adversaries. The Shang-class (type-093) submarines, first commissioned in 2006, are drastically more advanced than the previous two nuclear submarines. The type-093 SSNs have undergone series of technological improvements, adding better detection systems such as flank arrays and towed array sonars, and the noise level that the engine emits has come close to 110 decibels.4 In addition, the submarines have vertical launch system (VLS) cells along with the torpedo tubes that can fire variations of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) such as the YJ-18 and CJ-10 (Gady 2018). Although only six type-093 submarines were produced, the reason may have been the limited production capacity of the Bohai shipyard which exclusively produces them (Sutton 2020). Finally, the Jin-class (type-094) submarines are the latest flagship SSBNs that first appeared in 2007. The type-094 nuclear submarines are equipped with 12 missile tubes that can carry JL-2 SLBMs. Typically, the type-094 submarines would fit 1-3 nuclear warheads on the JL-2s 4 The closer the noise level to ambient sea noise, which is around 90 decibels, the stealthier the submarine is. The USN Los-Angeles-class submarines have similar noise decibels to the PLAN Shang-class submarines. H. I. Sutton, “China’s Submarines May Be Catching Up With U.S. Navy,” Forbes,

November 24, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2019/11/24/latest- chinese-submarines-catching-up-with-us-navy/?sh=7c46fc24298c. that would allow China to have a reliable second-strike deterrent against adversaries (Navy Recognition 2020). The submarine force, like the aircraft carriers, is also limited to regional operations despite the potential for expanding the scope using nuclear-powered submarines. First, the production of diesel submarines outweighs that of the nuclear submarines. In 2005, there were 8 nuclear submarines and 51 diesel submarines. In 2020, only three more nuclear submarines have been added to the stockpile while diesel submarines increased to 63 (Office of Naval Intelligence 2015, 15). Of course, diesel submarines take less time to build and are comparatively cheaper, but the widening gap in the number of the two submarines represent the preference of the PLAN for diesel submarines based on its strategic advantages. For one, the air- independent power (AIP) system is reportedly more silent than the noise that small nuclear reactors emit undersea. The Yuan-class (type-039A/B) diesel submarines are the latest versions of the same class and are capable of deep-water operations with improved sonar for “detecting, tracking, and engaging targets of interest” (Carlson 2015). Moreover, the ship is equipped with supersonic YJ-18 ASCMs, the primary purpose of the ship being “submerged for long periods of time in difficult-to-access shallow littorals” (Holst 2015). In other words, the diesel-type submarines are more efficient than the nuclear-type submarines which require substantial refinements in terms of noise and long-distance 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 operations. The significance of nuclear submarines remains symbolic— the achievement of a reliable nuclear second-strike capability against the United States. Therefore, considering the trends of recent acquisition, it can be expected that China will focus on making qualitative improvements on the SLBM launch technology for nuclear deterrence purposes rather than making a quantitative leap.

Destroyers

In addition to aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, China also has a robust surface force, comprised of various assortments of destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. The Luhu-class destroyers (type 052) are the oldest, proceeding the Luda-class (type 051), which have all been decommissioned by 2020 (Panda 2020). There are currently two Luhu- class destroyers (Harbin and Qingdao) in-service and the ships have continuously been improved of its armament and performance. The type-052 destroyers are the first of its kind to adopt the U.S. gas turbine propulsion system after the end of the Cold War. The gas turbines were adopted from General Electrics (GE) and each destroyer has two turbines, allowing them to cruise 5,000 miles at 16 knots while maximum speed can reach 32 knots. The ships have anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) armaments. Moreover, there is a helicopter deck at the stern, increasing warfare capabilities by carrying up to two attack helicopters. However, experts have argued that the type-052 destroyers were simply “technology demonstration vessels” that show little inter-operability between diverse functions since many parts were directly imported from abroad and the crew had little knowledge of the usage (Naval Encyclopedia 2018). However, the Luyang III-class (type 052D) guided-missile destroyers, first commissioned in March 2014, were significant additions to the PLAN naval surface force that shifted the regional naval balance of power (Holmes and Yoshihara 2017, 277). Although smaller in displacement than the U.S. Arleigh- burke-class DDGs, the type-052D destroyers have 64 VLS cells that can load various anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-surface missiles depending on the purpose of the mission. The next-generation destroyers are the Renhai-class (type 055), in which China possesses one so far, but plans to add seven more by 2022. Some are in the sea-trial phase and is expected to be in operation by this year. According to the Global Times, the type-055 destroyers are equipped with cutting-edge technology, including the dual-band radar system that can neutralize enemy stealth and satellite capabilities. The official English-language newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) directly referred to the U.S. stealth aircrafts such as the F-35s, F-22s, and the B-2 bombers that these advanced satellites are targeted to detect (Liu 2020). While the type-052 destroyers were powered by two gas turbines engines and two diesel 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 engines; type-055 destroyers have four gas turbines. Moreover, the propulsion system has been produced domestically (QC-280) without having to rely on foreign imports. In terms of armaments, the most striking characteristic of the type-055 destroyer is the 112 VLS cells that are 60 percent larger than the U.S.’ variants (Lin and Singer 2018). As noticeable by the specifications of the type-055 destroyer, it represents “a major qualitative leap for the Chinese Navy into the forefront of surface combatant design” (Caldwell, Freda, and Goldstein 2020, 1). Quantitatively as well, until 2013, China was absent of any corvettes, but within seven years, the number has risen to 49. Furthermore, by 2035, the PLAN is expected to add up to 25 type-052D and 10-12 type- 055 destroyers which will put China ahead of any other regional states in terms of surface combat ships (Peltier 2020, 3). Despite the torrid pace of PLAN surface force acquisition, the United States has the competitive edge over China at the current stage, where China has 41 destroyers and cruisers combined while the U.S. has 62 Arleigh-burke- class destroyers and 22 Ticonderoga-class cruisers (Goldstein 2017, 912). Amphibious Ships Amphibious warfare has been considered an obsolete scenario for some experts in an age of long-range assaults due to drastic advancements in weapons technology; but concentrated increase in the PLAN amphibious-related vessels and joint landing training with the Army and the Marine Corps signify China’s assertive intent towards Taiwan. There are largely four types of amphibious ships: The Landing Platform Docks (LPD), Landing Ship, Tanks (LST), Landing Ship, Mediums (LSM), and Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD). First, the Yuzhao-class (type-071) LPD was commissioned in 2007 and serves multi-purposes. The voluminous storage capacity allows the ship to carry up to 800 marines; about 20 amphibious vehicles; and four landing craft air cushioned (LCAC). The Zubr-class Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) are massive (world’s largest) hovercrafts loaded on larger amphibious ships or single- handedly to transport ground forces on expeditionary missions. Each hovercraft can accommodate up to 500 men depending on other weaponry that are loaded on the LCACs. The purpose of these hovercrafts was evident when photos were revealed of a banner hanging behind the LCACs that wrote “Reuniting the Motherland” (Rogoway 2014). While there are only four Zubr-class LCACs, sufficient number of smaller-sized hovercrafts such as the Jinsha II-class (type 722) LCACs enable China to transport large number of ground troops for invasion. The stern deck of the LPD offers space for two additional transport helicopters (Z-8) and is powered by four diesel engines, mediated by an automated propulsion control system to the twin shafts (Naval Technology 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 2020). Initially, three LPDs were put in service until 2012, but five more were added by the 12th five-year plan (2011-15), adding up to a total of 8 LPDs. The last of its kind is undergoing fitting out as of 2019 (Vavassuer 2019). In terms of LSTs, there are four sub-classes, adding up to 32 ships in total. The Yushen-class (type-075) LHD is the latest of the assortments of amphibious ships and was first launched in September 2019. As of August 2020, the second LHD is fitting out and the third is expected to launch by the end of the year (Farley 2020). Other than the one already constructed and deployed; China expects an addition of two more type- 075 LHDs by 2025 (Funaiole and Bermudez Jr. 2020). The LHDs can carry up to 900 ground troops, 30 helicopters, and a few fighter jets if the PLAN masters the electromagnetic catapult system or adopts a vertical landing aircraft. The significance of amphibious vessels lies in the ability “to make a landing in Taiwan or seize other strategically important or disputed territory in China’s offshore regions” (Lague 2020). Acquisition of amphibious vessels has been the most conspicuous aspect of the PLAN modernization project. In 1996, there were 54 amphibious landing ships; but in 2015, the number has increased to 89.

Naval Exercises The “Maneuver-5” naval exercise conducted in 2013 was the first time Chinese naval forces from all three fleets participated and tried out various open seas operations in the waters of the West Pacific Ocean. As the executive director of Maneuver-5 Rear Admiral Liao Shining stated, the purpose of the exercise was to “test the practical fighting ability and open-sea flexible fighting ability” and “display firm determination to safeguard our [China’s] marine rights” (Meng, Qian 2013). The significance of the exercise was that China went beyond the first island chain after a brief near seas training. Two frigates from the East Sea Fleet, three destroyers and two frigates from the North Sea Fleet sailed eastward crossing the Miyako Strait; a destroyer and a frigate along with a replenishment ship from the South Sea Fleet transited through the Bashi Channel to conduct a joint exercise in the western Pacific Ocean for 15 days. The drills were designed to create an actual war-like situation where training units were unaware of each other’s positions and intentions. The purpose was to “improve readiness and capabilities in more realistic combat conditions … [and to] become more flexible and responsive to changing conditions at sea” (Ruixue 2013).

In December 2016, a carrier task group has been formed with five destroyers and frigates centering around the Liaoning to enter the Pacific Ocean through the Miyako Strait. The task group then sailed past near the Pratas Island, controlled by Taiwan, into the South China Sea (The Guardian 2016). While the Maneuver-5 exercise was the first time 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 Chinese naval forces from all three fleets joined together outside the first island chain, the December 2016 exercise was the first time a carrier task group went further out to the seas to practice joint maneuvering and to conduct live fire drills. Taiwanese lawmaker Johnny Chiang (2016) argued that the exercise was “China’s signal to the United States that it has broken through the first island chain.” In response, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying spoke in a regular press brief that the exercise was “part of the annual routine exercises” and that there is no need to “read too much into it, as assuming that it is targeted against anyone” (PRC Foreign Ministry 2016).

Most recently in November 2020, China held live fire drills near the Liuzhou peninsula and amphibious exercises at the Honghai bay, near the city of Sanwei. The bay has been used occasionally for amphibious drills in the past—China and Thailand had held a combined landing exercise in May 2019 in the same area (The Global Times 2020). Three type-071 landing ships and multiple type-022 missile boats were mobilized for the landing exercise, which was aimed at “simulating a mission to land on a large island or a large group of islands and reefs” (Liu 2020). The training area is only about 100 miles away from the disputed Dongsha islands. Not far away from Sanwei is Chaozhou, where Xi Jinping had inspected the Marine Corps a month before the November exercise. There, Xi had stressed that “the PLA Navy Marine Corps is an elite force for amphibious operations, and it shoulders the important duties of safeguarding the country’s sovereignty security, territorial integrity, maritime interests, and overseas interests” (Sheng and Yuwei 2020). The emphasis put on the expeditionary force that require close cooperation between the PLAN amphibious vessels and the Marine Corps is visible through the concentration of landing exercises in recent years and the reorganization of the Marine Corps in 2017 which was enhanced in terms of size and capabilities. From a force constituted of only two brigades (approximately 5,000-6,000 marines), the Marine Corps is expected to grow into a force of 7 brigades and 30,000 personnel (Blasko, Lee 2019). In particular, the Jiaolong Commandos, also known as the “Sea Dragon,” is a special unit within the Marine Corps. An increasing emphasis is put on the Commandos as part of the amphibious assault group by instituting preferential policies to attract young talents. As the Jiaolong Commandos squadron officer Gong Kaifeng proclaimed, the aim of the special unit is to “be the point of the sword in joint operations, to strike terror into the enemy” (Li 2019).

The select naval exercises indicate that carrier task groups composed of an aircraft carrier and a number of surface ships are targeted towards the United States while landing exercises are openly in preparation of a Taiwan contingency. The case study of Chinese behavior towards Taiwan evinces the fact that concentration of 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 amphibious capabilities and exercises encourage greater assertiveness.

Chinese Assertiveness Towards Taiwan

Reunification with Taiwan has been considered one of the “core interests” of China. There are three main reasons why the Taiwan issue remains of vital importance for the PRC. First is the recovery of the separated island as part of the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation (Ma 2018).5 The report delivered at the 18th National Congress of the CPC in November 2012 made clear of this point: “Working hand in hand, we, the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, will surely accomplish the great cause of China’s reunification in the course of our common endeavor to achieve the great renewal of the Chinese nation.” The second reason is regime security. The CCP regime is increasingly receptive to the nationalistic demands of the public, and part of its legitimacy is based on the pledge to recover the old territory. As Denny Roy (2017, 1137) pointed out, “if the Party failed to respond with maximum effort to an attempt by Taiwan’s government to form a 5 To understand Xi Jinping’s concept of the Chinese Dream see, Zheng Wang, “The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 19, no. 1 (2014). separate, non-“Chinese” country, the Party could expect severe condemnation from the Mainland Chinese public for allowing a perceived loss of national territory.” Finally, China’s negligence towards increasing calls for independence in Taiwan can undermine the stability in its peripheral regions concerning ethnical minorities. Furthermore, the geographical and economic importance of Taiwan goes without saying—the island would serve as China’s key foothold in the East/South China Sea and further beyond the first island chain. China will be able to shut out U.S. entry into the South China Sea with added claims to the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that extends to the Bashi Strait.

When the U.S. Health Secretary Alex Azar visited Taiwan in August 2020—the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan since 1979—China responded with a mix of strong diplomatic statements and military actions. On the day that Azar met with Taiwanese leaders, the Chinese Air Force dispatched two fighter jets (J-10 and J-11) along the median line of the Taiwan Strait and momentarily flew into unofficial airspace boundary (Sheng 2020). In response, the Taiwanese Air Force Command criticized the intrusion of Chinese fighter jets and stated that the move had “severely undermined the security and stability of the region” (Ministry of National Defense ROC 2020). A few days later, China conducted naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait, combining all forces 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 from the three fleets, openly targeting Taiwanese secessionists and separatist activities (Wang 2020). In September, the PLAN East Sea Fleet conducted another round of exercises which the PRC Defense Ministry noted that “it will help enhance the capability of troops under the PLA Eastern Theater Command to safeguard the national unity, territorial sovereignty and security.” (Xu 2020) In addition to naval exercises, Chinese air traffic control has refused Taiwanese flight access over the Pratas Island (occupied by Taiwan) for the first time in October 2020 due to unspecified reasons. As Felix Chang (2020) noted of the incident, it “reflects a marked change in not only how China sees Taiwan’s remote outposts, but also how confident China is in its ability to control the air and sea spaces of the South China Sea and its willingness to wield that power as a political tool” Regarding questions related to Chinese force deployments such as the repositioning of J-20 stealth fighters and the DF-17 hypersonic missiles near Taiwan, Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Defense Ministry, warned: “Seeking ‘Taiwan independence’ with force is a dead-end road. Don’t every try to kick against the pricks” (Zhuo 2020).

The assertive diplomatic statements by Chinese officials are worrisome because the naval balance between China and Taiwan favors the former and the amphibious capabilities necessary for invading Taiwan are moving towards favoring the offense than the defense with the continuous acquisition of amphibious vessels and increased landing exercises that openly train to prepare for a Taiwan contingency. When comparing the naval balance between China and Taiwan, the mainland has an upper hand by a large margin. In brief, the number of Taiwanese ground forces are approximately 1/10 of China and Taiwan lags behind in all aspects of the military such as marine brigades, tanks and army aviation brigades (Hsin-po and Chin 2019). As the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress in 2019 observed, the PLA is “likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force.” While the report was pessimistic of PLAN Marine Corps’ capabilities as a global military force; examination of the 2017 reorganization measures, government will, and increase in the number of joint exercises between the Navy and the Marine Corps targeting Taiwan showcase a greater potential for the use of force in case of Taiwan’s proclamation of independence. Several studies on the potential war scenario between China and Taiwan indicate that “the bulk of Chinese troops and equipment would come from the sea” (Heginbotham 2015, 202). As H I Sutton (2020) delineates the possible war-scenario between the two countries, the carrier battle group will provide protection and air support, type-071/075 LPDs and LHDs will transport enormous amounts of Marines and Army personnel into the island, and the hovercrafts from the ship’s flooded well deck will carry 500 troops 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 at a time. As noticeable by the study of the PLAN rapid advancements in amphibious capabilities, the Chinese amphibious assault brigades are capable of establishing a beachhead for landing ships to continuously pump in fresh troops and the grounds forces of the Army will play a major role in the initial assault. While the RAND study in 2015 argued that it will take substantial time for the PLAN to gain “full repertoire of skills necessary to coordinate a large landing” based on irregular conducts of large-scale amphibious exercises; the recent developments since 2015 point towards greater ability to conduct successful landing operations in Taiwan. Overall, the tension in the cross-strait relations indicate China’s growing assertiveness based on its increased naval amphibious capabilities that puts the offense favorable than the defense and increasingly threaten to impose costs on Taiwan.

Conclusion

To summarize, the naval buildup of the PLAN and the case study showcase an assertive foreign policy relying more on coercion than persuasion. Accordingly, the PLAN has focused on acquiring amphibious naval forces and conducting joint exercises with the Marine Corps to project power and discourage Taiwan from behaving in a more autonomous manner. Evidence can be found not only from Chinese official’s diplomatic rhetoric, but also from increasing amphibious capabilities that are clearly directed against Taiwan. Of course, the case study of Chinese assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis Taiwan is highly contextual, meaning that Chinese foreign policy in other areas towards other countries may not be assertive. For instance, the PLAN hospital ship has been frequently dispatched to Africa for humanitarian assistance purposes and thus can be argued that behavior towards Kenya, for instance, may be non-assertive. Note that the aim of this article is not to make any generalizations but to argue that systemic theories are insufficient in providing a detailed account of Chinese foreign policy and suggest considering naval capabilities that show a clearer picture.

Contrary to conventional understandings of attaching Chinese assertiveness to the development of large-scale ships such as the aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines, the trend of PLAN acquisition show that China is focusing on qualitative improvements to gradually catch up the United States. As Chad Peltier testified before the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission in February 2020, “the PLAN’s Type 001 and Type 002 aircraft carriers are relatively unlikely to be used in an expeditionary role outside China’s near seas” (Peltier 2020, 3). Moreover, Chinese aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are all deployed in the North and South Sea Fleet, absent in 8. Taking Stock of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernization: Evidence of Increasing Assertiveness Against Taiwan _해상자위대 사세보 사료관 the East Sea Fleet which implies little utility against Taiwan. On the other hand, bulk of amphibious vessels are deployed in the East and South Sea Fleet. The aircraft carriers seem to reflect the growing nationalist demands to match the rising international status of China, and the nuclear-powered submarines to prove a reliable nuclear second- strike deterrent. Although the Chinese Navy is no match vis-à-vis the United States at the current stage for direct surface combat, China has the ability to deny access of U.S. Navy vessels near the Chinese coastline. Since the introduction of “anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)” strategy, China has deployed coastal guns and ballistic missiles such as the DF-21 and DF-26 to heighten the risks of U.S. naval forces sailing close to the disputed waters (Biddle and Oelrich 2016). As a result, “the U.S. war plan is now to fight primarily from outside what is called the first island chain” (Sestak 2020/21). An eventual reunification with Taiwan will further detach the United States from the East and South China Sea, reducing U.S. presence in areas of Chinese national interests. It is time to take stock of China’s improving expeditionary capabilities targeting Taiwan more than aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines that are still at the stage of demanding drastic refinements.

An assertive foreign policy is defined as policies that explicitly threaten to impose costs on another actor. Examinations of the motivations alone cannot determine the nature of foreign policies because they are based on unwarranted prior assumptions. Instead, we need to look at the force structure of the PLAN because actual dispositions often speak louder than official proclamations of intent. What makes the recent situation more worrisome is not the rhetoric, but the increasing naval landing capabilities along with the ability to fend off the United States in place of a contingency.

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