The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage: The 1980s Amendment to the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement and Trade Disputes

Finding a Center in a Turbulent East Asia: Young People of Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

Jeong Da-eun Seoul National University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: May 14, 2026

Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum · Jeong Da-eun · Seoul National University

Introduction

Due to the dual-use technological nature inherently possessed by nuclear energy, its peaceful use is encouraged only under conditions that satisfy nuclear non-proliferation. In practice, multilateral or bilateral international cooperation on nuclear technology is pursued as a means to simultaneously achieve the two goals of 'expanding use' and 'effective regulation.' Among these, bilateral nuclear cooperation typically involves a structure where a country possessing nuclear technology supplies or transfers key technologies and materials to a recipient country, in exchange for exercising regulatory and control authority. In essence, it can be described as a form of asymmetric cooperation based on the rights of the supplier and the obligations of the recipient. Interestingly, despite being the only country to have directly experienced the destructive power of atomic bombs during World War II, Japan has actively pursued the commercialization of core nuclear technologies. What is particularly noteworthy is that Japan, as a non-nuclear state party to the NPT, is recognized as a quasi-nuclear state, being the only one to possess major nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The fundamental background for the elevation of Japan's status regarding nuclear energy within the international community lies in the 'Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,' amended in 1988. Through this amendment, Japan secured the rights to reprocessing technology and plutonium use, and by establishing a long-term cooperative relationship with the United States, laid the foundation for autonomous nuclear power development. Currently, Japan possesses not only industrial-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities but also a substantial amount of plutonium. The amendment to the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement marks a turning point, standing at the boundary between the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy.

What is noteworthy here is that, unlike Japan's traditional diplomacy with the US, the negotiation process for the amendment resulted in an agreement with terms of equality, with Japan engaging the US on a considerably more equal footing. The negotiations, which lasted for about five years, encountered difficulties as Japan refused unilateral concessions to the US's demand for new regulations. Ultimately, however, many of Japan's demands were reflected in the final agreement. 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - The 1980s Amendment to the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

This was an exceptional diplomatic event, especially considering the strong influence the US exerted over Japan in economic and security matters, not just energy, at the time.

This report begins by analyzing the case of the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement amendment to examine the background behind the US's authorization of nuclear technology with potential military applications to Japan. To this end, it first reviews the domestic and international situations faced by the US and Japan in the 1980s through the lens of summit meetings between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone, and then examines the resulting changes in each country's trade policies, nuclear policies, and related laws. In particular, through the cases of the automotive trade dispute (1980-81), the semiconductor agreement (1986), and the nuclear agreement (1988), which were the most prominent topics and subjects of negotiation in US-Japan relations at the time, this report seeks to explore how the actions of various actors on the stages of 'energy' and 'economy' became intertwined within the single timeline of the '1980s.' Furthermore, by reconfirming through hearing records on the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement whether the aforementioned contextual factors were reflected, it aims to understand the diverse interests of the various actors surrounding the amendment of the agreement at the time. Thus, this report aims to identify the decisive factors that enabled the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement amendment to pass the US Congress and be ratified, by focusing on the domestic politics of each country and the interactions within the bilateral relationship between the US and Japan during the policy-making process. Therefore, this report will trace the factors behind the amendment of the nuclear cooperation agreement from the US perspective, based on the empirical findings derived from each case study.

US-Japan Relations in the 1980s: The Stages of Energy and Economy

1. Reagan-Nakasone Summit Meetings

The early Reagan administration, unlike the preceding Carter administration, pursued a policy of embracing Japan and forged a close cooperative relationship with Prime Minister Nakasone based on a shared perspective on the Soviet threat. However, due to the fact that Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume XXX, Japan; Korea, 1981-1984 and Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume XXX, Japan; Korea, 1985-1989 have not yet been declassified, there are limitations in directly verifying the intimate discussions that took place between the two leaders at the summit meetings. Therefore, this report, as a preliminary study, has divided the summit statements of President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone in the 1980s, with 1985 as a turning point, into three main areas (① Peace/Security/Defense, ② Economy/Trade, ③ Liberal Democracy/Bloc Logic) and examined how they were discussed.

At the May 1983 summit, the two leaders primarily addressed issues related to ① Peace/Security/Defense and ③ Liberal Democracy/Bloc Logic, emphasizing the importance of the US-Japan partnership and continuous cooperation (Reagan Library, 1983). At the summit on November 30 of the same year, the main topics were the situations in Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean, as well as global arms control, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union, and East-West relations. Through this, they reaffirmed the importance of the US-Japan security treaty based on common ideas and values of liberal democracy and pledged solidarity for world peace and prosperity. Regarding ② Economy/Trade, the two summit meetings generally emphasized macroeconomic issues such as the liberalization of international trade and financial systems, the elimination of protectionism, economic development without inflation, and support for developing countries, as well as multilateral trade negotiations to consolidate the global free trade system. Specifically for US-Japan relations, measures such as establishing a ministerial-level working group to implement and monitor yen-dollar exchange rate improvement measures and forming a committee to promote mutual investment were discussed. However, President Reagan pressured Prime Minister Nakasone, stating that if the trade disputes could not be overcome, the realization of the vision of international partnership between the US and Japan would be difficult (Reagan Library, 1983).

At the 1985 summit, US-Japan trade disputes became visible. Although the joint statement focused on the Geneva arms reduction talks between the US and the Soviet Union, discussing international political issues (① Peace/Security/Defense + ③ Liberal Democracy/Bloc Logic), it then devoted most of its content to bilateral trade relations (② Economy/Trade) as the top priority. The US urged Japan to implement urgent cooperative measures, such as capital market liberalization, with the long-term goal of fully opening the Japanese market and resisting protectionist pressures. In particular, it demanded efforts for more balanced development in a new era characterized by active cooperation and capital exchange in advanced technology fields. In response, Japan also promised joint follow-up measures to strengthen domestic demand-led growth and accelerate market opening (Reagan Library, 1985).

At the 1985 summit, the US-Japan trade dispute became visible. Although the joint statement focused on the Geneva arms reduction talks between the US and the Soviet Union, discussing international political issues (⓵Peace/Security/Defense + ⓷Liberal Democracy/Bloc Politics), it devoted most of its content to discussing the bilateral trade relationship (⓶Economy/Trade) as a top priority. The US urged Japan to implement urgent cooperative measures, such as capital market actions, with the long-term goal of fully opening the Japanese market and resisting protectionist pressures. In particular, it demanded efforts for more balanced development in a new era characterized by active cooperation and capital exchange in advanced technology sectors. In response, Japan also promised joint follow-up measures to strengthen domestic demand-led growth and accelerate market opening (Reagan Library, 1985).

The April 1986 summit also briefly touched upon ① Peace/Security/Defense, after which the US-Japan trade issue was the main focus as part of ② Economy/Trade. President Reagan identified the 'trade imbalance' as the biggest problem in US-Japan trade relations and once again emphasized the need to implement structural measures to improve market access and expand trade in manufacturing and other high-value-added sectors. Prime Minister Nakasone, while pointing to US protectionist pressures, pledged that the Japanese government, which supports free trade, would pursue fundamental policy changes, including strengthening the international trading system, to reduce the trade surplus (Reagan Library, 1986).

In the two summit meetings between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone in May 1987, they agreed to further strengthen policy cooperation to resolve trade friction swiftly (② Economy/Trade). The two leaders agreed that further depreciation of the dollar could hinder the resolution of the significant trade imbalance between their countries. President Reagan stated that Prime Minister Nakasone had promised to expand domestic demand by lowering interest rates, increase market access for American products, and provide foreign aid amounting to $30 billion. 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - The 1980s Amendment to the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

In return, Reagan stated he would firmly resist protectionist pressures. Prime Minister Nakasone acknowledged that Japan's significant trade imbalance with the US could have serious repercussions on the global economy and reaffirmed efforts to promote domestic growth policies and increase Japanese consumer demand.

Trade between our two countries was, as expected, an area of intense discussion.

Both Japan and the United States recognize that the current trade imbalance is politically

unsustainable and requires urgent attention.

The Prime Minister explained the measures his government intended to take, and I

support those positive steps and am optimistic that the situation will begin to improve soon.

In this regard, we reaffirmed our commitment to cooperate closely on economic policy, as

stated in our joint communiqué.

Of course, the United States must also do its part, and we make it clear that we are

committed to reducing our fiscal deficit and strengthening the competitiveness of American industry.

Consistent with the approach agreed upon by Prime Minister Nakasone and myself, protectionism will be strongly opposed on both sides of the Pacific (Reagan Library, 1987).

Consistently, protectionism on both sides of the Pacific would be strongly opposed.

However, President Reagan, based on the policy of 'fair free trade,' once again urged a swift resolution to the issue of trade surplus imbalance. He demanded an expansion of the Japanese market in manufacturing, agriculture, construction, finance, and high-tech industries, which could lead to increased opportunities, despite domestic political pressures influencing decision-making processes in each country.

However, President Reagan, based on the policy stance of 'fair free trade,' once again urged a swift resolution to the trade imbalance issue. Despite domestic political pressures influencing decision-making processes in each country, he demanded an expansion of the Japanese market in manufacturing, agriculture, construction, finance, and high-tech industries, which could lead to increased opportunities.

There is an invisible bridge across the Pacific. It is a bridge built by the efforts,

commercial genius, and productive power of our two peoples. We must endeavor to ensure that it is maintained in good order, carrying goods and services that improve life and increase happiness, and that it operates with equal vigor in both directions (Reagan Library, 1987).

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nakasone approached the issue from the perspective of friendly cooperation between the two countries. Unlike President Reagan, he first raised the issue of arms control, emphasizing the solidarity of Western nations in laying the foundation for world peace. In other words, he argued that for international responsibilities to be fulfilled, the development of bilateral relations on a stable foundation was essential. Of course, he expressed concern about the intensifying trade friction between the US and Japan and agreed that such a situation should not be allowed to harm the friendship and mutual trust between the two countries. Accordingly, while confirming the need for proactive and consistent policy measures, he tended to emphasize the achievements of the measures already taken by Japan, unlike in previous meetings. 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - The 1980s Amendment to the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

We recognized that our enormous current account imbalance could have serious consequences for the health of the world economy. It is necessary to correct this situation fundamentally and as quickly as possible. We reaffirmed our shared political resolve to take proactive and consistent policy measures. In this regard, we decided to cooperate closely on macroeconomic policies and exchange rates, as stated in our joint communiqué... (omitted) The President and I noted the satisfactory progress in other specific areas. The governments of both countries will continue to work to resolve the remaining issues. I informed the President that our government is leading efforts to expand imports through significant special fiscal measures (Reagan Library, 1987).

Furthermore, Prime Minister Nakasone made it clear that US regulatory measures concerning the Japanese semiconductor industry should be immediately withdrawn ahead of the Venice Summit. In a speech at the National Press Club, Prime Minister Nakasone warned that US protectionism could collapse the free trade system. He stated, 'If the trade bill passed by the House of Representatives yesterday becomes law, global trade will shrink significantly,' and expressed his strong hope that the House trade bill would not be enacted as is. Nevertheless, at the summit, President Reagan avoided specific mention of the most pressing issue, semiconductor retaliatory tariffs, and deferred the matter until the Venice meeting, indicating that the two leaders failed to reach a compromise.

2. Energy: Japan's Energy Policy and Nuclear Power in the 1980s

In addition to the three main issues, it is noteworthy that in the 1983 and 1985 summit meetings, the US emphasized the expansion of energy trade. At the time, Japan was the world's largest importer of coal, and the US, along with Australia and Canada, was a supplier of coal to Japan. President Reagan also reiterated the acceleration of the implementation of the Energy Cooperation Agreement and the job creation and enhanced energy security benefits that would result from expanded energy trade. He viewed it as an opportunity to reduce mutual vulnerabilities in energy security and gain economic benefits through joint US-Japan efforts. However, Prime Minister Nakasone did not mention energy trade at all in the joint statement. 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - The 1980s Amendment to the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

In the 1980s, Japan dramatically shifted its national energy policy to lower energy demand and diversify energy sources in response to the two oil crises (Bang Ki-yeol, 2007). In a world of energy uncertainty, it reduced oil dependency through effective government-business cooperation, promoted the introduction of nuclear and natural gas, and accelerated the development of renewable energy. Among these, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which had traditionally been involved in the global energy market, led the changes in energy policy (Morse 1981, 5).

First, they considered importing steam coal for industrial coal-fired power plants. However, coal presented significant technical and environmental constraints for power plant construction and was relatively more expensive than nuclear power. Moreover, questions arose as to whether importing large quantities of US coal would enhance Japan's energy security or merely exacerbate economic antagonism. This was because, similar to the excessive US dependence on Japan for automobiles, Japan's potential dependence on US coal could strain bilateral relations (Gale in Morse 1981, 85-105). Although purchasing coal from the US would help improve the balance of payments, it was judged that it would likely not offset the impact of increasingly sophisticated high-value electronics penetrating the US market.

Nuclear power, on the other hand, was notable for its contribution to Japan's security by reducing the nation's dependence on foreign oil and other raw materials (Suttmeier in Morse 1981, 106-109). At the time, Japan not only held a leading position in nuclear power generation but also aimed to establish nuclear energy as an independent energy source by investing heavily in its own research and development capabilities. Japan, the first country to join the US's nuclear program following President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' initiative, rapidly promoted the growth of its nuclear industry after signing the 'Atoms for Research Agreement' with the US in 1955. Since establishing the Atomic Energy Commission in 1956 and formulating long-term plans for nuclear power generation, Japan has maintained a high level of expertise in enrichment and reprocessing technologies, which are essential for nuclear technology control. Consequently, Japan was recognized as a country possessing advanced nuclear technology by independently enhancing its domestic nuclear technological capabilities. President Reagan evaluated Japan's advanced nuclear program as follows:

A significant degree of technological autonomy has been achieved in the reactor and nuclear fuel cycle areas...

While acquiring greater fuel supply autonomy is an important energy security goal for Japan, international cooperation with the United States is a crucial element of the Japanese program (Reagan

Library, 1987).

1987, 206-209).

By the early 1980s, significant progress had been made toward this goal. The Tokaimura reprocessing facility, built with design support from French nuclear companies such as AREVA and Cogema, without U.S. technical assistance, had the capacity to reprocess 90 tons of spent nuclear fuel annually, laying the groundwork for more autonomous nuclear industry activities. The institutional framework for commercial reprocessing in Japan was also established. Government authority over nuclear policy was officially concentrated in the Prime Minister's Office, with the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) serving in an advisory capacity. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) also exercised authority over licensing, safety regulation and inspection of power plants, promotion of public acceptance for nuclear power generation, and setting of public utility rates. Thus, 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement and Trade Disputes in the 1980s_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The progress in Japan's nuclear technology development was the result of close cooperation between the government and industry in various activities, including industrial structure, research and development, licensing and permitting, uranium procurement, and non-proliferation.

3. Economy/Trade: Background of U.S.-Japan Economic and Trade Disputes in the 1980s

The summit meetings between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone in the 1980s, while varying in intensity depending on the period, saw the main focus gradually shift from military and security issues such as ⓵peace/security/defense and ⓷logic of free democracy/bloc to matters of ⓶economy/trade, particularly U.S.-Japan trade disputes. This emerged as the trade imbalance between the two countries deepened, along with changes in the global economic order.

Due to a series of domestic and international factors since the 1970s, the proportion and status of the United States in the global economy began to decline rapidly. The U.S. economy entered a period of recession due to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, the resulting resource crisis, rising unemployment, deepening inflation, and the loss of competitiveness in traditional manufacturing industries. Above all, the appreciation of the dollar by nearly 40% between 1980 and 1985, rather than lowering import costs in the short term, eroded export competitiveness, leading to an unprecedented trade deficit. The fundamental fear that the U.S. position could be shaken was amplified not only by the trade deficit but also by the combination of economic slowdown, structural decline in productivity, and the catching up of neighboring countries. The U.S.-Japan trade dispute began from this sense of crisis in the United States. At the time, Japan was the United States' main trading partner and the largest source of trade imbalance, so the U.S. trade deficit with Japan acted as a trigger (United States Census Bureau, no date). In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration sought to revive the U.S. economy through neoliberal economic policies, exemplified by tax cuts and increased defense spending, known as 'Reaganomics.' However, this led to a worsening of the 'twin deficits'—a widening trade deficit due to increased imports from tax cuts and a growing fiscal deficit due to increased defense spending. Amidst increasing pressure to protect domestic manufacturing industries, the perception spread that the loss of competitiveness in American industries was not an inherent U.S. problem but was caused by unfair trade practices of other countries.

Beginning with the Plaza Accord in 1985, the focus of the U.S.-Japan trade dispute began to shift to high-tech industries, and U.S. trade policy also evolved from free trade to a 'strategic trade policy' that acknowledged the limits of free trade and pursued 'free but fair trade.' To foster high-value-added industries such as high-tech industries, protectionist trade policies, rather than free trade, were necessary for specific industries through protection and support from the U.S. government (Tyson 1992, 258; Gandolfo 2014, 277-278). At the time, semiconductor manufacturing capabilities and competitiveness were considered synonymous with the health of American industry and essential for national security as the future of advanced industrial economies. 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement and Trade Disputes in the 1980s_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The semiconductor dispute was seen as a major test for the Reagan administration.

The Energy Stage: Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement

1. Reagan Administration's Nuclear Policy and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

In the 1970s, the United States entered a new turning point in its nuclear technology control policy. India's nuclear test in 1974 prompted a reassessment of the U.S.'s international standing as a nuclear power and led to more universal and stringent control requirements for U.S. nuclear technology and nuclear material exports. At the time, the technology for developing nuclear weapons from industrial reactors was highly concentrated scientific technology, and there was not a high level of awareness of its potential. India's successful nuclear test demonstrated the possibility of nuclear weapons development to the international community, blurring the lines between the peaceful and military use of nuclear technology. Consequently, the Carter administration established a strong multilateral nuclear export regime, regulating reprocessing and enrichment facilities and implementing universal control measures for sensitive nuclear materials and technologies. Simultaneously, to strengthen nuclear technology control in bilateral relations, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA(1978)) was enacted, mandating strict non-proliferation regulations and increasing congressional involvement in U.S. nuclear cooperation (US Govinfo, 1978). Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act stipulates that the U.S. government must incorporate strict non-proliferation requirements into agreements when entering into nuclear cooperation of a certain scale with cooperating countries, whether through new agreements or amendments (OCED, no date). These U.S. demands meant greater restrictions on the nuclear industry activities of cooperating countries. Japan's strong commitment to nuclear power development also began to falter due to the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. In particular, Japan's independent fuel cycle development plan faced new uncertainties as new authorization was required for the reprocessing or re-export of U.S.-origin fuel.

The Reagan administration, which began its term amidst a strong atmosphere of nuclear non-proliferation in the U.S. Congress in the 1980s, inherited 'nuclear non-proliferation' as the basic policy of U.S. foreign nuclear policy (Beckman, 1985). However, the Reagan administration significantly altered many aspects of existing policies, criticizing the hardline stance of the Carter administration in domestic nuclear policy. Most importantly, with the growing recognition of the need for new energy sources following the oil crises of the 1970s, nuclear power was pursued as a primary source of energy supply. The 'Initiative on Nuclear Energy Policy' announced in October 1981 focused on implementing more relaxed policies regarding regulatory and licensing procedures for nuclear power.

I am lifting the indefinite ban on commercial reprocessing activities in the United States imposed by the previous administration.

Furthermore, regarding the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants, 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement and Trade Disputes in the 1980s_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

I will pursue a consistent and long-term policy

for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and will remove regulations for commercial interests while ensuring appropriate safeguards.

(Reagan, 1981).

The Reagan administration, which prioritized the U.S. economic recovery, also eased existing stringent nuclear regulations and export control policies. Facing the need for a nominal amendment to the agreement with Japan due to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the U.S. aimed to improve relations with advanced nuclear countries and foster friendly cooperation by considering Japan a country without nuclear proliferation risks and partially allowing reprocessing and plutonium utilization (The White House 1981, 2). This easing of regulations was an exceptional decision given that, following India's peaceful nuclear test in 1974, the control of reprocessing facilities had become a core element of non-proliferation. However, as East-West relations deteriorated with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, President Reagan adopted a more pragmatic approach to maintain friendly relations with allies.

Many U.S. allies have a strong interest in nuclear energy...

for peaceful nuclear cooperation under appropriate safeguards

We must re-establish predictable and reliable partnerships.

This is essential for the goal of non-proliferation. If we do not rebuild partnerships with our cooperative partners,

they will pursue 'peaceful uses of nuclear energy' based on their own directions, which will further diminish U.S. influence.

Consequently, U.S. effectiveness in resolving nuclear proliferation issues will further decline (Reagan, 1981).

Thus, the Reagan administration's non-proliferation policy aimed to foster the nuclear industries of its allies while concentrating on facilitating control over nuclear energy use within its sphere of influence. The U.S. was concerned that other suppliers, such as the UK and France, could secure nuclear control through nuclear agreements. Unlike other suppliers who presented relatively relaxed requirements for nuclear export controls, the U.S. pursued a stringent non-proliferation policy domestically, judging it more effective to maintain the status of responsible suppliers and strengthen the credibility of recipient countries. In particular, considering that recipient countries' proactive stance on building nuclear facilities was linked to the negative energy security situation that emerged after the oil crisis, the U.S. announced that it would not prohibit the development of reprocessing facilities and fast breeder reactors for countries possessing advanced nuclear programs without proliferation risks.

As such, the non-proliferation policy of the Reagan administration aimed to foster the nuclear industries of its allies while concentrating on more easily controlling nuclear energy use within its sphere of influence. The United States was concerned that other suppliers, such as the United Kingdom and France, would secure nuclear control through nuclear agreements. Unlike the United States, which pursued a strict non-proliferation policy domestically, other suppliers presented comparatively relaxed requirements for nuclear export controls, judging it more effective to maintain their status as responsible suppliers and enhance the reliability of recipient nations. Considering that recipient nations' proactive stance on establishing nuclear facilities was linked to the negative energy security situation that emerged after the oil crisis, the U.S. stated that it would not prohibit the development of reprocessing facilities and fast breeder reactors for countries possessing advanced nuclear programs free from nuclear proliferation risks.

2. Amendment of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (1982-1987)

Sensing the shift in the Reagan administration's nuclear policy, the Japanese government actively pursued an amendment to the agreement to obtain U.S. long-term prior consent for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. In 1982, 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Uses of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - Amendment of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and Trade Disputes in the 1980s_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The United States and Japan commenced full-scale negotiations to amend the nuclear cooperation agreement. The U.S.-Japan negotiations proceeded in two main phases. Phase 1, from August 1982 to July 1985, involved comprehensive bilateral discussions primarily addressing the resolution of reprocessing issues and the amendment of the agreement. Phase 2, from November 1985 to August 1986, focused specifically on amending the agreement.

The U.S. Department of State effectively led the negotiations, with participation from the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The State Department approached nuclear cooperation from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy and national security. The Defense Department viewed it from a defense and national security standpoint, while the Energy Department considered it in terms of energy, science and technology, and the environment. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission focused on ensuring nuclear safety by managing licensing and regulatory requirements for the ownership, use, and disposal of nuclear facilities and materials. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a federal agency focused on arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament, prepared proliferation assessment reports. Among these, a notable conflict arose between the State Department, which supported the agreement amendment, and the Defense Department, which opposed it. However, the State Department held a monopoly on major decisions, effectively excluding the Defense Department from the negotiations (U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 1987, 345-347). On the Japanese side, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which led nuclear policy decisions, clashed from the initial phase of negotiations regarding the amendment. However, from the second phase of negotiations onwards, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively took the lead to secure a favorable agreement for Japan (Jeon Jin-ho 2001, 185-188).

In the first phase of negotiations, Japan's primary objective was to secure U.S. approval for the operation of the Tokaimura reprocessing facility, which had already been completed. At that time, Japan viewed the inability to operate its completed reprocessing facility due to U.S. domestic law as a significant economic loss. However, given that Japan was recognized as a crucial recipient of U.S. energy trade, with imports of enriched uranium reaching approximately $300 million annually, negotiations proceeded on a relatively equal footing between the two countries (Yoshida 2018, 2-3). Nevertheless, as Japan adopted a strategy of not responding to calls for agreement amendments under increasingly stringent nuclear regulations, no clear agreement was reached during the initial three years of negotiation. Ultimately, the final U.S.-Japan agreement allowed for the reprocessing facility and plutonium conversion facility construction to be postponed for two years, with the exception of the plutonium storage method, which was agreed upon in a batch extraction format favored by Japan. This signified an agreement that was more favorable to Japan in terms of nuclear technology controls.

Only after the reprocessing negotiations in 1985 could the United States begin comprehensive negotiations to amend the nuclear technology control requirements of the existing nuclear cooperation agreement. At that time, the Reagan administration was facing domestic pressure to incorporate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act into the agreement amendment. The administrative agreement that the executive branch could utilize in conducting nuclear-related foreign policy could not be applied. The final approval of the agreement by Congress was also required. Nevertheless, as negotiations became uncertain due to Japanese opposition, the Reagan administration sought to achieve a win-win outcome with Japan by introducing a long-term prior consent mechanism while still accepting existing domestic laws. At the time, Japan also considered maintaining a friendly cooperative relationship with the United States important, in addition to the issue of constructing a second reprocessing facility, and thus agreed to participate in the negotiations (Jeon Jin-ho 2002, 33-35).

were not applicable, and the final approval of the agreement by the National Assembly was also required. Nevertheless, as the possibility of successful negotiations became uncertain due to Japan's opposition, the Reagan administration sought to lead a win-win negotiation with Japan by introducing the long-term advance consent mechanism while accepting existing domestic laws. At the time, Japan also agreed to participate in the negotiations because it was important to maintain friendly relations with the United States, in addition to the issue of constructing the second reprocessing facility (Jeon Jin-ho, 2002, pp. 33-35).

The long-term advance consent mechanism was ultimately an attempt to relax the nuclear technology control requirements for Japan. Although ostensibly included within the scope of prior consent, the U.S. nuclear technology control authority, it allowed Japan more autonomy in its nuclear activities by establishing a 30-year period rather than a case-by-case reporting method for nuclear industry activities closely linked to non-proliferation. All four key elements of nuclear technology control requirements—third-country transfer, reprocessing, enrichment, and plutonium and highly enriched uranium storage—were approved under the long-term advance consent mechanism. In particular, the allowance of the long-term advance consent mechanism for reprocessing facilities and plutonium use significantly contributed to Japan's ability to complete its own nuclear fuel cycle in its nuclear industry activities. This became a decisive factor that has enabled Japan to attain the status of a quasi-nuclear state today.

Economic Arena: U.S.-Japan Trade Disputes

1. Reagan Administration's Trade Laws and Trade Policy

The Reagan administration's trade policy evolved in response to challenges posed by changes in global trade, production, and financial systems. In the 1980s, the core objective of U.S. trade policy was to ensure a level playing field. The era of 'gentle tolerance' was over. The changes in trade law were a strong expression of the United States' determination not to passively accept unfair discrimination or restrictions against its products abroad. The history of U.S. trade law since World War II has seen shifts marked by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the Trade Act of 1974, and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, gradually moving away from free trade towards protectionist, restrictive, and retaliatory characteristics. Among these, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a provision for redressing unfair trade practices, empowers the President to retaliate by prohibiting imports of goods produced/manufactured in countries engaging in unfair trade practices that significantly reduce U.S. sales, such as tariffs, import restrictions, and export subsidies. In essence, it stipulated strict responses to foreign unfair or unreasonable trade practices, while also allowing the administration to take unilateral retaliatory measures if negotiations proved difficult (U.S. Govinfo, 1974). 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement in the 1980s and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

As U.S.-Japan trade disputes became visible starting in 1985, the U.S. Congress unanimously adopted resolutions to impose import restrictions on Japan if there were no progress in market opening, thereby pressuring the Reagan administration (Funabashi, 1987, p. 93). In September of the same year, the administration announced the 'Trade Policy Action Program,' which actively utilized Section 301 of the Trade Act in its trade relations with Japan, its main target, and presented a new direction for trade policy (Cannon, 1985). Despite these efforts, protectionist pressures intensified due to the growing U.S. trade deficit and declining international competitiveness. Ultimately, Congress overwhelmingly passed an amendment to H.R. 3 (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987) by Representatives Rostenkowski and Gibbons by a vote of 290 to 137 in the final vote on April 30, 1987 (Destler, 1986, pp. 96-107; U.S. Congress, 1987). On August 23, 1988, President Reagan signed H.R. 4848, enacting the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (U.S. Congress, 1988). The Trade Act of 1988 was dubbed 'Super 301' because it allowed for broader retaliatory measures than Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. It aimed to mandate trade sanctions by authorizing the U.S. Trade Representative to designate countries engaging in practices deemed unfair or unreasonable as targets for investigation, and to significantly enhance investigations into specific trade practices. The transfer of sanctioning authority to the U.S. Trade Representative, a specialized trade body, was a measure to free the operation of Section 301 from constraints imposed by non-trade factors. The Trade Act of 1988 was possible due to bipartisan support, with the Democratic Party, which strongly supported protectionist policies, holding a majority in Congress. This was because a consensus had formed on the need for strong trade policy amid growing anxiety over the failures of existing economic policies leading to increased fiscal deficits and Japan's unfair trade practices further exacerbating the U.S. trade deficit. Most importantly, due to the structure of U.S. domestic politics, where domestic actors and interest groups could easily pressure Congress while the executive branch had relatively weak authority, the administration found it difficult to ignore the demands of Section 301, which conflicted with GATT. Instead, American unilateralism, spearheaded by Section 301 of the Trade Act, justified unilateral retaliatory actions when the U.S. unilaterally deemed the trade practices or systems of trading partners to be unfair, or when negotiations did not proceed as desired.

2. Trade Pressure on Japan and U.S.-Japan Trade Disputes in the 1980s

In the 1980s, trade friction between the United States and Japan unfolded on 'Two Tracks': manufacturing and high-tech industries, and trade and technology disputes. Primarily based on domestic trade laws, the U.S. employed two strategies: ⓵ restricting Japanese automobile exports to the U.S. and ⓶ opening the Japanese market to increase U.S. exports and reduce the trade deficit, thereby protecting U.S. domestic industries (Ito and Hoshi, 2020). In addition to protectionist measures based on trade laws, 'gray area' import restrictions that circumvented GATT regulations, known as 'voluntary export restraints (VERs),' were also actively utilized. 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement in the 1980s and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The relocation of the function for investigating and determining dumping and subsidy allegations from the relatively neutral Treasury Department to the Department of Commerce, which has direct ties to corporate activities, in 1979 also contributed to the surge in import restrictions (Kwon Young-min, 2005, p. 59).

1) Automobiles (1980-1981): Voluntary Export Restraints (VER)

The conflict surrounding Japanese automobiles in the United States began in the 1970s when U.S. imports of Japanese compact cars surged due to the two oil shocks. As consumer demand shifted towards Japanese compact cars, which were more fuel-efficient, their market share expanded, while some U.S. auto industry workers faced a series of layoffs (Yoffie, 1983, pp. 221-230; Winham and Kabashima, 1982, p. 82). As the structural changes in the U.S. domestic auto market led to the perception of the auto industry as an object of international competition, extensive interactions occurred not only between U.S. and Japanese government agencies but also among domestic private actors such as labor unions and the auto industry in automobile trade disputes. In particular, six major actors were closely involved: the United Auto Workers (UAW), the Big Three U.S. automakers, Japanese automakers, the Japanese government, the U.S. Congress, and the U.S. administration.

From 1980, the UAW exerted pressure on the administration and Congress to request relief measures from the government under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and to promote legislation for import quotas on Japanese auto exports (Kojima, 2011, pp. 53-54). In the same year's U.S. presidential election, the issue was brought to public attention through various means, including media interviews and participation in congressional hearings. Congress also exerted significant influence in the 1980-81 U.S.-Japan auto negotiations. Congressional representatives, primarily from districts with strong ties to the auto industry, took a hardline stance and led relevant legislation. Indeed, in March 1981, the Senate introduced a bill to limit Japanese auto imports to 1.6 million units per year for three years, seeking concessions from Japan on automobile import restrictions.

Under pressure from various domestic actors, President Reagan had to adjust his trade strategy with Japan immediately upon taking office in 1981. At the time, the administration established a cabinet-level task force to lead automobile trade negotiations and conceived a policy of demanding voluntary export restraints from Japan, but opinions on trade policy were divided between free traders and protectionists. The Departments of Transportation, Commerce, and Labor, along with the U.S. Trade Representative, supported a protectionist approach, considering the significant impact of Japanese imported cars on the performance of U.S. automakers and overall employment rates. In contrast, the Treasury Department and the Office of Management and Budget opposed import restriction bills, pointing out the adverse effects of protectionist policies. However, all shared the recognition that they needed to find a course of action that could restore the auto industry while maintaining a commitment to free trade under the GATT framework. Therefore, the Reagan administration 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement in the 1980s and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

sought to change the existing automobile trade relationship without resorting to protectionist measures.

However, Japanese automakers, who had benefited from the existing U.S.-Japan trade relationship, sought to maintain the status quo. With the U.S. market already accounting for a significant portion (20-40%) of Japanese automakers' exports, they were naturally reluctant to comply with requests to restrict U.S. sales (Reich, 1989, p. 572). Conversely, the preferences of the Japanese government and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) regarding the automobile trade dispute with the U.S. differed from those of domestic industries. Given the highly politicized nature of automobile trade in the U.S., they were concerned about the broader implications for U.S.-Japan relations rather than specific issues, and therefore sought ways to accommodate U.S. interests (Winham and Kabashima, 1982, pp. 111-113). Ultimately, to avoid the passage of the quota bill by the U.S. Congress and to resolve domestic conflicts surrounding the automobile issue, the U.S. and Japan agreed to implement 'Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs),' a form of informal negotiation strategy. On April 1, 1981, eleven days before the bill's scheduled expiration, MITI announced measures to voluntarily limit Japanese auto exports to the U.S. to no more than 1.68 million units per year for three years. As a result, Senator Danforth withdrew the bill to restrict Japanese auto imports.

2) U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement (1986)

In the late 1970s, Japan emerged as a major semiconductor producer, while the U.S. semiconductor industry faced difficulties including high capital costs, the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, delays in adopting new process technologies, and quality control issues. As the rapid increase in Japan's share of the global semiconductor market placed U.S. companies at a distinct competitive disadvantage, U.S. semiconductor manufacturers strongly criticized Japan's industrial strength as a direct product of a national strategy to protect and promote international competitiveness (Tyson and Zysman, 1983). In fact, the Japanese semiconductor industry was being nurtured under government policy at the time and exhibited a closed nature, allowing market entry conditional on technology transfer from U.S. companies (Kondo, 2011, pp. 54-55). This was not a level playing field from the U.S. perspective.

The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) of the United States expanded its political influence through extensive and continuous lobbying activities, starting with legislation related to intellectual property rights in the late 1970s. They also demanded a reduction in Japan's semiconductor import tariffs and filed a series of lawsuits against Japanese companies for intellectual property infringement (Kim Sang-bae, 2002). Eventually, through negotiations with the U.S. in 1981, Japan reduced its semiconductor import tariff rate to 4.2%, and in April 1982, the newly established U.S.-Japan Working Group on Advanced Technology Industries, within its semiconductor subcommittee, reached agreements on tariff elimination, mutual trade promotion, removal of investment barriers, continued incentives for foreign companies investing in Japan, and promotion of technological exchange (O'Shea, 1993, p. 61).

The situation changed drastically starting in 1985. As semiconductor prices plummeted due to a downturn in the computer industry between 1984 and 1985, the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association, finding itself in a difficult position, filed a complaint with the U.S. Trade Representative in June 1985 regarding the closed nature of the Japanese semiconductor market and allegations of anti-dumping practices, citing violations of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Even before the dumping or Section 301 investigations, Congress had provided full support to the domestic semiconductor industry. On July 30, the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy held hearings to review industry complaints about Japan's market access restrictions and allegations of Japan's predatory marketing practices. The Departments of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative also pressured Japan to create a level playing field for U.S. companies to preserve competitive U.S. industries. The CIA and the Department of Defense supported the petition due to concerns about increasing reliance on foreign supply, but the U.S. Departments of State and the Treasury, along with the NSC, opposed sanctions against Japan, arguing that the problems of the U.S. industry were partly due to mismanagement (Prestowitz, 1988, p. 160). The Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Justice Department, the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), and the Justice Department opposed the trade negotiation strategy of the Departments of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative, citing adherence to free trade agreements and violations of GATT regulations (O'Shea, 1993, p. 72).

The market's closed nature and anti-dumping practices were reported to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) under allegations of violating Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Even before the dumping or Section 301 investigations, Congress had shown strong support for the domestic semiconductor industry. On July 30, the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy held hearings to examine industry complaints about Japan's market access restrictions and allegations of Japan's predatory marketing practices. The Department of Commerce and the USTR also pressured Japan to create a level playing field for American companies to preserve competitive U.S. industries. The CIA and the Department of Defense supported the petition due to concerns about increasing reliance on overseas supply, but the U.S. Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the NSC opposed sanctions against Japan, citing that the problems of U.S. industry stemmed in part from mismanagement (Prestowitz 1988, 160). The Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), the Department of Justice, and the Justice Department opposed the trade negotiation strategies of the Department of Commerce and the USTR, citing adherence to free trade agreements and violations of GATT regulations (O'Shea 1993, 72).

However, given the intensified pressure from both Congress and industry, and the magnitude of the threat posed by Japan's unfair competition to the U.S. semiconductor industry, a consensus within the administration for an aggressive negotiation strategy began to form. The Reagan administration, having just secured re-election, was also closely monitoring Japan's unfair practices, and internal pressure was mounting to define U.S. interests in all aspects—political, economic, and security. The petition aligned with the administration's stress over the trade deficit with Japan and the opening of foreign markets, and there was a need for a new initiative to appease Congress, which desired a stronger policy toward Japan, and to preempt the executive branch's authority over trade policy (Irwin, 1994, p. 41). Consequently, despite some initial resistance, the Departments of State and other agencies began to support the Departments of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative, leading to broad internal consensus.

On the Japanese side, MITI led the semiconductor dispute. MITI sought to strengthen its control over the semiconductor industry using bureaucratic mechanisms and trade agreements, while also fearing being labeled an unfair trading nation (Prestowitz, 1988, pp. 64-65). Most importantly, with lobbying by Japan limited by the strict administrative procedures under U.S. trade law during the anti-dumping and Section 301 review processes, sanctions against Japan alerted Japanese industry and government officials to the resolve of their U.S. counterparts in resolving the semiconductor issue. The reaction of the Japanese semiconductor industry was mixed. Some semiconductor companies were unconcerned about tariffs being imposed on Japan if negotiations failed, while others preferred some concessions to avoid U.S. retaliation. Many of these companies were exporters of products such as consumer electronics, who were concerned about the potential impact of U.S. retaliatory measures on their exports. Ultimately, the Japanese government accepted the U.S. demands to avoid the imposition of anti-dumping duties and potential sanctions under Section 301. In return for these promises, the U.S. agreed to suspend the anti-dumping proceedings for 256K DRAM and to seek cessation of EPROM and anti-dumping proceedings for the petitioner. 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement in the 1980s and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

As a result, the '1986 U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement' was signed in September 1986. The core of this agreement was a secret annex stating that 'Japan understands, welcomes, and will make efforts to help U.S. companies reach a market share of 20% within five years' (Kondo, 2011, p. 63).

Hearings (1987-1988): The Performance of U.S. Domestic Actors

Currently, the United States is the only country among nuclear supply nations that has codified the conclusion of nuclear cooperation agreements into domestic law. When the executive branch enters into an agreement with another country as part of its foreign policy, the dynamics between the executive and legislative branches emerge during the congressional review process, considering Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. In particular, because the U.S. has applied varying standards for agreements depending on the timing and the cooperating country, there have been intense debates at the domestic political level, including with Congress and various domestic actors, over nuclear agreements that deviate from these standards.

This report infers the determining factors by analyzing the hearing records from the U.S. Congress's review process for the amendment of the agreement, which involved various domestic actors: 'United States-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress First and Second Sessions, December 16, 1987 and March 2, 1988.' According to the records, the relevant hearings were held twice, on December 16, 1987, and March 2, 1988. The first hearing included representatives from the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which led the negotiations, while the second hearing involved experts from the domestic nuclear industry, related research institutes, and academia.

The new nuclear agreement allowed Japan to reprocess U.S.-origin nuclear fuel and use the extracted plutonium, which caused divisions not only between the executive branch and Congress but also within them. Within the U.S. administration, while the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which led the negotiations, strongly advocated for the agreement, the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission expressed opposition due to concerns about future terrorist threats to plutonium-related facilities and the physical protection and safety issues associated with plutonium transport. Within the U.S. Congress, numerous House members, along with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which led the review of the proposed agreement, strongly opposed the amendment. However, some members, including those from the Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, argued that the practical achievements of the agreement and its compatibility with domestic law should be focused on, without emotional bias. Apart from government officials, industry stakeholders such as General Electric and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), an alliance of electric power companies, and the American Nuclear Energy Council supported the agreement, while 1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement in the 1980s and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), the American Enterprise Institute, and the Hudson Institute opposed it.

Accordingly, the hearing was structured around four discussion points within two major issues. The first issue examined three technical points directly related to the Atomic Energy Agreement (plutonium transport, application of new safeguards, and the long-term advance consent mechanism). The second issue was a political matter linked to economics and trade, involving heated debate over security (non-proliferation) versus economic interests.

1. Technical Issues Related to Nuclear Cooperation

1) Plutonium Transport: Environment and Safety

u Plutonium is a highly toxic substance that disperses easily in the air and can cause lung cancer with even brief exposure.

u Given that the Environmental Impact Assessment report submitted by the Department of Energy has largely ignored environmental and safety issues related to past nuclear production, an additional environmental impact assessment involving external agencies is necessary.

u The use of plutonium as fuel is not essential for nuclear power generation compared to the cheaper and more reliable alternative of low-enriched uranium, which is not suitable for weapons. Therefore, it is not a favorable negotiation for resource-scarce Japan.

u The aerial transport of plutonium will increase risks to safety and the environment. Doubts exist regarding the possibility of aerial transport of plutonium across the United States, and the possibility of strict safety measures and accidents cannot be ruled out. Particularly, with the governments of Alaska and Canada raising objections to the plutonium transport issue, if transport is not possible through Canada and Alaska, it will inevitably lead to the transport of over 300 pounds of plutonium three times a month from Washington. Furthermore, the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism in the long term cannot be entirely dismissed due to the use of plutonium. It cannot be guaranteed that plutonium produced in Europe and Japan will not be used by certain countries or terrorists for weapons contrary to the interests of the United States or overseas.

u The long-term use of plutonium cannot entirely dismiss the possibility of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. It cannot be guaranteed that plutonium produced in Europe and Japan will not be used by certain countries or terrorists for weapons contrary to the interests of the United States or overseas.

u Considering the National Environmental Policy Act, a comprehensive and extensive environmental assessment was prepared, concluding that plutonium 'will not have a significant impact on the environment.'

u The transport of plutonium will occur via dedicated cargo aircraft along polar routes or other paths selected to avoid natural disasters and civilian areas. In reality, any plan involving the transport of plutonium to a specific country is impossible without that country's approval and participation, and no country has an obligation to cooperate or provide support. Furthermore, the agreement provides long-term advance consent for the transfer of spent fuel from Japan to specific facilities in France and the United Kingdom for reprocessing, and it also stipulates that the return of materials recovered from EURATOM to Japan requires U.S. consent. Continuous adherence to international transport guidelines is based on international consultations on physical protection measures, and guidelines can be updated as needed. Therefore, it is expected to help establish broader international norms for the shipment and transport of Japanese plutonium, to which U.S. consent rights do not apply.

1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy in a Complex Stage - Revision of the US-Japan Atomic Energy Agreement in the 1980s and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

u The agreement provides long-term advance consent for the transfer of spent fuel from Japan to specific facilities in France and the United Kingdom for reprocessing, and it also stipulates that the return of materials recovered from EURATOM to Japan requires U.S. consent. Continuous adherence to international transport guidelines is based on international consultations on physical protection measures, and guidelines can be updated as needed. Therefore, it is expected to help establish broader international norms for the shipment and transport of Japanese plutonium, to which U.S. consent rights do not apply.

u Continuous adherence to international transport guidelines is based on international consultations on physical protection measures, and guidelines can be updated as needed. Therefore, it is expected to help establish broader international norms for the shipment and transport of Japanese plutonium, to which U.S. consent rights do not apply.

u Therefore, it is expected to help establish broader international norms for the shipment and transport of Japanese plutonium, to which U.S. consent rights do not apply.

2) Application of New Safeguards

u The acceptance of conceptual safeguards is deemed risky because the new safeguards exclude scientific, engineering, and technical facts, and thus they cannot be binding. Above all, current safeguards technology is an undeveloped concept, and extensive development efforts are still required for the agreement to implement acceptable safeguards. Ultimately, rather than approving a long-term program for future facilities whose technological needs are unknown, approval of specific provisions on a case-by-case basis, as in the existing agreement, is desirable. u The safeguards approach explicitly states that it enables the achievement of IAEA safeguards and inspection goals, but it is concerning that no performance criteria are specified to bind the goals. Particularly, while setting inspection goals for large-scale reprocessing facilities at over 100 kg of plutonium annually, the assertion that such a calculation method will provide an acceptable level of processing remains unproven.

u The safeguards approach explicitly states that it enables the achievement of IAEA safeguards and inspection goals, but it is concerning that no performance criteria are specified to bind the goals. Particularly, while setting inspection goals for large-scale reprocessing facilities at over 100 kg of plutonium annually, the assertion that such a calculation method will provide an acceptable level of processing remains unproven.

u Although the new agreement includes the legal requirements stipulated in the Atomic Energy Act,

and ensures that not only nuclear material and facilities but also related components are included.

Therefore, even if the possibility of nuclear proliferation is extremely low,

it is an unwise decision.

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The amendment to the Agreement includes not only a set of comprehensive criteria but also

general concepts and detailed safeguards concepts applicable to future power plant facilities and equipment not yet constructed.

These conceptual documents incorporate the safeguards principles established by the IAEA

and, in specific circumstances, go beyond existing principles to define

which facilities meet the criteria and to inform the United States of the specific safeguards measures required.

If a new facility is to be operated, Japan must devise appropriate safeguards

measures before its operation. If Japan fails to devise appropriate safeguards measures, the United States may withdraw its long-term prior consent for that facility. If an agreement is still not reached thereafter, Japan will no longer be able to use U.S. nuclear material. u Considering the current situation where the United States cannot control plutonium worldwide,

it is important to establish a basis for close cooperation with Japan

and ensure the application of state-of-the-art safeguards concepts and physical protection measures to the plutonium they will actually use. Therefore,

the new Agreement will not only provide an opportunity to establish a substantive and long-term U.S. role in the application of safeguards and physical protection measures to Japan's advanced nuclear facilities and programs,

but also provide a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation. u In its policy statement accompanying this Agreement, Japan also pledged to cooperate with the IAEA to provide all opportunities for the effective and efficient application of safeguards and to integrate advanced safeguards techniques to improve safeguards implementation.

Therefore, from the initial design stage of future facilities through their construction and operation,

it is possible to apply more effective safeguards in cooperation with the IAEA.

u Articles III, IV, and V of the new Agreement clearly state that the primary objective of the Agreement is non-proliferation.

These provisions will be implemented in a manner that meets the mutually agreed requirements specified in these articles and further promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy in each country, based on long-term, predictable, and reliable criteria. To this end, the implementation agreement, which constitutes an essential part of the Agreement for the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act, is ensured through a separate agreement as required by Article XI.

3) Long-term Prior Consent Mechanism

u Replacing the existing case-by-case review mechanism with a more comprehensive prior consent mechanism means abandoning U.S. rights.

The existing mechanism is sufficient to monitor Japan's spent fuel-related activities and fully exercise the right of consent for plutonium use.

Nevertheless, adopting a prior consent mechanism raises questions as to whether it constitutes a blanket authorization, a blank check, or a waiver of review and consent authority during the actual agreement period.

u Specifically, it is unclear whether the Agreement explicitly states that consent can still be exercised in the future if circumstances change over the next 30 years.

Rather, it is suspicious that this approach is being used to circumvent congressional review under the case-by-case review mechanism.

By providing blanket approval for 30 years to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and use plutonium,

the Agreement will grant Japan the authority to use plutonium in facilities that have not yet been constructed.

This does not appear to be a prudent measure for nuclear non-proliferation.

In the future, the permissible amount of plutonium should increase in proportion to the size of other types of facilities constructed or operated in non-nuclear-weapon states.

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u The existing case-by-case review mechanism uses each case to gradually achieve desired outcomes, always in favor of the United States.

1. The Boundary Between Peaceful and Military Use of Nuclear Energy on a Complex Stage - 1980s U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement Revision and Trade Disputes_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The Agreement grants Japan the authority to use plutonium in facilities that have not yet been constructed.