Mao Zedong's Strategy and Mind During the Early Sino-Japanese War

China People's Anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall · Jang Ji-young · Ewha Womans University

Introduction

Let us understand China. This should be the ultimate goal of our classes and field trips. In this regard, it is essential to explore and understand the various elements that constitute China and shape its identity. China cannot be understood without the Communist Party. To read and anticipate the moves China, as an abstract, monolithic state actor, makes in international relations, it is important to properly understand the mindset of the Chinese Communist Party in response to foreign powers and the policies that result from it. This process will involve understanding the Chinese government's position and, simultaneously, understanding the anti-Japanese sentiment or nationalism among the Chinese people.

To this end, it is very important to examine the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), a major war China has fought in modern times.

103 The Sino-Japanese War is sometimes easily explained as part of the Pacific War, appearing as a result of power and structure, as it ended in China's victory with the aid of major powers and the victory of the Allied forces. However, examining the actors within China at the time reveals an interesting process. At that time, a civil war was ongoing between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the process of two hostile actors, who had been aiming their guns at each other, cooperating against a foreign power is fascinating. This was not merely a matter of differing opinions among various domestic parties; it was a fierce situation where they did not hesitate to engage in military confrontation over who would hold the legitimacy of the Chinese government at the time. In this context, we aim to examine Mao Zedong's mindset, which led him to choose 'sleeping with the enemy'.

Was Mao Zedong a strategist blinded by personal power, or a nationalist who dreamed of the development of China and its people? Why did Mao Zedong ally with the three actors within China during the Sino-Japanese War? What were the mindsets of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, and the people at the time? Given that the official Chinese name for the Sino-Japanese War is the 'Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression,' it seems natural that they allied because 'resistance against Japan' was the core task that united China. However, considering that they repeatedly engaged in civil war and alliance during the Sino-Japanese War, and that ordinary students demanded an end to the civil war and cooperation between the government, it is evident that China could not achieve internal unity simply because of foreign invasion.

104 To vividly portray the situation of China's unification during the Sino-Japanese War, rather than taking it for granted, we must carefully navigate the space between the rational 'strategy' Mao Zedong chose to win the war and the 'mind' within it. First, we will briefly examine the military strategy that enabled victory in the Sino-Japanese War as an asymmetric war. Subsequently, we will compare and imagine Mao Zedong's true intentions through critical assessments of Mao by Chang Jung and John Halliday, based on interviews, and through the records of Edgar Snow and John Service's visits to China.

105 With these preliminary investigations and objectives, we visited the 'China People's Anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall.' Although originally scheduled for the morning of the second day, the visit was rescheduled to the last day, as the final activity, considering the overall itinerary. By the end, everyone seemed to be somewhat depleted in energy, and the clearing of the overcast weather made it even harder for us to concentrate. Nevertheless, we mustered our strength until the end, driven by our desire to understand China better and to grasp the true intentions of the Communist Party and Mao Zedong.

Reading Mao Zedong's Strategy

The Sino-Japanese War as an Asymmetric War

Upon entering the China People's Anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall, the first thing we encountered was a general explanation focusing on the representative battles of the Sino-Japanese War. The Sino-Japanese War has been extensively studied from the perspective of an 'asymmetric war' because of the highly asymmetrical situation between China and Japan at the time, focusing on how China achieved strategic victory. Typically, when two countries are described as asymmetric in an asymmetric war, it is not based on the size of their territories or populations, but on the scale of their military power. A comparison of the military strengths of China and Japan just before the Sino-Japanese War makes it even clearer that it was an asymmetric war. Comparing the army personnel at the time, Japan had 380,000 troops, and China had 2 million. In naval power, Japan had 285 vessels with a displacement of 1.15 million tons, while China had 120 vessels with a displacement of 68,000 tons. In air power (aircraft), Japan had 1,600 aircraft, and China had 600.

106 While China had an advantage in army personnel, Japan was overwhelmingly superior in naval and air power. In particular, Japan's navy was 17 times larger than China's, and even without considering technological superiority, its air power was about three times larger than China's. Furthermore, it is important to note that while China's army personnel were about five times more numerous than Japan's, this difference in troop numbers does not directly translate to a difference in combat effectiveness on the battlefield. A comparison of the organizational structure, weaponry, and equipment to assess the army combat power between China and Japan at the time reveals that Japan was significantly superior.

Moreover, this comparison of military strength assumes that China was internally unified. If factors such as political and military organization, internal unity of the military, and morale are considered, the gap in military strength between the two countries would widen. In fact, although the regional armies in China nominally received central command, the actual command authority of these units lay with local strongmen, and these units were qualitatively inferior compared to the reorganized central army. They were particularly weak in areas such as military logistics and personnel replenishment. Therefore, it can be concluded that even if a war broke out between China and Japan, the possibility of the Chinese army achieving victory in a direct confrontation with the Japanese army was almost nil.

1 He Yingqin, "Military Report During the War of Resistance," Shanghai Bookstore, 1990, p. 38

107 Even this comparison of military strength assumes that China was internally unified. If factors such as political and military organization, internal unity of the military, and morale are considered, the gap in military strength between the two countries would widen. In fact, although the regional armies in China nominally received central command, the actual command authority of these units lay with local strongmen, and these units were qualitatively inferior compared to the reorganized central army. They were particularly weak in areas such as military logistics and personnel replenishment. Therefore, it can be concluded that even if a war broke out between China and Japan, the possibility of the Chinese army achieving victory in a direct confrontation with the Japanese army was almost nil.

Mao Zedong's and Chiang Kai-shek's Strategies in the Asymmetric Sino-Japanese War

As in the research papers on the Sino-Japanese War, the memorial hall also did not make much effort to understand the 'minds' of the various actors. However, there were various studies on the strategies by which China defeated Japan at the time, and we hope to glimpse their minds by first examining the strategies chosen by Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek. We will examine the steps taken by Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek in the process of adopting the 'protracted war' strategy.

One of the most frequently mentioned terms in China's security strategy is 'People's War,' which is a national-level strategy stating that 'when the enemy attacks, not only the regular army fighting on the front lines but also the entire populace in the rear areas must unite and launch widespread resistance to achieve victory.' It can be considered a grand strategy implemented in various fields such as politics, military affairs, diplomacy, and culture. On the other hand, protracted war is a military strategy, a sub-strategy, and purely a military concept. That is, protracted war is a strategy to avoid decisive battles with the enemy by utilizing China's vast territory, rugged terrain, and unlimited potential, ultimately aiming to bring about a change in capabilities. In this light, People's War was a strategic policy adopted out of necessity due to the weakness of the government and military, relying on the participation and support of the 'people.' Protracted war can be seen as a strategy proposed purely from a military perspective to implement People's War.

108 national-level strategy. It can be considered a grand strategy implemented in various fields such as politics, military affairs, diplomacy, and culture. On the other hand, protracted war is a military strategy, a sub-strategy, and purely a military concept. That is, protracted war is a strategy to avoid decisive battles with the enemy by utilizing China's vast territory, rugged terrain, and unlimited potential, ultimately aiming to bring about a change in capabilities. In this light, People's War was a strategic policy adopted out of necessity due to the weakness of the government and military, relying on the participation and support of the 'people.' Protracted war can be seen as a strategy proposed purely from a military perspective to implement People's War.

Mao Zedong divides the long process of protracted war into three stages. Stage 1 is the stage where the enemy launches a strategic offensive and the Red Army conducts a strategic defense. In this stage, as the friendly forces are militarily inferior to the enemy, they carry out a strategic retreat. The strategic defense at this time refers to an active defense that involves constantly harassing the enemy, rather than a passive defense of simply retreating without resistance. Stage 2 is the stage of strategic stalemate, where the enemy is on the strategic defensive and the friendly forces are preparing to counterattack. Stage 3 is the stage where the friendly forces launch a strategic counteroffensive and the enemy makes a strategic retreat, a stage that pursues a decisive battle.

Although there was some change in the attitude of the Chinese Kuomintang government towards Japan between 1934 and 1935, as mentioned earlier, the military gap between China and Japan made it difficult for the National Government to respond militarily directly to Japan.

109 making it difficult for the National Government to respond militarily directly to Japan. Furthermore, since military buildup is not achieved simply by expanding the size of the army, it was realistically difficult for the National Government to catch up to Japan's military strength in a short period. However, as Japan's military threat in North China significantly increased from 1935 onwards, the National Government had no choice but to prepare for war with Japan immediately.

In this context, we can see references to protracted war in the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War. At the time, Falkenhausen, who was appointed as the head of the Chinese military advisory group, submitted a 'Plan to Respond to the Current Situation' to the Kuomintang government in 1935. Falkenhausen had studied Japanese at the University of Berlin and served as a military attaché in Japan in 1912, so he had a good understanding of the situation in Japan. According to this 'Plan to Respond to the Current Situation,' Falkenhausen stated, 'The most threatening and immediate enemy to China at present is undoubtedly Japan, so we must establish a response policy and prepare accordingly.' However, he also mentioned protracted war, stating, 'The current Chinese army cannot handle modern warfare. However, this does not mean that protracted war cannot be used to counter the Japanese army.' This can be interpreted as Falkenhausen pointing out that the current Chinese army, considering its weaponry and equipment, could not realistically engage in a normal frontal confrontation with the Japanese army and advising the Chinese army to conduct a protracted war.

110 Falkenhausen's concept of protracted war, as stated in his lecture notes, refers to 'yielding space to gain time by resisting and fighting in stages and retreating.' He also stated, 'When our forces are superior, we sometimes provoke engagement with the enemy, but when our forces are inferior, if the enemy attacks strongly, we delay the immediate enemy in one area, achieve victory in a decisive battle in another area, and guide the enemy's operations to a line favorable to us to easily achieve a decisive battle against the enemy later.' Therefore, it can be understood that Falkenhausen's 'protracted war' was not simply about prolonging the war by yielding space and gaining time, but about creating conditions for victory in a subsequent decisive battle.

However, the strategy that Chiang Kai-shek actually implemented in battle showed a slightly different aspect. When the Lugou Bridge Incident occurred in July 1937, Japan anticipated victory within three months and pursued a swift conclusion. In response, the Kuomintang leadership at the time conceived an anti-Japanese strategy of engaging in a 'war of attrition through protracted war,' utilizing China's vast manpower, extensive territory, and geographical characteristics, as advised by Falkenhausen. Since the early 1930s, Chiang Kai-shek had been anticipating Japan's invasion of the mainland and planned to delay the war as much as possible based on the principle of trading space for time, rather than directly confronting a militarily superior enemy.

111 However, Chiang Kai-shek's strategy for the war of resistance was a plan to delay the war by 'directly confronting the strong enemy' rather than 'retreating.'

Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was fully realized in the Battle of Shanghai. His strategic choice was not to avoid the enemy's attack but to defend the positions prepared in the area connecting Shanghai and Nanjing. However, contrary to Chiang Kai-shek's judgment, the timing of the outbreak of war was unfavorable to China. The Japanese army landed two divisions in Shanghai and, by mid-September, deployed approximately 200,000 troops in six divisions, equipped with warships, aircraft, tanks, artillery, and special forces. For the first week, the Chinese army successfully defended against the Japanese offensive, but Chinese casualties reached 130,000.

The failure of this strategy is also evident in the Battle of Nanjing. The Kuomintang commanders, focused solely on defending their capital, recklessly deployed central army units, resulting in the waste of elite combat power without providing much assistance to the defense. Ultimately, Nanjing fell. And the Japanese army carried out a brutal massacre for seven weeks. While the number of Japanese casualties during the approximately three months it took to capture Nanjing was 40,000, Chinese casualties reached 270,000. The number of Chinese casualties, representing 60% of the Kuomintang forces deployed in this battle, clearly demonstrates how reckless Chiang Kai-shek's pursuit of a decisive battle was. Above all, Chiang Kai-shek

112 inflicted significant losses on the military by deploying the Central Army, the elite unit of the Chinese army. What the Kuomintang government sought to achieve through a 'delaying war' via 'frontal confrontation' was the intervention of major Western powers, including the Soviet Union and the United States. However, international relations in the early stages of the war worked unfavorably for China. Japan had not yet started a full-scale war with the Soviet Union, and the United States and Britain were proclaiming neutrality policies. As seen in the overview of the Sino-Japanese War in II, although Britain and the United States condemned Japan's military actions, they were exporting essential military supplies and strategic resources to Japan. Therefore, China was in a position where it had no choice but to continue the war alone until the international situation changed. Facing an unfavorable international environment, China, after the fall of Nanjing, sought to reorganize its wartime system during a brief lull when Japan maintained its policy of non-escalation.

While reorganizing its wartime system, Chiang Kai-shek announced a shift from 'defensive decisive battle' to 'protracted war of attrition' in 1938. The concept of 'protracted war' advocated by Falkenhausen was not only discussed within the Kuomintang but was also considered important within the Communist Party. Mao Zedong of the Communist Party advocated for People's War and protracted war, aiming to lead both the revolutionary war (civil war) and the war of resistance against Japan (Sino-Japanese War) to victory.

Upon the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Communist Party held a meeting in Shaanxi Province on August 22 and formulated operational guidelines. As a result of the Battle of Shanghai, Japan was able to control one-third of China. However, according to the protracted war advocated by Mao,

113 Stage 1, the stage of strategic defense, was relatively successfully executed. This is because the Japanese army was delayed in Nanjing for seven weeks, preventing Japan from achieving a decisive victory and prolonging the war. This can be attributed not to Chiang Kai-shek's strategy of pursuing a decisive battle, but to the fact that the Japanese army did not achieve a decisive expansion of its gains.

The stages 2 and 3 presented by the Communist Party involved disrupting the Japanese army's rear through surprise attacks, dispersing enemy combat power, and frustrating the Japanese government's pursuit of a 'swift resolution.' Mao Zedong instructed that operations in this stage should support the regular army's operations by extensively destroying enemy supply lines and hindering enemy transportation. The Hundred Regiments Offensive, carried out from August to December 1940, is a representative example. The Communist Party's Eighth Route Army launched large-scale operations behind Japanese lines, such as destroying railways and roads to disrupt the enemy's rear. These rear operations against Japan acted as a factor hindering the concentration of combat power at the front. If Stage 2 was spent creating a change in the capabilities of the enemy and friendly forces to prepare for a strategic counteroffensive, Stage 3, where the friendly forces launched a strategic counteroffensive and the enemy made a strategic retreat, became possible with the participation of two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, the decisive victory in the Sino-Japanese War may be seen as a result of the participation of major powers. However, the fact that China was able to sustain its resistance for approximately nine years by refusing a decisive victory for the Japanese army proves the success of the strategy of 'protracted war.'

114 years of resistance, by refusing a decisive victory for the Japanese army, proves the success of the strategy of 'protracted war.'

In assessing the situation during the Sino-Japanese War, Mao believed that the vast difference in capabilities between China and Japan made it impossible to predict the end of the war, and even that Japan could only be defeated with the military support of the United States and the Soviet Union internationally. Mao's protracted war strategy was a desperate measure arising from the impossibility of a short-term victory given the overwhelming strength of Japanese imperialism's weaponry. Mao's emphasis on the 'human factor' was a sophisticated political strategy to buy time to shift the balance of military power by boosting the will of the Chinese people not to succumb to enemy weapons, and to create conditions for strengthening friendly forces. Furthermore, Mao Zedong's past experiences of failure when using other strategies against the Kuomintang in the early stages allowed him to firmly pursue the protracted war strategy.

3 Park Chang-hee, "The Origin of Modern Chinese Strategy: From the Chinese Revolutionary War to the Intervention in the Korean War," Planet Media, 2011, p. 124

115

Reading Mao Zedong's True Intentions

The Monster Mao Zedong

As examined above, from the time the Sino-Japanese War began to brew, Mao Zedong had two missions: to strengthen the position of the Communist Party and to confront the common enemy, Japan. In their book, Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, through interviews with 363 people from 38 countries, present previously unknown stories about Mao Zedong. They claim that Mao Zedong was primarily focused on consolidating his personal position within the Communist Party and was filled with personal ambition for power.

Master of Image Making

The first anecdote that clearly illustrates this is introduced in their book. In the early 1930s, Mao Zedong had risen to become the regional leader of the Communist Party in Jiangxi Province, but when the central leadership of the Communist Party flooded into this region, Mao Zedong was pushed to the Shaanxi Province region. Liu Zhidan, who had established a revolutionary base with the respect and full support of the local people in the northern Shaanxi region, was imprisoned by the central Communist Party forces who had previously been pushed out. In 1935, special envoys of the Communist Party accused Liu Zhidan of being a spy for Chiang Kai-shek who 'established a base for the Red Army to annihilate the Red Army.' His attitude of voluntarily obeying the authority of the Party was not recognized as an act of loyalty but rather worked against him, leading to accusations of being 'a cunning man who uses deceptive tactics to make the Party trust him.' It was around this time that Mao Zedong arrived, making him suitable to play the role of a benevolent mediator. He ordered the arrest and execution to be postponed, and in late November, he released Liu Zhidan and his colleagues. The purge of Liu Zhidan and his group was judged a 'major mistake.' Two scapegoats were reprimanded. Thus, Mao Zedong succeeded in portraying himself as the one who destroyed the regional Communist Party leadership while also saving them. This put Mao Zedong in a position to take over their base. Thanks to the purge, Liu Zhidan and his colleagues were already sufficiently intimidated by the time Mao Zedong appeared (Liu Zhidan could barely walk after being shackled), and Mao Zedong expelled them from decision-making positions and key military posts without significant resistance. Mao Zedong intended to use Liu Zhidan's name to legitimize his rule, so he did not want it to appear that he was purging Liu Zhidan. However, since Liu Zhidan was from that region, Mao Zedong had no intention of letting him live.

116 He was accused of being a spy for Chiang Kai-shek who 'established a base for the Red Army to annihilate the Red Army.' His attitude of voluntarily obeying the authority of the Party was not recognized as an act of loyalty but rather worked against him, leading to accusations of being 'a cunning man who uses deceptive tactics to make the Party trust him.' It was around this time that Mao Zedong arrived, making him suitable to play the role of a benevolent mediator. He ordered the arrest and execution to be postponed, and in late November, he released Liu Zhidan and his colleagues. The purge of Liu Zhidan and his group was judged a 'major mistake.' Two scapegoats were reprimanded. Thus, Mao Zedong succeeded in portraying himself as the one who destroyed the regional Communist Party leadership while also saving them. This put Mao Zedong in a position to take over their base. Thanks to the purge, Liu Zhidan and his colleagues were already sufficiently intimidated by the time Mao Zedong appeared (Liu Zhidan could barely walk after being shackled), and Mao Zedong expelled them from decision-making positions and key military posts without significant resistance. Mao Zedong intended to use Liu Zhidan's name to legitimize his rule, so he did not want it to appear that he was purging Liu Zhidan. However, since Liu Zhidan was from that region, Mao Zedong had no intention of letting him live.

As soon as he settled into the new base, Mao Zedong began planning to open a passage to the Soviet-controlled border to procure supplies, especially weapons. His plan was to cross the Yellow River into the wealthier Shaanxi Province to the east, acquire new troops and supplies, and if possible, establish a base.

117 then turn north and advance into Outer Mongolia, which was under Soviet control. The expedition began in February 1936. The Communist Party presented the goal of the Long March as fighting the Japanese army, and under slogans like 'Going to fight Japan with our kin,' they claimed to be the 'Anti-Japanese Vanguard.' However, this was pure propaganda. Mao Zedong's army made no attempt to approach the Japanese army. Although they obtained a small amount of spoils and a few new recruits during the expedition, they were soon repelled by Chiang Kai-shek's forces and driven back to the west of the Yellow River, so they never even approached the Mongolian border. Liu Zhidan died during this short operational period at the age of thirty-three. Some history books record his death as occurring in battle. However, an overwhelming amount of evidence suggests he was murdered.4 Mao Zedong succeeded in creating an image of a benevolent mediator, eliminating a powerful local leader, and thereby establishing his own legitimacy and authority.

Mao Zedong's success in creating a positive image without revealing his personal ambitions is also evident in his meeting with Edgar Snow. It is difficult to read his true intentions solely through Mao Zedong's personal writings, so the first approach was to examine the people he met and interviewed, and the writings they left behind. The most representative figure among them was the American journalist Edgar Snow. The meeting between Mao Zedong and Snow was not due to Snow's active efforts or by chance; rather, Mao politically planned and executed it, successfully creating a positive image for the Communist Party and himself.

118 people he met and interviewed, and the writings they left behind. The most representative figure among them was the American journalist Edgar Snow. The meeting between Mao Zedong and Snow was not due to Snow's active efforts or by chance; rather, Mao politically planned and executed it, successfully creating a positive image for the Communist Party and himself.

In contrast to Mao Zedong's indifferent attitude towards his own children, Chiang Kai-shek's attitude towards his son was almost paranoid. In February 1937, while Stalin was still detaining Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek, who desperately wanted his son's return, bestowed another favor upon the Chinese Communist Party. He appointed Shao Lizi (who had taken Chiang Kai-shek's son to the Soviet Union in 1925), a fixed spy for the Communist Party, as the head of the Kuomintang's Propaganda Department, giving him responsibility for the media. Shao Lizi's task was to change the fiercely anti-communist public opinion and media attitudes. His appointment was a significant gesture of goodwill towards Moscow.

From this point on, the Soviet Union became the subject of extensive and enthusiastic media coverage. A moderate and positive image of the Chinese Communist Party began to emerge. By the summer, Shao Lizi and Mao Zedong were planning to publish an autobiography that would portray Mao Zedong as a benevolent and kind figure. This autobiography was supplemented with various declarations depicting Mao Zedong as dedicated to the war of resistance against Japan. Mao Zedong wrote the following inscription in the tone of an ardent patriot: 'Fought unyieldingly to the end against Japanese imperialists.' This autobiography was published on November 1st and received a great response.

119 At this time, the myth of the Communist army being the most dedicated to the Sino-Japanese War was born, playing a crucial role in Mao Zedong's success. Tens of thousands of people joined the Communist Party thanks to this myth, and many of those who joined at this time would later hold important positions in Mao Zedong's regime.

The "Autobiography of Mao Zedong" was primarily based on the interviews Mao Zedong had with the American journalist Edgar Snow in the summer of 1936. This was the only time Mao Zedong extensively explained his life. Snow also published his book, "Red Star Over China." This book, overwhelmingly reliant on interviews with Mao Zedong and other Communist Party members, erased the bloody history of the Communist Party and laid the foundation for its rehabilitation.

Mao Zedong's meeting with Snow was no accident. In the spring of that year, Mao had requested the Shanghai underground to find one foreign journalist and one doctor who could help him publish his autobiography. After careful investigation, Mao invited Snow, who possessed all the necessary qualifications. He was an American, contributed to the influential "Saturday Evening Post" and "New York Herald Tribune," and was favorably disposed towards the Chinese Communist Party. Snow arrived at the Communist base in July with a Lebanese-American doctor, George Hatem. Hatem smuggled top-secret Comintern documents hidden in his medical bag. While Snow stayed for three months, Hatem remained with the Communists until his death, serving as Mao Zedong's personal physician and an operative for the Chinese Communist Party's foreign intelligence agency.

120 Mao Zedong left nothing to chance and personally directed the details of Snow's visit. "Security, secrecy, friendliness, and hospitality." The Political Bureau meticulously coordinated the answers to Snow's pre-submitted questionnaire. Mao provided Snow with a mixture of valuable information and absurd fabrications, which Snow accepted uncritically, describing Mao and the Chinese Communist leadership as "direct, honest, simple, and without guile." Mao concealed atrocities such as the AB massacres, cunningly reframed the march across China as the "Long March," and fabricated heroic deeds and achievements during the march, such as the Luding Bridge incident. He made sure Snow believed he had walked most of the 6,000 miles of the Long March with the common soldiers, except when he was ill. Mao also completely concealed his relationship with Moscow and claimed to desire friendship with the United States, a claim that deceived many.

Mao Zedong took the additional precaution of reviewing everything Snow wrote, partially revising and rewriting it after publication. On July 26, 1937, before "Red Star Over China" was published, Snow sent a letter to his wife, who was in Yan'an, stating: "Please do not send me any more contact information from people who deny what they told me... In fact, after deleting so much, I'm starting to feel like I'm reading 'Childe Harold'." Snow avoided mentioning this background in "Red Star Over China," instead claiming that Mao had "not imposed any censorship on me."

121 The Chinese edition further embellished Snow's account, with Snow writing that he found Mao's statements to be "honest and truthful."

The English edition of "Red Star Over China" was published in the winter of 1937-1938 and played a significant role in shifting Western public opinion in favor of Mao. The Chinese Communist Party planned to publish a Chinese edition under the title "Tales of the Journey to the West" to appear impartial. In addition to this book and "Autobiography of Mao Zedong," a third book was produced based on Snow's material. This book was also published under the neutral-sounding title "Impressions of Mao Zedong." Furthermore, "Red Star Over China" had a profound impact on young Chinese radicals. Many young people read Snow's book and joined the Communist Party. Among them was the first Tibetan communist. This marked the beginning of the resurgence of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong stated that the publication of this book achieved "results comparable to the flood control achievements of Emperor Yu." Emperor Yu was a mythical emperor who controlled floods, enabling the beginning of Chinese civilization. Shao Lizi, Chiang Kai-shek's head of press, played an essential role in supporting Snow and promoting Mao and the Communist Party. When Chiang Kai-shek dismissed Shao Lizi nearly a year later, Mao Zedong and the Communist Party had already shed their subversive image.5

5 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, "Mao: The Unknown Story" (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), pp. 256-258.

122 Mao's Coldness Towards His Family

It is well-known that Mao Zedong was not a good father or husband personally. Mao Zedong's children arrived in Moscow in early 1937 and were placed in a boarding school for the children of foreign Communist leaders. The children wrote letters and sent photos to their father, but Mao rarely replied.6

Mao Zedong's wife, He Zizhen, had to endure her husband's indifference throughout their nearly ten-year marriage. She was particularly hurt by his lack of concern for her painful pregnancies and childbirths. One of these involved a pregnancy and birth during the Long March. She was also hurt by her husband's joke that she gave birth "as easily as a hen lays an egg." Mao Zedong resented that he continued to impregnate her despite his indifference to his children and his lack of attention when four of their children died or were abandoned. Their fifth child, named Zhao Zhao, was born in Bao'an in 1936. The living conditions in Bao'an, infested with scorpions and rats, were dire. A year later, He Zizhen became pregnant again, leading to depression. Repeated pregnancies under extremely poor living conditions worsened her health, for which she received no compensation in her family life. To add to her suffering, her husband openly engaged in extramarital affairs.7

123 Her health deteriorated due to repeated pregnancies under extremely poor living conditions, for which she received no compensation in her family life. To add to her suffering, her husband openly engaged in extramarital affairs.7

The Tripartite Era of Chiang Kai-shek, Japan, and the Communist Party Despite Japan's direct territorial ambitions in China after the Manchurian Incident, the Nationalist government was passive in its resistance to Japan. However, Mao Zedong is known to have advocated for China's unified resistance against Japan. Yet, Mao Zedong never considered Chiang Kai-shek an ally; he allied with Chiang Kai-shek not to resist Japan, but with the intention of eliminating Chiang Kai-shek through Japan, viewing the situation as a tripartite era of Chiang Kai-shek, Japan, and the Communist Party. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, a full-scale war between China and Japan erupted in Shanghai as desired by the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union ordered Mao Zedong to fight alongside the Nationalists, he opposed this and participated passively in the war.

On July 7, 1937, a battle occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops at Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge) near Beijing. By the end of July, Japanese forces had occupied Beijing and Tianjin, the two largest cities in northern China. Chiang Kai-shek did not declare war and did not want a full-scale war. The Japanese army also did not want a full-scale war. At this point, Japan had no intention of expanding the conflict beyond northern China. However, within a few weeks, a full-scale war broke out in Shanghai, 1,000 kilometers to the south. Shanghai was an area where neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Japan intended to wage war. Japan had only deployed 3,000 marines near Shanghai under the 1932 armistice agreement. By mid-August, Japan's plan remained as follows: "The army is deployed only in northern China." "There is no need to send the army to Shanghai." 7 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, "Mao: The Unknown Story," p. 262.

124 In July, Japan's rapid occupation of northern China posed a direct threat to Stalin. Large Japanese forces were now positioned to attack the Soviet Union from any point along the thousands of kilometers of border. A year earlier, Stalin had publicly identified Japan as the main threat. He now believed that he had activated a long-standing Communist spy within the heart of the Nationalist army, triggering the full-scale war in Shanghai. The full-scale war inevitably drew Japanese forces deep into the vast interior of China, away from the Soviet Union.8

In July, Stalin felt a direct threat from Japan's swift occupation of northern China. Large Japanese forces were now positioned to turn north and attack the Soviet Union anywhere along the thousands of kilometers of border. A year earlier, Stalin had publicly identified Japan as the main threat. He was now believed to have triggered a full-scale war in Shanghai by activating Communist spies long planted in the heart of the Nationalist army. A full-scale war would inevitably draw Japanese forces deep into China's vast interior, away from the Soviet Union.8

The outbreak of full-scale war between Japan and China immediately brought Mao Zedong several benefits. Finally, Chiang Kai-shek accepted a crucial demand from the Communists. Until then, Chiang Kai-shek had refused to guarantee the autonomy of the Red Army. Although the Red Army was considered part of the central government's forces, Mao Zedong thus gained command over his own army. While Chiang Kai-shek was the supreme commander of the Chinese army, he could not directly order the Red Army and had to convey his requests in a "request" format. The Chinese Communist Party was now effectively legalized. This was just the beginning of the various gains Mao Zedong made in the Sino-Japanese War, which lasted for eight years and claimed the lives of approximately twenty million Chinese. The Sino-Japanese War significantly weakened Chiang Kai-shek's position and allowed Mao Zedong to command an army of 1.3 million men. While the ratio of Nationalist to Communist forces at the beginning of the war was 60:1, it became 3:1 by the end of the war. 8 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, "Mao: The Unknown Story," pp. 267-269.

125 After orchestrating the outbreak of full-scale war between China and Japan from behind the scenes, Stalin ordered the Chinese Red Army to participate and made it clear to the Chinese Communist Party that they should actively cooperate with the Nationalist government and not give Chiang Kai-shek any excuse to seek a truce with Japan. However, Mao Zedong opposed this. Mao Zedong did not view the Sino-Japanese War as a war for all Chinese to unite and fight against Japan. He never considered himself an ally of Chiang Kai-shek. Years later, Mao Zedong told his confidants that he viewed the Sino-Japanese War as a tripartite conflict. He recalled the period known as the Three Kingdoms in Chinese history, saying, "Chiang Kai-shek, Japan, and us: our three kingdoms." He saw this war as an opportunity for Japan to destroy Chiang Kai-shek. Years later, Mao Zedong expressed his gratitude to Japan several times for "lending a big hand." After the war, when some Japanese visitors apologized for Japan's invasion of China, he replied, "I would rather thank the Japanese military leaders." "If the Japanese army had not occupied large parts of China, we would still be living in the mountains today." His words were sincere.

Mao Zedong never formulated a strategy to drive out the Japanese without Chiang Kai-shek. Nor did he dream that the Chinese Communist Party could defeat the Japanese occupying forces if Chiang Kai-shek were defeated. All his hopes rested on Stalin. Mao Zedong clearly articulated his calculations in his 1936 interview with Edgar Snow: "The Soviet Union cannot ignore the events unfolding in the Far East. The Soviet Union cannot remain passive. Will the Soviet Union stand by while Japan conquers all of China and uses China as a strategic base to attack the Soviet Union? Or will the Soviet Union support the Chinese? We believe the Soviet Union will choose the latter."9

126 Therefore, Mao Zedong's basic plan for the Sino-Japanese War was to preserve the strength of the Chinese Red Army and expand its occupied territories while waiting for Stalin to act. Thus, when Japan pushed deeper inland from northern China, not only from the Shanghai region, Mao Zedong made Chiang Kai-shek agree to deploy the Red Army not in combat but as a supplementary support unit for the government forces. Mao Zedong did not want the Red Army to engage in combat with the invading forces at all. He ordered the Red Army commanders to wait until the Nationalist forces were defeated by the Japanese army, and then to occupy the territories behind the Japanese front lines after the Japanese advance. The Japanese army could not defend the vast areas of China they had conquered, and the Japanese occupied territories eventually became much larger than Japanese territory itself. The Japanese army could only control railways and major cities, leaving the smaller cities and rural areas vacant. Mao Zedong also ordered the recruitment of defeated Nationalist soldiers to augment the Red Army's strength. His plan was to expand the Red Army's territory by capitalizing on the Japanese advance. 9 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, "Mao: The Unknown Story," pp. 270-271.

Mao Zedong sent telegrams to his army commanders like a downpour: "Focus on building base areas. Do not focus on combat." And when the Japanese army swept through Shaanxi Province, he ordered: "Establish our territory throughout Shaanxi Province." He later said that he adopted the attitude: "The more territory the Japanese army occupied, the better." Mao Zedong's approach met with resistance from Communist army commanders who were enthusiastic about fighting the Japanese army.

However, Stalin wanted the Chinese Communist Party to fight the Japanese army and, to implement his policy, sent his most loyal Chinese comrade to Yan'an by Soviet plane in November 1937. This person was Wang Ming, whom Stalin summoned and told: "The most important issue at present is the war (i.e., the war with Japan). After the war ends, we will face the problem of how to fight the civil war." The majority of the Chinese Communist Party leadership agreed with Stalin's line. When Wang Ming returned, the first Political Bureau meeting was held in December, where he became the proponent of the "prioritize anti-Japanese war" policy. The Political Bureau decided that the Red Army should obey the orders of the Nationalist army headquarters, with Chiang Kai-shek as the supreme commander and the Chinese Communist Party as a part of it. Mao Zedong opposed this decision. However, faced with Stalin's clear orders, he could not refuse. His colleagues expressed their opposition to Mao Zedong's goals by deciding to remove him from the position of number one leader. The CCP convened its National Congress, last held in 1928, and Wang Ming, not Mao Zedong, was selected by the Political Bureau to deliver the political report.

127 Mao Zedong also lost control of the Secretariat, the core decision-making body. For the first time since the split with the Nationalist Party in 1927, all nine members of the Secretariat were present, and five of them did not support Mao Zedong. The leader of the majority opposition was Wang Ming. Xiang Ying, the political commissar of the New Fourth Army, had long been an open opponent of Mao Zedong. Zhang Guotao, whom Mao Zedong had systematically targeted during the Long March, hated Mao Zedong. And both Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu supported Wang Ming. Zhou Enlai supported actively fighting the Japanese army and readily followed the majority opinion. Mao Zedong was in the minority. Wang Ming, backed by the authority of Moscow, exercised his right to represent the party in Moscow, met with Stalin, and was close to international Communist leaders. Fluent in Russian and familiar with the workings of the Kremlin, he was a ruthless ambitious man. During the Soviet purges, he sent many Chinese Communists to prison or execution. Meanwhile, this thirty-something Communist, short and stout but extremely self-confident, posed a serious threat to Mao Zedong.

128 In February 1938, the Political Bureau convened again to prevent Mao Zedong from continuing to issue orders that contradicted the agreed strategy with Chiang Kai-shek. Wang Ming requested the meeting to discuss another urgent matter besides this objective. In January, under Mao Zedong's leadership, the new Communist territory of Jincha was officially declared a Communist base without Chiang Kai-shek's consent. Again, the majority of the Political Bureau members supported Wang Ming, who drafted the minutes stating that "the Red Army must obey the supreme commander Chiang Kai-shek, and all new Communist base areas must obtain prior consent and approval from the Nationalist government." This was Moscow's line, and thus Mao Zedong appeared to adopt the "prioritize the Sino-Japanese War" policy.

Mao Zedong, in a state of severe nervous tension, took preventive measures to prevent Moscow from discovering his true intentions. At the December 1937 Political Bureau meeting, under the pretext of "maintaining security," he confiscated all handwritten records of the attendees.

130 By the end of October 1938, Mao Zedong's strongest opponents (Zhou Enlai, Xiang Ying, Bo Gu, Wang Ming) had left the city. Attacking the opposition, he forcefully presented his policies at a plenary session: namely, the policy of actively expanding Red Army base areas and, if necessary, waging war against the Nationalist army.10

Mao Zedong also lost control of the Secretariat, the key decision-making body. For the first time since the split with the Kuomintang in 1927, all nine members of the Secretariat met together, and five of them did not support Mao Zedong. The leader of the majority opposition was Wang Ming, and Xiang Ying, the political commissar of the New Fourth Army, had long been an open opponent of Mao Zedong. Zhang Guotao, whom Mao Zedong had intensively targeted during the Long March, hated Mao Zedong. And Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu both supported Wang Ming.

Zhou Enlai supported active fighting against the Japanese army and readily followed the majority opinion. Mao Zedong was in the minority. Wang Ming, backed by the authority of Moscow, exercised his right to represent the Party in Moscow, met with Stalin, and was close to the leaders of international communism. He was fluent in Russian and familiar with the workings of the Kremlin, and he was a ruthless ambitious man. During the Great Purge in the Soviet Union, he sent many Chinese Communists to prison or the executioner's block. Meanwhile, this short, stout, and extremely self-confident thirty-something Communist posed a formidable threat to Mao Zedong.

In February 1938, the Politburo convened again to stop Mao Zedong from continuing to issue orders that deviated from the agreed strategy with Chiang Kai-shek. Wang Ming requested the meeting to discuss another urgent matter besides this purpose. In January, under Mao Zedong's initiative, the new Communist territory of Jin Chaji was officially declared a Communist base without Chiang Kai-shek's consent. Again, a majority of the Politburo members supported Wang Ming, who drafted minutes stating that the Red Army must obey Supreme Commander Chiang Kai-shek and that all new Communist bases must receive prior consent and approval from the Nationalist government. This was Moscow's line, and thus Mao Zedong adopted an attitude that seemed to accept the 'priority policy for the Sino-Japanese War'.

In a state of severe nervous tension, Mao Zedong took precautionary measures to prevent Moscow from discovering his true intentions. At the Politburo meeting in December 1937, under the pretext of 'maintaining security,' all handwritten records of the attendees were confiscated.

In late October 1938, Mao Zedong's strongest opponents (Zhou Enlai, Xiang Ying, Bo Gu, and Wang Ming) left the city. Attacking the opposition, he forcefully pushed his policy through the plenary session. That is, the policy was to actively expand the Red Army bases and, if necessary, to wage war against the Nationalist army.10

Even before the full-scale Sino-Japanese War began, Mao Zedong was actively checking Chiang Kai-shek. First, he used Zhang Xueliang. Mao Zedong was willing to help Zhang Xueliang replace Chiang Kai-shek and form an alliance with him. If Zhang Xueliang depended on the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party would play a pivotal role, and Mao Zedong could become the behind-the-scenes power broker controlling all of China. Mao Zedong proposed an anti-Chiang Kai-shek alliance between Zhang Xueliang and the Chinese Communist Party, offering to support him in becoming the new supreme leader of the Nationalist government in place of Chiang Kai-shek. When Guangdong and Guangxi provinces formed an alliance and rebelled against the Chiang Kai-shek government, Mao Zedong persuaded Zhang Xueliang to use this incident as an opportunity to launch a similar rebellion, declare independence in the northwestern region, and form an alliance with the Communist Party.

Zhang Xueliang made it clear that he was willing to ally with the Chinese Communist Party and "engage in a decisive struggle against Japan," meaning he was willing to declare war on Japan, which Chiang Kai-shek still had not done. In return, the Soviet Union wanted to support Zhang Xueliang to become China's supreme leader instead of Chiang Kai-shek. This proposal was very attractive to Stalin. He wanted China to engage in full-scale war against Japan. Japan had been encroaching on Chinese territory since 1931. After annexing Manchuria, Japan established another puppet regime in parts of northern China in November 1935, but Chiang Kai-shek was avoiding full-scale war with Japan. Stalin was anxious that Japan might turn north and attack the Soviet Union. His goal was to use China to draw the Japanese army into the vast interior of China, bogging them down there and thus keeping Japan away from the Soviet Union. Zhang Xueliang's proposal was suitable for the Soviet Union, but Stalin did not trust him. Stalin did not believe that Zhang Xueliang, a warlord from Manchuria, had the ability to unite all of China and wage war against Japan. If China fell into civil war, it would facilitate Japan's victory, and this would double the threat of Japan to the Soviet Union. The Soviet side, while pretending to consider the proposal, manipulated Zhang Xueliang into helping the Chinese Communist Party. Soviet diplomats told Zhang Xueliang to make direct contact with the Chinese Communist Party in secret. The first meeting between the Chinese Communist Party's negotiating representative and Zhang Xueliang took place in January 1936. 10 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, "Mao: The Unknown Story," p. 285.

131 Mao Zedong was willing to help Zhang Xueliang replace Chiang Kai-shek and form a genuine alliance with him. If Zhang Xueliang depended on the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party would play a pivotal role, and Mao Zedong could become the behind-the-scenes power broker controlling all of China.

Mao Zedong was willing to help Zhang Xueliang take Chiang Kai-shek's place and form a true alliance with him. If Zhang Xueliang relied on the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party would play a pivotal role, and Mao Zedong could become the behind-the-scenes power broker for control of all of China.

132 Mao Zedong instructed his negotiator, Li Kenong, to propose an anti-Chiang Kai-shek alliance between Zhang Xueliang and the Chinese Communist Party, and to promise to support him in becoming the new supreme leader of the Nationalist government in place of Chiang Kai-shek.

In June of that year, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces formed an alliance and rebelled against the Chiang Kai-shek government. Mao Zedong persuaded Zhang Xueliang to use this incident as an opportunity to launch a similar rebellion, declare independence in the northwestern region, and form an alliance with the Communist Party. However, Zhang Xueliang was not interested in the plan because he wanted to rule all of China, not just a part of it. Furthermore, Moscow explicitly opposed the plan. Stalin wanted a unified China that would draw Japan into a full-scale war, not a divided China. Stalin was convinced that Chiang Kai-shek was the only person who could unite China. Moscow issued an landmark order to the Chinese Communist Party, stating that they should not treat Chiang Kai-shek as an enemy but as an ally. "It is not right to treat Chiang Kai-shek the same as the Japanese... You must strive to stop the hostilities between the Red Army and Chiang Kai-shek's army. And you must strive to reach an agreement to fight together against the Japanese... Everything must be for the cause of anti-Japanese resistance." Thus, Stalin wanted the Chinese Communist Party to uphold Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of a unified China, at least for the time being. Moscow firmly instructed the Chinese Communist Party to enter into serious negotiations to form an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Zedong had no choice but to accept. Negotiations on a "united front" began in September.

133 Both Moscow and Mao Zedong kept this policy change hidden from Zhang Xueliang, allowing him to continue to misjudge the issue of replacing Chiang Kai-shek, which he was most concerned about. From Mao Zedong's perspective, he also encouraged Zhang Xueliang to believe that he might gain Moscow's support. 11 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, "Mao: The Unknown Story," pp. 238-241.

Furthermore, Mao Zedong planned and carried out the kidnapping and murder of Chiang Kai-shek. The book states: When Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped, one leader recalled that Mao Zedong was "laughing like a madman." With Chiang Kai-shek captured, Mao Zedong now had one major goal: to have Chiang Kai-shek killed. If Chiang Kai-shek were assassinated, a power vacuum would be created, providing a good opportunity for the Soviet Union to intervene and hand over power to the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong himself.

While Mao Zedong was plotting to kill Chiang Kai-shek, Stalin began working to save him. Three days after Chiang Kai-shek was captured, on December 13, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Nanjing stated: "Rumors are circulating that the Chinese Communist Party was involved in this coup, and if Chiang Kai-shek's safety is threatened, the people's anger will extend beyond the Communist Party to the Soviet Union, and pressure may be applied (to the Chinese government) to ally with Japan against the Soviet Union." Stalin understood that this kidnapping could pose an imminent threat to his various strategic interests. 11 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, "Mao: The Unknown Story," pp. 238-241.

134 Stalin suspected that Mao Zedong might have colluded with Japan. Stalin had already begun arresting, torturing, and interrogating almost all of the Soviet Union's "seasoned China experts." Four days after Chiang Kai-shek's kidnapping, Mao Zedong's name emerged from the confessions of several tortured individuals. Comintern General Secretary Dimitrov condemned the kidnapping in a telegram to Mao Zedong, pointing out that it "could not only cause clear damage to the anti-Japanese united front but also aid Japan's invasion of China." The gist of the telegram was that "the Chinese Communist Party must take a firm stance in favor of a peaceful resolution." This was an order to ensure the release of President Chiang Kai-shek and his return to power.

When the telegram arrived, Mao Zedong was reportedly "furious... stamping his feet and cursing." His next move was to act as if the telegram had never reached him. He kept the arrival of the telegram secret from everyone; Zhou Enlai was on his way to Xi'an to persuade Zhang Xueliang to kill Chiang Kai-shek. Mao Zedong later claimed that the telegram from the Comintern dated December 16 was "unintelligible due to poor reception" and that the Chinese Communist Party had requested Moscow to resend it on the 18th. These claims were fabricated. Radio operators who worked at the core of the Chinese Communist Party's operations stated that it was standard operating procedure to immediately request a resend from Moscow for any difficult-to-read telegram, and that they would never wait two days, especially in a crisis. On the 19th, Mao Zedong informed the Communist Political Bureau: "The Comintern's instructions have not arrived." This was a high-risk tactic against Moscow. Mao Zedong not only concealed the fact that he had instigated Chiang Kai-shek's kidnapping plot but also concealed and defied Stalin's direct orders. However, for Mao Zedong, the prospect of eliminating Chiang Kai-shek was greater than the risk of angering Stalin. Meanwhile, Zhang Xueliang, realizing he did not have Moscow's support, decided to ensure Chiang Kai-shek's safety. He decided that he should release Chiang Kai-shek, leave Xi'an with him, and place himself at Chiang Kai-shek's mercy.

On the 20th, Moscow sent another telegram to the Chinese Communist Party, and Mao Zedong also hid this second telegram, which instructed "peaceful resolution." Mao Zedong then sent this telegram to Zhou Enlai along with instructions to "help restore Chiang Kai-shek's freedom." Thus, Mao Zedong redirected his goals to align with Stalin's. The Chinese Communist Party promised to ensure the cessation of the "anti-Communist extermination policy" and demanded that Chiang Kai-shek hold talks with Zhou Enlai. Just before Chiang Kai-shek's kidnapping, Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's ambassador to Moscow, had requested to return, and Moscow finally showed willingness to accept. When Zhou Enlai brought this direct promise from Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to the Communist demands and invited "Zhou Enlai to Nanjing for direct negotiations."

135 When the telegram arrived, Mao Zedong was reportedly "furious... stamping his feet and cursing." His next move was to act as if the telegram had never reached him. He kept the arrival of the telegram secret from everyone; Zhou Enlai was on his way to Xi'an to persuade Zhang Xueliang to kill Chiang Kai-shek. Mao Zedong later claimed that the telegram from the Comintern dated December 16 was "unintelligible due to poor reception" and that the Chinese Communist Party had requested Moscow to resend it on the 18th. These claims were fabricated. Radio operators who worked at the core of the Chinese Communist Party's operations stated that it was standard operating procedure to immediately request a resend from Moscow for any difficult-to-read telegram, and that they would never wait two days, especially in a crisis. On the 19th, Mao Zedong informed the Communist Political Bureau: "The Comintern's instructions have not arrived." This was a high-risk tactic against Moscow. Mao Zedong not only concealed the fact that he had instigated Chiang Kai-shek's kidnapping plot but also concealed and defied Stalin's direct orders. However, for Mao Zedong, the prospect of eliminating Chiang Kai-shek was greater than the risk of angering Stalin. Meanwhile, Zhang Xueliang, realizing he did not have Moscow's support, decided to ensure Chiang Kai-shek's safety. He decided that he should release Chiang Kai-shek, leave Xi'an with him, and place himself at Chiang Kai-shek's mercy.

On the 20th, Moscow sent another telegram to the Chinese Communist Party, and Mao Zedong also hid this second telegram, which instructed "peaceful resolution." Mao Zedong then sent this telegram to Zhou Enlai along with instructions to "help restore Chiang Kai-shek's freedom." Thus, Mao Zedong redirected his goals to align with Stalin's. The Chinese Communist Party promised to ensure the cessation of the "anti-Communist extermination policy" and demanded that Chiang Kai-shek hold talks with Zhou Enlai. Just before Chiang Kai-shek's kidnapping, Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's ambassador to Moscow, had requested to return, and Moscow finally showed willingness to accept. When Zhou Enlai brought this direct promise from Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to the Communist demands and invited "Zhou Enlai to Nanjing for direct negotiations."

136 Zhou Enlai to Nanjing for direct negotiations." From this moment on, the Chinese Communist Party was officially treated as a legitimate political party, not a bandit group.12

Mao Zedong: Was He Truly a Monster?

The co-authored work "Was Mao Really a Monster?" by Gregor Benton and Lin Chun directly refutes the books by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday. Jung Chang used Chinese sources, and her husband and co-author Jon Halliday used Russian sources. The book, based on extensive research involving interviews with 363 people from 38 countries, is undoubtedly a thorough study. However, the claim of "unknown stories" may be an exaggeration. Rather than a discovery of new historical facts, it is more appropriate to view it as a new evaluation or condemnation of Mao. The assertion that his life was driven solely by a lust for power without any ideological commitment is difficult to accept readily. It is undeniable that he was not a good family man. However, if he had been overly devoted to his family, he would have been accused by his soldiers of sacrificing the party for personal gain. The animosity of Jung Chang and Jon Halliday towards Mao not only permeates their interpretations but also affects the historical narrative itself, which should be objective. Chiang Ching-kuo's trip to the Soviet Union in 1925 was with Chiang Kai-shek's permission, not an abduction. It even contradicts Chang's earlier work, "Daughter of the Continent," and is historically inaccurate. Furthermore, many facts are judged and speculated upon based solely on circumstantial evidence without verification. The excessive number of anonymous interviewees and the reference to unpublished documents also undermine the book's credibility. Moreover, by focusing solely on Mao personally, it presents a narrow perspective and is perceived not as an objective academic work but as a passionate critique filled with one-sided arguments. It presents counterarguments.13 While "Mao: The Unknown Story" was plausible and exciting, it seemed to present only a somewhat biased aspect of Mao. Therefore, we will also examine the writings of Edgar Snow and John Service from that time, which offered a different perspective on Mao Zedong.

137 The historical narrative itself, which should be objective, is also influenced by their interpretations. Chiang Ching-kuo's trip to the Soviet Union in 1925 was with Chiang Kai-shek's permission, not an abduction. It even contradicts Chang's earlier work, "Daughter of the Continent," and is historically inaccurate. Furthermore, many facts are judged and speculated upon based solely on circumstantial evidence without verification. The excessive number of anonymous interviewees and the reference to unpublished documents also undermine the book's credibility. Moreover, by focusing solely on Mao personally, it presents a narrow perspective and is perceived not as an objective academic work but as a passionate critique filled with one-sided arguments. It presents counterarguments.13 While "Mao: The Unknown Story" was plausible and exciting, it seemed to present only a somewhat biased aspect of Mao. Therefore, we will also examine the writings of Edgar Snow and John Service from that time, which offered a different perspective on Mao Zedong.

Nationalism for Anti-Japanese Resistance

In August 1937, Mao Zedong published an article titled "Let us fight with all our might to win the victory of resistance." "Some members of the Nationalist Party advocate for political reform after the victory of resistance. 13 Gregor Benton and Lin Chun, eds., Was Mao Really a Monster? The academic response to Chang and Halliday's Mao: The Unknown Story, Routledge, 2010.

138 They believe that Japan's invaders can be thoroughly defeated by the government's solo resistance, which is mistaken. The government's solo resistance can only achieve individual victories, not thoroughly defeat the Japanese invaders. Only through a comprehensive national resistance can the Japanese invaders be thoroughly defeated. However, to realize comprehensive national resistance, there must be a comprehensive and thorough transformation of the Nationalist Party's policy, and all levels of the nation must jointly implement a thorough anti-Japanese program." 14 Immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Mao Zedong put forth the official argument for a united anti-Japanese front, seeking to unite the Communist Party. 77 Incident occurred. Immediately after the incident, Mao Zedong put forth the official argument for a united anti-Japanese front, seeking to unite the Communist Party.

Edgar Snow (1935) also indirectly conveyed the atmosphere of unity for anti-Japanese resistance at the time by showing that the student protests on December 9, 1935, carried the slogan "Stop the Civil War! Cooperate with the Communist Party for Anti-Japanese Resistance!" This was a historical turning point that benefited the Communist Party.15 The text also briefly introduces Pastor Wang, who was educated at a missionary school in Shanghai and was a member of the Qingbang. Pastor Wang, who abandoned his church work and official position, had been cooperating with the Communist Party for some time. He was a kind of secret envoy for the Communist Party in contact with warlords and officials. The Communist Party sought to gain understanding and support for its proposal for a national united front from these individuals.16

15 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, 2013[1939], translated by Hong Su-won et al., "Red Star Over China" (Seoul: Dure), p. 34.

139 Furthermore, in his writings, he stated that during his personal meeting at Mao Zedong's home in 1936, "I was deeply impressed that Mao was a man of great emotion."17 He also noted that Mao seemed distant from personal ambition. "He clearly regarded personal importance as trivial. Like other Communists I met, he only wanted to talk about 'committees, organizations, armies, resolutions, battles, tactics, strategies,' and rarely about personal experiences. He could not remember the detailed roles of individuals. It seemed that 'individuals' did not exist and only had importance in a 'collective' sense."18

Mao Zedong's reminiscences began to transcend the category of 'personal history' and were sublimated into the process of a grand movement, which was not easily perceived. He continued to play an important role in this movement, but the listener could not clearly discern his personal aspects. It was no longer 'I' but 'we,' and Mao Zedong, rather than being the sole protagonist, represented the Red Army. It was not a subjective impression reflected in his solitary life experiences but an objective record that observed the vicissitudes of human collective destiny as historical material. By the end of his story, I found myself increasingly having to ask about himself. What was 'he' doing at that time? What was 'his' position at that time? What was 'his' stance on this or that situation? The mention of himself in the following story, which forms the last chapter of his narrative, was largely extracted through such questions.19

From October 1933 to October 1934 was the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. Due to two strategic errors and Chiang Kai-shek's new tactics and strategy, combined with the overwhelming numerical and technological superiority of the Nationalist army, the Red Army had no choice but to seek a way to break out of the rapidly deteriorating conditions in Jiangxi in 1934. Furthermore, the domestic political situation influenced the decision to move the main theater of operations to the northwest. When Japan invaded Manchuria and Shanghai, the Soviet government had already officially declared war on Japan in February 1932. Although this declaration of war could not be implemented due to the Nationalist army's blockade and encirclement of Soviet China, it was followed by the Soviet government issuing a manifesto urging all armed forces within China resisting Japanese imperialism to form a united front. In early 1933, the Soviet government declared its willingness to cooperate with any White Army on the condition that they accept the cessation of the civil war, the halt of attacks on Soviet areas and the Red Army, the guarantee of civil liberties and various democratic rights to the masses, and the armament of the people for the anti-Japanese war.20 19 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, 2013[1939], translated by Hong Su-won et al., "Red Star Over China" (Seoul: Dure), p. 219.

17 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, 2013[1939], translated by Hong Su-won et al., Red Star over China (Seoul: Dure), p.111

18 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, 2013[1939], translated by Hong Su-won et al., Red Star over China (Seoul: Dure), p.159

It was not the Red Army, but rather the Red Army, and it was not a subjective impression reflected in Holoman's life experience, but an objective record that closely observed the changes in humanity's collective destiny as historical material. By the time his story concluded, I found myself increasingly needing to inquire about him. What was 'he' doing at that time? What was 'his' position at that time? What was 'his' stance on this or that situation? His own mentions were largely forced out by my questions in the following story, which became the final chapter of his narrative.19

From October 1933 to October 1934 was the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. We had to find a way to overcome the rapidly deteriorating conditions for survival in Jiangxi in 1934, due to two strategic mistakes and Chiang Kai-shek's new tactics and strategy, combined with the overwhelming numerical and technical superiority of the Nationalist army. Furthermore, the domestic political situation influenced the decision to move our main operational base to the northwest. When Japan invaded Manchuria and Shanghai, the Soviet government had already officially declared war on Japan in February 1932. Although this declaration of war could not be implemented because the Nationalist army blockaded and surrounded the Soviet Chinese territories, following this declaration, the Soviet government called for all Chinese within the occupied territories to resist Japanese imperialism.19 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, 2013[1939], translated by Hong Su-won et al., Red Star over China (Seoul: Dure), p.219

141 armed forces to form a united front. In early 1933, the Soviet government declared its willingness to cooperate with any White Army on the condition that they accept the cessation of the civil war, the halt of attacks on Soviet areas and the Red Army, the guarantee of civil liberties and various democratic rights to the masses, and the armament of the people for the anti-Japanese war.20

As anti-Japanese sentiment grew increasingly fierce, the Nationalist government felt pressured to respond strongly to Japan. Furthermore, following the Xi'an Incident in December 1937, Chiang Kai-shek felt he had to prepare for war. He had secured his release from Xi'an by promising to resist future attacks. Thus, in February 1937, Chiang Kai-shek was able to begin reconciling with his long-time enemy, the Communist Party.21

Immediately after the Manchurian Incident, anti-Japanese movements, such as large-scale boycotts of Japanese goods and economic severance movements, had already begun to unfold widely across China. The anti-Japanese movement, which had started after the Wanbaoshan Incident, began to spread nationwide. Following the September 18th Manchurian Incident, the boycott of Japanese goods (日貨排斥運動) was carried out thoroughly through the unified action of officials and citizens. In fact, on August 1, 1932, in Guangdong, 20 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, 2013[1939], translated by Hong Soo-won et al., Red Star over China (Seoul: Dure), p.231

21 Lloyd Eastman, et al., Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese war 1937-1945, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.120

142 Inspectors of Japanese goods were executed by firing squad on charges of smuggling Japanese goods, and on the 18th in Nanjing, the Anti-Japanese Association (抗日會) sentenced to death those arrested for smuggling. Under these circumstances, it was very difficult to openly distribute Japanese products. 22 According to Lee Jung-hee (2017), Korean Chinese also actively engaged in anti-Japanese activities during the Sino-Japanese War. The Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression confirmed the joint efforts of Korea and China against Japan.

22 Kim Ji-hwan, 'China's War Diplomacy and International Relations during the Sino-Japanese War', Proceedings of the Academic Conference of the Society for East Asian Studies (1), 2019, p.150

143 This anti-Japanese spirit was not merely a reflection of the prevailing atmosphere. The fundamental cause for the birth of the Chinese Communist Party itself is closely related to nationalism, stemming from the 'awakening of Chinese nationalism due to imperialist powers' invasion of China' and the 'desire to realize anti-feudal democracy to overcome the ills of feudal dynasties and warlord politics.'23

Confidence in Chiang Kai-shek

In the writings of John Service, a US diplomat during the Sino-Japanese War, his main assessment of Mao was that 'Mao was full of confidence.' He stated that the Communist Party would seize the Chinese government and play an important role in the future, and he refrained from criticizing his rival, the Nationalist Party. Instead, he expressed, 'Our support for Chiang Kai-shek does not mean support for tyranny. We are supporting him to fight Japan... (He) was elected president by a single party of only 90 people; Hitler might have more democratic power. At least Hitler was elected by the people.' 24 While refraining from harsh criticism of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong exuded confidence. In September 1937, in his article 'The Urgent Task of the Establishment of the Second United Front,' he stated, 'The United Front, as it is currently, will find it difficult to complete its mission, and therefore, it is necessary to further develop the United Front between the two parties.' He further argued, 'The current anti-Japanese United Front still lacks a political program that is recognized and officially promulgated by both parties to replace the Nationalist Party's autocratic policies.' He strongly asserted, 'We must not only rely on the government and military to resist alone, but also mobilize the masses to faithfully implement the United Front.'25

24 Lynne Joiner, Honorable Survivor: Mao's China, McCarthy's America, and the Persecution of John S. Service (2009) p.71

144

This confident demeanor of Mao Zedong seems to have persisted into the latter half of the Sino-Japanese War in the Yan'an region. John Service, upon arriving in the Yan'an region on July 22, 1944, described the atmosphere he felt at the time in an interview: 'We finally arrived in Yan'an. What surprised us most was the atmosphere in Yan'an. Chongqing was merely waiting for the war to end. Most people there were refugees who had crossed the river and were waiting to return to their homes and families in Shanghai and Nanjing. However, the people in Yan'an, despite having nothing, being poor, and sleeping outdoors, were filled with passion and confidence. They were certain of their victory. As the Communists always said, things were going very well. Everything 25 Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2, BeomwooSa, 2002[1991], pp.41-43

145 was positive, everything was good, we were going to win, and we were on the path to victory. We never imagined such a scene. They were confident that 'the Nationalist Party would not be able to overwhelm us. And they would never occupy this region.' Their attitude was very different. It was something entirely new; they welcomed us, were hospitable, and did not seem wary or push us away. Our liaison officer stayed with us and spent time together. It was informal and comfortable, and the people there seemed to be very close to each other.26

Magnanimous and Friendly Mao

While Mao Zedong was ruthlessly cold and detached towards his own family, he appears to have been very hospitable towards his colleagues and even to foreigners visiting from the West. John Service frequently met with Communist Party leaders and Mao Zedong in very informal settings. He wrote: 'We met the new Communist leaders and they reported to us for almost a day or two. We met all the high-ranking military officials, Chu Teh, Yeh Chien-ying, P'eng Teh-Huai, Lin Piao, and many 26 John Service, Interview with John Service, The Bancroft Library University of California at Berkeley, 1977, p.319

146 people from various regions. Many of them were already in Yan'an. They spoke about their Seventh Party Congress and clearly seemed to be waiting for the opportune moment. There were also many people from outside who had traveled there, taking one to two months. So they had arrived in Yan'an in advance. I interviewed them and talked with them, leaving very thick notes. During an early meeting, Mao Zedong once said, 'I thought you would want to meet me.' He was smiling. I then replied, 'Of course.' But he continued, 'I also wanted to meet you. However, it would be more useful if we talked after we got to know each other a little better and you had seen more of us.' A month later, I received a message like, 'Can we meet tomorrow around 2:30 PM?' Perhaps it was two o'clock. I replied, 'Of course.' The conversation that day lasted from 2 PM to 10 PM. I took notes on everything, but when I returned from Japan 50 years later, my wife (Caroline), who always thought it was a bad idea for those notes to be circulating, threw them all away.27 Mao Zedong would drop by in the evening for a brief chat, or we could meet almost anytime and go somewhere. They had a telephone, and by calling headquarters and asking, 'May I visit for a moment?' 27 John Service, Interview with John Service, The Bancroft Library University of California at Berkeley, 1977, p.321

147 'Of course,' I could meet them anytime. If we met like that, we would have lunch together. The atmosphere felt congenial, friendly, and frank. Of course, there were things they didn't tell us, but we didn't know what they were. (Laughter)'28

At a formal welcoming banquet in 1942, US diplomat John Service sat to Mao Zedong's right, and Colonel Barrett sat to Mao's left (next to Chu Teh). Mao Zedong sincerely requested cooperation from the United States, and John Service, recalling that it was sincere, even stated that it was his mistake not to have seriously considered it at the time.29

Conclusion

About halfway through the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, I saw the first edition of Edgar Snow's 'Red Star Over China' and other materials displayed alongside photographs from foreign correspondents of the time. At the time, I found it so fascinating, and I was so engrossed in searching for Edgar Snow among the displayed photos that I regretted not taking pictures of the book. However, the reason that moment remained special enough to regret not photographing this seemingly minor book was that it felt like encouragement, saying, 'Yes, you've embarked on the right path to understanding China!'

29 Lynne Joiner, Honorable Survivor: Mao's China, McCarthy's America, and the Persecution of John S. Service (2009) p.72

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Was Mao Zedong a master strategist blinded by personal power, or a nationalist who dreamed of the development of China and its people? It is said that a person's true nature is revealed in moments of crisis, and understanding Mao Zedong's strategies and mindset during the Sino-Japanese War, when the Communist Party and Mao himself were threatened, is essential to glimpsing the true nature of China. Japan was clearly invading China, the Soviet Union sought to prevent such a threat to its own country, and Mao Zedong sought to exploit this international situation to his advantage. He was a ruthless individual who skillfully crafted his image to gain personal power, using Japan to check his enemies even in moments of crisis like war, almost abandoning his family. Or was he simply a magnanimous nationalist full of confidence in his ideology and love for his country and people? The military strategies he chose, 'People's War' and 'Protracted War,' were decisive factors in the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan, but these strategies also represented a passive resistance to expand the Red Army's occupied territories.

Thus, the question of Mao Zedong's true nature, a key figure in constituting China, may require acknowledging multiple answers.

149 It is rare for someone in history to reveal their true intentions by saying, 'Actually, it was like this!' Therefore, perhaps there is no such thing as a correct answer, and even if such a truth exists, finding it may be nearly impossible. However, by preparing for this field trip and visiting China in person, we have taken a step forward in progressing in the right direction of understanding China.

Furthermore, I hope that understanding the true intentions of an individual national leader will have significance beyond that of reading or writing a biography. Even for this attempt to write a short report, there were many difficulties. If one delves into deeper research, what other difficulties will they actually face? Beyond the actual events or policies, is understanding an individual leader's true intentions truly important for understanding a nation? What about understanding the true intentions of various groups that constitute a nation, rather than just an individual? How much more can we understand that nation through this process is a matter that requires further contemplation and research regarding this topic.

150 Bibliography Kato Yoko. 2007. From the Manchurian Incident to the Sino-Japanese War, Eumunhaksa.

Kubo Toru. 2013. Modern Chinese History Vol. 4: Challenge Towards Socialism, Samcheonri. Ki Se-chan. 2013. Sino-Japanese War and China's Military Strategy Against Japan, Gyeongin Munhwasa.

Kim Ji-hwan. 2019. 'China's War Diplomacy and International Relations during the Sino-Japanese War', Society for East Asian Studies

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Zhang Rong, John Halliday. 2006. Mao: The Unknown Story (Vol. 1), Kkachi. Park Chang-hee. 2013. Theory of Military Strategy, Planet Media.

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