The Two Faces of Mao Zedong

Woo Hee-won · Ewha Womans University

Introduction: Chairman Mao Memorial Hall

In 1976, after Mao Zedong's

death

(毛主席紀念館)

(Mao Zedong)

is a place where his embalmed body is enshrined and open to the public. As such, it is a place where one can feel Mao Zedong's final moments and his influence that continues even after his death. The path to meeting Mao Zedong was arduous. From the moment we included Chairman Mao Memorial Hall in our itinerary, we could not help but worry about the 2-3 hour wait to enter. Even the day before, after reading reviews (or rather, warnings) about Chairman Mao Memorial Hall online, I had to urge the tired others to wake up early the next day to minimize the waiting time. It was already nearing midnight.

In addition to the 2-3 hour wait to enter, the process of entering Chairman Mao Memorial Hall was strict and demanding. No items, including cameras, were allowed inside, and once inside, visitors had to move in an orderly fashion under the guidance of public security officers. Care had to be taken to keep voices from becoming too loud. Wearing hats was also not permitted. For foreign visitors, passports were essential for identification.

You might react with disbelief. Why are all these cumbersome procedures necessary? What kind of person was Mao Zedong that countless Chinese people flock to Chairman Mao Memorial Hall to see his body even after his death?

On the day we visited Chairman Mao Memorial Hall, we were, as expected, running late due to the strenuous schedule from the previous day. To avoid further delays and potentially longer waits, a few of us decided to take a taxi ahead of time to secure a spot in line. When we hailed a taxi and told the driver our destination, he briefly explained in Chinese that Chairman Mao Memorial Hall was "no open," perhaps out of consideration for our inability to speak Chinese. The three of us who left early were bewildered, but we agreed to go to the memorial hall ourselves to assess the situation. Fortunately, the memorial hall was not closed that day. The taxi driver had simply misunderstood because there were very few people in line.

As the taxi driver had said, upon arriving at Chairman Mao Memorial Hall, we found no long queue of people waiting to enter. Although many people were gathered around the entrance, contrary to our concerns, the long lines seen online were nowhere to be found. Apart from a brief wait in the cold weather for the others who left later, we were able to visit Mao Zedong much more easily than expected. While the number of people was still not small in our view, we couldn't understand why the infamous long queues were absent on the day we visited. Could it be that we had a special connection with Mao Zedong?

The Two Faces of Mao Zedong

Much like the stringent conditions for entering Chairman Mao Memorial Hall, Mao Zedong himself is a figure whose true nature is difficult to approach. This is because Mao Zedong's actions during his lifetime are subject to conflicting evaluations today. We cannot help but feel confused by the contradictory and dualistic aspects of a single individual.

Before the founding of the People's Republic of China, he was a possessor of strong national consciousness and an outstanding revolutionary. Furthermore, during the Anti-Japanese War, he demonstrated a judgment and analytical ability that accurately predicted not only the current situation but also future developments. However, after the founding of the People's Republic of China, his actions resulted in more harm than good. The Cultural Revolution, in particular, which took place from 1966 to 1976, was an event that occurred entirely under Mao Zedong's responsibility. The mistakes made by Mao Zedong in this single event alone are immense. Not only did it result in a vast number of casualties, the exact figures of which have yet to be precisely calculated, but its brutality was truly shocking. The positive aspects of Mao Zedong prior to the founding of the nation lost their significance during the Cultural Revolution.

So, how should we evaluate Mao Zedong? First, let us examine both sides of Mao Zedong's dual nature. This article aims to present Mao Zedong's merits and demerits in a balanced manner, without unduly emphasizing any particular aspect. How each individual chooses to view Mao Zedong is entirely up to them, and there is no single correct answer.

On Protracted War

Among Mao Zedong's numerous writings, "On Protracted War" demonstrates his keen judgment of reality and analytical skills regarding the political situation before the founding of the People's Republic of China. Mao Zedong wrote this essay in May 1938, during the height of Japan's invasion of China. In this work, Mao Zedong raises the questions, "Why a protracted war?" and "Why will the final victory belong to China?" and provides answers. In his answers, Mao Zedong coolly and accurately compares and analyzes the situations and characteristics of Japan and China, the reactions of the international community, and the changes in circumstances over time. Let us examine the specific answers he presented.

• Japan's strengths lie in its powerful military, economy, and political organization.

However, Japan will face international opposition that outweighs international aid,

due to its regressive and barbaric imperialist nature.

7. The Two Faces of Mao Zedong

• In contrast, China is much weaker than Japan in terms of military strength and economic power.

However, China possesses a vast territory and abundant resources and population,

which will become advantages in a protracted war.

Furthermore, China's Anti-Japanese War represents progress and justice,

so significant international aid can be expected.

• In the initial stages, Japan's powerful military and economic might will inflict defeats upon China.

However, Mao Zedong states that one should not be consumed by such defeats.

As time progresses, the situation will change, and at that point, Japan's

weaknesses will become more pronounced, while China's strengths will grow significantly.

Consequently, the probability of China achieving victory will increase (Mao Zedong 1989, 207-253).

How do you perceive Mao Zedong's judgment of the situation and analysis of reality in 1938, during the midst of the Second Sino-Japanese War? If you think, "Is it that difficult?", consider it from a different perspective. We know today that Japan was defeated. But what about in 1938? Was it easy to predict Japan's defeat? Think about the present. For example, consider the current relationship between China and the United States. Accurately predicting the relationship between China and the United States in five or ten years in broad terms is by no means easy. Mao Zedong's prediction of China's victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1938 was also likely not an easy task. One might still question whether Mao Zedong's predictions were merely his delusions and whether their alignment with the actual course of history was mere coincidence. However, what Mao Zedong intended to convey through "On Protracted War" was not an unconditional victory for China. He clearly pointed out China's weaknesses and the inevitability of defeat for a certain period. Rather than dismissing it as mere delusion or coincidence, the judgment displayed in "On Protracted War" is highly balanced, realistic, and persuasive. Therefore, we must acknowledge Mao Zedong's outstanding abilities and achievements as demonstrated in "On Protracted War." Judging solely by this aspect, Mao Zedong can be described as a possessor of strong national consciousness, a revolutionary, and a strategist.

How do you perceive Mao Zedong's situational judgment and analytical skills at the time of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1938? If you think, "Is it that difficult?", you might need to reconsider. We already know that Japan was defeated. But what about the situation in 1938? Was it easy to predict Japan's defeat? Think about the present. For example, consider the current relationship between China and the United States. It is never easy to accurately predict the relationship between China and the United States in the big picture five or ten years from now. Predicting China's victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1938 was by no means an easy task for Mao Zedong. One might still question whether Mao Zedong's prediction was merely a delusion and whether its alignment with the actual course of history was mere coincidence. However, what Mao Zedong intended to convey through the theory of protracted war was not an unconditional victory for China. He clearly pointed out China's weaknesses and the inevitability of its defeat for a certain period. The judgment displayed by Mao Zedong in the theory of protracted war is highly balanced, realistic, and persuasive, making it difficult to dismiss it as mere delusion or coincidence. Therefore, we must acknowledge Mao Zedong's outstanding abilities and achievements as demonstrated in the theory of protracted war. Judging solely by these aspects, Mao Zedong can be described as a possessor of firm national consciousness, a revolutionary, and a strategist.

The Cultural Revolution

The aspect we will now examine will further complicate perspectives and stances on Mao Zedong. While "On Protracted War" can be explained as one of Mao Zedong's outstanding achievements and accomplishments, the Cultural Revolution, which marked his later years, is arguably his greatest failure. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party officially assesses Mao Zedong's merits and demerits at a 7:3 ratio. Before delving into the specifics of this ratio, it is important to note that even the Chinese Communist Party cannot unconditionally defend Mao Zedong, and this is precisely due to the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution left profound scars and had a tremendous impact on the entire Chinese society, including its leadership.

The Cultural Revolution was an event that occurred solely based on Mao Zedong's decision, and the full responsibility lies with him. Therefore, understanding Mao Zedong is essential to comprehending the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, to gain a balanced perspective on Mao Zedong, it is imperative to examine and understand the Cultural Revolution, which dominated his later years. Why did Mao Zedong make such an extreme choice? How should we understand the Cultural Revolution? These two questions, though seemingly different, are closely related.

For instance, the French scholar Marie-Claire Bergere defined the Cultural Revolution as "Mao Zedong's process of regaining power," or a "power struggle." However, it was not solely driven by Mao Zedong's lust for power. Even Bergere understood the Cultural Revolution as being "to prevent the revolution from declining and falling into revisionism" from Mao Zedong's perspective (Bergere 2009, 184-185). Clearly, Mao Zedong's actions in the decision-making and implementation of the Cultural Revolution were irrational, cruel, and dictatorial. One might think that his erratic behavior would be easier to understand if it were solely due to an insatiable desire for power. However, if he carried out such actions not just for power but for the sake of revolution, it raises many questions.

The key keyword describing Mao Zedong would be 'revolution.' This characteristic of Mao Zedong can also partly explain why he initiated the Cultural Revolution. However, it is important to note that even though the Cultural Revolution stemmed from Mao Zedong's continuous pursuit of revolution, this does not negate the violence and Mao Zedong's mistakes that occurred during the event. Rather, as the purpose of this article was to showcase Mao Zedong's extreme duality, I wanted to provide the minimal link that could connect these two extremes. We have now examined Mao Zedong's differing aspects as revealed in "On Protracted War" and the Cultural Revolution. The evaluation of Mao Zedong is now up to you, the reader.

Conclusion

My feelings were complex while studying Mao Zedong, but never more so than when I left Chairman Mao Memorial Hall. I am still unsure whether it was simply the unsettling feeling of having seen someone's corpse, or if it was due to the fact that, although not as crowded as we had heard, a considerable number of Chinese people were still visiting the site. The scene was indeed extraordinary. This is because, for Koreans, there is no figure whose corpse is preserved eternally. I could not find any reason why a historical figure, even one who significantly influenced history and the nation, should have their corpse venerated. This is especially true given the egregious mistakes made in his later years. Perhaps this reflects my strong perspective as a Korean.

As I left the memorial hall, questions continued to arise. Why did Mao Zedong's body remain on display, while Deng Xiaoping's did not? What do Chinese people actually think when they see Mao Zedong's body? Are they, as intended by the Chinese Communist Party, impressed by Mao Zedong's achievements and grateful to him? Or do they feel nothing at all? Is there anyone else who feels as conflicted as I do? What can we feel and think when we observe a phenomenon where a single individual has such a colossal impact on a society or nation? What about others who may be reading this? Do you feel like visiting the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall to encounter Mao Zedong? ■ References Kojima Shinji and Maruyama Matsuyuki. 1988. "Chūgoku Kindai Shi" (Modern Chinese History). Seoul: Jisik Sanupsa. Riversal, Kenneth. 2013. "Governing China: Understanding Contemporary Chinese Politics." Seoul: Simsan. Mao Zedong. Translated by Lee Hee-ok. 1989. "Mao Zedong Xuanji I" (Selected Works of Mao Zedong I). Seoul: Jeonin.

Meisner, Maurice. 2004. "Mao's China and After" Vol. 1-2. Seoul: Isan. Berger, Marie-Claire. 2009. "Histoire de la Chine contemporaine: le Parti, l'État, la société" (Contemporary Chinese History: The Party, the State, Society).

Seoul: Simsan Publishing.

Blecher, Marc. 2001. "China: Against the Tide." Seoul: Dolbegae. Schram, Stuart R. 1979. "Mao Zedong." Seoul: Dure.

Amako Satoshi. 2003. "50 Years of the People's Republic of China." Seoul: Iljogak.

Jeon Ri-gun. 2012. "The Mao Zedong Era and the Post-Mao Zedong Era 1949-2009" Vol. 1-2.

Paju: Hanul Academy.

Snow, Edgar. 2013. "Red Star Over China." Seoul: Dure.

Spencer, Jonathan D. 1998. "In Search of Contemporary China" Vol. 1-2. Seoul: Isan. Appendix

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11. Crisis and Complexity: The World Order After the Economic Crisis; 8. Changing Korean Voters V: Panel Study of the 2012 General and Presidential Elections; 12. East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory

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14. Ha Young-sun's International Politics Columns 1991-2011, Vol. I; EAI English Books

15. Ha Young-sun's International Politics Columns 1991-2011, Vol. II; 1. Between Compliance and Conflict: East Asia, 16. Global Development Cooperation Governance and Korea; Latin America, and the “New” Pax Americana; 17. North-South Economic Cooperation Strategy for Coevolution: Conservatives and Progressives Consider Together; 2. Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies

Strategies; 3. Party Politics in East Asia: Citizens, Elections,

18. Ten Major Tasks for Korean Diplomacy 2020: Complexity and Coevolution; 4. Collective Violence in Indonesia

EAI 민주대전략시리즈 4. Collective Violence in Indonesia

EAI Democratic Grand Strategy Series

1. Conditions for Presidential Success I: Role, Authority, Responsibility; 5. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia; 2. Conditions for Presidential Success II: Retrospect and Proposals; 6. The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea; 3. Conditions for Political Reform Success: From Power Struggle to Policy Competition; 7. Future of North Korea 2032: Coevolutionary Strategy for the Advancement

Policy Competition; 4. Political and Parliamentary Reform: Retrospect and Prospects from the Field

Prospects from the Field

5. Conditions for Parliamentary Success: Ethics and Policy; EAI English Journals

6. Democracy That Revives the Economy; Journal of East Asian Studies (SSCI Indexed) 2001-

7. Decentralized Constitution: The Path to Advancement; 8. Conditions for Successful Presidential Transition: 67 Days Determine 5 Years

Determine 5 Years

9. How Conservative Politics Survived: The History of the British Conservative Party

10. Second Act of Globalization: A New Vision for Korean Globalization; 11. Conditions for Presidential Success in 2013

12. Japan's Revival Leadership: Post-War Japan's Crisis and Reconstruction

12. Japan's Revival Leadership: Post-War Japan's Crisis and Reconstruction

and Reconstruction