[Global NK Commentary] Priorities for the Lee Jae-myung Administration's Diplomacy Toward China

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The brief phone call between the leaders of the two countries on June 10th expressed a policy will for improving relations, while also clearly demonstrating the inherent challenges and tasks facing bilateral ties. Both South Korea and China have high expectations for improving relations. However, South Korea-China relations have stagnated at their lowest level since the THAAD conflict in 2016, and the momentum and motivation for improvement have weakened. The launch of the new administration itself cannot bring about an improvement in South Korea-China relations as public expectations might suggest. The new administration's top priority realistically must be diplomacy and negotiations with the United States; conversely, diplomacy toward China faces various challenges and risks of instability, being influenced by South Korea-U.S. relations. South Korea-China relations still involve differing strategic expectations and demands toward each other and face challenges in finding common ground for cooperation.

I. Careful Management of Sensitive Issues and Restoration of Strategic Communication between South Korea and China

The differing priorities and requests between the two countries were clearly evident even in the brief phone call between their leaders. President Xi's emphasis can be summarized in two points: first, the joint defense of multilateralism and free trade, and supply chain stability; second, respect for core interests and major concerns. In essence, China is seeking to improve relations with South Korea as a means to counter U.S. tariff policies. China expects that by improving relations with South Korea, the Lee Jae-myung administration will not join the U.S.-led anti-China coalition amidst escalating U.S.-China competition and confrontation. In particular, China demands that South Korea not interfere in the Taiwan issue, which it claims as a core interest. In other words, China's strategic interest in South Korea and its motivation for improving relations are an extension of its competition and confrontation with the United States. The Xi Jinping administration harbors expectations that the Lee Jae-myung administration will differ from the previous government, which focused on strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance and trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan.

However, the U.S. Trump administration is strongly urging its ally, South Korea, to participate in containing China. The new administration, without sufficient preparation, will face difficult negotiations on critical issues that affect the nation's destiny, ranging from tariffs and advanced technologies to cost-sharing for U.S. Forces Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control, and even the North Korean nuclear issue, all from a defensive position. Simultaneously, the public opinion that the alliance should be strengthened, especially given it is a progressive administration, cannot be ignored. Despite its willingness to improve relations with China, the new administration faces a complex reality where it is very difficult to meet the expectations and demands of the Xi Jinping government.

Nevertheless, public opinion expressed through the 13th East Asia Institute (EAI) East Asia Survey conducted on June 4-5, 2025, indicates that the dominant view remains that South Korea-U.S. relations are most important and the alliance should be further strengthened. In 2025, the South Korean public perceives the U.S.-China strategic competition and conflict (64.9%) and the spread of protectionism and competition in advanced technologies (59.8%) as the most pressing threats, even more so than North Korea's nuclear missile threat (33.2%: a decrease of 17.9 percentage points from 51.1% in 2024), reflecting significant concerns about U.S.-China competition and resulting economic instability (see Figure 1). Consequently, the response that South Korea-U.S. relations are the most important diplomatic relationship increased by 15.6 percentage points from 2024 to a record high of 90.7%, with both liberal (91.2%) and conservative respondents (91.7%) giving similar answers. South Korea-China relations (43.2%) are considered important, but this is less than half the proportion that considers South Korea-U.S. relations important.

Furthermore, amidst intensifying U.S.-China competition, the response that the South Korea-U.S. alliance should evolve beyond responding to North Korea's military threats to play a role in resolving regional and global issues increased from 77.8% in 2024 to 86.3% in 2025. The response that tensions and conflicts in the Taiwan Strait are important to South Korea's national interests also increased by 8.2 percentage points from 2024 to 87.5%. This reflects the view that South Korea's security can be influenced by regional issues beyond the Korean Peninsula, and therefore the scope of the South Korea-U.S. alliance's activities should be expanded.

However, in the event of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the maximum response from South Korea should be 'humanitarian aid' (49.3%) and 'non-involvement' (15.8%), which ranked first and second respectively. This represents an increase from 2024, by 5.1 and 6.7 percentage points respectively. Regarding the role of U.S. Forces Korea in a Taiwan contingency, the top two responses were 'rear support missions on the Korean Peninsula' (42.3%) and 'focusing solely on the defense of South Korea' (29.5%), rather than direct intervention. While concerned about the negative impact of tensions and conflicts in the Taiwan Strait on South Korea, there is a clear consensus to minimize involvement in the Taiwan issue and focus more on South Korea's security.

Given the prevailing public sentiment of high disapproval toward China and the overwhelming importance placed on South Korea-U.S. relations, it is difficult for the new administration to prioritize and actively pursue improved relations with China. Realistically, the new administration will inevitably focus on negotiations with the United States and managing U.S.-originated risks in its early tenure, making it highly likely that it will struggle to pursue the 'balanced diplomacy' between the U.S. and China that China hopefully anticipates.

Therefore, rather than fostering unrealistic optimistic expectations for South Korea-China relations, the new administration should prioritize managing China-originated risks. Both South Korea and China should exercise mutual restraint on sensitive issues that could cause conflict, and establish and strengthen a system for rapid communication to respond to conflicts and prevent their unnecessary escalation and reproduction. The new administration should consistently communicate South Korea's position—that the strengthening of the alliance with the U.S. is to respond to North Korean provocations—through various channels, while restoring a pragmatic and functional cooperative relationship with China. Particularly concerning the Taiwan issue, South Korea should avoid direct intervention as suggested by public opinion, express a principled stance that China will abide by its commitments made at the time of diplomatic relations, and carefully manage the situation while closely monitoring changes.

Furthermore, while the alliance with the United States is a constant, the new administration must secure space and means to respond to excessive tariff pressure from the Trump administration by keeping open possibilities for cooperation with China on the principled grounds of supporting multilateral cooperation and the free trade order. Concurrently, the new administration must prepare for negotiations while strengthening cooperation with the U.S., and also prepare for and manage potential friction with China arising from this, ensuring it does not escalate.

Notably, looking back at the 33-year history of South Korea-China relations, when conflicts between the two countries escalated, official intergovernmental dialogue was often the first to be suspended and difficult to resume, leading to an inability to find solutions. Therefore, to prepare for such situations, it is necessary to establish various supplementary dialogue channels on a practical level that can swiftly restore official intergovernmental dialogue. If dialogue is regularized and institutionalized across various fields and levels, it can broaden mutual understanding and prevent conflicts arising from misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Additionally, it can be expected to improve predictability regarding mutual policy changes, thereby preventing the worsening of situations through preparedness for unforeseen circumstances.

Figure 1. Major Threats Facing South Korea

II. Realistic Readjustment of Expectations Regarding China's Role in the North Korean Nuclear Issue

In his phone call, President Lee requested "China's constructive role in denuclearization and peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula." In response, President Xi stated, "Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula are of common interest to both South Korea and China, and thus China will strive for the resolution of the issue and for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula." Although brief, the conversation revealed differences in the two countries' views on the long-standing issue of North Korea in South Korea-China relations.

The dialogue between Lee Jae-myung and Xi Jinping regarding the Korean Peninsula was not included in the official announcement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the briefing by the spokesperson for the South Korean Presidential Office, President Lee directly mentioned 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' while President Xi responded with 'peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.' Since the U.S.-China summit in Bali, Indonesia, in late 2022, the phrase 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' has not appeared in official announcements from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the so-called 'three principles for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' which China has consistently advocated, have also been rarely mentioned recently.

Instead, in the joint statement following the summit with Russian President Putin in May 2024, President Xi Jinping stated, "We oppose military threat actions by the United States and its allies that could escalate confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and lead to armed conflict and tension," effectively arguing that the responsibility for tensions on the Korean Peninsula also lies with the U.S. and South Korea. In the Xi Jinping-Putin summit in May 2025, a joint statement was issued calling for an "end to pressure on North Korea" without any mention of the North Korean nuclear issue or denuclearization.

First, in this situation, the Lee Jae-myung administration needs a new approach and design at a different level regarding China's role in the North Korean issue. Despite these changes in attitude, it is difficult to conclude that China has accepted North Korea's claim to be a nuclear state, but preemptive preparation for a rapidly unfolding situation is necessary. The new administration must first accurately grasp the meaning of these changes in China's attitude and the measures it is considering in response to North Korea's claim to be a nuclear state. Based on this, the new administration must actively pursue strategic communication to share perceptions with China regarding the impact that North Korea's claim to be a 'nuclear state' could have on peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in East Asia.

Both South Korea and China emphasize China's 'constructive role.' In the June EAI public opinion survey, 84.1% of South Koreans responded that China has a role in responding to North Korea's military provocations. The response that China's influence is important in the process of North Korean denuclearization reached 88.3%. Notably, despite the stark division of opinions between political camps on North Korea-related issues, both liberal and conservative respondents in South Korea stated that China's role and influence are important.

In summary, both South Korea and China recognize that China has a role and influence in the North Korean issue and that it is important. Indeed, China has played and will continue to play a role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The issue, however, is whether there is agreement and consensus on the specific content of China's 'constructive role' in the so-called North Korean nuclear issue. Opinions differ even between the liberal and conservative camps in South Korea. In fact, both liberal and conservative governments in South Korea have, during their terms, attempted to pursue and leverage different roles and influences of China, respectively, but failed to achieve the expected results. As pointed out by public opinion, national consensus and integration are important agendas prior to discussions with China.

Furthermore, an accurate understanding is needed of what China's 'constructive role' entails and whether it aligns with the role expected by the South Korean government. China consistently emphasizes denuclearization through dialogue and negotiation, arguing that the purpose of sanctions against North Korea is to facilitate dialogue. Recently, China has been emphasizing the 'political settlement' of the North Korean nuclear issue. Underlying China's advocacy for a 'political settlement' is the argument that the U.S. is responsible for the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, China argues that the U.S., which is responsible for the North Korean nuclear issue, must take the lead in resolving it politically and diplomatically. China fundamentally maintains an attitude that it is not a party to the North Korean nuclear issue, has not sought to be a solver, and its greatest role to date has been as a mediator to facilitate dialogue for situation management.

However, while maintaining a balanced diplomacy toward North and South Korea focused on management aimed at stability on the Korean Peninsula, China has shifted its policies and played an active role during two significant junctures. First, when the U.S.'s offensive against China intensified, if China judged that the regime of North Korea was facing an imminent crisis, it played an active role in preventing it. For example, during crises in the North Korean regime following the deaths of Kim Il-sung in 1994 and Kim Jong-il in 2011, China swiftly provided active support and assistance to North Korea. And in 2003 and 2017, when the possibility of direct military action by the U.S. against North Korea was raised, China preemptively imposed sanctions on North Korea to deter U.S. military action and manage the crisis.

Second, when there was a concern that China's position and influence on the Korean Peninsula would significantly weaken, China actively intervened to manage and stabilize the situation. For example, during the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in October 1994, China actively promoted relations with South Korea. And following the Pyeongchang Olympics in February 2018, when North-South and North Korea-U.S. summits were suddenly held, leading to the emergence of the 'China exclusion theory,' China led five consecutive summit meetings with North Korea in just over a year, confirming China's status and influence on the Korean Peninsula, after a hiatus of nearly six years since Xi Jinping came to power.

In conclusion, although both South Korea and China emphasize the importance of China's 'constructive role' in the North Korean nuclear issue, there remain significant differences in the specific content of this 'role,' making it difficult to find common ground for cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, even if the new administration improves relations with China. Past administrations, by overestimating China's role and failing to achieve expected outcomes, immediately pressured China with responsibility, ultimately leading to friction in South Korea-China relations. Conversely, by downplaying or neglecting China's role, they provoked China, causing it to act as a spoiler and preventing South Korea from achieving desired outcomes.

Public opinion, while acknowledging the importance of China's influence on the North Korean nuclear issue, shows a decline in the priority placed on policy coordination with China for North Korean denuclearization in the new administration's diplomacy toward China. This dropped from first place in 2021 (24.4%) to third place in the 2025 survey (17.2%), following expanded economic exchanges and advanced technology cooperation (33.9%) and response to economic sanctions (24.1%) (see Figure 2). This is presumed to reflect the experience and judgment that there are limitations to policy coordination with China on denuclearization.

Figure 2. Priority Issues in Diplomacy Toward China

In conclusion, to avoid repeating the mistakes of previous administrations, the new administration must first acknowledge the limitations of a single five-year term and resist the temptation to set overly ambitious political goals such as denuclearization, establishing a peace regime, or unification within its term and pursue unrealistic diplomacy. Considering the complex challenges facing the new administration and the reality of South Korea-China relations, the top priority is to restore substantial strategic communication with China. Establishing a high-level dialogue channel that can operate continuously with China is the urgent minimum measure to secure 'peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula,' as agreed upon by the leaders of South Korea and China. This will enable rapid and close communication when instability originating from North Korea is anticipated or occurs, preventing the worsening of the situation due to mutual misunderstandings and misinterpretations, and preparing to manage and respond to crises. Furthermore, thorough preparation is needed, including accurately analyzing and understanding the actual content and strategies of the role China has played in the North Korean issue, and developing a meticulous strategy to maximize China's role in a way that aligns with South Korea's national interests.

III. Restoring People-to-People Exchanges between South Korea and China and Designing Medium- to Long-Term Strategies

The Lee Jae-myung administration, which was suddenly launched amidst a political crisis, is inevitably sensitive to public opinion. The diplomatic tasks requested by public opinion for the new administration are very realistic and specific. That is, strengthening economic diplomacy (49.8%) should be the top diplomatic priority for the new administration. This aligns with the view that U.S.-China competition and friction, protectionism, and competition in advanced technologies are the biggest threats to South Korea. The public hopes that the administration will wisely respond to trade negotiations with the U.S. and restore economic cooperation with China to revitalize and stabilize the economy. Furthermore, it emphasizes national consensus building (41.0%) as an extension of this. In a situation where the confrontation and conflict between liberal and conservative factions in South Korea are expanding to the diplomatic front and U.S.-China competition and confrontation are escalating daily, public opinion holds that internal division should not further deepen and hinder the pursuit of economic diplomacy. Strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance (34.3%) is presented as the third diplomatic priority (see Figure 3). This reflects concerns about security instability and the expectation that the administration will successfully protect national interests in difficult negotiations with the Trump administration across various fronts.

Figure 3. Top Diplomatic Priorities for the New Administration

In summary, public opinion urges the new administration to focus on reviving the stagnant economy and resolving security concerns, and hopes this focus will be reflected in diplomacy toward China. That is, while public disapproval of China is high, public opinion nevertheless believes that South Korea-China relations are important for economic exchange, advanced technology cooperation, and the North Korean issue, thus necessitating improved relations with China. In a situation of intensifying trade friction between the U.S. and China and escalating instability and uncertainty in the international situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula, it is perceived that sustained tension with neighboring China is not beneficial to national interests.

However, the economic competition with China is intensifying, and strategic communication on the North Korean issue has effectively ceased. U.S.-China competition and conflict are escalating, and the Trump administration will increasingly pressure South Korea to participate in containing China. Public opinion holds expectations for improved South Korea-China relations, but simultaneously clearly advocates for strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance. With public opinion favoring the strengthening of the South Korea-U.S. alliance growing, the new administration faces the complex puzzle of responding to U.S. demands for China containment while also improving relations with China, which suffers from high public disapproval.

Although public expectations for improved South Korea-China relations are high, and the new administration clearly has the policy will, it is essential to fully consider the realistic environment that makes rapid improvement of South Korea-China relations difficult. The new administration needs to pursue cautious, substantive, and phased improvements rather than setting excessive goals and rushing the process in its diplomacy toward China. In particular, as the new administration pursues improvements in inter-Korean relations, it must be vigilant not to repeat the errors of underestimating or overestimating China's role, as committed by previous administrations.

First, the new administration needs to quickly create an environment for basic exchanges and cooperation to be revitalized by finding a breakthrough for improved relations with China. If exchanges and cooperation with China are restored, it can be expected that mutual understanding will be enhanced, and conditions will be created for the gradual improvement of mutual negative sentiment. South Korea's policies and strategies toward China have tended to seek emergency responses after bilateral issues arise and conflicts occur. As a result of China policies being conducted in a short-term, reactive manner, various policy tools and leverage toward China have not been prepared in advance. If the sole leverage for diplomacy toward China is the strengthening of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, South Korea is likely to become more deeply entangled in the vortex of U.S.-China strategic competition, contrary to its intentions, in the current environment.

In conclusion, the need for preemptive and comprehensive design of policies and strategies toward China, and the consideration of various scenarios, is growing daily. As South Korea-China relations have evolved beyond the bilateral dimension to become vulnerable to the international structure and environment, diplomacy and strategy toward China must be designed and implemented based on an organic and comprehensive review of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, South Korea-Japan relations, inter-Korean relations, the North Korean nuclear issue, unification policy, and domestic political and economic conditions.■

References

Lee, Dong-ryul. 2025. "Expectations and Challenges for Improving Relations with a 'Disliked' China for the New Administration: Analysis of the 2025 EAI East Asia Survey Results ①," 『EAI Issue Briefing』 East Asia Institute (June 16), https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=23321&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: June 17, 2025)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2024. Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Two Countries. May 16. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml(Accessed: December 28, 2024)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2025. Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Further Strengthening Cooperation and Upholding the Authority of International Law. May 9. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202505/t20250509_11617831.shtml (Accessed: June 17, 2025)

■ Lee, Dong-ryul_Director of EAI Center for Chinese Studies; Professor of Chinese Studies, Dongduk Women's University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Oh, In-hwan_Senior Researcher, EAI

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