[EAI Issue Briefing] Japan-South Korea Relations: Prioritizing Future-Oriented Cooperation Over Historical Issue Resolution: Analysis of the 2025 EAI East Asian Survey Results

I. Introduction

“We will build a future-oriented ROK-Japan relationship that the new era demands.”

(SNS message from President Lee Jae-myung immediately after a phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba)

We have frequently used the phrase ‘future-oriented ROK-Japan relationship.’ Given that ROK-Japan relations have been fraught with diplomatic confrontation and conflict over historical issues, we use this phrase as a way to move beyond the reality where both countries are mired in historical issues and fail to advance cooperation in areas such as economy, security, and technology. Both countries still face historical issues in 2025. Regarding the comfort women issue, the governments of both countries reached an agreement in 2015 on the issue of former wartime "comfort women" mobilized by the Japanese military, but the controversy surrounding the agreement's content and implementation remains alive. For the issue of forced labor victims, the South Korean government proposed a third-party compensation plan, but its implementation is facing difficulties due to a lack of cooperation from the Japanese side to the extent desired by South Korea. The issue of the Sado mine's inscription as a UNESCO World Heritage site also remains a diplomatic issue, sparking considerable controversy.

Following the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's proposal of the 'third-party compensation plan' in 2023, relations between the two countries have demonstrably improved, leading to the resumption of government and private exchanges and the dawn of a new era of ROK-US-Japan cooperation with the 'Camp David Accords.' Nevertheless, the results of the Japan component of the 2024 East Asian Survey revealed clear divisions, competition, and confrontation between progressive and conservative factions on major issues, raising concerns about a decline in the rationality, consistency, and sustainability of ROK policy toward Japan, as well as a weakening of negotiation power (Yeol Sohn 2024). Furthermore, at the beginning of 2025, South Korean society witnessed deepening political polarization and inter-factional confrontation between progressives and conservatives amidst a state of emergency, impeachment, and early presidential elections. The extreme anti-Japan sentiment within some progressive circles was also reflected in the first impeachment motion against President Yoon Suk-yeol. This situation risked leading to a deterioration of public opinion towards Japan.

However, the 13th EAI East Asian Survey, conducted from June 4-5, 2025, appears to herald a new era in public opinion towards Japan. Favorable impressions of Japan and the Japanese Prime Minister surpassed unfavorable impressions, and evaluations of the third-party compensation plan also showed a positive majority, marking an unprecedented "golden cross" across several items. Amidst this trend, the public prioritized future-oriented cooperation over the resolution of historical issues as the primary concern in ROK-Japan diplomacy. This indicates a recognition that while efforts should be made to resolve historical issues between the two countries as a goal for ROK-Japan relations, cooperation in trade, technology, security, climate change, and the environment should not be delayed due to being held back by these historical issues.

The message from this public opinion poll, conducted at a historic juncture marking the 60th anniversary of the normalization of ROK-Japan relations on June 22, is clear. It can be seen as a signal heralding the dawn of a new era in ROK-Japan relations. This report aims to analyze the trends and driving forces behind this change and propose future political tasks.

II. Surge in Favorable Impressions of Japan

The increase in favorable impressions of Japan among South Koreans has been continuous since hitting a low in 2020, and for the first time since the inception of the East Asian Survey, positive impressions have surpassed negative ones, marking a golden cross. Specifically, it has increased fivefold from 12.3% to 63.3% over the past five years since 2020. The increase of 21.6 percentage points compared to last year is also a record-breaking change ([Figure 1]). This figure is close to the favorable impression of the United States (77.5%) and shows a significant difference from the favorable impression of China (25.6%) ([Figure 2]).

[Figure 1] Trend of Impressions of Japan, 2013-2025

[Figure 2] Comparison of Impressions of the United States, Japan, and China, 2023-2025

The increase in favorable impressions of Japan is unlikely to be the result of progress in resolving historical issues, which have been considered obstacles to friendly ROK-Japan relations. Public opinion in South Korea was lukewarm towards the 'third-party compensation plan' proposed by the South Korean government in 2023 as a solution to the forced labor issue, and this reaction continues to this day (Yeol Sohn et al. 2023). Public opinion was also highly critical of the government's response to the Sado mine's UNESCO inscription in 2024. In other words, favorable impressions of Japan have continuously increased amidst ongoing public criticism regarding various historical issues. While Japan's attitude towards historical issues is the biggest factor contributing to unfavorable impressions of Japan, the increase in favorable impressions indicates that factors other than the resolution of historical issues are at play.

[Figure 3] Reasons for Developing a Positive Impression of Japan (Rank 1+2)

For the past several years, the reasons cited for developing a positive impression of Japan include the Japanese people's 'kind and diligent national character,' 'attractive food culture and shopping,' 'advanced country with a high standard of living,' and 'popular culture such as manga, anime, music, novels, and movies.' These can all be considered reasons learned through personal experiences in Japan. Therefore, the experience of visiting Japan becomes a strong explanatory variable. Instead of relying on the fixed notions and narratives formed by older generations, individuals form their own perceptions of Japan through direct experiences of Japanese attitudes, food culture, shopping, and popular culture during their visits. Indeed, the number of South Korean tourists visiting Japan has increased exponentially in recent years. After exceeding one million in 2022, immediately following the COVID-19 pandemic, it reached 7.82 million in 2023, 8.82 million in 2024, and already surpassed 3.2 million by April of this year.

[Figure 4] Trend of Visits to Japan, 2013-2025

[Figure 5] Number of Visits to Japan in the Past 5 Years

As shown in [Figure 4] and [Figure 5], the proportion of respondents who have visited Japan in the last 2-3 years has significantly increased, and nearly half of them have visited Japan more than twice. The proportion of repeat visitors was particularly high among the 18-39 age group, i.e., the MZ generation, who are also the generation showing favorable views towards Japan. 74% of those aged 18-29 and 74.1% of those aged 30-39 expressed favorable views (compared to 63.3% favorable views among all respondents). This generation is also the main consumer of Japanese popular culture. Considering that the consumption of popular culture is improving mutual perceptions between South Korea and Japan, especially increasing mutual favorability (Yeol Sohn and Ha-yeon Lee 2021), it can be said that the younger generation is driving the increase in favorable views towards Japan through their visits to Japan and consumption of popular culture.

Even so, to explain the surge in favorable impressions over the past year, additional variables need to be examined. We will examine the variables that explain the public's support for the new administration's pursuit of future-oriented cooperation, which is another notable change in this survey.

III. Demand for Future-Oriented Cooperation

Regarding the priorities for the new administration, 'pursuing future-oriented cooperation in areas such as economy, technology, security, and environment' (49.6%) significantly surpassed 'resolving historical issues' (31.5%), with a difference of 18.1 percentage points. This reverses the results of a pre-election poll in 2022, where resolving historical issues (40.7%) ranked higher than future-oriented cooperation (35.3%) ([Figure 6]). The emphasis in the so-called 'two-track diplomacy' pursued by previous administrations now lies on functional cooperation.

[Figure 6] Issues to Prioritize in New Administration's Diplomacy Towards Japan

What, then, are the main factors driving this change? The regression analysis in [Table 1] presents the results of analyzing the statistical significance of various variables influencing future-oriented cooperation, indicating a strong correlation with factors such as the US-China strategic competition and conflict, protectionism and competition in advanced technologies, favorable impressions of Japan, and trust in Japan.

[Table 1] Regression Analysis Results: Factors Supporting Future-Oriented ROK-Japan Cooperation[1]

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Numbers in parentheses are t-values

The most statistically significant variables here are US-China strategic competition and protectionism/high-tech competition. These are also identified by the public as the "greatest threat factors facing Korea." As shown in [Figure 7], strategic competition and conflict between the US and China (64.9%) ranked first, protectionism and high-tech competition ranked a close second (59.8%), and the North Korean nuclear-missile threat ranked third (33.2%). The fact that US-China competition and conflict has surpassed the North Korean nuclear threat as the top threat, a position it held last year, appears to reflect the reality of the expanding US-China trade war and escalating war risk in the Taiwan Strait. The second-ranked issue, the spread of protectionism and high-tech competition, is in a similar context. In short, this means that future-oriented cooperation is correlated with the threat factors facing Korea. The greater the US-China strategic competition and conflict, the more intense the protectionism and high-tech competition, and the higher the favorability and trust toward Japan, the greater the likelihood of positive future-oriented cooperation with Japan.

[Figure 7] Greatest Threat Factors Facing Korea (Rank 1+2)

[Figure 8] Militarily Threatening Countries, 2013-2025

[Figure 9] Impressions of China, 2019-2025

The risk of US-China competition and conflict has aspects that combine China risk and US risk. While Korea has expanded its supply chains to China and increased exports to China amidst the wave of globalization, driving sustained economic growth, it has become excessively dependent on China, at one point relying on the Chinese market for 28% of its exports. As a result, it has exposed strategic and security vulnerabilities to China and suffered economic pressure, such as the THAAD retaliation from China. Perceptions of threat from China have significantly increased since around 2017 and are sharply rising from 2020 onwards ([Figure 8]). Favorability toward China has also fallen to 10.7%, indicating the spread of China threat discourse and anti-China sentiment within Korean society ([Figure 9]). In this context, public opinion desires an increased role for the US and Japan to reduce over-reliance on China, and there has been a growing tendency to support a "US-Japan vs. China" framework (Son Yeol 2021).

Meanwhile, the changes observed over the past year are largely related to the potential return of President Trump. As a result of expanding exports to the US in an effort to "de-sinicize" or pursue a "China + 1" strategy, Korea faced Trump's tariff threats due to increased trade surpluses with the US. This can be seen as a consequence of excessive dependence on a Trumpist America. In terms of security, Korea perceives an increased risk from its complete reliance on the ROK-US alliance. The US, in its declining hegemony, is selectively reducing its foreign interventions and seeking to transfer deterrence capabilities by demanding increased financial contributions, military buildup, and expanded military roles from its allies (Jeon Jae-seong 2025). This manifests as pressure on Korea for a reduction in the size of US Forces Korea, an expansion of strategic flexibility, the regionalization of the ROK-US alliance to counter China, and a significant increase in cost-sharing for stationing troops, to which Korean public opinion is reacting sensitively.

[Figure 10] Current ROK-US Relations

[Figure 11] Trust in the United States

First, the perception that current ROK-US relations are pessimistic has significantly increased compared to last year (14.9% → 33.9%), and the response of "do not trust the US" has surged (18.2% → 28.6%) ([Figure 10], [Figure 11]). Critical sentiment toward the US is reflected in the unfavorable impression of President Trump. His unfavorability rating (75.5%) was as high as that of President Xi Jinping (71.7%) ([Figure 12]). The biggest point of contention is the overwhelming opposition to Trump's tariffs (85.6%) ([Figure 13]). In line with this, the response that ROK-US economic relations are competitive has also increased (25.4% → 37.6%) ([Figure 14]). The perception that the US poses a risk, similar to China, has significantly grown.

[Figure 12] Impressions of the US President

[Figure 13] Support/Opposition to Tariffs Imposed by the Trump Administration

[Figure 14] Economic Relations between Korea and the United States

[Figure 15] Opinions on US Economic Restrictions Against China

In fact, a major part of the U.S. risk is related to the issue of joining China's containment as part of the U.S.-China strategic competition. As much as the intention to use the ROK-U.S. alliance as a regional alliance to contain China, the U.S. seeks to block China's supply chains and export routes to the U.S. through tariffs, and to restrict its allies' exports to and direct investment in China. The public's strong opposition (55.4% → 70.8%, [Figure 15]) to Trump's tariffs or restrictions on economic transactions with China signifies their concern about the dilemma and economic damage resulting from the U.S.-China conflict.

The fear of dependence on China, the instability of alliances and declining trust due to the decline of the United States, and the sense of threat from the deepening US-China strategic competition and conflict have provided an opportunity for South Korea to re-evaluate Japan's strategic value. The increase in trust towards Japan (33.1% → 41.2%) is not due to an increase in Japan's national power or diplomatic capabilities, but rather due to changes in South Korea's strategic environment requiring a reduction in the risk of dependence on China and the United States. As self-reliance has limitations in managing and reducing growing external risks for the time being, solidarity and cohesion with countries sharing similar positions are important. In this regard, public opinion appears to favor prioritizing cooperation with Japan in areas such as security, economy, and technology, given the shared predicament. The increased support for strengthening ROK-US-Japan military security cooperation (66.5% → 75.3%) also expresses the will to unite not only with the United States but also with Japan ([Figure 16]).

[Figure 16] Stance on Strengthening ROK-US-Japan Trilateral Military Security Cooperation, 2018-2025

IV. Polarization of Policy Toward Japan and Pragmatic Diplomacy

This East Asia Survey confirmed public opinion supporting future-oriented ROK-Japan cooperation, against the backdrop of a record increase in favorability towards Japan. This also signifies support for the new administration's will to pursue future-oriented ROK-Japan relations. In this regard, President Lee Jae-myung stated, “I hope that both ROK and Japan will seek ways to jointly respond to future challenges and achieve mutual prosperity from the perspective of mutual national interest.” The public identified the joint response to the risk of excessive dependence on China and the United States in economic and security aspects as a core challenge. This can be interpreted as an answer that these are common tasks to be pursued gradually and continuously from a strategic and long-term perspective.

However, it is also true that there are uneasy views regarding this policy orientation. The current ruling party adopted a hardline stance towards Japan during the previous Moon Jae-in administration and reacted negatively to the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's efforts to improve ROK-Japan relations. They criticized the forced labor resolution, the response to the discharge of contaminated water from Fukushima, and the response to the inscription of Sado Mine as a UNESCO World Heritage site as humiliating diplomacy or the worst diplomatic disaster. The survey results also show that in almost all areas related to Japan, including impressions, trust, and current bilateral relations, the perceptions of ruling party supporters (progressive camp) are negative, while those of opposition party supporters (conservative camp) are positive. Therefore, concerns may arise that political polarization could hinder future-oriented ROK-Japan cooperation. The reality that the response that "ROK-Japan relations will worsen compared to the Yoon administration" (41.5%) precedes the response that they will improve (31.9%) in the outlook for the new administration's foreign relations also falls within this context.

The success or failure of the Lee Jae-myung administration's future-oriented policy toward Japan depends not only on Japan's stance as the counterpart but also on the ability to secure the consent of the domestic support base and to exercise political power to prevent rival political factions from engaging in obstruction for obstruction's sake. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the normalization of ROK-Japan diplomatic relations, the Lee Jae-myung-style pragmatic diplomacy, which pursues practical benefits beyond nationalistic ideology and values, has been introduced. ■

References

Son, Yeol. 2021. “The Intensification of US-China Conflict Demands Improvement in ROK-Japan Relations: Reading ROK-Japan Relations Through the 9th ROK-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey.” EAI Issue Briefing. October 8. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=20828&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: June 16, 2025.)

______. 2024. “ROK-Japan Relations Swayed by Political Polarization: Analysis of Relationship Improvement and Public Opinion Division in the 2024 Public Opinion Survey.” EAI Issue Briefing. September 19. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22667&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: June 16, 2025.)

Son, Yeol, Kim, Yang-gyu, and Park, Han-soo. 2023. “The Gap Between ROK and Japanese Public Perceptions on Relationship Improvement: Analysis of the 2023 ROK-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey Results.” EAI Issue Briefing. October 12. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22130&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: June 16, 2025.)

Son, Yeol, and Lee, Ha-yeon. 2021. “ROK-Japan Mutual Favorability Driven by Popular Culture Consumption: Can it be a Breakthrough for Strained ROK-Japan Relations?” EAI Issue Briefing. November 15. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=20891&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: June 16, 2025.)

Jeon, Jae-seong. 2025. “Changes in the International Order and US-China Strategic Competition: Foreign Policy and Security Strategy Tasks for the New Administration.” EAI Special Report. May 27. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=23263&board=kor_special(Accessed: June 16, 2025.)

[1]This statistical analysis was conducted with the assistance of Professor Kim Yang-gyu (Korea National Defense University).

■ Son, Yeol_Director of the East Asia Institute, Professor at Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies.

■ Responsible for and edited by: Park, Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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