[EAI Issue Brief] Hopes and Challenges for Improving Relations with China, a "Disliked" Country, for the New Administration: Analysis of the 2025 EAI East Asia Survey Results

In the East Asia Survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in June 2025, 68.3% of respondents expected Korea-China relations to improve after the inauguration of the new administration, overwhelmingly outweighing the 6.7% who expected them to worsen. Compared to the prospects for improved relations with the US (49.9%), Japan (31.9%), and North Korea (62.6%), the expectation for improved Korea-China relations is the highest. (Figure 1) Public opinion expresses an expectation that Korea-China relations, currently at their lowest point, will improve and should improve with the inauguration of the new administration. However, the survey also conveys a message that Korea-China relations will not easily improve in the short term. When asked about the new administration's top diplomatic priorities, respondents ranked strengthening economic diplomacy (49.8%), efforts to unify divided national opinion (41.0%), and strengthening the Korea-US alliance (34.3%) in that order. Strengthening cooperation with China accounted for only 7.3%, placing it low on the priority list along with promoting Korea-Japan relations (6.0%). (Figure 2)

As is well known, Korea-China relations have stagnated at their lowest point for nearly a decade since the THAAD conflict in 2016. The momentum and motivation for improving Korea-China relations have also weakened. The inauguration of the new administration itself is unlikely to bring about an improvement in Korea-China relations, contrary to public expectations. The international situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula is complex, like a tangled thread, with unstable security and a sluggish economy, making it difficult for the new administration to prioritize improving Korea-China relations. In particular, the new administration, having been inaugurated without sufficient preparation, faces immediate and difficult negotiations with its ally, the United States, on critical issues affecting national destiny, including tariffs, advanced technology, cost-sharing for US Forces Korea, and wartime operational control. Realistically, the new administration's top priority must be diplomacy and negotiations with the US. Instead, diplomacy with China faces various challenges and risks becoming unstable, influenced by Korea-US relations.

[Figure 1] Prospects for Major Diplomatic Relations After the Inauguration of the New Administration

[Figure 2] Top Diplomatic Priorities for the New Administration

I. Sentiment Towards China

1. We must be wary of the potential for prolonged negative sentiment towards China

According to survey results, anti-China sentiment persists and is unlikely to improve significantly in the future. While favorable responses have shown an increasing trend, from 14.8% in 2023 to 19.6% in 2024 and 25.6% in 2025, unfavorable responses remain high at 66.3%, a trend that has continued since the THAAD conflict in 2016. Anti-China sentiment is high among both conservative (70.5%) and progressive (63.8%) respondents, with no significant difference. However, generational differences are pronounced. Unfavorable sentiment among those in their 20s increased by 9.4 percentage points from 2024 to 80%, the highest among all age groups. In contrast, unfavorable responses were relatively lower among those in their 60s (60.2%) and 70s (53.9%). (Figure 3)

Concerns exist that anti-China sentiment, largely driven by the younger generation, may become prolonged. However, it is also possible that the sharp decline in direct exchanges between young Koreans and Chinese since 2016, following the THAAD conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic, has reduced opportunities for mutual understanding, thereby exacerbating unfavorable views. If exchanges between the two countries recover in the future, there is hope that unfavorable sentiment may gradually ease to some extent.

[Figure 3] Impression of China (by generation)

2. The reasons for unfavorable views of China are also shifting towards more fundamental and structural issues.

Amidst persistent unfavorable views of China, the primary reasons have been changing and diversifying annually. This also does not signal a positive trend for improving South Korea-China relations. In the 2023 survey, the main reasons for unfavorable views were "China's coercive behavior" (59%) and "disrespect towards Korea" (47.6%). This reflects the impact of China's retaliatory measures following the 2016 THAAD deployment, against the backdrop of widening power asymmetry between South Korea and China. In 2024, "China's environmental issues such as fine dust" (44.2%) emerged as the top reason, followed by "disrespect towards Korea" (39.4%) and "coercive behavior" (38.3%).

However, a notable change occurred in the 2025 survey. "Chinese people's national character and behavior" (58.1%) newly became the leading reason by a significant margin, followed by "Communist Party one-party system" (39.5%) and "economic coercion and retaliation" (36.9%). Conversely, responses for "disrespect towards Korea" (22.3%), which was a primary reason for unfavorable views in 2024, and "environmental issues such as fine dust" (29.1%) declined in ranking. (Figure 4) This indicates that the unfavorable sentiment stemming from the THAAD conflict is gradually easing over time. In contrast, unfavorable views driven by more fundamental issues such as "Chinese people's national character and the Communist Party system" are increasing. The reasons for unfavorable views of China are shifting towards fundamental and structural problems that are difficult to resolve, raising concerns about the long-term entrenchment of negative sentiment.

The sudden surge in responses regarding the "Communist Party one-party system" in 2025, despite it being included in annual opinion polls, warrants attention. The emergence of the regime type as a primary reason for unfavorable views could pose a significant burden and obstacle for the new administration in improving relations with China. As is well known, South Korea and China established diplomatic relations 33 years ago based on an implicit agreement to acknowledge and mutually accept their differences in systems, leading to remarkable advancements in economic exchange and cooperation. However, with recent economic exchanges and cooperation between the two countries significantly shrinking, the increasing prominence of systemic differences could hinder the improvement of bilateral relations.

[Figure 4] Reasons for unfavorable impression of China (2022-2025)

Since the advent of the Xi Jinping administration, China's authoritarian system has been strengthening, while South Korea, through two instances of active citizen participation leading to presidential impeachment, has seen heightened awareness of democracy and popular sovereignty, thus widening the systemic gap between the two nations. Furthermore, the recent political climate, where China-related issues have been abnormally weaponized in domestic political disputes, appears to have further highlighted China's systemic issues. Therefore, the new administration needs to closely monitor these public opinion trends, exercise meticulous vigilance to prevent sensitive diplomatic issues from becoming fodder for domestic political conflict, and prudently seek to improve relations with China.

Generational differences are also evident in the reasons for unfavorable views. Respondents aged 70 and above cited "Communist Party one-party system" (54.5%) as the primary reason. In contrast, respondents in their 20s to 60s cited "national character and behavior" as the reason for unfavorable views (59.6%, 64.9%, 66.8%, 60.2%, and 48.7% respectively). (Figure 5) If younger generations, who should be actively engaged in exchange and cooperation with China, hold unfavorable views due to "Chinese people's national character and behavior," leading to conflict and avoidance of interaction, the future of South Korea-China relations, given their geographical proximity, appears uncertain. However, it is important to note that the survey newly included the item on environmental issues in 2024 and national character and behavior in 2025, and the reasons for unfavorable views have been changing annually. Therefore, it is necessary to continue monitoring trends for several more years.

[Figure 5] Reasons for unfavorable impression of China (by generation)

II. Perception of South Korea-China Relations

1. South Korea-China Economic Relations are Important

Despite harboring unfavorable views towards China, the response that South Korea-China relations are important has increased by 2.5 percentage points from the 2024 survey to 88.4%. (Figure 6) Generational differences are also pronounced here. While 74.9% of those in their 20s responded that relations are important, this figure rises to 96.3% among those in their 60s, a difference of 21.4 percentage points.

Notably, the response that economic relations with China are important has increased by 8.5 percentage points from 2024 to 82.7%. (Figure 7) The primary reason cited for favorable views of China is "its large market offering significant economic opportunities" (70.8%), followed by "its sustained economic growth despite US pressure" (41.5%). (Figure 8) The top priority for South Korea's diplomacy towards China is expanding economic exchange and cooperation in advanced technologies (33.9%). (Figure 9) Furthermore, the proportion of respondents who oppose US restrictions on South Korea's trade and investment with China has significantly increased from 55.4% in 2024 to 70.8%.

[Figure 6] Importance of South Korea-China Relations (2023-2025)

[Figure 7] Economically Important Countries or Regions

[Figure 8] Reasons for favorable impression of China (2022-2025)

[Figure 9] Priority Issues in Diplomacy Towards China

In essence, the most significant reason for considering South Korea-China relations important is the economic relationship. This indicates that, particularly in the aftermath of the US Trump administration's tariff policies, the public believes economic and technological cooperation with China is important. However, on the other hand, the response that the economic relationship between South Korea and China is competitive has increased from 58% in 2024 to 64.4%. (Figure 10) Indeed, China is rapidly transforming into a formidable competitor for South Korea due to its faster-than-expected industrial upgrading and advancements in high technology. Moreover, South Korea's dependence on China in components and materials is deepening. Amidst this, the Trump administration is pressuring South Korea to decouple from China. Therefore, while economic exchange and cooperation with China are clearly important, if South Korea cannot swiftly adapt to the rapidly changing environment and find new methods and areas for economic cooperation, it will be practically difficult to enjoy the benefits of past China booms.

[Figure 10] South Korea-China Economic Relations (2023-2025)

2. Controversy over China's Role and Influence in North Korea's Military Provocations and Denuclearization

The second reason for considering relations with China important is the North Korea issue. The response that China plays a role in responding to North Korea's military provocations is 84.1%. (Figure 11) The response that China's influence is important in the denuclearization process of North Korea reaches 88.3%. (Figure 12) Notably, despite this being a North Korea-related issue, both progressive and conservative respondents agree that China's role and influence are important.

The most distinct divergence between progressive and conservative respondents in opinion polls appears in items related to North Korea. For instance, when asked about priority issues for the new administration's North Korea policy, progressive respondents chose "Promotion of Inter-Korean Exchange" (41.7%) as the top priority, while conservative respondents selected "Maintaining and Strengthening Economic Sanctions for Denuclearization" (34.8%). Regarding priority issues for the new administration's diplomacy towards China, "Policy Coordination for North Korean Denuclearization" ranked third at 17.2%. However, 23.1% of conservative respondents and 10.9% of progressive respondents chose this option, showing a clear difference of 12.2 percentage points.

[Figure 11] China's Role in Responding to North Korea's Military Provocations

[Figure 12] China's Influence in the Denuclearization Process of North Korea

In summary, while both conservative and progressive respondents acknowledge China's role and influence in North Korean affairs as important, they hold fundamentally different expectations and demands regarding that role and influence. Specifically, conservative respondents seek China's involvement in imposing sanctions and pressure on North Korea for denuclearization, whereas progressive respondents expect China to act as a mediator in promoting inter-Korean exchange.

Indeed, China's role and influence in managing North Korean issues have consistently existed and continue to do so. However, both progressive and conservative governments have attempted to leverage China's role and influence during their terms, but failed to achieve expected outcomes, leading to a deterioration of South Korea-China relations. Consequently, the new administration faces the challenging task of managing North Korean issues by converging and integrating sharply divided domestic public opinion, and by appropriately and realistically leveraging China's role and influence. If the new administration, driven by the urgency of the North Korean issue, makes arbitrary judgments about South Korea-China relations or hastily seeks to leverage China's role and influence, it risks not only failing to address the North Korean issue but also missing opportunities to improve South Korea-China relations. To effectively leverage China's role in North Korean affairs, the new administration must first restore bilateral relations and systematically create an environment and conditions for strategic communication on the North Korean issue, proceeding step by step.

III. Expectations for the New Administration's Sophisticated Strategy Amidst US-China Strategic Competition and Conflict

In the 2024 survey, the greatest threats facing South Korea were climate change and environmental issues (51.2%) and North Korea's nuclear and missile threats (51.1%). However, in the 2025 survey, US-China strategic competition and conflict (64.9%) and the spread of protectionism and high-tech competition (59.8%) were identified as the biggest threats, while North Korea's nuclear and missile threats dropped to third place (33.2%). (Figure 13) Concurrently, the response that the US-South Korea relationship is the most important diplomatic relationship increased by 15.6 percentage points from 2024 to 90.7%, with both progressive (91.2%) and conservative (91.7%) respondents showing similar figures. (Figure 14) The response that the United States is the most important country also increased by 3.8 percentage points to 83.1%. South Korea-China relations (43.2%) are considered important, but less than half that of US-South Korea relations. Conversely, the response that China is a military threat, while acknowledging the importance of economic relations with China, has increased annually: 57.9% (2023), 63.7% (2024), and 70.5% (2025). (Figure 15) Furthermore, amid intensifying US-China competition, the proportion of respondents who believe the US-South Korea alliance should evolve beyond responding to North Korea's military threats to playing a role in resolving regional and global issues increased from 77.8% in 2024 to 86.3% in 2025.

[Figure 13] Major Threat Factors Facing South Korea

[Figure 14] Most Important Diplomatic Relationship

[Figure 15] Countries or Regions Perceived as Military Threats (2013-2025)

In other words, as competition and conflict between the US and China intensify, particularly in trade and high-tech sectors, public opinion overwhelmingly prioritizes the US-South Korea relationship. This perception likely stems from the traditional importance placed on the US-South Korea relationship, amplified by concerns regarding trade negotiations with the United States.

Since the advent of the Trump administration, trust in the United States has decreased by 4.7 percentage points, from 73.1% (2024) to 68.4% (2025). This is underpinned by a more negative impression of President Trump (75.5%) than President Xi Jinping (71.7%) and overwhelming opposition to the Trump administration's imposition of tariffs (85.6%). The response citing "coercive attitude in trade and tariffs towards other countries" as a reason for a negative impression of the US increased by a substantial 45.5 percentage points from 2024 to 79.9%. The background for the increased importance placed on economic relations with China appears to be linked to the Trump administration's tariff policies.

In conclusion, amidst escalating trade conflicts and competition between the US and China, public opinion reflects growing concerns about South Korea's economic issues, leading to the perception that both the US-South Korea relationship and economic relations with China are important. This is further evidenced by the public prioritizing "strengthening economic diplomacy" over "strengthening the US-South Korea alliance" as the new administration's top diplomatic task, indicating a strong focus on and concern for the economy.

On the security front, there has also been an increase in agreement with expanding the role of the US-South Korea alliance to regional and global dimensions. This suggests that while the fundamental security concerns are rising due to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and China's military buildup, the importance of strengthening the US-South Korea alliance is recognized. However, regarding specific issues such as the Taiwan issue, public sentiment remains cautious and reserved.

The response that tensions and conflicts in the Taiwan Strait are important to South Korea's national interests has increased by 8.2 percentage points from last year to 87.5%. However, in the event of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the maximum extent of South Korea's response should be humanitarian aid (49.3%), and the opinion that South Korea should not be involved was the second most common response (15.8%). (Figure 16) This represents an increase of 5.1 and 6.7 percentage points, respectively, compared to 2024. Regarding the role of US Forces Korea in a Taiwan contingency, responses indicating a rear support mission on the Korean Peninsula (42.3%) or focusing solely on the defense of South Korea (29.5%) were ranked first and second, rather than direct intervention. (Figure 17) Despite growing concerns about tensions and conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, public opinion favors prioritizing South Korea's security and minimizing involvement in the Taiwan issue. The increase in the proportion of respondents favoring neutrality (51.3% in 2025, up from 46.8% in 2024) in the event of a severe US-China conflict reflects this public sentiment.

[Figure 16] South Korea's Response in Case of Military Conflict in the Taiwan Strait

[Figure 17] Role of USFK in Case of Military Conflict in the Taiwan Strait

Public opinion indicates growing concerns about economic issues, leading to the recognition of the importance of trade negotiations with the United States and, by extension, economic relations with China. On the other hand, there is a recognition of the need to strengthen the US-South Korea alliance to resolve security instability. However, there is concern that involvement in the Taiwan issue could further weaken South Korea's security, and thus the public desires minimal intervention. Public opinion expects the new administration to prepare meticulous and sophisticated strategies and policies based on economic priorities to wisely navigate the complex equation of the international situation.

IV. Prospects and Challenges for South Korea-China Relations

Although public sentiment is largely unfavorable towards China, public opinion holds that South Korea-China relations are important due to economic exchange, technological cooperation, and the North Korea issue, thus necessitating improvement. The public's core diplomatic agenda for the new administration—revitalizing the stagnant economy and resolving security concerns—is also reflected in its views on diplomacy towards China. The public perceives that in a situation of intensifying US-China trade friction and increasing instability and uncertainty in the international dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula, prolonged stagnation in bilateral relations between neighboring countries is detrimental to national interests. Therefore, it is desirable to promptly create an environment where a breakthrough in improving relations can be achieved, enabling the revitalization of basic exchanges and cooperation. It is anticipated that as exchanges and cooperation between South Korea and China recover, conditions will be created for the gradual improvement of mutual unfavorable sentiment.

Despite high public expectations for improved South Korea-China relations and a clear policy will from the new administration, rapid improvement in bilateral relations appears difficult. The economic competition with China is intensifying, and strategic communication on the North Korea issue has effectively ceased. US-China competition and conflict are escalating, and the Trump administration will likely exert greater pressure on South Korea to participate in containing China. While public opinion expects an improvement in South Korea-China relations, it also clearly advocates for strengthening the US-South Korea alliance.

The new administration faces the complex challenge of appeasing the US's demands for China containment while simultaneously improving relations with China, a country viewed unfavorably by the public, at a time when public opinion increasingly favors strengthening the US-South Korea alliance. If the new administration fails to achieve tangible results in improving relations with China, there is a risk of domestic anti-China sentiment being mobilized, leading to political conflict and difficulties. Notably, unfavorable views towards China are not only persistent but are also growing due to fundamental reasons such as "Chinese people's national character and behavior" and the "Communist Party system," suggesting that attempts to improve relations with China without success could provoke backlash. Considering this, the new administration needs to develop a sophisticated strategy and proceed cautiously and incrementally, taking into account relations with other major countries such as the United States and North Korea when improving relations with China. ■

■ Lee Dong-ryul_Director, EAI Center for Chinese Studies; Professor, Department of Chinese Language and Literature, Dongduk Women's University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr