[Global NK Commentary] The Art of the Deal vs. Structural Crisis: Trump-Style Negotiations and the Future of North Korean Denuclearization

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I. The Evolution and Limitations of Trump's Mediation Style

From his presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to end conflicts worldwide early. This was a measure to reduce the drain on national strength and economic burden from US foreign intervention, pursuing the goal of restoring the economic foundation of hegemony. The issue is that this US restraint strategy is still being pursued under the objective of maintaining US global leadership. The key question is whether the US can maintain its role while preserving its influence and preventing deterrence failure.

During his first 100 days in office, President Trump made efforts to end various conflicts. In his speech in Saudi Arabia during his Middle East tour in May, President Trump emphasized achievements in concluding major negotiations in foreign relations since taking office, while also mentioning domestic political and economic situations. The US pursued negotiations to end various conflicts in regions such as Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia, and similar negotiation developments are expected in the future regarding US-China relations and the Korean Peninsula.

President Trump maintains a diplomatic stance of highlighting himself as a 'crisis solver' by directly or indirectly intervening in issues worldwide, including the Yemen, India-Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Israel-Palestine, and Ukraine wars. In particular, this is also seen as reflecting an intention to enhance domestic political support by making diplomatic achievements visible early through negotiations.

As the world's hegemonic power, the United States has led global military and diplomatic policies and has played various roles in intervening in different regions. These interventions have taken various forms according to strategic objectives for international order and regional stability, which can be broadly categorized into four types: the role of stabilizer, balancer, mediator, and broker.

First, the role of a stabilizer refers to the US effort to maintain a rules-based international order and ensure peace and predictability at regional and global levels by preventing conflicts and crises. As a stabilizer, the US focuses on maintaining the integrity of the order through institutional mechanisms and promoting balance and stability throughout the system. This corresponds to the most traditional form of global leadership and contributes to building trust and an institutional foundation for US leadership in the international community.

Second, the role of a balancer refers to interventions aimed at maintaining a balance of power in a specific region to prevent any single power from becoming hegemonic or for influence not to become concentrated. The goal is to prevent imbalances of power among regional states from escalating into conflict and to maintain structural stability. As a balancer, the US focuses on conflict adjustment and mitigation, promotion of cooperation, and multilateral coordination to increase common interests.

Third, a mediator plays the role of a facilitator who leads negotiations and compromises between parties in a region where conflict or dispute has occurred. A mediator, based on clear neutrality, is deeply involved in building trust and forming consensus between parties and values the maintenance of long-term and sustainable relationships. The intervention of a mediator is considered a model of diplomatic engagement that prioritizes international peace and cooperation over direct national interests.

Fourth, a broker is a role that intermediates information, resources, and opportunities for cooperation between states or groups that lack direct interests or institutional connections. A broker contributes to filling structural gaps within a network and creating arenas for interaction, but in this process, prioritizes short-term practicality and national strategic interests over neutrality and public interest. It often manifests in the form of closing deals based on expertise in specific fields and pursuing short-term gains.

Thus, the US has performed different diplomatic strategies and roles depending on various international political contexts and interests, rather than appearing as a single hegemonic power. Each role is not mutually exclusive but can overlap or be mixed depending on the time and region. As a global hegemonic power, the US has pursued the roles of stabilizer and balancer, aiming to promote structural and long-term stability in various regions. However, under the Trump administration, US strategy shows a trend of gradually shifting towards the roles of mediator or broker.

President Trump has attempted diplomatic engagement in major issues such as Yemen, Iran, and Syria by combining military pressure with limited negotiations. In this context, the US has focused more on the role of a broker, pursuing efforts for short-term conflict resolution. First, negotiations with the Houthi rebels in Yemen are a representative case. In March 2025, President Trump ordered strong military strikes against the Houthis with the goal of achieving visible results within a month. Consequently, US airstrikes inflicted some damage, but the Houthis' military capabilities, concealment abilities, and air defense systems remained intact, failing to deliver a decisive blow. On May 6, President Trump announced that the Houthis had promised to cease attacks on ships in the Red Sea, defining it as a 'surrender,' and that the US would also cease its attacks. Through these measures, both sides reached a conditional agreement to halt mutual attacks. However, the Houthis stated they would continue missile and drone attacks on Israel and declared they had defeated the US. As a result, while temporary safety for Red Sea shipping was secured, it failed to weaken the Houthis' capabilities or ensure medium- to long-term regional stability.

The nuclear negotiations with Iran are also essentially limited to an agreement. In April 2025, the Trump administration resumed nuclear negotiations with Iran after approximately seven years, but a comprehensive agreement was not reached. The US initiated negotiations to prevent Iran's development of nuclear weapons, but Iran maintained its stance of continuing uranium enrichment for civilian purposes and expressed its intention not to cease support for pro-Iranian forces in the region. Consequently, instead of a comprehensive framework like the past Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), there is a high probability of a short-term and limited exchange involving a temporary freeze of the nuclear program and partial easing of US sanctions. Iran views uranium enrichment and regional influence as strategic leverage and has no intention of conceding, while complex variables such as military pressure from Israel and the possibility of restoring international sanctions remain intertwined.

Meanwhile, regarding the Syrian issue, President Trump announced his intention to lift US sanctions as the civil war concluded and initiated full-scale negotiations. In May 2025, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump announced the lifting of US economic sanctions on Syria, and the two countries began the process of normalizing relations. In this process, Syria proposed economic cooperation, including development of natural resources, mineral agreements, oil supply, and participation in reconstruction projects, to which the US responded by accepting them in exchange for lifting sanctions. This agreement, made without sufficient discussion of human rights issues or accountability during the civil war, is likely to face criticism as a negotiation centered on short-term exchange of benefits. Ultimately, the Trump administration's Middle East diplomacy has generally employed a strategy of using coercive means followed by limited concessions to achieve short-term results, which can be evaluated as an approach focused on visible diplomatic achievements rather than institutional peace or sustainable cooperation.

On April 22, 2025, a terrorist shooting incident in Indian-administered Kashmir rapidly escalated into armed conflict between India and Pakistan. The two sides went beyond simple localized skirmishes to exchanging missile attacks, leading to a critical situation where the possibility of nuclear war was discussed, given that both countries are nuclear-armed states. In its initial response, President Trump maintained a watchful stance, stating that the issue was a regional conflict unrelated to the US. However, as the situation escalated with Pakistan officially mentioning the possibility of using nuclear weapons, President Trump decided to intervene diplomatically. As a result of US mediation efforts, India and Pakistan agreed to an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, and President Trump self-assessed the outcome as a result of US diplomatic mediation.

Pakistan officially expressed gratitude for the US mediation in this regard, but India maintained its position that the agreement was reached through direct dialogue between the two countries, downplaying the US role in the intervention. Sporadic clashes continued in border areas thereafter, and structural conflict factors such as trade, terrorism, and the status of Kashmir still remain. In particular, Indian Prime Minister Modi declared Pakistan's immediate response to terrorism as the 'new normal,' indicating that relations between the two countries remain tense.

Meanwhile, regarding the Gaza war, President Trump also attempted mediation efforts, promising an early end, but the war has entered a prolonged phase. President Trump vaguely mentioned a 'Gaza Resort' concept, where the US would directly manage and develop Gaza long-term and resettle Palestinian residents, but faced criticism for violating international law and accusations of ethnic cleansing. The Trump administration's stated intention was to induce the end of the war through disarmament, economic reconstruction, and infrastructure development, but no substantive content or results have been confirmed.

In this process, relations between Israel and the US gradually deteriorated, and the US role as a mediator in the Middle East was significantly weakened. The 'Gaza Resort' concept was evaluated as a pragmatic approach, while also being criticized as an unrealistic proposal reflecting the US's self-centered perspective. The overall situation in the Middle East remains at a stalemate without any significant breakthroughs, and the limitations of US diplomatic influence have become apparent.

Ultimately, the Trump administration's security strategy has the following limitations: First, it uses US national power to create crises or transitions to negotiations through coercive pressure to resolve conflicts, but this only results in short-term diplomatic achievements, potentially destabilizing the overall order. Second, during the negotiation process, core structural issues are relatively avoided, and negotiations remain confined to narrow and achievable agendas. Third, while the US plays a mediating role in the conflict itself, it shows a passive stance in providing support, guarantees, and enforcing sanctions to maintain the post-negotiation structure. This raises questions about the sustainability of the negotiation outcomes. Fourth, when the interests of US allies are critically involved in this process, support and commitment to the alliance are unclear. Focusing on short-term US interests or the goal of concluding negotiations means that the US inevitably becomes relatively indifferent to the process of readjusting the regional order it pursues with its allies in the long term. Fifth, President Trump gives the impression of pursuing domestic political interests rather than genuinely seeking to resolve international issues. This can weaken the credibility of the conflict resolution process and its outcomes.

II. Prospects and Conditions for Success of Future US-North Korea Summits

The Trump administration is striving to resolve conflicts in various regions quickly and reduce the scope for interventions that could deplete US resources. If conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia subside, various issues in East Asia may emerge prominently. As East Asia is a region where the US's greatest competitor, China, competes with the US, all issues in East Asia are more sensitive and linked to core US interests. The security situation on the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean relations, and the North Korean nuclear issue are not only important for the security of South Korea, a US ally, but ultimately, the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is inextricably linked to macro-level issues such as the adjustment of geopolitical interests between the US and China, and the preservation and maintenance of the global nuclear order.

Given President Trump's mediation efforts in conflicts to date, it is difficult to predict the future of a US-North Korea summit, which is highly likely to be held. Will the US-North Korea summit be held while fully considering the structural issues that led to the North Korean nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula, the issues determining North Korea's political status in Northeast Asian geopolitics, and the geopolitical issues arising from North Korea-China-Russia cooperation? Can it overcome existing limitations such as President Trump's domestic political interests, a broker-like approach that secures US benefits aligned with America First, an unconventional approach that does not significantly consider the interests of allies, and a negotiation style that pursues short-term agreement rather than confronting structural security issues?

Ultimately, a US-North Korea summit will pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea, but it is intertwined with various issues such as security guarantees for North Korea, military agreements between the two Koreas, lifting economic sanctions on North Korea and normalizing North Korea, establishing new relations between the international community and North Korea, and setting the direction of cooperation to ensure that North Korea-China-Russia cooperation does not pose a threat to regional security.

However, based on President Trump's policy style to date, it can be anticipated that an economic approach will be prominent, even with the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue in mind. The recent mineral agreement between the US and Ukraine has garnered attention as a new form of international partnership that encompasses security cooperation and strategic linkage, going beyond a simple economic transaction. This agreement is designed as an economic security guarantee model that links US investment, technology transfer, market access, and security cooperation frameworks while respecting Ukraine's sovereignty over its mineral resources. It is evaluated as a precedent that suggests a new direction for US foreign economic strategy in terms of supply chain reorganization, diversification of geopolitical risks, and strengthening the self-reliance of partner countries.

The possibility of applying such a model to negotiations with North Korea can be cautiously considered. Since coming to power, the Kim Jong Un regime has consistently emphasized economic development and improvement of residents' livelihoods as major national goals, and policy attempts to earn foreign currency and attract investment have continued. In this context, international investment in North Korea's mineral resources, development of the Wonsan-Kumgangsan International Tourist Zone, infrastructure construction, and establishment of industrial complexes can serve as meaningful economic incentives on the negotiation table. In fact, North Korea has participated in economic cooperation projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Kumgangsan tourism in the past, and has presented the development of the tourism industry, including the Masikryong Ski Resort and Wonsan Tourist Zone, as national agendas. The Kim Jong Un regime, while advocating for resident welfare, has also shown an aspect of opening up to the outside economy through attracting foreign capital and tourists. These precedents suggest that economic incentives may partially align with North Korea's strategic interests.

For economic approaches such as tourism zone development or mineral agreements to yield substantial results, several preconditions are required. First, international sanctions must be eased to some extent, or at least exceptions for economic cooperation projects must be made. Second, institutional mechanisms must be established to ensure the safety of external investors and the possibility of capital recovery. Third, international agreements or multilateral frameworks must be established to enhance the transparency and monitorability of project operations.

Various challenges also exist. The most significant is the issue of security guarantees. In negotiations with Ukraine, the US proposed the concept of economic security guarantees, but this was not reflected in the final agreement. It remains uncertain whether active economic activities by US companies in North Korea can fully resolve North Korea's security threats. Furthermore, there is a possibility of conflict between active economic activities by external entities and the North Korean regime. Following the failure of the Hanoi summit, North Korea has advocated for the strongest possible response to the US and has focused on acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities that can threaten the US mainland. Perhaps the current goal of North Korea is to fully secure its military deterrence capability by possessing a complete second-strike capability. Even if a US-North Korea summit is held, if there is no commensurate compensation for these efforts, the possibility of reaching an agreement is projected to be low. Moreover, given the possibility of continuous transfer of military technology from Russia and certain levels of economic support from China and Russia, it remains questionable whether North Korea will perceive the conclusion of US-North Korea negotiations as a matter of existential importance.

Additionally, North Korea may perceive external monitoring, control, and conditional restrictions on the use of funds as a threat to its regime and interpret them as infringements on its sovereignty. Therefore, the feasibility of an economic approach will inevitably be influenced by a complex interplay of factors including the sanctions regime, political trust, and institutional transparency.

III. Repercussions of Negotiation Failure and South Korea's Response

While a US-North Korea summit could create a starting point for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea-related problems, another failure would have even more severe repercussions. Above all, skepticism about North Korea's denuclearization will be further strengthened. North Korea is also likely to blame the US for the breakdown of negotiations and use it as an opportunity to seek international recognition of its status as a nuclear-armed state. Subsequently, North Korea is likely to further advance its nuclear weapon-related technologies and make greater efforts to receive advanced technology transfers from Russia.

Second, if North Korea conducts additional nuclear tests or continues high-intensity provocations such as ICBM test launches, military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia are likely to escalate. North Korea is likely to move towards securing complete deterrence by possessing nuclear weapon capabilities that can strike the US mainland and a second-strike capability.

Third, if negotiations fail, cracks are likely to appear in the international cooperation system for North Korean denuclearization. North Korea will seek recognition as a nuclear-armed state from China and Russia, and China and Russia are likely to criticize the efforts of neighboring countries like South Korea and the US in the context of negotiation failure. This would relatively weaken US influence over North Korea, and the sanctions against North Korea centered around the United Nations could also face a severe test.

Fourth, if close cooperation and agreement on a future vision between South Korea and the US are not achieved during the US-North Korea summit process, the ROK-US alliance could also be damaged regarding North Korean denuclearization and Korean Peninsula security. Close cooperation between South Korea and the US is necessary for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and for the future of North Korea-related issues. However, if the US role is limited to short-term, issue-specific mediation during the negotiation process, ROK-US relations could be harmed.

Finally, if US-North Korea negotiations fail and the North Korean nuclear issue does not progress, it could become entrenched as a structural security problem on the Korean Peninsula. The possibility of inter-Korean relations, a peace regime, and further unification will diminish. Cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan may be strengthened to prepare for North Korean provocations, and military cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia may also be intensified. If security bloc confrontation and an arms race accelerate, the possibility of peace will further diminish.

The strategic challenges for South Korea to prepare for such a situation are clear. First, it is necessary to agree on a roadmap for the North Korean nuclear issue through close cooperation with the United States. President Trump may seek to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through the role of a broker, as in other matters. The possibility that he may focus on the success of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue rather than cooperation with allies cannot be ignored. Efforts should be made to maximize cooperation between South Korea and the US on the broader issue of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, rather than just the specific issue of North Korean nuclear weapons. While the success of US-North Korea negotiations is certainly important, the North Korean nuclear issue must be approached from a longer-term perspective. The Trump administration may adopt a short-term approach in terms of conflict mediation, and preparations for this are necessary.

Above all, it is necessary to maintain a military deterrence system against North Korea. Especially as various alliance reorganization tasks, such as the flexibility of US Forces Korea and changes in the North Korean deterrence system, emerge amidst US-China strategic competition, South Korea's next government must make maximum efforts to ensure that deterrence against North Korea is not weakened. ■

■ Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies; Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

■ Managed and Edited by:Kim Chae-rin, EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr