[Global NK Commentary] The Art of the Deal vs. Structural Crisis: Trump-Style Negotiations and the Future of North Korean Denuclearization

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I. The Evolution and Limitations of Trump's Mediation Style

From his presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to bring an early end to conflicts worldwide. This was pursued as a measure to reduce the loss of national strength and economic burden resulting from U.S. foreign intervention, aiming to restore the economic foundation of hegemony. The issue is that this U.S. restraint strategy is still being pursued under the goal of maintaining U.S. global leadership. The key question is whether the U.S. can maintain its role while preserving its influence and preventing deterrence failures.

During his first 100 days in office, President Trump made efforts to resolve various conflicts. In a speech delivered in Saudi Arabia during his Middle East tour in May, President Trump emphasized achievements in concluding major negotiations in foreign relations since his inauguration, while also mentioning domestic political and economic situations. The U.S. pursued negotiations to resolve various conflicts in regions such as Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia, and similar negotiations are expected to unfold in the future regarding U.S.-China relations and the Korean Peninsula.

President Trump maintains a diplomatic stance of highlighting himself as a 'crisis solver' by directly or indirectly intervening in issues in various parts of the world, including the Yemen conflict, the India-Pakistan issue, Iran, Syria, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, it is believed that this reflects an intention to enhance domestic political support by making diplomatic achievements visible early through negotiations.

As the global hegemonic power, the U.S. has led military and diplomatic policies on a global scale and has played various roles in intervening in different regions. These interventions have taken various forms according to strategic objectives for maintaining international order and regional stability, and can be broadly categorized into four types: stabilizer, balancer, mediator, and broker.

First, the role of a stabilizer refers to the U.S.'s efforts to maintain a rules-based international order and ensure peace and predictability at regional and global levels by preventing conflicts and crises. As a stabilizer, the U.S. focuses on maintaining the integrity of the order through institutional mechanisms and promoting balance and stability throughout the system. This corresponds to the most traditional form of global leadership and contributes to building trust in U.S. leadership and establishing an institutional foundation in the international community.

Second, the role of a balancer refers to interventions aimed at maintaining a balance of power in a particular region to prevent any single power from becoming hegemonic or from influence becoming concentrated. The goal is to prevent imbalances of power among regional countries from escalating into conflict and to maintain structural stability. As a balancer, the U.S. focuses on coordinating and alleviating conflicts, promoting cooperation, and engaging in multilateral coordination to enhance common interests.

Third, a mediator plays the role of a facilitator who leads negotiations and compromises between parties in a region where conflict or disputes have occurred. A mediator, based on clear neutrality, is deeply involved in building trust and forming agreements between parties and values the maintenance of long-term and sustainable relationships. The intervention of a mediator is considered a model of diplomatic engagement that prioritizes international peace and cooperation over direct national interests.

Fourth, a broker acts as an intermediary for information, resources, and cooperation opportunities between countries or groups that lack direct interests or institutional connections. A broker contributes to filling structural gaps within a network and creating arenas for interaction, but in this process, prioritizes short-term practicality and national strategic interests over neutrality and public good. This often manifests as brokering deals based on expertise in specific fields and pursuing short-term gains.

Thus, the U.S. has not acted as a singular hegemonic power but has performed various diplomatic strategies and roles depending on different geopolitical contexts and interests. Each role is not mutually exclusive but can overlap or be mixed depending on the time and region. As a global hegemonic power, the U.S. has pursued roles as a stabilizer and balancer, aiming to foster structural and long-term stability in various regions. However, under the Trump administration, U.S. strategy has shown a tendency to shift towards the roles of mediator or broker.

President Trump has attempted diplomatic maneuvers in major issues such as Yemen, Iran, and Syria by combining military pressure with limited negotiations. In this context, he has focused more on the role of a broker, pursuing efforts for short-term conflict resolution. Firstly, the negotiation with the Houthi rebels in Yemen is a representative case. In March 2025, President Trump ordered strong military strikes against the Houthis with the goal of achieving tangible results within a month. The U.S. airstrikes inflicted some damage, but failed to deliver a decisive blow as the Houthis' military capabilities, concealment abilities, and air defense systems remained intact. On May 6, President Trump announced that the Houthis had promised to cease attacking ships in the Red Sea, describing it as a 'surrender,' and that the U.S. would also halt its attacks. This led to a conditional agreement for mutual cessation of attacks. However, the Houthis stated they would continue missile and drone attacks on Israel and declared they had defeated the U.S. Consequently, while temporary security for Red Sea shipping was secured, efforts to weaken the Houthis' capabilities or achieve medium-to-long-term regional stability failed.

Similarly, nuclear negotiations with Iran have essentially resulted in limited agreements. In April 2025, the Trump administration resumed nuclear negotiations with Iran after approximately seven years, but a comprehensive agreement was not reached. The U.S. initiated negotiations to prevent Iran's development of nuclear weapons, but Iran maintained its position to continue enriching uranium for civilian purposes and expressed its intention not to cease support for pro-Iranian forces in the region. Consequently, instead of a comprehensive framework like the past Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), there is a high possibility of a short-term, limited exchange involving the temporary freezing of the nuclear program and partial easing of U.S. sanctions. Iran views uranium enrichment and regional influence as strategic leverage and has no intention of making concessions, while complex variables such as Israel's military pressure and the possibility of reimposing international sanctions intersect.

Meanwhile, regarding the Syrian issue, President Trump announced his intention to lift U.S. sanctions as the civil war ends and began full-fledged negotiations. In May 2025, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump announced the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions on Syria, and the two countries embarked on the process of normalizing relations. In this process, Syria proposed economic cooperation including development of natural resources, mineral agreements, oil supply, and participation in reconstruction projects, to which the U.S. responded by accepting them in exchange for lifting sanctions. This agreement, reached without sufficient discussion on human rights issues or accountability during the civil war, may face criticism for being a negotiation focused on short-term exchange of benefits. Ultimately, the Trump administration's Middle East diplomacy has generally employed a strategy of using coercive means to achieve short-term results through limited concessions, which can be assessed as an approach focused on visible diplomatic achievements rather than institutional peace or sustainable cooperation.

On April 22, 2025, an armed terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir rapidly escalated into armed conflict between India and Pakistan. The two sides went beyond mere localized clashes to exchange missile attacks, creating a critical situation where the possibility of nuclear war was discussed, given that both countries are nuclear powers. In its initial response, President Trump maintained an observing stance, stating that the issue was a regional conflict unrelated to the U.S. However, as the situation escalated with Pakistan officially mentioning the possibility of using nuclear weapons, President Trump decided to intervene diplomatically. As a result of U.S. mediation efforts, India and Pakistan agreed to an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, and President Trump self-praised the outcome as a result of U.S. diplomatic mediation.

Pakistan officially expressed its gratitude for the U.S. mediation in this regard. However, India maintained its position that the agreement was reached through direct dialogue between the two countries, downplaying the role of U.S. intervention. Sporadic clashes continued in the border areas thereafter, and structural conflict factors such as trade, terrorism, and the status of Kashmir remain. In particular, with Indian Prime Minister Modi declaring an immediate response to Pakistani terrorism as the 'new normal,' relations between the two countries remain tense.

Meanwhile, regarding the Gaza War, President Trump also attempted mediation efforts, promising an early end to the conflict, but the war has entered a prolonged phase. President Trump alluded to a plan for direct, long-term U.S. management and development of Gaza, with the relocation of Palestinian residents – the so-called 'Gaza Resort' concept – but faced criticism for violating international law and accusations of ethnic cleansing.

During this process, relations between Israel and the U.S. gradually deteriorated, and the U.S.'s role as a mediator in the Middle East was significantly weakened. The 'Gaza Resort' concept was evaluated as a pragmatic approach on one hand, and criticized as an unrealistic proposal reflecting the U.S.'s self-centered perspective on the other. The situation in the broader Middle East remains in a stalemate without any significant breakthroughs, and the limitations of U.S. diplomatic influence have become apparent.

Ultimately, the Trump administration's security strategy has the following limitations: First, it uses U.S. national power to create crises or use coercive pressure to transition to negotiations and resolve conflicts, but this results only in short-term diplomatic achievements, potentially destabilizing the overall order. Second, during the negotiation process, core and structural issues are relatively avoided, remaining confined to narrow and solvable agendas. Third, while the U.S. plays a mediating role in the conflict itself, it shows a passive stance in subsequent support, guarantees, and enforcement of sanctions to maintain such structures. This raises questions about the sustainability of negotiated outcomes. Fourth, in this process, when the interests of U.S. allies are crucially involved, there is a lack of clear support and commitment to the alliance. Focusing on short-term U.S. interests or the objective of concluding negotiations inevitably leads to relative indifference towards the process of readjusting regional order that the U.S. should pursue with its allies in the long term. Fifth, President Trump gives the impression of pursuing domestic political interests rather than seeking to resolve international issues themselves. This can weaken the credibility of conflict resolution processes and outcomes.

II. Prospects for Future North Korea-U.S. Summits and Conditions for Success

The Trump administration is striving to resolve conflicts in various regions of the world quickly and reduce the scope for intervention that could consume U.S. resources. If conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia subside, various issues in East Asia may emerge in earnest. As East Asia is a region where the U.S.'s greatest competitor, China, competes with the U.S., all issues in East Asia are more sensitive and are linked to U.S. core interests. The security situation on the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean relations, and the North Korean nuclear issue are not only important for the security of South Korea, a U.S. ally, but ultimately, in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, geopolitical interests between the U.S. and China and the preservation and maintenance of the global nuclear order are inevitably linked.

Given President Trump's mediation efforts thus far, it is difficult to predict the future of North Korea-U.S. summits, which are highly likely to be held. Will North Korea-U.S. summits be held while fully considering the structural issues that led to the North Korean nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula, the issues determining North Korea's political status in Northeast Asian international politics, and the international political issues caused by North Korea-China-Russia cooperation? Can these existing limitations be overcome, such as President Trump's pursuit of personal political gain, a broker-like approach focused on U.S. self-interest, an unconventional approach that disregards allied interests, and a negotiation style that prioritizes short-term agreement over confronting structural security issues?

Ultimately, North Korea-U.S. summits will pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea, but various issues are intertwined, including security guarantees for North Korea, military agreements between the two Koreas, the lifting of economic sanctions on North Korea and North Korea's normalization, the establishment of new relations between the international community and North Korea, and the direction of cooperation to ensure that North Korea-China-Russia cooperation does not pose a threat to regional security.

However, based on President Trump's policy style to date, it is possible to predict that an economic approach will be prominent, even with the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue in mind. The recent mineral agreement between the U.S. and Ukraine has garnered attention as a new form of international partnership, encompassing security cooperation and strategic linkage beyond mere economic transactions. This agreement is designed as an economic security guarantee model that links U.S. investment, technology transfer, market access, and security cooperation mechanisms while respecting Ukraine's sovereignty over its mineral resources. It is evaluated as a precedent that suggests a new direction for U.S. foreign economic strategy in terms of supply chain reorganization, diversification of geopolitical risks, and strengthening partner countries' self-reliance capabilities.

The possibility of applying such a model theoretically to negotiations with North Korea can be cautiously considered. Since coming to power, the Kim Jong-un regime has consistently emphasized economic development and improvement of residents' livelihoods as major national goals, and has continued policy efforts to earn foreign currency and attract investment. In this context, international investment in North Korea's mineral resources, development of the Wonsan-Mt. Kumgang International Tourist Zone, infrastructure construction, and industrial park development can serve as meaningful economic incentives to be placed on the negotiating table. Indeed, North Korea has participated in economic cooperation projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Kumgang tourism in the past, and has presented the development of the tourism industry, including the Masikryong Ski Resort and the Wonsan tourist area, as a national agenda. The Kim Jong-un administration, while promoting resident welfare, has also shown an aspect of opening up to the external economy through attracting foreign capital and tourists. These precedents suggest that economic incentives may partially align with North Korea's strategic interests.

For economic approaches such as the development of tourist zones or mineral agreements to yield tangible results, several preconditions are required. First, international sanctions must be partially eased, or at least exceptions for economic cooperation projects must be provided. Second, institutional mechanisms must be established to ensure the safety of external investors and the possibility of capital repatriation. Third, international agreements or multilateral frameworks must be established to enhance the transparency and monitorability of project operations.

Various challenges also exist. Above all, there is the issue of security guarantees. In negotiations with Ukraine, the U.S. presented the concept of economic security, but it was not reflected in the final agreement. It remains uncertain whether active economic activities by U.S. companies in North Korea can completely resolve the security threats perceived by North Korea. Furthermore, there is a possibility of conflict between the active economic activities of external entities and the North Korean regime. Following the failure of the Hanoi summit, North Korea has advocated for the strongest possible response against the U.S. and has focused on developing nuclear weapons capabilities that can threaten the U.S. mainland. It is likely that North Korea's goal to date has been to fully possess a second-strike capability and secure complete military deterrence. Even if North Korea-U.S. summits are held, the possibility of reaching an agreement is not high if there is no corresponding compensation for these efforts. Moreover, given the possibility of continuous transfer of military technology from Russia and potential economic support from China and Russia, it remains questionable whether North Korea will perceive the conclusion of North Korea-U.S. negotiations as a matter of survival.

Furthermore, North Korea considers external surveillance, control, and conditional restrictions on the use of funds as threats to its regime, which can be interpreted as infringements of its sovereignty. Therefore, the feasibility of an economic approach is inevitably influenced by complex factors such as the sanctions regime, political trust, and institutional transparency.

III. Ripple Effects of Negotiation Failure and South Korea's Response

While North Korea-U.S. summits could create a starting point for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea-related problems, a repeat failure would have even more dire consequences. Above all, skepticism about North Korea's denuclearization will be further strengthened. North Korea is also likely to shift the blame for the breakdown of negotiations to the U.S. and use it as an opportunity to gain international recognition for its status as a nuclear power. Subsequently, North Korea is likely to further enhance its nuclear weapons-related technology and strive more to receive advanced technology transfers from Russia.

Second, if North Korea continues high-intensity provocations such as additional nuclear tests or ICBM test launches, military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia are likely to escalate. North Korea is likely to move towards securing complete deterrence by possessing nuclear weapons capabilities that can target the U.S. mainland and a second-strike capability.

Third, if negotiations break down, it is highly probable that cracks will appear in the international cooperation system for North Korean denuclearization. North Korea will seek to be recognized as a nuclear power by China and Russia, and China and Russia are also likely to criticize the efforts of neighboring countries such as South Korea and the U.S. in the context of failed negotiations. This would relatively weaken U.S. influence over North Korea, and the sanctions against North Korea, centered around the United Nations, could face a severe test.

Fourth, if close cooperation and agreement on a future vision between South Korea and the U.S. are not achieved during the North Korea-U.S. summit process, the ROK-U.S. alliance regarding the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and Korean Peninsula security could also be damaged. Close cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. is necessary for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and the future of the North Korean problem. However, if the U.S. role is limited to short-term, issue-specific mediation during the negotiation process, ROK-U.S. relations could be negatively impacted.

Finally, if North Korea-U.S. negotiations fail and no progress is made on the North Korean nuclear issue, it could become entrenched as a structural security problem on the Korean Peninsula. The possibility of inter-Korean relations, a peace regime, and furthermore, unification, will further diminish. Cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan may be strengthened to prepare for North Korean provocations, and military cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia may also intensify. If security-based bloc confrontation and an arms race accelerate, the possibility of peace will further diminish.

South Korea's strategic challenges to prepare for such a situation are clear. First, it is necessary to agree on a roadmap for the North Korean nuclear issue through close cooperation with the U.S. President Trump may seek to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through the role of a broker, as in other matters. The possibility that he may focus on the success of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue rather than cooperation with allies cannot be ignored. Efforts should be made to promote cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. on the broader North Korean issue and the entire Korean Peninsula issue, rather than just the narrow North Korean nuclear issue. While the success of North Korea-U.S. negotiations is certainly important, the North Korean nuclear issue must be approached from a longer-term perspective. The Trump administration may adopt a short-term approach in terms of conflict mediation, so preparations for this are also necessary.

Most importantly, it is necessary to maintain a military deterrence system against North Korea. In particular, given the various alliance realignment tasks arising from the U.S.-China strategic competition, such as the flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea and changes in the North Korean deterrence system, South Korea's next government must make maximum efforts to ensure that deterrence against North Korea is not weakened. ■

■ Jeon Jae-sungDirector, EAI Center for National Security Studies; Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

■ Edited by:Kim Chaerin, EAI 연구보조원

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr