[Global NK Commentary] The Art of the Deal vs. Structural Crisis: Trump-style Negotiations and the Future of North Korean Denuclearization

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I. The Evolution and Limitations of Trump's Mediation Style

From his presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to end conflicts worldwide early. This was a measure to reduce the drain on national strength and economic burden caused by US intervention abroad, pursuing the goal of restoring the economic foundation of hegemony. The issue is that this US restraint strategy is still being pursued under the objective of maintaining US global leadership. The key question is whether the US can maintain its role while preserving its global leadership and preventing deterrence failure.

During his first 100 days in office, President Trump made efforts to end various conflicts. In his speech in Saudi Arabia during his Middle East tour in May, President Trump mentioned the domestic political and economic situation of the United States while emphasizing the achievements of concluding major negotiations in foreign relations since his inauguration. The US has pursued negotiations to end various conflicts in regions such as Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia, and similar negotiations are expected to unfold in the future regarding US-China relations and the Korean Peninsula.

President Trump maintains a diplomatic stance of highlighting himself as a 'crisis solver' by directly or indirectly intervening in issues worldwide, including Yemen, India-Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the war in Ukraine. In particular, it is believed that this reflects an intention to enhance domestic political support by making diplomatic achievements visible early through negotiations.

As the world's hegemonic power, the United States has led global military and diplomatic policies and has played various roles when intervening in different regions. These interventions have taken various forms according to strategic objectives for international order and regional stability, which can be broadly categorized into four types: the role of stabilizer, balancer, mediator, and broker.

First, the role of a stabilizer refers to the US's efforts to maintain a rules-based international order and ensure peace and predictability at regional and global levels by preventing conflicts and crises. As a stabilizer, the US focuses on maintaining the integrity of the order through institutional mechanisms and promoting balance and stability throughout the system. This corresponds to the most traditional form of global leadership and contributes to building trust and an institutional foundation for US leadership in the international community.

Second, the role of a balancer refers to interventions aimed at maintaining a balance of power in a specific region to prevent any single power from becoming hegemonic or influence from becoming concentrated. Its goal is to prevent imbalances of power among regional states from escalating into conflict and to maintain structural stability. As a balancer, the US focuses on coordinating and mitigating conflicts, promoting cooperation, and multilateral coordination to increase mutual interests.

Third, a mediator plays the role of a coordinator who facilitates negotiations and compromises between parties in a region experiencing conflict or dispute. A mediator, based on clear neutrality, is deeply involved in building trust and forming agreements between the parties and values the maintenance of long-term and sustainable relationships. The intervention of a mediator is considered a model of diplomatic engagement that prioritizes international peace and cooperation over direct national interests.

Fourth, a broker plays the role of intermediating information, resources, and opportunities for cooperation between countries or groups that lack direct interests or institutional connections. A broker contributes to filling structural gaps within a network and creating arenas for interaction, but in this process, prioritizes short-term practicality and national strategic interests over neutrality and public interest. It often manifests as closing deals based on expertise in specific fields and pursuing short-term gains.

Thus, the United States has not acted as a single hegemonic power but has performed various diplomatic strategies and roles depending on different international political contexts and interests. Each role is not mutually exclusive but can overlap or be mixed depending on the time and region. As a global hegemonic power, the US has pursued the roles of stabilizer and balancer, aiming to promote structural and long-term stability in various regions. However, under the Trump administration, US strategy appears to be gradually shifting towards the roles of mediator or broker.

In key issues such as Yemen, Iran, and Syria, President Trump has attempted to conduct diplomacy by combining military pressure with limited negotiations. In this context, the US has focused more on the role of a broker, pursuing efforts for short-term conflict resolution. First, negotiations with the Houthi rebels in Yemen are a representative example. In March 2025, President Trump ordered strong military strikes against the Houthis with the goal of achieving visible results within a month. Consequently, US airstrikes inflicted some damage, but the Houthis' military capabilities, concealment abilities, and air defense systems remained intact, failing to deliver a decisive blow. On May 6, President Trump announced that the Houthis had promised to stop attacking ships in the Red Sea, defining it as a 'surrender,' and that the US would also cease its attacks. Through these measures, both sides reached a conditional agreement to cease mutual attacks. However, the Houthis stated they would continue missile and drone attacks on Israel and declared they had defeated the US. As a result, while temporary safety for Red Sea shipping was secured, it failed to weaken the Houthis' capabilities or achieve medium- to long-term regional stability.

The nuclear negotiations with Iran are also essentially limited to an agreement. In April 2025, the Trump administration resumed nuclear negotiations with Iran after approximately seven years, but a comprehensive agreement was not reached. The US initiated negotiations to prevent Iran's development of nuclear weapons, but Iran maintained its position of continuing civilian uranium enrichment and expressed its intention not to cease support for pro-Iranian forces in the region. Consequently, instead of a comprehensive framework like the past Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), there is a high possibility of a short-term, limited exchange involving a temporary freeze of the nuclear program and partial easing of US sanctions. Iran views uranium enrichment and regional influence as strategic leverage and has no intention of yielding, and complex variables such as Israel's military pressure and the possibility of restoring international sanctions are still intersecting.

Meanwhile, regarding the Syrian issue, President Trump announced his intention to lift US sanctions as the civil war ended and began full-scale negotiations. In May 2025, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump announced the lifting of US economic sanctions on Syria, and the two countries began the process of normalizing relations. In this process, Syria proposed economic cooperation, including development of natural resources, mineral agreements, oil supply, and participation in reconstruction projects, and the US responded by accepting these proposals in exchange for lifting sanctions. This agreement, made without sufficient discussion of human rights issues or accountability during the civil war, is likely to be criticized as a negotiation focused on short-term exchange of benefits. Ultimately, the Trump administration's Middle East diplomacy has generally employed a strategy of using coercive means to achieve short-term results through limited concessions, which can be assessed as an approach focused on visible diplomatic achievements rather than institutional peace or sustainable cooperation.

On April 22, 2025, a terrorist shooting incident in Indian-administered Kashmir rapidly escalated into armed conflict between India and Pakistan. The two sides went beyond mere localized skirmishes to exchanging missile attacks, and given that both are nuclear-armed states, the situation escalated into a critical crisis where the possibility of nuclear war was discussed. In its initial response, President Trump maintained a wait-and-see attitude, stating that the issue was a regional conflict unrelated to the United States. However, as the situation intensified with Pakistan officially mentioning the possibility of using nuclear weapons, President Trump decided to intervene diplomatically. As a result of US mediation efforts, India and Pakistan agreed to an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, and President Trump praised the outcome as a result of US diplomatic mediation.

Pakistan officially expressed its gratitude for the US mediation in this regard, but India maintained that the agreement was reached through direct dialogue between the two countries, downplaying the role of US intervention. Sporadic clashes continued in the border areas thereafter, and structural conflict factors such as trade, terrorism, and the status of Kashmir still remain. In particular, Indian Prime Minister Modi declared immediate responses to Pakistani terrorism as the 'new normal,' indicating that relations between the two countries remain tense.

Meanwhile, President Trump also attempted mediation efforts for the Gaza war, promising an early end, but the war has entered a prolonged phase. President Trump vaguely mentioned a plan for the US to directly manage and develop Gaza long-term and resettle the Palestinian population, a so-called 'Gaza Resort' concept, but faced criticism for violating international law and accusations of ethnic cleansing. The Trump administration's stance was to induce an end to the war through disarmament, economic reconstruction, and infrastructure development, but no substantial content or results have been confirmed.

During this process, relations between Israel and the United States gradually deteriorated, and the US role as a mediator in the Middle East was significantly weakened. The 'Gaza Resort' concept was evaluated as a pragmatic approach, but at the same time, it was criticized as an unrealistic proposal reflecting the US's self-centered perspective. The overall situation in the Middle East remains deadlocked without any significant breakthroughs, and the limitations of US diplomatic influence are considered to have been revealed.

Ultimately, the Trump administration's security strategy has the following limitations: First, it uses US national strength to create crises or transitions to negotiations through coercive pressure to resolve conflicts, but this only results in short-term diplomatic achievements, and the overall order may become more unstable. Second, during the negotiation process, core and structural issues are relatively avoided, and the focus remains on narrow and negotiable agendas. Third, while the US plays a mediating role in the conflict itself, it shows a passive attitude towards supporting and guaranteeing the maintenance of such structures after negotiations, and enforcing sanctions. This raises questions about the sustainability of the negotiated outcomes. Fourth, when the interests of US allies are critically involved in this process, support and commitment to alliances are not clear. If the focus is on short-term US interests or the goal of concluding negotiations, it is inevitable that the US will be relatively indifferent to the process of readjusting the regional order that it pursues with its allies in the long term. Fifth, President Trump gives the impression of pursuing domestic political interests rather than resolving international issues. This can weaken the credibility of the conflict resolution process and its outcomes.

II. Prospects and Conditions for Success of Future US-North Korea Summits

The Trump administration is striving to resolve conflicts in various regions of the world quickly and reduce the scope for intervention that could consume US resources. As conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia subside, various issues in East Asia may come to the forefront. As this is a region where China, the US's greatest competitor, competes with the US, all issues in East Asia are more sensitive and linked to core US interests. The security situation on the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean relations, and the North Korean nuclear issue are not only important for the security of South Korea, a US ally, but ultimately, the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is inevitably linked to macro-level issues such as the adjustment of geopolitical interests between the US and China, and the preservation and maintenance of the global nuclear order.

Given President Trump's conflict mediation efforts to date, it is difficult to predict the future of a US-North Korea summit, which is highly likely to be held. Will the US-North Korea summit be held while fully considering the structural issues that led to the North Korean nuclear problem, the issues determining North Korea's political status in Northeast Asian international politics, and the international political issues arising from North Korea-China-Russia cooperation? Can it overcome existing limitations such as President Trump's domestic political interests, a broker-like approach that secures US benefits in line with America First, an unconventional approach that does not significantly consider the interests of allies, and a negotiation style that pursues short-term agreement rather than confronting structural security issues?

Ultimately, a US-North Korea summit will pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea, but various issues are intertwined, including security guarantees for North Korea, military agreements between the two Koreas, the lifting of economic sanctions on North Korea and North Korea's normalization, the establishment of new relations between the international community and North Korea, and setting the direction of cooperation to ensure that North Korea-China-Russia cooperation does not pose a threat to regional security.

However, based on President Trump's policy style to date, it can be anticipated that an economic approach will be prominent, even with the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue in mind. The recent mineral agreement between the US and Ukraine has garnered attention as a new form of international partnership that encompasses security cooperation and strategic linkage, going beyond a simple economic transaction. This agreement is designed as an economic security guarantee model that links US investment, technology transfer, market access, and security cooperation frameworks while respecting Ukraine's sovereignty over its mineral resources. It is evaluated as a precedent that suggests a new direction for US foreign economic strategy in terms of supply chain reorganization, diversification of geopolitical risks, and strengthening the self-reliance of partner countries.

The possibility of applying such a model to negotiations with North Korea can be cautiously considered. Since coming to power, the Kim Jong-un regime has consistently emphasized economic development and improvement of residents' livelihoods as major national goals, and policy attempts to earn foreign currency and attract investment have continued. In this context, international investment in North Korea's mineral resources, development of the Wonsan-Kumgangsan International Tourist Zone, infrastructure construction, and establishment of industrial complexes can serve as meaningful economic incentives to be placed on the negotiating table. In fact, North Korea has participated in economic cooperation projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Kumgangsan tourism in the past, and has presented the development of the tourism industry, such as the Masikryong Ski Resort and the Wonsan Tourist Zone, as national agendas. The Kim Jong-un regime, while advocating for the welfare of its citizens, has also shown an aspect of opening up its economy to the outside world through attracting foreign capital and tourists. These precedents suggest that economic incentives may partially align with North Korea's strategic interests.

For economic approaches such as tourism zone development or mineral agreements to yield substantial results, several preconditions are required. First, international sanctions must be eased to some extent, or at least exceptions for economic cooperation projects must be provided. Second, institutional mechanisms must be established to ensure the safety of external investors and the possibility of capital recovery. Third, international agreements or multilateral frameworks must be established to enhance the transparency and monitorability of project operations.

Various challenges also exist. Above all, there is the issue of security guarantees. In negotiations with Ukraine, the US proposed the concept of economic security guarantees, but this was not reflected in the final agreement. Even if US companies actively engage in economic activities in North Korea, it remains uncertain whether this can fully resolve North Korea's security threats. Furthermore, there is a possibility of conflict between active economic activities by external entities and the North Korean regime. Since the failure of the Hanoi summit, North Korea has advocated for the strongest possible response to the US and has focused on acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities that can threaten the US mainland. Perhaps North Korea's goal to date has been to fully secure its military deterrence capability by possessing a second-strike capability. Even if a US-North Korea summit is held, if there is no corresponding compensation for these efforts, the possibility of reaching an agreement is unlikely. Moreover, given the possibility of continuous transfer of military technology from Russia and certain levels of economic support from China and Russia, it remains questionable whether North Korea will perceive the conclusion of US-North Korea negotiations as a matter of survival.

Furthermore, North Korea may perceive conditional restrictions on external monitoring, control, and the use of funds as a threat to its regime and interpret them as infringements on its sovereignty. Therefore, the feasibility of an economic approach is inevitably influenced by a complex interplay of factors such as the sanctions regime, political trust, and institutional transparency.

III. Ripple Effects of Negotiation Failure and South Korea's Response

While a US-North Korea summit could create a starting point for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea-related issues, another failure would have even more dire ripple effects. Above all, skepticism about North Korea's denuclearization will be further strengthened. North Korea is also likely to blame the US for the breakdown of negotiations and use it as an opportunity to solidify its status as a nuclear-armed state and seek international recognition. Subsequently, North Korea is likely to further advance its nuclear weapons-related technology and strive more to acquire advanced technology from Russia.

Second, if North Korea continues with high-intensity provocations such as additional nuclear tests or ICBM test launches, military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia are likely to escalate. North Korea is likely to move towards securing complete deterrence by ultimately possessing the capability to launch nuclear weapons attacks against the US mainland and a second-strike capability.

Third, if negotiations fail, cracks are likely to appear in the international cooperation system for North Korea's denuclearization. North Korea will seek to be recognized as a nuclear-armed state by China and Russia, and China and Russia are also likely to criticize the efforts of neighboring countries such as South Korea and the US in the event of a negotiation breakdown. This would relatively weaken US influence over North Korea, and the sanctions against North Korea, centered around the United Nations, could also face a serious test.

Fourth, if close cooperation and agreement on a future vision between South Korea and the US are not achieved during the US-North Korea summit process, the ROK-US alliance could also be damaged regarding North Korea's denuclearization and Korean Peninsula security. Close cooperation between South Korea and the US is necessary for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and the future of North Korea-related issues. However, if the US role is limited to short-term, issue-specific mediation during the negotiation process, ROK-US relations could be harmed.

Finally, if US-North Korea negotiations fail and the North Korean nuclear issue does not progress, it could become entrenched as a structural security problem on the Korean Peninsula. The possibility of inter-Korean relations, a peace regime, and ultimately unification will further diminish. ROK-US-Japan cooperation may be strengthened to prepare for North Korean provocations, and North Korea-China-Russia military cooperation may also be enhanced. If security bloc confrontation and an arms race accelerate, the possibility of peace will further decrease.

South Korea's strategic tasks to prepare for such a situation are clear. First, it is necessary to agree on a roadmap for the North Korean nuclear issue through close cooperation with the United States. President Trump may seek to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through the role of a broker, as in other matters. The possibility that he may focus on the success of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue rather than cooperation with allies cannot be ignored. Efforts should be made to maximize cooperation between South Korea and the US on the broader issue of North Korea and the entire Korean Peninsula, rather than just the specific issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons. While the success of US-North Korea negotiations is certainly important, the North Korean nuclear issue must be approached from a longer-term perspective. The Trump administration may adopt a short-term approach in terms of conflict mediation, so preparations for this are also necessary.

Above all, it is necessary to maintain a military deterrence system against North Korea. Especially as various alliance realignment tasks, such as the flexibility of US Forces Korea and changes in the North Korean deterrence system, emerge amidst the US-China strategic competition, the next South Korean government must make maximum efforts to ensure that deterrence against North Korea is not weakened. ■

■ Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies; Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

■ Managed and Edited by:Kim Chae-rin, EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr