[Global NK Commentary] A Diachronic Approach to the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly' Theory: From the Perspective of North Korea-China-Russia Geopolitics

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I. Background of the Emergence of the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly' Theory

In July 2023, at North Korea's Victory Day celebrations, Chairman Kim Jong-un received a letter from Chinese President Xi Jinping in a public setting observed by foreign dignitaries including Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. In September of the same year, Kim stated, "Our country's top priority is relations with Russia," hinting at a shift in the center of gravity of its foreign relations. In June 2024, the 'North Korea-Russia Treaty' was signed, to which China offered a rather principled response. In January of this year, Putin's New Year's greeting was prominently featured on the first and second pages of Rodong Sinmun, while Xi's greeting was placed on the third page.

In 2024, China also began to show a changed attitude through symbolic diplomatic measures. The commemorative footprint plaque of 'Kim Jong-un–Xi Jinping's Stroll (2018)' was removed, and the exhibition space commemorating the visits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to China, which was located nearby, was also closed. In May of the same year, China agreed to include the phrase 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' in the joint statement of the South Korea-China-Japan summit, to which North Korea strongly reacted, calling it interference in internal affairs. In July, immediately after the signing of the 'North Korea-Russia Treaty,' Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun's absence from North Korea's Victory Day celebrations was a diplomatic expression of the distance between North Korea and China.

Amidst this series of circumstances, the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly' theory emerged. Some analysts interpret this as North Korea expressing dissatisfaction with China's efforts to stabilize relations with the United States. They cite the existing so-called 'China Role Theory' and the attempts to manage US-China conflict observed at the APEC summit in November 2023, as well as the moves to restore US-China military channels between April and May 2024 as evidence. Meanwhile, some attribute the deterioration of North Korea-China relations to the signing of the 'North Korea-Russia Treaty.' They argue that this treaty, which increases the possibility of Russia's influence in the Korean Peninsula and dilutes China's influence over North Korea, conflicted with China's interests and has acted as a source of tension in recent North Korea-China relations.

However, these interpretations not only lack comprehensive explanatory power but also suffer from the limitation of hindering logical coherence in causality by mixing analytical layers of events and structures. For example, the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly' theory began to be observed in earnest at least a year before the signing of the 'North Korea-Russia Treaty,' raising questions about the claim that North Korea-Russia cooperation was the direct trigger for the conflict between North Korea and China. Furthermore, the fact that China prioritizes managing its relations with the US over North Korea is a phenomenon that has been consistently observed, and it is difficult to consider it a sufficient analytical framework to explain the recent series of developments.

Amidst overlapping prospects regarding the exit strategy for the Russia-Ukraine war and the possibility of resuming North Korea-US dialogue, distinguishing between signal and noise has become extremely difficult. In such times, efforts are required to clearly establish the hierarchy among variables. In other words, focusing solely on individual events to draw hasty conclusions, or treating structural factors and short-term events on the same level, can undermine the validity of the analysis. Therefore, this paper aims to complement the limitations of existing interpretations by diachronically examining North Korea-China-Russia relations with a focus on structural factors such as geopolitical context and great power international politics, thereby presenting a more consistent framework for understanding North Korea-China relations.

II. A Diachronic Review of North Korea-China-Russia Relations During the Cold War

For the decade following 1945, the primary country supporting North Korea economically and militarily was the Soviet Union, as it perceived the northeastern region of the Korean Peninsula as a potential bridgehead for expanding its sphere of influence. At the time, China also highly valued North Korea's strategic importance as a buffer zone to defend itself from foreign aggression, but it lacked the capacity to provide substantial military and economic support. This geopolitical perception of the Soviet Union and China was clearly demonstrated during the Korean War.

In early October 1950, Stalin urged Mao Zedong to intervene in the Korean War, but Mao demanded Soviet air support as a condition for China's participation. However, Stalin, concerned about the possibility of direct conflict with the United States and a potential escalation to nuclear war, proposed withdrawing North Korean forces to Manchuria (Shen 2020). This measure reflected a strategic calculation that North Korea might have to be ceded entirely to UN forces in the worst-case scenario. Despite this proposal, Mao ultimately decided to commit Chinese troops to the Korean Peninsula, given the uncertainty of Soviet air support. This event can be seen as a clear example of the divergence in geopolitical interests between the Soviet Union and China concerning the Korean Peninsula.

From Stalin's perspective, the Korean Peninsula was a useful geopolitical space for expanding Soviet influence, but not a region to be defended at the risk of nuclear war with the United States. Even if UN forces occupied all of North Korea, the Soviet Union's strategic focus was on Europe, and the Far East Siberia was a sparsely populated wasteland. In contrast, for China, North Korea was a strategically important buffer zone. Even after the Korean War armistice, China continued to provide sustained and comprehensive support to North Korea. During the post-war reconstruction, China mobilized a large number of troops to assist in rebuilding North Korea's infrastructure (Shen and Xia 2012) and provided $320 million to North Korea between 1954 and 1956, exceeding Soviet aid (CIA 1956).

From 1956 onwards, Khrushchev promoted the movement for collective leadership rather than a one-man dictatorship and adopted a line of peaceful coexistence. This was a line that neither Kim Il-sung nor Mao Zedong could accept. Consequently, around 1964, North Korea-Soviet relations and China-Soviet relations deteriorated to the point of mutual denunciation. In response to these policy changes by the Soviet Union, Kim Il-sung purged elements of the Yan'an faction and the Soviet faction, who were supported by the Soviet Union and China, in August 1956, and emphasized self-reliance from foreign powers. This indicated North Korea's intention not to allow foreign troops to be stationed in its territory, meaning the Soviet Union could not utilize North Korean territory for its expansionist purposes. Consequently, the Soviet Union significantly reduced its economic and military aid to North Korea. In contrast to the reduction in Soviet aid, China expanded its support to North Korea despite internal difficulties such as mass starvation resulting from the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Notably, from 1958 to 1964, China provided approximately 460 aircraft to North Korea. This was because, given China's internal hardships, the importance of North Korea as a buffer zone was further highlighted.

From 1965 to 1968, North Korea-China relations worsened, while North Korea-Soviet relations gradually improved. North Korea publicly criticized China's Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution, to which China strongly reacted. This mutual denunciation deepened ideological discrepancies between the two countries. However, a more decisive factor in the deterioration of North Korea-China relations was China's stance on supporting North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. At that time, the Soviet Union supported North Vietnam through Vladivostok, the Black Sea coast, and across China. Within China, there were differing opinions regarding the transit of Soviet military supplies through Chinese territory. The Mao Zedong faction opposed the transit of Soviet supplies through Chinese territory, while the Deng Xiaoping faction was inclined to accept it. This internal line struggle became one of the background factors for the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution (Radchenko 2024). The fundamental reason Mao Zedong was reluctant to allow Soviet military supplies to pass through Chinese territory, beyond the sensitivity of the issue itself, was his apprehension about the emergence of a strong, unified Vietnam in China's southern neighborhood.

This Chinese stance was perceived by Kim Il-sung as a potential threat that China could obstruct North Korea's reunification of the Korean Peninsula, deepening distrust towards China. It was against this backdrop that as the Sino-Soviet conflict escalated, North Korea-Soviet relations improved. Notably, the Soviet Union paid attention to North Korea's role as a strategic location, given its proximity to Beijing. Consequently, the Soviet Union strengthened its relations with North Korea by providing approximately 100 MiG-21 fighter jets.

Recognizing the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in 1969, Nixon, as part of his strategy to end the Vietnam War and contain the Soviet Union, pursued improved relations with China. This progress in US-China relations led the Soviet Union to recognize the need for improved relations with the United States, prompting the Soviet Union to propose détente with the US for strategic tension reduction. With the US accepting this proposal, US-Soviet détente began to be pursued following US-China détente. For both China and the Soviet Union, improved relations with the US meant a significant reduction in security threats, which diminished North Korea's geopolitical value as a buffer. Consequently, in the latter half of the 1970s, both China and the Soviet Union significantly reduced their economic and military aid to North Korea.

In the mid-1970s, after the end of the Vietnam War, Sino-Vietnamese relations rapidly deteriorated. This was driven by the Sino-Soviet competition for leadership within the Third World. The signing of the economic and military cooperation agreement between Vietnam and the Soviet Union in 1978 decisively provoked China. China considered this agreement a de facto military alliance. As Soviet-Vietnamese ties deepened, China feared that the Soviet Union was strategically encircling it. Consequently, China deemed it necessary to restore its strategic standing and 'correct' Vietnam's foreign policy by launching a military reprisal against Vietnam.

China ostensibly presented three justifications for the war. First, the Vietnamese government's unfair policies towards overseas Chinese and ethnic minorities within Vietnam. Second, Vietnam's full-scale invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, which ousted the Khmer Rouge regime supported by China. Third, Vietnam's occupation of parts of the Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands), claimed by China. Simultaneously, it harbored an intention to promote the modernization of the People's Liberation Army through this conflict. While all these factors were considered, the decisive factor was the perception of a geopolitical encirclement crisis. Domestically, Chinese media characterized the war as a 'defensive counterattack against Soviet proxies' (Zhang 2015).

The Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), which broke out against this backdrop, impressed upon North Korea the reality that China could resort to force against a smaller neighboring country. When Deng Xiaoping directly conveyed his intention to invade Vietnam to Kim Il-sung in 1979, the North Korean leadership felt a profound sense of betrayal. Through the Sino-Vietnamese War, North Korea confirmed that China could use force against even its long-standing allies for its own strategic interests. Furthermore, North Korea developed a sense of crisis that it could be sacrificed at any time according to China's strategic calculations, even if it were to 'unify' the Korean Peninsula. This led to structural distrust in North Korea's perception of China (Shin Jong-ho et al. 2020).

In fact, North Korea was encouraged by North Vietnam's victory over the United States and South Vietnam immediately after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975. During the Vietnam War, North Korea supported North Vietnam for strategic purposes, including ideological solidarity and the accumulation of combat experience. North Korea provided substantial military and economic aid, including at least one fighter squadron and two anti-aircraft artillery regiments (RFA 2024). In 1975, when Kim Il-sung met Mao Zedong, he presented his plan for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. However, Mao responded negatively (Wilson Center 1975).

US-Soviet détente ended in 1977 with the Soviet Union's precision missile strike tests and advancements in MIRV technology, and the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. During the Reagan administration, the US pursued a strategy of collapse aimed at overwhelming the Soviet Union. North Korea's geopolitical value to the Soviet Union was re-evaluated. In response, the Soviet Union provided 100 aircraft, including MiG-29s, MiG-23s, and Su-25s, to North Korea between 1984 and 1986 (CIA 1985). Meanwhile, US-China relations maintained a stable developmental trajectory. Consequently, North Korea's significance as a buffer zone for China diminished, and as a result, China did not consistently provide significant support to North Korea. As the Soviet Union weakened due to the US-Soviet confrontation from 1981 onwards, the US and the Soviet Union pursued détente again starting with the Geneva Summit in 1987. This again reduced North Korea's geopolitical value from the perspective of Soviet security. The Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. Therefore, from the late 1980s onwards, there was no significant support from either China or the Soviet Union to North Korea.

The changes in great power relations during the Cold War and the consequent fluctuations in North Korea's geopolitical value decisively influenced the provision and level of aid from China and the Soviet Union to North Korea, and this trend repeated itself. In particular, China and Russia provided limited military support, such as advanced weapons (by the standards of the time), to North Korea only when they perceived a significant threat to their own security. North Korea did not align itself with either China or the Soviet Union. Notably, the year 1979, when China militarily invaded Vietnam, a long-standing ally, ingrained distrust towards China. (It is also possible to interpret this event as the Soviet Union instigating conflict with Vietnam to deplete China's national strength.) Instead, North Korea closely observed changes in the strategic environment and maximized its role as a buffer zone between great powers to pursue strategic autonomy and survival.

III. Structural Stability and Constraints in North Korea-China-Russia Relations After the End of the Cold War

The key difference between the Cold War era and contemporary great power international politics is the shift of the US's primary competitor from the Soviet Union to China. The development of US-China relations since the late 1960s reduced North Korea's geopolitical value to China. However, as China emerged as the US's main competitor, the US established containing China as a consistent national strategy, thereby restoring North Korea's importance as a strategic buffer from China's perspective. However, in this process, North Korea chose nuclear armament based on its own strategic judgment, not at the behest of Russia or China. This also signifies that North Korea has further solidified its role as China's buffer. In contrast, Russia today has no reason or capacity to pursue power expansion in Northeast Asia or to engage in full-scale conflict with the United States. Consequently, paradoxically, aid from China and Russia to North Korea has been limited to preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime.

In particular, China cannot rule out the possibility of severe instability in its Northeast provinces if North Korea were to collapse rapidly, or the possibility of a 'unified Korean Peninsula' becoming strategically aligned with the United States. These possibilities are perceived as greater geopolitical risks than the current divided state of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, China prioritizes maintaining the status quo, with North Korea serving as a buffer zone. Furthermore, unlike the Soviet Union in the past, China's current power expansion does not necessarily require passing through North Korea. Considering these factors comprehensively, China is pursuing strategic balance encompassing the entire Korean Peninsula while maintaining a certain level of relations with South Korea. As a result, despite China's support being crucial for North Korea's survival from the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War to the present day, North Korea-China relations have maintained a certain distance. In essence, North Korea-China relations can be considered structurally stable, but at the same time, they have been in an environment where progress towards a close cooperative relationship is constrained. Under this structure, they can be seen as experiencing certain fluctuations.

The 'brinkmanship' employed by North Korea during its nuclear weapons development, and the attempts by both Koreas to unilaterally change the status quo during the Moon Jae-in administration, are noteworthy. When attempts that could be interpreted as North Korea or inter-Korean led 'status quo changes' occurred, China generally tended to temporarily increase its involvement and engagement with North Korea. This is because, from China's perspective of prioritizing the 'maintenance of the status quo' on the Korean Peninsula, changes led by North Korea or inter-Korean initiatives after the Cold War, regardless of their differing objectives, were perceived as 'anomalous.' However, the influence and driving force of current status quo-changing attempts originating from the Korean Peninsula appear to have significantly weakened compared to the past.

Following the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit, North Korea declared a 'new path' and (re)shifted its strategic direction. This can be interpreted as North Korea's recognition that the US's strategic goal was not to improve relations but rather to provoke deteriorating relations, thereby strengthening security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, and consequently reinforcing containment against China through a broader strategic design. In other words, North Korea reaffirmed that the relations among great powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula possess a very strong status quo-maintaining character. Accordingly, North Korea has resumed strengthening its 'independent diplomacy line' through the advancement of its nuclear capabilities, and concurrently, China's level of engagement has decreased. Therefore, the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly' theory can be seen as a phenomenon of 'structural regression,' where North Korea-China relations are returning to their original structure.

Another difference from the Cold War era is that current China-Russia relations are generally stable and friendly. This suggests that the possibility of conflicts between China and Russia directly impacting North Korea, as during the Cold War, is low. Of course, both North Korea and Russia are concerned about the deepening structural asymmetry with China, and there exists a space for strategic cooperation between North Korea and Russia stemming from these concerns. However, the more critical variable today is the complex and strategic calculations among great powers regarding the exit strategy for the Russia-Ukraine war. In this process, Russia is interpreted as intending to expand its strategic leverage by strengthening relations with North Korea, beyond simply securing operational support, and complicating the West's strategic calculations. North Korea also appears to be pursuing a long-term strategy of utilizing its closeness with Russia as a strategic lever to seek advantageous strategic space, while closely monitoring the direction and conclusion of the war, rather than limiting its cooperation with Russia to the acquisition of economic and military benefits.

This suggests that North Korea's attempts to expand its strategic space do not necessarily mean a resumption of North Korea-US dialogue. Prior to the Hanoi Summit, North Korea pursued a change in the status quo through normalization of relations with the United States. However, since the breakdown, it is highly likely that North Korea has shifted to a status quo-maintaining strategy that uses adversarial coexistence with the US as a driving force for domestic and external stability. Therefore, while the possibility of the recently proposed 'exchange of nuclear freeze for sanctions relief' or 'improvement of inter-Korean-US relations' cannot be entirely ruled out, it can be seen as involving a certain degree of logical leap. North Korea is judged to be considering a very long-term strategy in preparation for fundamental inflection points in US-China relations and the emergence of an alternative international order, rather than short-term progress in North Korea-US relations, and its prospects for actively engaging in dialogue with the US in the short to medium term are limited.

Paradoxically, this situation explains why China and Russia are inevitably cautious about transferring advanced military technology to North Korea. As long as China-Russia relations remain solid, the possibility of China and Russia falling into a significant security threat situation is low. Furthermore, excessive autonomy and leverage gained by North Korea through the transfer of advanced weapons could impose an additional burden of variable control on China, which is strategically confronting the US over the East and South China Seas and the Taiwan issue. Russia, while engaged in a large-scale war in western Eurasia, would find an increase in instability in the Far East an unbearable strategic burden. The possibility exists that both China and Russia may attempt to secure leverage in diplomatic negotiations through a 'staged closeness' with North Korea. However, even in such cases, they would likely avoid situations where North Korea's autonomous military actions or excessive leverage directly involve China and Russia. In conclusion, unless there is a structural change such as South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation crossing a structural turning point (singularity) and posing a significant security threat to China and Russia, or conversely, the decline of US power becomes evident and competition between China and Russia reignites, there appears to be little strategic incentive for China and Russia to transfer advanced weapon systems to North Korea.

IV. Implications for North Korea-China-Russia Dynamics and South Korea's Strategic Response

It is important to note that interpreting the North Korea-China relationship solely through a dichotomous framework of 'normal' or 'anomalous' based only on recent events can hinder strategic judgment. Similarly, a cautious approach is required when interpreting the closeness between North Korea and Russia as a structural alliance. While the possibility of some form of reciprocal benefit for the shells, ammunition, and personnel provided by North Korea to Russia exists, from a structural perspective, it cannot be ruled out that Russia may, depending on future strategic environmental changes, consider North Korea at a level comparable to Armenia around 2020. Continuous and precise analysis of North Korea-China-Russia relations, focusing on key variables such as great power international politics and geopolitical factors, is necessary.

South Korea must maintain cooperation with its existing allies while simultaneously exploring possibilities for strategic communication with China. In particular, considering China's structural tendency to prioritize stability on the Korean Peninsula, there is room to build and develop a basis for cooperation with China to a certain extent if South Korea proactively presents and actively pursues a clear plan for stable Korean Peninsula management. Russia, too, prior to the Russia-Ukraine war and the strengthening of South Korea's cooperation with NATO, had shown a tendency to value relations with South Korea in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, communication between the leaders and foreign ministers of the US and Russia is ongoing. This suggests that diplomatic space exists between South Korea and Russia in the process of seeking an exit strategy for the Russia-Ukraine war. South Korea also needs to secure diplomatic flexibility that aligns with the medium- to long-term strategic environment through contact with Russia. By pursuing these efforts in parallel, it will be possible to mitigate the increase in Korean Peninsula security risks caused by intensified strategic competition among great powers.

In conclusion, South Korea must avoid a short-sighted approach that defines the current distance in North Korea-China relations as a simple rift or perceives it as a temporary opportunity. The policy focus should be on strengthening independent diplomatic and security capabilities to coordinate and enhance our external leverage by analyzing the structural understanding of major powers within the long-term strategic environment and the dynamics between North Korea's strategic goals and its position in a balanced manner. ■

References

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CIA. 1985. "North Korea's Air Force: Impact of Soviet Deliveries." CIA-RDP86T00590R000400600002-4. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00590R000400600002-4.pdf.

Radchenko, Sergey. 2024. "The Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet Split." In The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War, ed. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, 529–548. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shen, Zhihua. 2020. "Revisiting Stalin's and Mao's Motivations in the Korean War." Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/revisiting-stalins-and-maos-motivations-korean-war?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

Shen, Zhihua and Yafeng Xia. 2012. "China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953–1961." NKIDP Working Paper No. 4. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/misc/NKIDP_Working_Paper_4_China_and_the_Postwar_Reconstruction_of_North_Korea.pdf.

Wilson Center Digital Archive. 1975. "Record Regarding Kim Il-Sung's Visit to Beijing, 18–26 April 1975." Wilson Center Digital Archive. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/record-regarding-kim-il-sungs-visit-beijing-18-26-april-1975?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

Zhang, Xiaoming. 2015. Deng Xiaoping's Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

■ Jeon Jae-wooSenior Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

■ Responsible Editor:Kim Chaerin, EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr