[EAI Commentary] A Diachronic Approach to the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly': From the Perspective of Geopolitics in North Korea-China-Russia Relations

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I. Background of the Emergence of the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly'

In July 2023, at North Korea's Victory Day celebrations, Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, received a personal letter from Chinese President Xi Jinping in a public setting observed by foreign dignitaries including Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. In September of the same year, Kim stated, "Our country's top priority is relations with Russia," making a remark that seemed to imply a shift in the center of gravity of foreign relations. In June 2024, the 'North Korea-Russia Treaty' was signed, and China offered a somewhat standard response. In January of this year, Putin's New Year's greeting was extensively featured on the first and second pages of Rodong Sinmun, while Xi Jinping's greeting was placed on the third page.

In 2024, China also began to show a changed attitude through symbolic diplomatic actions. The commemorative footprint plaque of 'Kim Jong Un–Xi Jinping Walk (2018)' was removed, and the exhibition space commemorating Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il's visits to China, located nearby, was also closed. In May of the same year, China agreed to include the phrase 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' in the joint statement of the South Korea-China-Japan summit, to which North Korea strongly reacted by calling it interference in internal affairs. Immediately after the signing of the 'North Korea-Russia Treaty' in July, Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun's absence from North Korea's Victory Day celebrations publicly signaled a distance between North Korea and China.

Amidst this series of events, the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly' was raised. Some analysts interpret this as North Korea expressing dissatisfaction with China's attempts to stabilize its relations with the United States. They cite the existing so-called 'China role theory' and China's efforts to manage conflict with the US at the APEC summit in November 2023, as well as the restoration of US-China military channels between April and May 2024, as grounds for this interpretation. Meanwhile, some suggest the signing of the 'North Korea-Russia Treaty' as the cause of the deterioration in North Korea-China relations. The argument is that the treaty, which increases the possibility of Russia's influence in the Korean Peninsula and dilutes China's influence in North Korea, conflicted with China's interests, acting as a source of tension in recent North Korea-China relations.

However, these interpretations not only lack comprehensive explanatory power but also have the limitation of hindering logical consistency in causality by conflating event-level and structural-level analysis. For example, the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly' began to be observed in earnest at least a year before the signing of the 'North Korea-Russia Treaty,' raising questions about the claim that North Korea-Russia cooperation was the direct trigger for the conflict between North Korea and China. Furthermore, the fact that China prioritizes managing relations with the US over North Korea has been a consistently observed phenomenon, making it difficult to consider it a sufficient analytical framework to explain the recent developments.

In a period where various prospects are overlapping regarding the exit strategy from the Russia-Ukraine war and the possibility of resuming North Korea-US dialogue, distinguishing between signal and noise is becoming extremely difficult. At such times, efforts to clearly establish the hierarchy between variables are required. In other words, focusing solely on individual events to draw hasty conclusions or treating structural factors and short-term events on the same level can undermine the validity of the analysis. Therefore, to compensate for the limitations of existing interpretations, this article aims to diachronically examine the North Korea-China-Russia relationship, focusing on geopolitical context and structural factors of great power international politics, thereby providing a more consistent explanatory framework for North Korea-China relations.

II. A Diachronic Review of North Korea-China-Russia Relations during the Cold War

For the decade following 1945, the primary country supporting North Korea economically and militarily was the Soviet Union. This was because the Soviet Union perceived the northeastern region of the Korean Peninsula as a potential bridgehead for expanding its sphere of influence. At the time, China also highly valued North Korea's strategic importance as a buffer zone to defend itself from foreign aggression, but it lacked the capacity to provide substantial military and economic support. These geopolitical perceptions of the Soviet Union and China were clearly demonstrated during the Korean War.

In early October 1950, Stalin urged Mao Zedong to intervene in the Korean War, but Mao conditioned China's participation on air support from the Soviet Air Force. However, Stalin, concerned about the possibility of direct conflict with the United States and a potential escalation into nuclear war, proposed withdrawing North Korean forces to Manchuria (Shen 2020). This was a strategic calculation reflecting the risk of potentially losing the entire Korean Peninsula to UN forces in the worst-case scenario. Despite this proposal, Mao ultimately decided to commit Chinese troops to the Korean Peninsula, given the uncertainty of Soviet air power. This event can be seen as a clear example illustrating the divergence in geopolitical interests between the Soviet Union and China regarding the Korean Peninsula.

From Stalin's perspective, the Korean Peninsula was a useful geopolitical space for expanding his sphere of influence, but it was not a region that needed to be defended at the risk of nuclear war with the United States. Even if UN forces occupied the entire North Korean territory, the Soviet Union's strategic focus was on Europe, and the Far East Siberia was a sparsely populated wasteland. In contrast, for China, North Korea was a strategically important buffer zone. Even after the Korean War armistice, China continued to provide consistent and comprehensive support to North Korea. During the post-war reconstruction, China mobilized a large number of troops to assist in rebuilding North Korea's infrastructure (Shen and Xia 2012) and provided North Korea with $320 million from 1954 to 1956, exceeding Soviet aid to North Korea (CIA 1956).

From 1956 onwards, Khrushchev led the movement for collective leadership rather than a one-man leadership system and adopted a policy of peaceful coexistence. This was a line that Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong could not accept. Consequently, by around 1964, North Korea-Soviet and China-Soviet relations had deteriorated to the point of mutual slander. In response to these policy changes by the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung purged pro-Soviet and pro-China elements within North Korea in August 1956 and emphasized autonomy from foreign powers. This indicated his intention not to allow foreign troops to be stationed in North Korea, signifying that the Soviet Union could not utilize the North Korean region for its expansionist purposes. As a result, the Soviet Union significantly reduced its economic and military aid to North Korea. In contrast to the reduction in Soviet aid, China expanded its support to North Korea despite internal difficulties such as mass starvation resulting from the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Notably, from 1958 to 1964, China provided North Korea with approximately 460 aircraft. This was because, given China's internal hardships, the importance of North Korea as a buffer zone was further highlighted.

From 1965 to 1968, North Korea-China relations deteriorated, while North Korea-Soviet relations gradually improved. North Korea publicly criticized Mao Zedong and China's Cultural Revolution, to which China strongly reacted. This mutual slander deepened ideological differences between the two countries. However, a more decisive factor in the deterioration of North Korea-China relations was China's stance on supporting North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. At that time, the Soviet Union supported North Vietnam through Vladivostok, the Black Sea coast, and China. Within China, there were disagreements regarding the transit of Soviet military supplies through Chinese territory. The Mao Zedong-centered faction opposed the transit of Soviet supplies through Chinese territory, while the Deng Xiaoping-centered faction was inclined to accept it. These internal policy conflicts served as one of the background factors for the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution (Radchenko 2024). The fundamental reason Mao Zedong was reluctant to allow Soviet military supplies to pass through Chinese territory, apart from the sensitivity of the issue itself, was his apprehension about the emergence of a strong unified Vietnam to China's south.

This stance by China was perceived by Kim Il Sung as a potential threat that China could obstruct North Korea's reunification of the Korean Peninsula, deepening distrust towards China. It was against this backdrop that as Sino-Soviet tensions escalated, North Korea-Soviet relations improved. Notably, the Soviet Union paid attention to North Korea's role as a strategic outpost, given its proximity to Beijing. Consequently, the Soviet Union was able to strengthen its relations with North Korea by providing approximately 100 MiG-21 fighter jets.

Recognizing the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in 1969, Nixon, as part of his strategy to end the Vietnam War and contain the Soviet Union, pursued improved relations with China. This progress in US-China relations led the Soviet Union to recognize the need for improved relations with the United States, prompting the Soviet Union to propose détente with the US for strategic tension reduction. With the US accepting this proposal, US-Soviet détente began to be pursued, following US-China détente. For China and the Soviet Union, improved relations with the US meant a significant reduction in security threats, which diminished North Korea's geopolitical value as a buffer zone. Therefore, in the late 1970s, both China and the Soviet Union significantly reduced their economic and military aid to North Korea.

In the mid-1970s, following the end of the Vietnam War, China-Vietnam relations rapidly deteriorated. This was driven by the Sino-Soviet competition for leadership within the Third World communist bloc. The signing of the economic and military cooperation agreement between Vietnam and the Soviet Union in 1978 was a decisive provocation for China. China viewed this agreement as a de facto military alliance. As Soviet-Vietnamese closeness deepened, China feared that the Soviet Union was strategically attempting to encircle it. Consequently, China deemed it necessary to restore its strategic standing and 'correct' Vietnam's foreign policy by launching a military reprisal against Vietnam.

China ostensibly presented three justifications for the war. First, the Vietnamese government's unfair policies towards overseas Chinese and ethnic minorities within Vietnam. Second, Vietnam's full-scale invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, which ousted the Khmer Rouge regime supported by China. Third, Vietnam's occupation of parts of the Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands), claimed by China. Concurrently, there was an underlying intention to promote the modernization of the People's Liberation Army through this conflict. While all these factors were considered, the decisive factor was the perception of a geopolitical encirclement crisis. Domestically, Chinese media framed the war as a "self-defensive counterattack against Soviet proxies" (Zhang 2015).

The Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), which broke out against this backdrop, impressed upon North Korea the reality that China could resort to force against a smaller neighboring country. When Deng Xiaoping directly informed Kim Il Sung of his intention to invade Vietnam in 1979, the North Korean leadership felt a profound sense of betrayal. Through the Sino-Vietnamese War, North Korea confirmed that China could use force even against its long-standing ally for its own strategic interests. Furthermore, North Korea developed a sense of crisis that even if it were to 'unify' the Korean Peninsula, it could be sacrificed at any time based on China's strategic calculations. This led to structural distrust in North Korea's perception of China (Shin Jong-ho et al., 2020).

In fact, North Korea was encouraged by the victory of North Vietnam over the US and South Vietnam immediately after Vietnam's reunification in 1975. North Korea supported North Vietnam during the Vietnam War for strategic purposes, including ideological solidarity and the accumulation of combat experience. North Korea provided substantial military and economic support, including at least one combat squadron and two anti-aircraft artillery regiments (RFA 2024). In 1975, when Kim Il Sung met Mao Zedong, he presented his plan for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, but Mao reacted negatively (Wilson Center 1975).

US-Soviet détente ended in 1977 with the Soviet Union's precision missile test and advancements in MIRV technology, and further collapsed with the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. From the Reagan era onwards, the US pursued a strategy of overwhelming the Soviet Union to the point of collapse. North Korea's geopolitical value to the Soviet Union was re-evaluated. In response, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with 100 aircraft, including MiG-29s, MiG-23s, and Su-25s, between 1984 and 1986 (CIA 1985). Meanwhile, US-China relations maintained a stable developmental trajectory. Consequently, North Korea's significance as a buffer zone for China diminished, and China consequently did not provide sustained meaningful support to North Korea. As Soviet power weakened due to the US-Soviet confrontation starting in 1981 with Reagan's rise, the US and Soviet Union pursued détente again starting in 1987 with the Geneva Summit. This again reduced North Korea's geopolitical value in terms of Soviet security. Subsequently, the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. That is, from the late 1980s onwards, neither China nor the Soviet Union provided significant support to North Korea.

The changes in great power relations during the Cold War and the resulting fluctuations in North Korea's geopolitical value critically influenced whether China and the Soviet Union provided aid to North Korea and the extent of that aid, a trend that repeated itself. In particular, China and Russia provided limited military support, such as aircraft (by the standards of the time), only when they perceived a significant threat to their own security. North Korea did not align itself with either China or the Soviet Union. Notably, 1979, when China militarily invaded Vietnam, a long-standing ally, cemented distrust towards China. (This event also raises the possibility that the Soviet Union instigated the conflict with Vietnam to deplete China's national strength.) Instead, North Korea closely observed changes in the strategic environment and maximally utilized the conflicts between great powers and its role as a buffer zone to pursue strategic autonomy and survival.

III. Structural Stability and Constraints in North Korea-China-Russia Relations After the End of the Cold War

The key difference between the Cold War era and today's great power international politics is the shift of the US's primary competitor from the Soviet Union to China. The development of US-China relations, ongoing since the late 1960s, reduced North Korea's geopolitical value to China. However, as China emerged as the US's main competitor, the US established containing China as a consistent national strategy, thereby restoring North Korea's importance as a strategic buffer zone from China's perspective. However, in this process, North Korea chose nuclear armament based on its own strategic judgment, not at the behest of Russia or China. This also served to solidify North Korea's role as China's buffer zone. On the other hand, Russia today has no reason or capacity to pursue territorial expansion in Northeast Asia or to engage in full-blown conflict with the US. As a result, paradoxically, aid from China and Russia to North Korea has been limited to preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime.

In particular, China cannot rule out the possibility of severe instability in Northeast China or the 'unified Korean Peninsula' strategically aligning closely with the US if North Korea were to collapse rapidly. These possibilities are perceived as greater geopolitical risks than the current divided state of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, China prioritizes maintaining the status quo, keeping North Korea as a buffer zone. Furthermore, unlike the Soviet Union in the past, China's current expansion of influence does not necessarily require passing through North Korea. Considering these factors comprehensively, China is pursuing strategic balance that encompasses the entire Korean Peninsula while maintaining a certain level of relations with South Korea. Consequently, despite China's support being crucial for North Korea's survival from the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War to the present day, North Korea-China relations have maintained a certain distance. In summary, North Korea-China relations can be considered structurally stable, but at the same time, they have been in an environment where progress towards a close cooperative relationship is constrained. Under this structure, they have experienced certain ups and downs.

The 'brinkmanship' employed by North Korea during its nuclear weapons development and the attempts by South and North Korea to unilaterally change the status quo during the Moon Jae-in administration are noteworthy. When attempts that can be interpreted as 'changing the status quo' led by North Korea or the Korean Peninsula occur, China has generally tended to temporarily increase its involvement and engagement with North Korea. This is because, from China's perspective of prioritizing the 'status quo' on the Korean Peninsula, changes led by North Korea or the inter-Korean process after the Cold War, even if their aims differ, have been perceived as anomalous. However, the influence and driving force of current attempts to change the status quo on the Korean Peninsula appear significantly weakened compared to the past.

Following the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit, North Korea declared a 'new path' and (re)shifted its strategic direction. This can be interpreted as North Korea's recognition that the US's strategic goal is not to improve relations but rather to induce deterioration, thereby strengthening security cooperation between South Korea, the US, and Japan, and consequently reinforcing containment of China within a broader strategic framework. In other words, North Korea has reconfirmed that the relations between great powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula possess a very strong status quo-preserving nature. Accordingly, North Korea has pursued the strengthening of its 'independent foreign policy line' through the advancement of its nuclear capabilities, and along with this, China's level of engagement has decreased. Therefore, the 'North Korea-China Relations Anomaly' can be seen as a phenomenon of 'structural regression' where North Korea-China relations are returning to their original structure.

Another difference from the Cold War era is that current China-Russia relations are generally stable and friendly. This suggests that the possibility of conflicts between China and Russia directly affecting North Korea, as seen during the Cold War, is low. Of course, both North Korea and Russia are concerned about the deepening structural asymmetry with China, and there is strategic cooperation space between them stemming from these concerns. However, the more critical variable currently is the complex and strategic calculations among great powers regarding the exit strategy from the Russia-Ukraine war. In this process, Russia is interpreted as intending to expand its strategic leverage by strengthening relations with North Korea, beyond merely securing operational support, and complicating Western strategic calculations. North Korea also appears to be pursuing a long-term strategy of seeking advantageous strategic space by utilizing its closeness with Russia as a strategic lever, not limiting its cooperation with Russia to the acquisition of simple economic and military benefits, but closely watching the direction and conclusion of the war.

This suggests that North Korea's attempts to expand its strategic space do not necessarily mean a resumption of North Korea-US dialogue. Prior to the Hanoi Summit, North Korea pursued a change in the status quo through normalization of relations with the United States. However, since the breakdown, it is highly likely that North Korea has shifted to a status quo strategy that utilizes hostile coexistence with the US as a driver for domestic and external stability. Therefore, while the possibility of the recently proposed 'exchange of nuclear freeze for sanctions relief' or 'improvement of inter-Korean-US relations' cannot be completely ruled out, they can be seen as involving a certain degree of logical leap. North Korea is judged to be considering a very long-term strategy in preparation for structural changes, such as fundamental turning points in US-China relations or the emergence of an alternative international order, rather than short-term progress in North Korea-US relations, and its prospects for actively engaging in dialogue with the US in the short to medium term are limited.

Paradoxically, this situation explains why China and Russia are cautious about transferring advanced military technology to North Korea. As long as China-Russia relations remain solid, the likelihood of China and Russia falling into a significant security threat situation is not high. Furthermore, excessive autonomy and leverage gained by North Korea through the transfer of advanced weapons could impose an additional burden of variable control on China, which is strategically confronting the US over issues in the East and South China Seas and Taiwan. Russia, while engaged in a large-scale war in Western Eurasia, would find it an unbearable strategic burden to increase instability in the Far East. The possibility exists that both China and Russia might attempt to secure leverage in diplomatic negotiations through 'staged closeness' with North Korea. However, even in such cases, both countries would likely avoid situations where North Korea's autonomous military actions or excessive leverage directly involve China and Russia. In conclusion, unless a structural change occurs, such as South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation crossing a structural turning point (singularity) and posing a significant security threat to China and Russia, or conversely, the decline of the US becomes evident and competition between China and Russia reignites, the strategic incentive for China and Russia to transfer advanced weapon systems to North Korea appears low.

IV. Implications for North Korea-China-Russia Dynamics and South Korea's Strategic Response

It is important to note that interpreting North Korea-China relations solely through the dichotomous framework of 'normal' or 'anomalous' based only on recent events can hinder strategic judgment. Similarly, a cautious approach is required for interpretations that immediately consider the closeness between North Korea and Russia as a structural alliance. While the possibility of some form of reciprocal benefits for the shells, ammunition, and personnel provided by North Korea to Russia remains, from a structural perspective, it is also possible that Russia may, depending on future strategic environmental changes, view North Korea at a level comparable to Armenia around 2020. Continuous and precise analysis of North Korea-China-Russia relations, focusing on key variables such as great power international politics and geopolitical factors, is necessary.

South Korea must maintain cooperation with its existing allies while simultaneously exploring possibilities for strategic communication with China. In particular, considering China's structural tendency to prioritize stability on the Korean Peninsula, if South Korea proactively presents a clear vision for stable Korean Peninsula management and actively pursues it, there is potential to build and develop a basis for cooperation with China up to a certain level. Russia, too, prior to the Russia-Ukraine war and South Korea's strengthening cooperation with NATO, had shown moves to value relations with South Korea in Northeast Asia. Moreover, communication between the leaders and foreign ministers of the US and Russia is ongoing. This suggests the existence of diplomatic space between South Korea and Russia in the process of seeking an exit strategy from the Russia-Ukraine war. South Korea also needs to secure diplomatic flexibility that aligns with the medium- and long-term strategic environment through contact with Russia. By pursuing these efforts concurrently, the increase in security risks on the Korean Peninsula due to intensified strategic competition among great powers can be mitigated in advance.

In conclusion, South Korea must avoid a short-sighted attitude that defines the current distance in North Korea-China relations as a simple rift or perceives it as a temporary opportunity. The policy focus should be on strengthening independent diplomatic and security capabilities that can coordinate and enhance our external leverage by analyzing the structural understanding of major powers within the long-term strategic environment and the dynamics between North Korea's strategic goals and its position in a balanced manner. ■

References

Shin Jong-ho et al. 2020. "Risks of US-China Strategic Conflict for the Korean Peninsula and Our Complex Response Strategies." Korea Institute for National Unification.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 1956. "Economic Rehabilitation of North Korea 1954–56." CIA-RDP79-01093A001100010001-5. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01093A001100010001-5.pdf.

CIA. 1985. "North Korea's Air Force: Impact of Soviet Deliveries." CIA-RDP86T00590R000400600002-4. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00590R000400600002-4.pdf.

Radchenko, Sergey. 2024. "The Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet Split." In The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War, ed. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, 529–548. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shen, Zhihua. 2020. "Revisiting Stalin's and Mao's Motivations in the Korean War." Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/revisiting-stalins-and-maos-motivations-korean-war?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

Shen, Zhihua and Yafeng Xia. 2012. "China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953–1961." NKIDP Working Paper No. 4. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/misc/NKIDP_Working_Paper_4_China_and_the_Postwar_Reconstruction_of_North_Korea.pdf.

Wilson Center Digital Archive. 1975. "Record Regarding Kim Il-Sung's Visit to Beijing, 18–26 April 1975." Wilson Center Digital Archive. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/record-regarding-kim-il-sungs-visit-beijing-18-26-april-1975?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

Zhang, Xiaoming. 2015. Deng Xiaoping's Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

■ Чон ДжэуСтарший научный сотрудник Института оборонных исследований Кореи

■ Ответственные за выпуск и редактирование:Ким Чхэрин, научный сотрудник EAI

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