[Global NK Commentary] ROK-US Wartime OPCON Transfer: Determination and Strategy for Advancement

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Abstract

The military must prepare for war by anticipating the worst-case scenario. This paper seeks to explore a warfighting system led by the ROK military while considering a simultaneous war scenario in Northeast Asia involving China's invasion of Taiwan and a preemptive attack by North Korea.

The ROK and US militaries are reorganizing into a future Combined Forces Command (CFC) with a ROK general as the commander and a US general as the deputy commander, based on the agreement between the two governments (U.S. Department of Defense and ROK Ministry of National Defense 2018). With the launch of a second Trump administration, the transfer of OPCON is expected to accelerate. The Trump administration's intention to transfer OPCON to the ROK military can be inferred from the U.S. Department of Defense's "Interim National Defense Strategy Guidance" and the remarks of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby ("Washington Post 2025).

The pursuit of OPCON transfer to prepare for war is a matter of national survival that requires national resolve.

Comprehensive preparations are needed at the national, governmental, military, and alliance levels for the transfer of wartime operational control. The public must be armed with the values of self-reliant defense and the protection of liberal democracy, believing that they will proactively defend this nation, rather than relying excessively on the alliance for security. The government must strengthen the functions of the National Security Council and establish a war command system. The ROK military must establish a Joint Chiefs of Staff, unify the command structure for wartime and peacetime, cultivate warfighting capabilities such as war command, strategic planning, intelligence assessment, operational planning, and operational sustainment, and foster a strong military proficient in strategy and tactics. The interrelationships and roles of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, UN Command, Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea must be established in consultation with the allies. The Military Committee, composed of the ROK and US Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will issue strategic and operational directives to the Combined Forces Command. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff will command readiness and local provocation response operations. The UN Command will manage the Armistice Agreement and provide forces from member states in case of emergency. The Combined Forces Command will develop operational plans, oversee combined exercises, and command the war by exercising operational control over US Forces Korea and US reinforcement forces, and tactical control over UN Command combat units during wartime. US Forces Korea will maintain combined combat readiness and perform wartime missions under the operational control of the Combined Forces Commander in case of emergency.

It is proposed to establish a ROK-US-Japan military cooperation TF composed of strategic planners and security experts from the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Indo-Pacific Command, and the Japanese Joint Staff Office to jointly respond to challenges, provocations, and threats within the Northeast Asian region.

I. Introduction

The military must prepare for war by always anticipating the worst-case scenario. This paper aims to highlight the necessity of a ROK military-led warfighting system by examining a simultaneous war scenario in Northeast Asia involving China's invasion of Taiwan and a preemptive attack by North Korea.

Hypothetical Scenario: "In 2027, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army, China launched an invasion of Taiwan under the pretext of seizing maritime hegemony and achieving unification. Kim Jong-un, who defines inter-Korean relations not as a relationship between compatriots but as belligerent enemy states, took this opportunity to launch a full-scale armed invasion of the South to occupy Korea. A simultaneous war erupts in two regions: Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. The United States concentrated its forces, including some of the US Forces Korea, on the Taiwan war, and Japan also supported the Taiwan war, leaving South Korea to fight North Korea's invasion independently (Chung and Zmire 2024)."

North Korea advocated for the theory of two hostile states in the December 2023 plenary meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea (<KCNA> 2023/12/31). While encouraging a great event for territorial completion among the North Korean populace, they are operating tactical nuclear units and conducting mobile training for commanders aimed at occupying South Korea (<JoongAng Ilbo> 2024/4/23. . 2023/8/31). In addition to the advancement of their nuclear capabilities, they continue to test-fire short-range missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

Missiles launched from North Korea land in the East and West Seas, and beyond the Japanese archipelago. If the direction of the missiles launched from the impact points is altered with the launch point as the center, they are aimed precisely at strategic targets such as the Yongsan Presidential Office, the Ministry of National Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff, Osan, Pyeongtaek, and Gyeryongdae, as well as US Air Force and Navy bases in Japan such as Yokosuka, Kadena, Sasebo, and Okinawa, which serve as launch bases for US forces deployed across the Korean Peninsula, and further towards Guam and Hawaii. This appears to be a dress rehearsal for a full-scale war.

Meanwhile, China, which has declared it will not rule out the use of force for Taiwan's unification, conducted encirclement drills around Taiwan on May 23, 2024, coinciding with the inauguration of Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te. Furthermore, from October 14 to 16, 2024, they mobilized aircraft carriers and hundreds of fighter jets to conduct large-scale military demonstrations encircling Taiwan, citing President Lai Ching-te's "two-state theory" speech on National Foundation Day as problematic (<Kyunghyang Shinmun> 2024). On April 1, 2025, China commenced joint land, sea, air, and rocket force exercises in a manner that encircles Taiwan. The spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army stated, "This is a stern warning and strong deterrence to Taiwan independence separatist forces" and asserted it was "a just and necessary action to safeguard national sovereignty and the reunification of the motherland" (<No Cut News> 2025).[1]as problematic (<Kyunghyang Shinmun> 2024). On April 1, 2025, China commenced joint land, sea, air, and rocket force exercises in a manner that encircles Taiwan. The spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army stated, "This is a stern warning and strong deterrence to Taiwan independence separatist forces" and asserted it was "a just and necessary action to safeguard national sovereignty and the reunification of the motherland" (<No Cut News> 2025).

The possibility of Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un colluding to instigate a simultaneous war in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula cannot be ruled out. If a simultaneous war erupts in two regions, US security experts suggest that the United States would deploy forces from Japan, Guam, and even Korea to the Taiwan war, leaving South Korea to defend itself independently (2024). The forces of the Northern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army are geographically distant from Taiwan and would likely intervene in a Korean Peninsula war. Carrier strike groups based in Dalian and Qingdao would attempt to seize maritime control in the West Sea by employing Anti-Access & Area Denial (A2AD) strategies to control the First Island Chain.

Furthermore, under the comprehensive strategic partnership treaty between North Korea and Russia, Russia could deploy forces from the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok to the East and South Seas, and ground forces from the Eastern Military District Command in Khabarovsk could also intervene. Conversely, in the worst-case scenario without allied support, the ROK military would be forced to fight the invading forces of North Korea, China, and Russia independently.

In the face of such a worst-case scenario, is South Korea truly prepared to confront and triumph over them? With this strategic perception and awareness of the problem, this paper will discuss why the OPCON transfer is so urgent. Subsequently, it will examine the purpose and significance of the OPCON transfer, followed by an exploration of the strategy for advancing the OPCON transfer at the national, governmental, military, and alliance levels. Finally, it will offer policy recommendations and provide a perspective on the post-OPCON transfer landscape.

II. The ROK-US Combined Defense System Led by the US and North Korea's Arrogant Perception of South Korea

The ROK-US alliance and the combined defense system, established under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States, have critically contributed to deterring war on the Korean Peninsula for the past 70 years. However, they have failed to deter North Korea's persistent localized provocations. Since the Armistice, North Korea has committed a total of 3,121 violations of the Armistice Agreement, including 2,002 infiltration incidents and 1,119 localized provocations (Ministry of National Defense, ROK 2022). These include the January 21 Blue House raid in 1968, the hijacking of the USS Pueblo and armed infiltration in Samcheok and Uljin, the Axe Murder Incident at Panmunjom in 1976, the bombing of the Aung San Martyrs' Mausoleum in 1983, the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 in 1987, and the infiltration of armed guerrillas in Gangneung in 1996. Even when the patrol vessel Cheonan was hit by a North Korean torpedo in our territorial waters on March 26, 2010, resulting in the deaths of 46 crew members, a proper retaliatory strike was not carried out. On November 23, 2010, hundreds of artillery shells rained down on Yeonpyeong Island in broad daylight, violating our territory, yet our military could only respond with K9 artillery due to the UN Command's rules of engagement during the armistice, and the KF-16 and F-15K fighter jets that were scrambled had to return without retaliating. Over the past year, from May 24 to November 28, North Korea launched 3,097 balloons carrying 8,870 waste items, targeting high-value targets in South Korea (Cha and Lim 2024). This is judged to have been for the purpose of gathering data for biological and chemical warfare.

Why can't our military respond to these provocations with ruthless and immediate retaliation to prevent further armed provocations? Why do we continue to be victimized? Why has it come to this? It is because we are bound by the principle of proportionality, which requires responding only with weapons commensurate to the provocation under the UN Command's rules of engagement to uphold the Armistice Agreement, and because the authority to approve retaliatory fire is escalated, leading to missed opportunities (2023).

During peacetime, the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises operational control, but when the Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) is elevated, the ROK military falls under the operational control of the Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. The dual command structure for wartime and peacetime limits the operational use of military power.

Although peacetime operational control was transferred to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 1, 1994, the Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command exercises combined delegated authority (CODA) for early warning and crisis management, development of combined operational plans and exercises, doctrine development, and interoperability. The ROK military conducts border operations, unit management, training, and disaster relief operations. This is a situation where the Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command exercises the basic authority that the ROK military should perform.

At the inter-Korean defense ministers' meeting held in Jeju Island on September 25-26, 2000, North Korean People's Armed Forces Minister Kim Il-chol argued, "No matter how much we discuss military issues between the South and North, it is useless if the owner, the United States, blocks it. South Korea has no sovereign military, so military issues should be discussed between North Korea and the US," thus disregarding South Korea and seeking direct dealings with the US (Moon Sung-mook 2018).

In a letter to President Trump dated August 7, 2019, Kim Jong-un expressed an arrogant perception, stating, "The South Korean military is not a match for the Korean People's Army" (Woodward 2020).

The moment OPCON is transferred, the ROK military's command structure will be unified for both wartime and peacetime, regaining operational control. The ROK military will respond to North Korean provocations with bold and immediate retaliation, targeting not only the point of origin but also command and support facilities. Furthermore, if North Korea launches an invasion, the ROK military will lead a ruthless and swift counterattack to achieve victory in the war.

III. The Justification and Resolve for OPCON Transfer to the ROK Military

1. The Justification for OPCON Transfer

The ROK and US are pursuing OPCON transfer through the reorganization of the future Combined Forces Command structure, with a ROK general as commander and a US general as deputy commander. However, the current US-led combined defense system faces limitations in operational control of military power. Protecting the nation and the lives of its citizens is possible through the operational use of military power.

In the event of simultaneous wars in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, the current Combined Forces Command system, with the US leading operations in the Korean theater, is expected to present numerous challenges. War is not fought solely with weapons. One must understand the objectives of the war, penetrate the enemy's strategies and tactics, and grasp their strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, one must be familiar with the operational area, demonstrate advanced operational art to neutralize the enemy, and possess the acumen to operate the combined ROK-US forces, including the reorganization through the mobilization of allied personnel and materiel.

Given this, can a Combined Forces Commander, who has only served for one to two years, effectively command a Combined Forces Command where a significant portion of US forces are deployed to the Taiwan war, and the ROK military forms the main body?

2. The Error of the "Pershing Principle" - The Absence of US Military Operational Control Over Foreign Forces

The US argues that it will not pursue OPCON transfer where it is under ROK military control, citing the 'Pershing Principle' that the US military has never been under the operational control of foreign forces. This perspective finds it difficult to accept the fact that the future Combined Forces Command, led by a ROK general, was agreed upon between the defense ministers of the ROK and the US on October 31, 2018, in the "ROK-US Combined Forces Command Transition Guidance" (U.S. Embassy Seoul 2018) (Jeong Gyeong-young 2023).

The assertion that the US military has never been under the operational control of foreign forces is erroneous, as demonstrated by the following three cases (Jeong Gyeong-young 2017). The first case is from the First World War, in the latter half of 1918, during the Battle of the Oise-Aisne. The Allied forces, composed of 1.2 million US troops led by US Commander John J. Pershing, along with French forces led by Petain and British forces led by Douglas Haig, fought against German forces led by General Erich Friedrich Ludendorff. At this time, French Marshal Ferdinand Foch served as the Allied Commander, exercising operational control over the US, British, and French armies, leading the First World War to victory (ROK Military Academy Department of Military History 2007; Liddel Hart 1991). Although the French army was smaller in number than the US or British forces due to significant combat losses from the German invasion, the French commander, who was familiar with the operational area and the enemy, exercised operational control over the US and British forces.

The second case involves the "Responsibility to Protect People" (R2P) adopted by the UN in 2005. Based on this, the UN Security Council passed a resolution for military sanctions against Gaddafi of Libya on March 19, 2011, leading to the participation of NATO forces, including the US, in the operation to remove Gaddafi. Despite the US forces deployed being more than three times the total strength of all participating NATO member states, operational control was delegated to an Italian commander, who was familiar with the local conditions from the colonial era, and the operation was successfully concluded with the removal of Gaddafi on October 20, 2011.

Third, during the second phase of the 2007 Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercise, Combined Forces Commander B. B. Bell delegated command authority to Deputy Combined Forces Commander Kim Byung-kwan, who then led the exercise. As a result, the exercise was evaluated as being conducted much better than when Commander Bell led it during the 2006 UFG exercise (Kim Byung-kwan 2007).

Meanwhile, regarding the question of how the US military could accept command from a ROK general with no war experience, former Commander of US Forces Korea Vincent K. Brooks testified before the US House Armed Services Committee on February 14, 2018, stating, "While a US general will be adjusted to the role of deputy commander of the future Combined Forces Command, the positions of UN Commander and Commander of US Forces Korea will remain, and US Forces Korea will remain under US command authority" (Brooks 2018). Furthermore, former Combined Forces Commander Robert B. Abrams stated in his keynote speech at a forum hosted by the ROK-US Alliance Foundation on July 1, 2020, that "the United States has an unwavering will" for the successful implementation of the alliance plan where a ROK general commands the Combined Forces Command ("The Korea Herald 2019). This clearly indicates the US government's firm intention regarding the adjustment of the Combined Forces Command's command structure and the transfer of operational control to the ROK military (Chung 2021; Nishizuka 2018).

3. OPCON Transfer with Resolve

Meanwhile, can the ROK military confront the nuclear-armed North Korean military? How can we defeat the North Korean military, which has concentrated all its national capabilities on augmenting its 1.28 million-strong military?

There is an allergic reaction to us exercising wartime operational control. Since handing over operational command of the ROK forces to UN Commander MacArthur at the beginning of the Korean War, we have never exercised operational control for over 70 years, so we may feel anxious about regaining operational control. This is a typical path dependence, where we do not find it unusual for a foreign commander, not our own military, to exercise operational control. Some even worry that if OPCON is transferred, it will provide a pretext for the withdrawal of US Forces Korea and lead to the collapse of the ROK-US alliance.

However, as shown in <Table 1> comparing the national power of South and North Korea, South Korea holds an overwhelming advantage over North Korea after 80 years of ideological struggle, thanks to the dedication and innovation of the Korean people. In terms of military power, South Korea ranks 5th globally, while North Korea ranks 34th. What is there to fear? We are confident in exercising wartime operational control.

<Table 1> Comparison of National Power between South and North Korea

Source: Ministry of National Defense, ROK 2023; CIA 2024; Global Firepower 2025; IISS 2024; South Korea's defense budget for 2025 is 61.5878 trillion KRW.

The proposal is to reorganize the Combined Forces Command by appointing a ROK general as commander and a US general as deputy commander to establish a ROK-led combined defense system, not to dismantle the Combined Forces Command. The agreement between the ROK and US defense ministers in 2018 on OPCON transfer is highly significant for the defense of South Korea. The world's strongest US military will participate in the war under the operational control of the ROK military. This sends a message that the US is fulfilling its trust in and obligations as an ally.

The ROK military, which demonstrated remarkable prowess in the Vietnam War (1965-1973), sank the North Korean patrol boat that crossed the NLL in the First Battle of Yeonpyeong (June 15, 1999), rescued the Samho Jewelry vessel hijacked by Somali pirates in Operation Dawn of Gulf of Aden (January 15, 2011), and ruthlessly retaliated with over 30 large-caliber artillery shells against North Korea's small-caliber artillery fire in response to psychological warfare broadcasts resumed after ROK soldiers were injured by landmines planted by North Korea, leading to North Korea's capitulation in the August 20 Operation (August 20, 2015). Given these achievements, there is no reason why our military cannot exercise OPCON. It is crucial to understand why North Korea exhibits an allergic reaction to our exercise of wartime operational control, comparable to its reaction to nuclear armament.

III. Purpose and Strategy for OPCON Transfer

1. Purpose and Significance of Establishing a ROK-Led ROK-US Combined Defense System

The purpose of the wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer is to establish a South Korea-led combined defense system, enabling us to defend our territory with our own strength and to resolutely punish invaders with force, thereby embodying a strong resolve and posture for self-reliant national defense (Park Chung-hee 1972). No country in the world delegates operational control of its own forces to a foreign military commander. Even Japan's Self-Defense Forces, a defeated nation, have not delegated OPCON, and their alliance, characterized by a parallel command structure between the U.S. and Japanese forces, is as strong as the ROK-U.S. alliance. While NATO exists, it is a collective defense system, not a bilateral alliance, and only 30% of member states' forces are delegated to the NATO commander, with the remaining two-thirds of main forces retained by the member states (NATO n.d.). Regaining operational control of the ROK Armed Forces is the path to becoming a normal state.

Exercising OPCON over the ROK Armed Forces signifies the restoration of national defense identity and the autonomy of military force operations. It will enable a more resolute response to North Korea's military provocations, boost the morale of our military, and enhance national pride. OPCON transfer is also essential for pursuing unified strategies during both wartime and peacetime. Through arms control, it can contribute to establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula, and if a South Korea-led counterattack operation is conducted in case of emergency, it could prevent Chinese intervention and lead to victory. The transfer of wartime OPCON, supported by the ROK-U.S. alliance, will be evaluated as a model alliance, achieving self-reliant security following economic growth and political development. Furthermore, OPCON transfer will provide an opportunity to expand our horizons on the international stage by exercising diplomatic autonomy. Moreover, OPCON transfer will foster the development of doctrines suited to the operational area and military strategy of the Korean Peninsula, cultivate a military capable of fighting and winning through weapons development tailored to the ROK military, and contribute to national interests through the promotion of the defense industry, job creation, and defense export (Jeong Gyeong-young 2017).

2. Re-examination of OPCON Transfer Efforts and the Trump Administration's Second Term Commitment to OPCON Transfer

The governments of South Korea and the United States agreed to transfer OPCON on April 12, 2012, but this was postponed to December 1, 2025, due to North Korea's nuclear tests and opposition from the South Korean public. Additionally, in May 2013, the South Korean side requested the U.S. to re-examine the conditions for OPCON transfer, judging that transferring OPCON on December 1, 2015, as agreed between the two countries, could lead to North Korea's miscalculation in the absence of sufficient ROK military capabilities. Consequently, at the 46th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2014, the defense ministers of South Korea and the United States agreed on the Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP).

The three conditions for OPCON transfer are: (1) securing the military capabilities necessary for the ROK military to lead combined defense; (2) securing comprehensive ROK-U.S. combined capabilities to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats; and (3) a stable security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region conducive to the OPCON transfer. Furthermore, the three-stage evaluation for the future Combined Forces Command's mission capability includes Stage 1: Initial Operational Capability (IOC), Stage 2: Full Operational Capability (FOC), and Stage 3: Full Mission Capability (FMC) (Ministry of National Defense n.d.; Korea Policy Briefing 2014).

On June 9, 2019, the defense ministers of South Korea and the United States agreed to relocate the Combined Forces Command from Yongsan Garrison to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, deviating from the initial plan to move it within the Ministry of National Defense compound. The relocation to Camp Humphreys was completed by the end of October 2022. During the ROK-U.S. summit on May 21, 2021, between President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Joseph R. Biden, the "firm commitment to the conditions-based OPCON transfer" was reaffirmed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021).

Following the verification of Initial Operational Capability (IOC) during the late 2019 Combined Command Post Training (CCPP), the defense ministers of South Korea and the United States noted the progress of the Conditions-Based Operational Control Transfer Plan (OCP) during the 53rd ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on December 2, 2021. They agreed to conduct a Full Operational Capability (FOC) evaluation of the Future Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 2023 and to jointly assess South Korea's core military capabilities and the alliance's comprehensive response capabilities to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats at the 54th SCM in 2023 (<Kyunghyang Shinmun> 2021).

It is regrettable that the transfer of wartime operational control (OC) did not occur during the Moon Jae-in administration, which had pursued the early transfer of OC. Despite the decision to reorganize the Combined Forces Command (CFC) into a future CFC while maintaining its existence, the question arises as to why the conditions-based transfer of OC, predicated on the dissolution of the CFC agreed upon by the Park Geun-hye administration, continued to be pursued.

It is believed that a combination of factors contributed to this situation, including the issue of whether the matter was solely left to the military without sufficient government commitment, the suspension of combined exercises declared by President Trump following the US-North Korea summit in Singapore in June 2018 and concerns about the impact on inter-Korean relations when US strategic assets were deployed amidst a delicate inter-Korean situation, leading to an inability to assess Full Operational Capability (FOC), limitations imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic that prevented large-scale combined exercises, and the prevailing atmosphere where the US prioritized strategic competition with China.

Meanwhile, President Yoon Suk-yeol, inaugurated on May 10, 2022, and U.S. President Joe Biden, during their summit on May 21, 2022, pledged to enhance deterrence through the strengthening of combined defense posture and reaffirmed their commitment to the Conditions-Based Operational Control Transfer Plan (OCP) (Office of the President 2022).

Combined exercises, which had been suspended or scaled down during the 2022 Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise, were resumed. In 2023, Full Operational Capability (FOC) was verified and evaluated through large-scale combined ROK-US exercises involving the deployment of US strategic assets. Although General Paul LaCamera, former Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, testified before the US Congress in March 2024 that "the transfer of operational control is not delayed, but is on track to be completed based on conditions, not time" (2024), the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, in effect, appeared to lack the will to pursue the transfer of operational control.

Christopher C. Miller, acting U.S. Secretary of Defense under the first Trump administration, stated in his policy proposal book "Project 2025" that "South Korea should lead conventional defense against North Korea" (Miller 2024). He also argued that "starting with the transfer of wartime operational control, the ROK-US relationship can be further solidified into an equal partnership (<Donga Ilbo> 2024)" and "if war breaks out again on the Korean Peninsula, I want to ensure that South Korean generals and admirals command the forces (2024)." Miller's assertion implies that the transfer of operational control would lead to a South Korean commander leading the Combined Forces Command. Notably, Pete Hegseth, nominated as Secretary of Defense under a potential second Trump administration, stated in the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance that "the United States will focus on deterring China's invasion of Taiwan and defending the U.S. homeland, while assigning most of the role of deterring North Korean threats to allies" (Washington Post 2025). Elbridge Colby, appointed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, testified during his confirmation hearing on March 4, 2025, regarding the ROK-US transfer of operational control, stating that "President Trump's foreign policy vision is to empower capable and willing allies like South Korea" (Yonhap 2025).

The transfer of operational control is expected to accelerate. It is crucial to develop and proceed with a timeline that reflects the conditions for the transfer of operational control.

IV. Strategy for the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control

The transfer of wartime operational control should not merely be the transition of the Combined Forces Command from a US general to a South Korean general; it must serve as an opportunity to fundamentally restructure South Korea's national security framework. To achieve the transfer of operational control, a South Korea-led warfighting system must be established across four dimensions: the public, the government, the military, and the alliance.

1. Self-Reliant Defense and Value-Based Security

First, the South Korean public must be equipped with the mindset of self-reliant defense, asserting our proactive role in protecting the nation, and value-based security, committed to safeguarding liberal democracy, rather than relying excessively on the alliance.

2. Establishment of a War Command System

At the government level, the National Security Council's functions must be strengthened, and national security capabilities enhanced through the establishment of a national war command system. In the event of a grave crisis affecting national security and public safety, the President should immediately convene and preside over meetings to address the situation. To ensure continuous assessment and response to domestic and foreign security conditions, the Presidential Security Council should be convened bimonthly, and the National Security Advisor should preside over monthly standing committee meetings. Relevant ministers and experts should be invited to these meetings on a case-by-case basis to develop and effectively implement security policies related to national security.

Furthermore, a war command system capable of fighting and winning wars must be established through comprehensive training exercises, such as the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise, which integrate the entire nation and national organizations. Possessing superior warfighting capabilities is not only a strategy for preventing war but also the surest path to victory in war.

War command refers to the leadership capacity that integrates, coordinates, and controls national strategy and military strategy to deter war in peacetime and achieve victory in wartime, thereby organizing the nation's total capabilities. National command authority is exercised by the President, who, with the assistance of the Minister of National Defense, directs military operations by issuing strategic directives and operational guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and to the Combined Forces Commander through the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting and the Military Committee in wartime. Additionally, as the civilian defense authority, the Prime Minister, in conjunction with national administrative agencies such as the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, will control the populace during wartime. The industrial mobilization authority, led by the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, will oversee economic ministries to provide financial support for the war effort.

Examining the phases of warfighting—the opening phase, the warfighting phase, and the war termination phase—first, during the opening phase, the war command organization is established and operated, war objectives and goals are set, and public support is secured. War resources are secured, military objectives are selected, US reinforcement forces are coordinated, and international support is obtained. During the warfighting phase, the enemy's strategic and operational centers are neutralized, third-party intervention is blocked, and the border is secured early. During the war termination phase, methods of ending the war, post-war arrangements, and the timing of termination are decided, and the war is directed towards the goal of completing a free democratic unification government. To ensure this system functions, a war command system must be established through exercises like Ulchi Freedom Shield. The defense budget as a percentage of GDP should be increased from the current 2.6% to 3%. Defense innovation to enhance self-reliant defense and deterrence capabilities is not an option but a necessity, requiring significant financial support.

When national unity is lacking, internal strife prevails, and a pacifist ideology takes hold, external enemies have invariably invaded. During the Imjin War (1592-1598), when the nation was divided by factionalism, hundreds of thousands of citizens were sacrificed, and the land was devastated. The Joseon Dynasty experienced the Second Manchu Invasion of Korea (1636-1637) due to the prevalence of a Sinocentric worldview that devalued military affairs. The Donghak Peasant Revolution occurred, and unable to suppress it independently, foreign powers were involved, leading to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) on Korean soil. After liberation, extreme ideological division and internal conflict between the left and right led to the North Korean invasion in June 1950, resulting in 4.46 million casualties during the Korean War, as shown in Table 2. The extremely unstable political situation today must be stabilized through politics of integration, coexistence, and cooperation as soon as possible.

Table 2. Korean War Casualties

Source: Park Dong-chan 2014.

3. Inter-Korean Political and Military Dialogue and ROK-US-China Strategic Dialogue to Foster a Stable Security Environment

Concurrently, it is necessary to create a security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region that is conducive to the stable transfer of wartime operational control. Through inter-Korean political and military dialogue, we must prevent inter-Korean relations from escalating into a confrontation of strength against strength. To improve the security environment in Northeast Asia, we should pursue strategic dialogue among South Korea, the United States, and China. Furthermore, to build trust through security cooperation among regional states, a Northeast Asian Security Cooperation Organization involving South Korea, North Korea, the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and Mongolia should be institutionalized. There is also a need to establish a rapid response system for joint responses to regional disasters and calamities. A Northeast Asian Rapid Response Force, composed of military, police, and NGOs, should be established to conduct humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations promptly in the event of disasters (Jeong Gyeong-young 2005).

Additionally, at the ROK-US-Japan summit held at Camp David on August 18, 2023, an agreement was reached to jointly respond to challenges, provocations, and threats in the Northeast Asian region (The White House 2023). To implement the spirit of Camp David, we propose the operation of a ROK-US-Japan Military Cooperation Task Force composed of strategic planners and security experts from the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Indo-Pacific Command, and the Japan Joint Staff Office.

4. Republic of Korea Armed Forces: Reorganization of the Upper Command Structure

At the military level, to ensure the completeness of the transfer of wartime operational control and streamline the upper command structure, the upper command structure should be reorganized to establish a Joint Command. After the transfer of operational control, it is necessary to unify wartime and peacetime command authority. Instead of two South Korean generals exercising operational control separately in wartime and peacetime, a single individual should serve as the Commander of the Joint Command in peacetime, exercising peacetime operational control, and as the Commander of the Future Combined Forces Command in wartime, exercising wartime operational control. This would allow the Joint Chiefs of Staff to faithfully fulfill its unique functions, such as advising on military command, establishing military strategy, developing military capabilities, and conducting military diplomacy (Shim Dong-hyun 2021). Our military must develop offensive strategies, enhance warfighting capabilities including command, intelligence assessment, operational planning, and logistical support, cultivate capabilities in cyber warfare, space warfare, electronic warfare, and information warfare, and foster a strong military proficient in AI, science, and technology, as well as advanced strategies and tactics.

5. Alliance: Establishing the Interrelationship between the JCS, UNC, CFC, and USFK

At the alliance level, a South Korea-led warfighting system must be established through the transfer of wartime operational control. To this end, it is necessary to define the interrelationships and roles among the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the United Nations Command (UNC), the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the United States Forces Korea (USFK). The Military Committee, composed of the ROK and US Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should issue strategic directives and operational guidance to the CFC. The ROK JCS will command readiness and respond to localized provocations. The UNC will manage the Armistice Agreement and provide forces in case of emergency. The CFC will develop armistice operational plans, lead combined exercises, exercise operational control over ROK forces, USFK, and US reinforcement forces during wartime, and tactically control (TACCON) UN Command combat units to direct the war. USFK will maintain combined readiness and, along with US reinforcement forces, perform wartime missions under the operational control of the CFC Commander in case of emergency. To establish a South Korea-led warfighting system, the military structure must be reorganized, including the establishment of a Joint Command, the reorganization of the ROK-US CFC command structure, and the operation of the newly established Strategic Command. This should be reflected in Strategic Directive No. 3 for the transfer of operational control.

IV. Policy Proposals and the Post-Transfer of Operational Control Landscape

The security tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the situation in Taiwan are more critical than ever. Failure to properly manage the crises in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula could lead to simultaneous wars in two locations in Northeast Asia.

South Korea must establish a total war preparedness posture. By establishing a war command system under the supreme commander, building a South Korea-led warfighting system, conducting realistic training proficient in strategy, operational art, and tactics, and implementing reserve mobilization drills and civil defense exercises that simulate actual combat situations, we can prevent war. If war breaks out, we can achieve victory with minimal casualties and realize a unified, free Korea.

It is proposed that the President, as the supreme commander, preside over meetings on the progress of the transfer of wartime operational control. These meetings should include the Chairpersons of the National Assembly's National Defense and Foreign Affairs and Unification Committees, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, the Director of the National Security Office, the Ministers of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior and Safety, the military leadership, and security experts to review the status of the transfer of operational control and formulate post-transfer security strategies.

Regarding the transfer of operational control, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was verified in 2019, and Full Operational Capability (FOC) was assessed during the 2024 Freedom Shield exercise with the deployment of US strategic assets. The ROK military is assessed to have acquired the capabilities in intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications necessary to lead combined defense and theater operations. The alliance's capabilities to respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats have reached an appropriate level through the pursuit of tailored extended deterrence via the Washington Declaration and the establishment of the ROK Strategic Command.

To foster a security environment conducive to the transfer of operational control, it is necessary to improve the security environment by pursuing inter-Korean political and military dialogue, dialogue among South Korea, North Korea, and the United States, strategic dialogue among South Korea, the United States, and China, and peace negotiations among South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China. Once the Future Combined Forces Command is assessed to have secured full mission capability, the ROK and US Ministers of National Defense can endorse this during the Security Consultative Meeting and recommend the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK military to the presidents of both countries.

Regarding Strategic Flexibility, when a portion of USFK is deployed outside the Korean Peninsula (flow-out), it is necessary to have a prior agreement between South Korea and the US on the conditions and measures for deploying replacement forces before or simultaneously with the deployment. Furthermore, in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, US forces deployed globally should flow into the Korean Peninsula theater to augment the combined ROK-US defense posture (Jeon Je-guk 2024). The ROK-US-Japan Military Cooperation Task Force, composed of strategic planners and security experts from the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Indo-Pacific Command, and the Japan Joint Staff Office, should also be promptly operationalized to jointly respond to challenges, provocations, and threats in the Northeast Asian region. Scenarios for a Taiwan war, a Korean Peninsula war, or simultaneous wars in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula should be developed, and roles and responsibilities of each country should be refined through wargaming.

Upon the transfer of operational control, South Korea will be liberated from the shame of relying on external forces for its defense and will regain self-esteem, significantly elevating its international standing. Our military will undergo a profound transformation into a true military force, capable of properly defending the homeland and achieving victory in battle. The United States will commend South Korea as an ally that fulfills its role and responsibilities. For North Korea, this will serve as an opportunity to eradicate its arrogant perceptions of South Korea and prevent miscalculations. The international community will view South Korea with admiration, not only as a liberal democracy, a digital leader, and a cultural powerhouse, but also as a guardian of peace on the Korean Peninsula and a defender of the liberal international order. ■

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[1]The theory of two states (兩國論) was first mentioned by former President Lee Teng-hui, who was from the Kuomintang party originating from mainland China, in a 1999 Deutsche Welle interview, asserting that China and Taiwan are separate countries.

■ Jeong, Gyeong-young_Adjunct Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University.

■ Responsible for and edited by:Kim, Chae-rin, EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr