[EAI Public Opinion Briefing] 2025 Political Polarization Perception Survey

I. Political Polarization

"Political Polarization Intensifies as Emotional and Partisan Conflict, Not Ideological"

● The ideological distribution of all respondents was 27.1% progressive, 46.3% moderate, and 27.7% conservative, showing no significant difference compared to 2021 (27.7% progressive, 41.8% moderate, 26.2% conservative).

● Supporters of the Democratic Party and the People Power Party tended to perceive the opposing party as having more extreme ideological leanings. Democratic Party supporters perceived the ideological distance between themselves, their party, and politicians as closer compared to People Power Party supporters. Conversely, People Power Party supporters perceived the ideological distance between themselves, their party, and politicians as closer compared to Democratic Party supporters. Meanwhile, all respondents evaluated the ideological positions of political leaders (Lee Jae-myung, Yoon Suk-yeol) as more extreme than those of their respective parties.

● The unfavorable ratings for the two major parties among all respondents were 54.1% for the Democratic Party and 68.7% for the People Power Party, an increase of 10.4 percentage points and 20.9 percentage points, respectively, compared to four years ago. Notably, the unfavorable ratings for the opposing party among supporters of the People Power Party and the Democratic Party exceeded 90%, at 93.5% and 94.6%, respectively.

● The group showing the largest gap in favorability towards politicians and parties was women in their 20s, who gave Yoon Suk-yeol a score of 10 and Lee Jae-myung a score of 44.9 out of 100. In contrast, men in their 20s showed low favorability towards both politicians, with scores of 22.6 for Yoon Suk-yeol and 24.9 for Lee Jae-myung. This trend was also observed in party favorability, where the average favorability rating for the People Power Party among women in their 20s was 15.1, and for the Democratic Party was 52.7. Meanwhile, men in their 20s showed similar favorability ratings for both the People Power Party (32.6) and the Democratic Party (31.8).

● Furthermore, in an additional question posed to respondents with party favorability ratings below 50 points, 56% responded that the Democratic Party "evokes anger, and I want to question their wrongdoings." For the People Power Party, 60.6% responded that it is "disgusting, and I don't want to see them in politics." When the same question was asked about Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, the proportion responding "disgusting, and I don't want to see them in politics" was higher, at 66.3% and 60%, respectively. This can be interpreted as a deep emotional polarization and division, with a desire for the expulsion of rival parties from the political sphere.

● A majority of the public does not expect this polarization to improve. Instead, 57.8% of all respondents predicted that political conflict would intensify in the next year. This figure is overwhelmingly higher than the responses indicating it would "ease" (19.7%) or "remain unchanged" (22.5%).

II. Decline of Korean Democracy

"Public Trust in Korean Democracy Declines... Belief in the Democratic System Weakens"

● The proportion of respondents satisfied with the way Korean democracy operates did not exceed a majority, standing at 45.8%.

● The percentage of respondents evaluating the Korean political system as 'democratic' was also only 46.7%, while the proportion responding 'not democratic' increased to 32.7% from 21.6% in 2021.

● Perceptions of the democratic system varied according to respondents' party affiliation and socio-demographic characteristics. In contrast to 90.6% of Democratic Party supporters responding that "democracy is always better than any other system," only 61.4% of People Power Party supporters gave the same response, and 31.6% answered that "dictatorship is better than democracy depending on the situation." Furthermore, the response "for people like me, democracy or dictatorship makes no difference" was highest among unaffiliated voters (18.6%).

● Differences in belief in democracy were also observed based on gender and age. Regarding the statement "democracy is always better than any other system," 71.9% of men and 77.9% of women agreed, indicating that women's belief in democracy is relatively stronger. These differences were more pronounced among those in their 20s and 30s; the proportion responding that democracy is always better was 62.6% for men in their 20s and 64.2% for men in their 30s, while it was 80.9% for women in their 20s and 86.5% for women in their 30s, showing a significant gap.

III. Trust in Major Institutions and Electoral Fairness

"Trust in Key Institutions Supporting Democracy Shows Significant Differences by Party Affiliation"

● In a survey on trust in the President, 67.5% of respondents expressed distrust, a significant increase compared to 32.5% in 2021. In contrast, distrust in the National Assembly and the courts showed a downward trend. Distrust in the National Assembly was 59.0%, a decrease of 9.2 percentage points from 2021, and distrust in the courts also decreased by 22.4 percentage points to 40.2%.

● However, opposing trends were observed based on party affiliation. Among Democratic Party supporters, the proportion responding with distrust in the National Assembly was only 35.1%, whereas 85.1% of People Power Party supporters expressed distrust. The proportion responding with distrust in the courts was also overwhelmingly higher among People Power Party supporters (60.8%) compared to Democratic Party supporters (20.7%).

● Differences based on party affiliation were also confirmed in trust levels for the Constitutional Court and the National Election Commission. Among all respondents, 32.9% expressed distrust in the Constitutional Court, with 14.4% of Democratic Party supporters and 57.3% of People Power Party supporters distrusting it. These differences were even more pronounced for the National Election Commission, with 42% of all respondents expressing distrust. The proportions of distrust by party affiliation were 16.2% for the Democratic Party and 75% for the People Power Party, revealing a stark contrast.

● Regarding the fairness of the 20th Presidential Election in 2022, 68.8% of all respondents answered "fair," with little difference between progressives (70.4%) and conservatives (64%). However, in the evaluation of the fairness of the 22nd National Assembly election in 2024, a clear difference emerged between progressives and conservatives. 83% of progressive respondents answered it was fair, while only 52.2% of conservative respondents gave the same answer.

IV. Elite Politics, Populism

"High Interest in Politics... Deepening Distrust in Elite Politics"

● 68.4% of all respondents reported being interested in political issues, but interest levels were relatively lower among those in their 20s and 30s. The proportion responding they were not interested in politics was 41.2% for those in their 20s and 47.4% for those in their 30s.

● While 67.6% of respondents stated they were well-informed about the important political issues in our society, a majority (60.9%) felt that politicians and public officials do not pay attention to the opinions of people like them. Distrust in elite politics was particularly evident, with 90.5% responding that "many people are elected in elections, but there is little actual action." Furthermore, 86.2% agreed with the statement "politicians compromise to protect their privileges," and 72.5% agreed that "the difference in political positions between elites and the public is greater than the difference between ordinary citizens."

● Additionally, 70% disagreed with the statement "society is better run by a few leaders than by the general public," confirming the public's rejection of elite rule. Meanwhile, 47.6% of respondents agreed with the assertion "individuals must be willing to sacrifice for the nation," which is noteworthy as it indicates a tendency to accept individual sacrifice for the nation while opposing rule by a minority.

V. Institutional Reform

"Support for Distributing Presidential Power 47.3% vs. Maintaining Status Quo 36.7%... Clear Differences Between Progressives and Conservatives"

● A majority of respondents (53.2%) answered that "it is better to amend the constitution to change the current presidential system." By ideological leaning, 63.3% of progressive respondents and 47.9% of conservative respondents indicated the need for constitutional amendment, showing a tendency to support constitutional amendment more strongly among progressives.

● Regarding the distribution of presidential power, 47.3% of respondents answered, "The president holds strong power and it should be distributed," which is 7 percentage points higher than the response "maintain the current status" (36.7%). Differences based on ideological leaning were also clearly observed; 61.3% of progressive respondents agreed with distributing presidential power, while only 26.3% of conservative respondents agreed.

● Concerning the reform of the electoral system for National Assembly members, 64.7% of all respondents stated that the current system needs to be changed. The most common reason cited for the need for reform was "to overcome the negative effects of the polarized structure of major parties" (45.4%), followed by "because elected National Assembly members do not reflect the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the general public" (21.4%), and "because elected National Assembly members work only for their own constituencies" (19.4%).

VI. Foreign Policy

"Efforts to Unify Divided National Opinion' Increased by 15.3%p in Four Years... Reflecting Shifts in Foreign Policy Stance"

● The most frequently cited priority foreign policy for the government was "strengthening economic diplomacy" (29.8%), followed by "strengthening the ROK-US alliance" (24.6%) and "efforts to unify divided national opinion" (22.1%). This contrasts with the 2021 survey, where the order was "strengthening the ROK-US alliance" (21.2%), "strengthening economic diplomacy" (14.6%), and "responding to US-China competition" (13.4%). Notably, the proportion of respondents selecting "efforts to unify divided national opinion" increased by 15.3 percentage points over four years.

● Priority issues in foreign policy towards major countries varied by ideological leaning. Regarding North Korea policy, 44.6% of progressive respondents cited "expanding inter-Korean exchanges" as the top priority, while 41.5% of conservative respondents chose "strengthening security posture." Only 15.7% of conservative respondents cited "expanding inter-Korean exchanges."

● Differences based on ideological leaning were also prominent in ROK-US diplomacy. 50.4% of conservatives cited "strengthening the ROK-US alliance" as the top priority, a significant gap from the second highest response, "economic and advanced technology cooperation" (20.6%). In contrast, progressive respondents most frequently chose "establishing a horizontal ROK-US relationship" (32.6%), followed by "strengthening the ROK-US alliance" (26.6%).

● Regarding diplomacy with China, progressives, moderates, and conservatives showed similar trends. All three groups ranked "expanding economic exchanges and cooperation in advanced technology," "cooperation on fine dust, environment, climate change, and infectious diseases," and "responding to economic sanctions" as important, in that order.

● In diplomacy with Japan, until 2021, "resolving historical issues" was cited as a higher priority than "pursuing future-oriented cooperation in areas such as economy, technology, and security." However, in the 2025 survey, the ranking was reversed by a narrow margin. By ideological leaning, a majority (56.2%) of progressive respondents selected "resolving historical issues," with only 26.8% choosing "pursuing future-oriented cooperation." Conversely, 55.5% of conservative respondents chose "pursuing future-oriented cooperation," while only 24% cited "resolving historical issues" as a priority.

■ Responsible and Edited by:Song Chaerin_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr