⑧ South Korea's Democratic Diplomacy Amidst the Decline of the Liberal International Order

I. Introduction

South Korea's foreign policy entering the new year of 2025 has been frozen by an internal crisis of democracy. The martial law declared on the night of December 3rd was lifted six hours after its proclamation, as the President accepted the National Assembly's resolution for its repeal. This grave incident, which led to the National Assembly's impeachment proceedings against the President, has left a deep scar on the history of South Korean democracy. The subsequent process of resolution has been utterly chaotic. The most concerning aspect is that the political circles, driven by vested interests, are partisanly arguing for their own interpretations and applications of the law, while the state institutions meant to resolve these issues are showing signs of division in the absence of a control tower. The climax was the execution of an arrest warrant against President Yoon Suk-yeol on January 15th, which occurred after much turmoil. Showing the world the unprecedented scene of a sitting president being arrested in the nation's history, the question arises: will active diplomacy be possible on the international stage going forward?

Entering 2025, a regression in democratic diplomacy seems inevitable in both the United States and South Korea. The second Trump administration is expected to be characterized by mercantilist "America First" policies, a "peace through strength" approach with selective military and diplomatic engagement, a disregard for multilateral cooperation, and indifference to democratic norms (O’Brien 2024; Foreign Affairs Podcast 2024). This is a 180-degree departure from the Biden administration, which actively pursued democratic diplomacy to maintain the primacy of the liberal international order. South Korea's situation is even more dire. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration, while framing universal values around freedom, human rights, and the rule of law, has dealt a blow to South Korea's democratic diplomacy by hosting the Summit for Democracy, initiated by President Biden, in Seoul twice. President Yoon's declaration of an anachronistic martial law and his subsequent disregard for the rule of law in managing the crisis have damaged the democratic diplomacy South Korea had been building. It is time to swiftly restore democracy and construct a new narrative for South Korean democracy.

The uncertainty about what order the world will be under, and indeed whether any order is possible, seems to have grown even larger at this juncture entering 2025. While many speak of a "rules-based order" in international relations, adhering to international law and norms, who will truly uphold these rules? It has often been attributed to the expansion of illiberal forces, led by China and Russia, that the liberal order faces uncertainty and instability. This is not the case. The root of the uncertainty lies in the weakening of internal democracy within the advanced democratic states that have underpinned the liberal order, and the collapse of their external leadership.

Illiberal actions in international relations are directly caused by the authoritarianism of political leaders who instigate these problems, as seen in Russia's invasion of Ukraine or Israel's war in Gaza, and indirectly by the disunity of liberal states that could prevent them. The weakening of the liberal order goes hand in hand with the retreat of democracy as a political system, because the emphasis on individual freedom and human rights, respect for the rule of law, and growth through market economies in each country are linked to respect for national sovereignty in international relations, adherence to international law, and increased efficiency through market integration.

In the first half of the year, South Korean foreign policy will likely be focused on defensive diplomacy, attempting to decouple economics and security from domestic politics. However, once the political situation stabilizes, it will be necessary to normalize foreign policy and pursue a more active democratic diplomacy to make up for the lost ground. Having recognized that democratic dysfunction is not just a distant problem for developing countries but also our own, we must engage in international cooperation to defend and properly uphold democracy.

II. The Decline of Liberal Internationalist Political Forces

The liberal international order, established after World War II, has been sustained by the "liberal internationalism" foreign policy of major Western nations. This foreign policy has fostered market integration and institutionalized multilateral cooperation through alliances and partnerships among democratic countries in the West and Asia. This foreign policy was stable when democracy was widespread and consolidated. From the mid-1970s to the 1990s, over 30 countries democratized; Samuel Huntington termed this period the "third wave of democratization." However, since the late 2000s, the world has entered a period of reversal, with a decline in democracy. The Democracy Report 2024 by the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) indicates that the level of democracy individuals currently enjoy on average has fallen to the level of 1985, and at the national level, it has dropped to the level of 1998. In 2003, half of the world's population lived in autocratic states; by 2023, 71% lived under autocracy.[1]

The most significant problem amidst the global spread of illiberalism is the decline in vote share for major parties in Western democratic countries and the rise of right-wing parties. This trend is particularly pronounced in multi-party Western European nations, raising concerns about the decline of leadership in Germany and France, key representatives of the European Union's (EU) liberal camp. In Germany, the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) narrowly won the federal election in September 2021 with 25.7% of the vote, just slightly ahead of the center-right CDU/CSU alliance's 24.1%. The SPD formed a "traffic light coalition" with the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). However, Chancellor Olaf Scholz, leading the coalition, faced a vote of no confidence in parliament on December 16th after dismissing the FDP finance minister who opposed tax increases. This collapse of the three-year traffic light coalition has led to early elections scheduled for February 23rd. Meanwhile, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) not only entered the European Parliament with 15.9% of the vote in the June 2024 EU elections but has also expanded its influence in several regional governments. Germany appears unlikely to pursue active diplomacy for a considerable period due to domestic political instability and significant economic challenges.

France is also experiencing considerable political turmoil. Following a defeat by the far-right National Rally (RN) in the EU parliamentary elections, French President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the National Assembly and called for early elections. In the July 7th runoff, the left-wing coalition New Popular Front (NFP), which came in first, and the pro-government coalition (Ensemble), which came in second, were able to form a coalition government excluding the National Rally, which finished third. Subsequently, President Macron ignored demands from the left-wing coalition to appoint a Prime Minister from their party. After the Prime Minister he appointed faced a vote of no confidence, President Macron appointed François Bayrou as the new Prime Minister in December. It remains uncertain whether Macron, facing pressure from both the far-left and the far-right, can stabilize the political situation and continue to be a voice for the liberal camp.

The results of the European Parliament elections held in June 2024 saw European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen secure a second term, with her center-right political group, the European People's Party (EPP), winning the most seats with 188. The center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) followed with 136 seats, and the centrist Renew Europe secured 77 seats. While these three political groups were able to form a majority coalition, hard-right and far-right political groups gained significant ground, securing 187 out of the total 720 seats in the European Parliament, in contrast to the Green Party's heavy losses (European Parliament 2024). The center-right EU leadership faces the challenge of accommodating far-right forces to maintain unity, but tensions are expected to escalate. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been in power for 15 years, is a prominent opponent of European integration within the EU, pursuing pro-Russia and pro-China policies. Rather than leaving the EU, he has sought to cause conflict as a member state by advocating for national sovereignty. He has not only obstructed Sweden's NATO accession for two years but has also consistently opposed EU support for Ukraine.

The event that capped off the election year of 2024 was the US presidential election in November, where former President Trump secured a comfortable victory with 312 electoral votes, well exceeding the magic number of 270. In the concurrent congressional elections, the Republican Party secured 220 out of 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 53 out of 100 seats in the Senate, gaining control of both the government and both chambers of Congress. This increases the likelihood that President Trump's "America First" foreign policy, upon his inauguration on January 20th, will face little opposition from Congress. As the United States has a two-party political structure, its major parties have not weakened as seen in Western European multi-party democracies. Instead, the US political landscape is experiencing illiberalism due to extreme partisan confrontation and the Republican Party's shift to the right. Traditional neoliberal conservatives within the Republican Party have declined, while a new right, characterized by post-liberalism, white Christian nationalism, and patriarchal family values, has gained prominence (Cha Tae-seo 2024). The extent to which the new right political forces within the Republican Party, in alliance with the populist MAGA (Make America Great Again) movement, influence American politics will shape the key policies of the Trump administration.

Many analyses diagnose the decline of mainstream parties and the rise of right-wing parties as a backlash against globalization. Right-wing populism, characterized by anti-elite ideology and national identity discourse, advocates for opposition to economic inequality, rejection of immigration, and defense of sovereignty against transnational rules. Trubowitz and Burgoon argue that while Western democratic leaders actively pursued trade and investment liberalization and strengthened transnational agreements and institutions from the 1990s onwards, they neglected domestic socioeconomic protection policies unlike in the past, creating a "solvency gap" for voters who had supported liberal foreign policies. Meanwhile, the disappearance of geopolitical threats following the end of the Cold War led to socioeconomic anxieties, causing traditional liberal supporters to back anti-globalist and nationalist parties (Trubowitz and Burgoon 2023).

Notably, the large-scale influx of refugees into Europe starting around 2015 due to the Syrian civil war and other conflicts played a decisive role in exacerbating existing economic grievances. In almost all Western European countries, 10% to 30% of voters harbor xenophobic sentiments and participate in far-right parties or movements; these are typically less educated white individuals residing in underdeveloped areas far from urban centers. This trend is also evident in the United States, but Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that unlike in Europe, only in the US could an extremist like Trump become president and subsequently incite the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot by denying the results of the 2020 election (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2023). President Trump's second administration is about to begin, and the international ripple effects of his foreign policy as president of the superpower United States will be immense.

It is noteworthy that in the United States, where individual freedom is cherished above all, philosophical and cultural critiques of liberalism are emerging and beginning to serve as an ideological foundation for MAGA movement supporters. Patrick J. Deneen, a prominent critic of liberalism, argues that liberalism, in its pursuit of maximizing freedom from external constraints, has dismantled customs and communities. Paradoxically, to maintain order among unconstrained individuals, it has led to the expansion of the administrative state. By the same logic, in the economic sphere, it has dismantled borders and globalized markets in the name of free choice. Deneen contends that the MAGA and similar popular movements represent a desire by individuals, who have lost power within this vast structure created in the name of freedom, to regain political control over an unmanageable administrative state and a denationalized economy (Deneen 2019).[2]

Counterarguments to these critiques of liberalism from the right are also fervent. Francis Fukuyama posits three principles that justify liberalism, as established in the late 17th century. First, practical legitimacy: "Liberalism is an institutional solution that allows diverse people to live peacefully without resorting to violence." Second, moral legitimacy: "A free society protects human dignity by granting citizens equal rights to live their lives autonomously." Third, economic legitimacy: "It spurs private property rights, economic growth, and modernization." Fukuyama argues that the increasing criticisms of liberalism today are not due to inherent flaws in the ideology itself, but rather because extreme transformations of liberalism by both the left and the right have undermined its legitimacy. While right-wing neoliberals, in their pursuit of economic autonomy free from state intervention, have caused today's economic inequality and damaged its economic legitimacy, the left, by absolutizing individual values and autonomous choices, has eroded social norms and harmed tolerance, a core principle of liberalism (Fukuyama 2022).[3]

It is concerning that liberalism, which served as the ideological foundation against fascism and communism in the 20th century, is now being criticized in American society without a clear alternative. As individuals worldwide are still not free from authoritarian customs or government control, democracy based on liberal values, i.e., liberal democracy, must be defended and spread. Furthermore, the anti-globalization sentiment arising from critiques of economic liberalism is dangerous as it leads to a disregard for international cooperation on security and trade. In particular, nationalist sovereignty combined with religious and racial exclusion can be toxic to liberal internationalism. Considering these issues, to protect liberal democracy and the liberal international order, we must rebalance transnational international cooperation with the establishment of domestic social safety nets, and pursue more gradual and flexible integration policies for diverse races and cultures.

III. Reconfiguring South Korea's Democratic Diplomacy

In an era where leadership to champion and support global democracy has weakened, is democratic diplomacy feasible for South Korea? There is no need to fall into skepticism, asking how we can speak of leadership when we cannot even manage our own affairs. By demonstrating the resilience of South Korean democracy, which has successfully navigated past crises, to both domestic and international audiences, we can provide an international reference for how to prevent illiberal political changes when they occur. The tasks that can be considered sequentially are as follows:

First, South Korea is facing a critical test with the ongoing impeachment proceedings. How this process is handled is crucial not only for the history of South Korean democracy but also for the international community's assessment of the nation's standing. The political circles must support the Constitutional Court in conducting its trial according to due process for the impeachment motion passed by the National Assembly, and bipartisanly accept the outcome. The political sphere has a responsibility to prove the resilience of South Korean democracy by prioritizing national interest over partisan interests during this process.

Second, having experienced the unprecedented declaration of martial law and the National Assembly's third impeachment motion against a president since democratization, not only the political community but also our citizens must engage in serious introspection regarding South Korean democracy. The fact that all three impeachment attempts occurred during periods of a minority opposition party holding a majority in the National Assembly demonstrates the general vulnerability of the presidential system under a divided government. In South Korea, where the legacy of a hegemonic presidency is strong, confrontations with a National Assembly led by the opposition party are particularly severe. Simultaneously, the extremism aimed at paralyzing the president and government when the opposition party holds a majority has intensified with each change of administration, even if conducted within ostensibly legal boundaries, and must be avoided. Levitsky and Ziblatt warn that the abuse of institutional powers to eliminate partisan rivals, a form of extremism, undermines democratic processes (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Today, our political parties, regardless of whether they are in power or opposition, engage in such extremist confrontations, effectively asking the judiciary to resolve issues that should be settled through political means. If the political sphere cannot resolve these issues through democratic politics characterized by mutual tolerance and restraint, extreme partisan politics will lead to irreparable national division. It is time to seek ways to mitigate political polarization through political reforms, such as amending the winner-take-all electoral system. If these structural problems are not addressed, even after overcoming the current situation, another crisis may arise, and it could be even more unsightly.

Third, it has become difficult for South Korea and other Asian democracies to expect leadership in democratic diplomacy from the United States. Rather than scattering because the leader has disappeared, we should more actively engage in diplomacy to protect and champion democracy, along with countries like Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Furthermore, we should step forward to support and assist emerging democracies in the region and around the world. Middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region that are committed to liberal democracy are well aware of the challenges of this transitional period marked by weakened Western democratic leadership, which paradoxically increases the potential for cooperation.

Fourth, we are entering an era where the Global South is emerging, asserting its voice for national interests without being caught between great powers and cooperating on an issue-by-issue basis. The Global South largely consists of countries that hold elections but have not yet reached the standards of liberal democracy. In these countries, economic development is often prioritized over democratization. South Korea, having experienced economic development preceding democratization, can share its trial-and-error experiences to help these nations pursue inclusive development and democratization tailored to their respective circumstances.

Fifth, South Korea's civil society and non-governmental organizations have been preoccupied with domestic issues and have not paid much attention to democracy abroad. For democratic diplomacy to be sustainable, people-to-people diplomacy is crucial, rather than relying solely on intergovernmental cooperation. Now that we are in a period of reflection and introspection after having taken pride in South Korea's democratic achievements, each of us must seriously consider what we can do in our respective positions for the democracy of this nation and for global citizens whose freedom and human rights are being violated. ■

References

Cha Tae-seo. 2024. “The Rise of the New Right and the Future of America.” EAI Working Paper. December 19. https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22693&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: January 12, 2025)

Deneen, Patrick. 2019. Why Liberalism Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.

European Parliament. 2024. “The Political groups of the European Parliament.” As of 16 July 2024. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/political-groups(Accessed January 12, 2025)

Foreign Affairs Podcast. 2024. “The World of Trump 2.0: A Conversation With Daniel Drezner and Kori Schake.” November 8. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/world-trump-second-term-foreign-policy(Accessed January 12, 2025)

Fukuyama, Francis. 2022. Liberalism and Its Discontents. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. How Democracies Die. New York: Broadway Books.

______. 2023. Tyranny of the Minority. New York: Crown.

O’Brien, Robert C. 2024. “The Return of Peace Through Strength: Making the Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs. June 18. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-peace-strength-trump-obrien(Accessed January 12, 2025)

Trubowitz, Peter, and Brian Burgoon. 2023. Geopolitics and Democracy: The Western Liberal Order from Foundation to Fracture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

V-Dem Institute. 2024. “Democracy Report 2024.” https://v-dem.net/documents/44/v-dem_dr2024_highres.pdf (Accessed January 12, 2025)

[1] It is reported that 42 countries are currently sliding into autocracy, 28 of which were originally democracies, and only half of these were able to maintain their democratic status in 2023 (V-Dem Institute 2024).

[2] Deneen argues that liberalism, characterized by its pursuit of conquering nature (e.g., gender distinctions), timelessness, spacelessness, and borderlessness, dismantles fundamental social structures such as family, community, and religion.

[3] The author seeks avenues for improvement from the original principles, as dissatisfaction with contemporary liberalism stems from a distortion of classical liberalism. This includes maintaining the primacy of individual freedom over the collective while exercising restraint, regulating public speech while respecting freedom of the press and privacy, restoring decentralized governance and trust in government, and prioritizing redistribution over growth.

■ Lee Sook-jong_Senior Fellow at the East Asia Institute, Professor Extraordinary at Sungkyunkwan University.

■ Manager and Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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