[New Year Special Commentary Series] ③ North Korea and the World in 2025: US-China Relations, the Russia-Ukraine War, and Trump

The world in 2025 will be turbulent. The return of Donald J. Trump presents a possibility for new turning points in US-China relations, the Russia-Ukraine war, and North Korea-US relations. North Korea, considering these circumstances, has been developing its own strategies and countermeasures. This article analyzes North Korea's foreign policy pursuits from various angles and forecasts the phenomena that will emerge as North Korea confronts the changes in the global order in 2025.

I. North Korea's Worldview: New Cold War and US-China Relations

North Korea's perspective on the world order has not significantly changed. While refraining from using the term 'new Cold War,' it continues to express a dichotomous worldview, dividing the world into a bloc of 'pro-sovereignty forces' versus a bloc of 'hegemonic forces,' effectively seeking to establish blocs. Kim Jong Un first mentioned the new Cold War in a speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in 2021, declaring, "The structure of international relations is changing into a new Cold War structure" (KCNA, September 29, 2021). The following year, at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in December 2022, it was confirmed that "it has clearly shifted to a new Cold War system" (Rodong Sinmun, December 27, 2022), and at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2023, it was stated again that "the new Cold War structure has become a reality on a global scale" (KCNA, September 27, 2023).

However, since then, Kim Jong Un has been cautious about using the term 'new Cold War.' At the 8th Central Committee's 11th Plenary Meeting last December, Kim Jong Un reportedly "outlined the characteristics of the current international situation, where the growth and advancement of the pro-sovereignty bloc are prominent and the position of the hegemonic bloc is rapidly weakening and declining" (Rodong Sinmun, December 29, 2024). He also advocated for a "fluid international relations structure" and the "construction of a just multipolar world." North Korea still appears to favor a complete bloc system, similar to the Cold War era, dividing the world into a 'pro-sovereignty bloc' centered around North Korea and a 'hegemonic bloc' centered around the United States, in a form of protracted struggle. Through this, North Korea desires to become a core state within a bloc that plays a role in the world order, rather than being an outcast nation. However, since mid-2023, 'new Cold War' has disappeared from at least Kim Jong Un's official statements, as China does not favor the term. China has consistently expressed its firm opposition to any division, including a new Cold War, stating that the Biden administration is building a bloc-based division of the world.

Therefore, whether a bloc structure at the level North Korea desires, even if not a new Cold War, can be established in 2025 could determine the success or failure of North Korea's foreign strategy. The key ultimately lies in US-China relations. Currently, two predictions are presented. First, with the launch of a second Trump term, similar to the end of his first term, he may re-initiate an ideological war by labeling the Chinese Communist Party as "bankrupt totalitarianism" (O’Keeffe and Mauldin 2020) and pursue decoupling across economic spheres, including supply chains. Second, Trump may re-initiate a trade war by imposing a 60% plus 10% tariff on China, but reach an agreement that significantly reduces the trade deficit, leading to a stable management of US-China relations. Given Trump's approach to foreign relations, which differentiates between friendly, rival, and hostile nations based on cost-benefit analysis, it is projected that he could limit ideological competition if clear US interests are reflected.

North Korea would naturally prefer the former scenario. In this case, China would build a bloc to counter the United States, and North Korea would be included as an ally. A specific manifestation would be the neutralization of sanctions. Currently, unlike Russia, China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, does not officially deny sanctions against North Korea that were passed with its consent. However, if Trump's offensive reaches the aforementioned level, China's sanctions against North Korea could be significantly weakened. Furthermore, if the situation escalates to China's departure from the US-led economic order, North Korea could gain access to an anti-US alternative economic model, which it is already pursuing. North Korea desires to build a new bloc with Russia and eventually China. North Korea may move in a direction different from the economic development through incorporation into the US-led economic order that Trump offered, and the lifting of sanctions that it sought in negotiations with the United States in 2018-19. This means that the targets of trade, such as coal, iron ore, and labor that North Korea produces, may not be Western countries. North Korea may seek its place in a newly reorganized economic order, rather than pursuing economic cooperation with the West, including the United States and South Korea (Hwang Il-do 2024, p. 6).

If US-China relations are managed stably to a certain extent, as in the second scenario, North Korea's foreign relations difficulties will persist. As will be discussed later, North Korea's choice to engage in the Russia-Ukraine war has been a strategic misstep. In this situation, as long as the Russia-Ukraine war continues, China may continue to distance itself from North Korea. Furthermore, it will become more difficult for Russia to transfer key technologies that North Korea desires, such as multi-warhead and re-entry technologies for intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear-powered submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. China may also not want North Korea to acquire the capability to strike the US mainland, as the United States could significantly expand its missile defense and attack systems in Northeast Asia to counter China, citing this as a reason. Moreover, as the global economy is not divided, the US-led economic order will remain in place, and consequently, China's neutralization of sanctions against North Korea will be limited. The 'pro-sovereignty bloc' economy that North Korea envisions will likely remain at the level of cooperation with Russia, which is significantly depleting its national strength due to the war.

A complete severance of US-China relations and division into two blocs is unrealistic. China maintains the top trading partner status with over 120 countries, and although its share of the global economy in 2023 was approximately 16.88%, a decrease from 2022 (World Bank Group n.d.), it is impossible to completely decouple from an economy of this magnitude. Therefore, the second scenario is more realistic, and this can be defined as a "transactional conflict relationship" (Ha Young-sun 2025). In this case, the new Cold War world envisioned by North Korea will remain a wishful thinking.

II. North Korea and Alliances: The Direction of the Russia-Ukraine War

As of January 2025, the Russia-Ukraine war is generally unfavorable for Ukraine. Although the front lines have been stalemated since last year, Russia, with the involvement of North Korean forces, is recapturing some of the territory occupied by Ukraine in the Kursk region (Drozdiak 2024). Furthermore, with Trump's pledge to end the war within 24 hours of taking office, active steps toward a ceasefire or armistice are also expected. A ceasefire in the form of a 'frozen conflict' maintaining the current front lines is also disadvantageous for Ukraine.

However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is likely to ultimately prove to be a strategic misstep. Even if Russia occupies parts of Ukrainian territory and prevents NATO membership, the costs incurred are too high. Europe will no longer engage in meaningful economic exchange with Russia, including natural gas imports. Considering the costs Russia has paid for the war and future economic relations, its national strength is bound to further weaken, especially since its economy and defense spending were similar to South Korea's even before the war. Gazprom, the state-owned energy company and a key source of national revenue, has seen its profits continuously decline since the start of the war, falling by 50% in 2023 compared to the previous year (Interfax n.d.). If the war continues in 2025, Russia is expected to allocate 40% of its total budget to defense spending. In a situation already experiencing 9% inflation, the wartime economy will further drive up prices. The difficulty in troop supply is sufficiently explained by the deployment of North Korean forces. Therefore, after the war, Russia may remain a 'regional power' rather than a global power, as predicted by Barack Obama during his presidency (Zakaria 2024). Russia's passive observation of the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, which it had supported for two generations, clearly demonstrates Russia's limitations.

Given this situation, North Korea's cooperation with Russia is limited. Even under the special circumstances of the war, the transfer of key nuclear-related technologies that North Korea truly desires has not been confirmed. Russia has never transferred such highly sensitive technologies since the Soviet era, and this will be further restricted with the launch of a second Trump term. With Trump prioritizing homeland defense based on his "America First" policy, Russia's technological support to North Korea could pose a direct threat to the United States, leading to severe retaliation. Russia, which will effectively have to cooperate with the United States in the process of ending the Russia-Ukraine war, will consider this situation. Even after the war, Russia will not be able to restore economic relations with Europe and may seek economic cooperation with South Korea based on the 'New Eastern Policy' that Vladimir Putin has already announced. While Russia may continue to cooperate with North Korea and attempt to form a sphere of influence, the level of cooperation is likely to be different from the situation where it relied on North Korea due to a shortage of weapons and personnel.

III. Prospects for North Korea-US Negotiations: Trump and Kim Jong Un

The most anticipated development in the Korean Peninsula situation in 2025 is the resumption of North Korea-US negotiations. During the last US presidential election, Trump repeatedly invoked Kim Jong Un, raising expectations for dialogue. However, even if North Korea-US negotiations resume, they are expected to unfold very differently from 2018-19.[1] North Korea will attempt negotiations based on bloc politics, as mentioned earlier. Instead of slogans like improving North Korea-US relations and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, as included in the US-North Korea Singapore agreement announced in June 2018, North Korea is expected to solidify the US's position as a rival and pursue 'nuclear disarmament' in a manner similar to the US-Soviet Union. This would be akin to negotiations aimed at preventing accidental conflict and nuclear escalation in a structured state of military confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. North Korea may pursue a "negotiation framework that solidifies the new Cold War structure" rather than negotiations seeking normalization of North Korea-US relations and peace on the Korean Peninsula by eliminating military confrontation (Hwang Il-do 2024, p. 5). North Korea has repeatedly stated that a diplomatic strategy focused on negotiations with the United States is no longer effective. For example, after Trump was nominated as the Republican presidential candidate, North Korea's KCNA published a commentary titled 'Whether the Second Hand of US-DPRK Confrontation Stops Depends on US Actions,' stating, "We do not care which US administration comes into power," indicating its lack of interest in improving relations with the United States (KCNA, July 23, 2024).

Conversely, Trump may attempt to restore communication channels with Kim Jong Un early on, but he will consider 'linked politics.' The negotiation environment of 2018 and the current security situation are different. Unlike before, Trump is now exposed to conflicts that take precedence over the Korean Peninsula issue, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East situation. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, North Korea has deployed troops. Trump's competition with China, which is at the top of his foreign policy agenda, is also linked to North Korea (Hwang Il-do 2024, pp. 1-2). While China opposes the new Cold War bloc politics, it is also true that it prefers a multipolar system with Russia and North Korea, challenging the US's sole superpower status.[2]

Due to these interconnected international dynamics, Trump's North Korea policy may also differ from before. The North Korean issue is not a priority in Trump's foreign policy. From Trump's perspective, seeking an end or armistice to the Russia-Ukraine war, which is consuming astronomical amounts of US taxpayer money, may take precedence. In that case, contact with North Korea to resolve the Russia-Ukraine war, which has become more complicated due to North Korea's troop deployment, could be important. This means he may attempt to isolate North Korea first, which is linked to the Russia-Ukraine war. In the early stages of his administration, Trump may try to restore communication channels with Kim Jong Un and limit the close ties between North Korea and Russia. After an armistice in the Russia-Ukraine war becomes visible, he may engage in more substantive dialogue with North Korea, but first, he may try to create an atmosphere to manage North Korea so that it does not act as a 'spoiler' (Hwang Il-do 2024, pp. 2-3).

If North Korea-US negotiations intensify, the limitation of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and corresponding US compensation could be the starting point. However, the formula discussed in Hanoi in February 2019 between the US and North Korea – North Korea's declaration of nuclear material production facilities and sanctions relief as compensation – is unlikely to be applied anymore.

Trump will first seek to eliminate North Korea's capability to strike the US mainland with nuclear weapons. It is uncertain whether he will pursue complete denuclearization of North Korea, but Trump needs to at least eliminate the threat to the US mainland to declare political victory and showcase it as his achievement. Trump meticulously assesses actual gains as negotiations approach. This means he will not make the mistake of lifting sanctions solely for a moratorium on North Korea's nuclear and missile tests. Just as he uses tariffs as an all-purpose tool to pressure other countries, Trump believes in the effectiveness of sanctions. Trump has repeatedly stated that sanctions provide him with leverage in negotiations, as they continue even when negotiations are stalled (Gordon et al. 2019). Given that North Korea began developing the KN-23, a short-range nuclear-capable missile, in May 2019, and has overtly resumed testing intercontinental ballistic missiles since 2022, and considering its advanced nuclear capabilities, Trump is likely to deem lifting sanctions for a mere temporary suspension of nuclear and missile tests as a loss in terms of transaction costs.

Rather, he will seek to eliminate North Korea's capability to strike the US mainland, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered submarines, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that it has been developing. The aim is to definitively prevent North Korea from acquiring assured retaliation capabilities against the US. It is necessary to neutralize not only North Korea's ongoing nuclear development but also its long-term development path. Trump may view these measures by North Korea as a bargaining chip to ensure US security at a minimal level (Hwang Il-do 2024, p. 5).

North Korea's calculations will be different. If it accepts Trump's demands, the utility of North Korean nuclear weapons will be significantly reduced. North Korea will never be able to complete its assured retaliation capability against the United States. A country without such capability initiating a nuclear war would inevitably face massive retaliation and defeat (Freedman 2003), making it essentially an act of suicide. However, despite these limitations, if North Korea abandons the development of capabilities to strike the US mainland, the political and military significance of its nuclear weapons will be limited to securing the capability to strike South Korea. Even this is further diminished if the US guarantees robust extended deterrence to South Korea. If the defense commitment that 'any use of nuclear weapons by North Korea against South Korea will result in the end of the North Korean regime' is maintained at a high level, North Korea can never use nuclear weapons against South Korea. Therefore, Kim Jong Un must pursue negotiations that leave room for the development of capabilities to strike the US mainland, regardless of the final possibility of completion. This means accepting Trump's demands is difficult (Hwang Il-do 2024, pp. 2, 6). In conclusion, meaningful results in achieving North Korean denuclearization through North Korea-US denuclearization negotiations are unlikely to be achieved after the launch of the Trump administration. During the period of stalled negotiations, North Korea will continue to advance its nuclear capabilities.

IV. North Korea in 2025

The world that Kim Jong Un faces in 2025 will not be easy. While some predict that a 'window of opportunity' will open for North Korea due to factors such as closer North Korea-Russia ties, intensified US-China conflict, Trump's emergence, and the domestic political situation in South Korea, the global situation is not favorable to North Korea. It is questionable whether North Korea, which has invested in a weakening Russia, can reap commensurate benefits for the sacrifices of its deployed troops. As Trump seeks an end to the Russia-Ukraine war, he may demand that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukraine and normalize relations with North Korea. The US-China conflict also carries significant uncertainties. Trump may leverage the North Korean issue in negotiations with China to demand increased pressure on North Korea. Unlike Joe Biden's US, which responds to adversaries based on principles and norms within the liberal international order, Trump's approach is likely to be far more flexible (Weisman 2024), especially given his admiration for William McKinley, who attempted exceptional imperialist wars in American history. Trump, who prioritizes winning in the process as much as the outcome of a deal, is unlikely to offer unconditional appeasement to Kim Jong Un. Most importantly, it is uncertain whether the bloc structure of US-Japan-South Korea vs. China-Russia, which Kim Jong Un desires, will be established in the international landscape of 2025. Perhaps recognizing this, Kim Jong Un instructed at the plenary meeting last December to "respond swiftly and flexibly to the changing dynamics of international relations" (Rodong Sinmun, December 29, 2024). The domestic political situation in South Korea, which could be an opportunity for North Korea, will also be resolved in due course. Therefore, 2025 will be another year of challenges for Kim Jong Un. ■

References

Ha Young-sun. 2025. “The Three Great Global Leadership Crises and Opportunities.” EAI New Year Special Visible Commentary. January 2. https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22840&board=kor_multimedia(Accessed: January 6, 2025)

Hwang Il-do. 2024. “Trump-Kim Jong Un Bromance 2.0? Differences Between 2018 and 2025.” IFANS FOCUS, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. November 12.

Drozdiak, Natalia. 2024. “Ukraine Risks Losing All the Russian Land It Seized Within Months.” Bloomberg. December 27. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-27/russia-ukraine-war-moscow-could-soon-retake-all-of-kursk-region(Accessed January 6, 2025)

Freedman, Lawrence. 2003. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gordon, Michael R, Vivian Salama, and Jonathan Cheng. 2019. “Trump, North Korea’s Kim Seek Path to Denuclearization.” The Wall Street Journal. February 28. https://www.wsj.com/articles/president-trump-meets-north-korean-leader-a-second-time-11551267951(Accessed January 6, 2025)

Interfax. n.d. “Gazprom’s Profit Plunges More than 40% Following Ukraine War.” https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/(Accessed January 6, 2025)

O’Keeffe, Kate, and William Mauldin. 2020. “Mike Pompeo Urges Chinese People to Change Communist Party.” The Wall Street Journal. July 23. https://www.wsj.com/articles/secretary-of-state-pompeo-to-urge-chinese-people-to-change-the-communist-party-11595517729(Accessed January 6, 2025)

Weisman, Jonathan. 2024. “Trump Praises Tariffs, and William McKinley, to Power Broker.” The New York Times. September 5. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/05/us/politics/trump-tariffs-william-mckinley.html(Accessed January 6, 2025)

World Bank Group. n.d. “World Bank national accounts data – GDP (current US$).” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (Accessed January 6, 2025)

Zakaria, Fareed. 2024. “Russia is weaker than you think.” The Washington Post. December 13. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/12/13/russia-weak-assad-economy-empire/ (Accessed January 6, 2025)

[1] The following content relies heavily on the research of the late Professor Hwang Il-do of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, who contemplated the North Korean nuclear issue with the author. We wish to commemorate the deceased and widely disseminate his outstanding analysis and foresight.

[2] The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in its white paper, "China's Proposals for the Reform and Construction of Global Governance," that multipolarization and economic globalization are continuously developing. White Paper on "China's Proposals for the Reform and Construction of Global Governance" (September 13, 2023).

■ Park Won-gon_Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute, Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr