[New Year Special Commentary Series] ② China's Search for a New Global Role: Strategy Toward the US and the Korean Peninsula

I. China's Search for a 'New Role' Through Five Global Capabilities and Its Constraints

China expresses concern and vigilance regarding the international situation in 2025. It is concerned that the international community will become more uncertain and unstable, with increased risks of conflict, division, and confrontation, leading to a complex and chaotic environment. In particular, China is wary of decoupling, unilateralism, and ideological offensives led by the United States, ahead of the potential launch of a second Trump administration. Nevertheless, China asserts that it will seek a new role in the chaotic international order and possesses the capabilities to do so. China also states that international expectations for its active role in global conflicts and challenges are growing.

China is asserting that it will play a new role in the international community by newly presenting five capabilities: peace, unity, openness, justice, and inclusiveness (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2024c). The fact that China has presented a new diplomatic paradigm that designs its diplomatic targets and strategies based on these five capabilities and seeks a new role in the chaotic international community signifies a major shift from its existing diplomatic paradigm. Historically, China has maintained a paradigm of distinguishing diplomatic targets into major powers, neighboring countries, developing countries, and multilateral arenas, and devising and implementing specific diplomatic strategies for these targets based on timing and issues. The presentation of a new diplomatic paradigm that designs diplomatic targets and strategies based on its own capabilities has significant implications. It conveys the message that China perceives itself as possessing, or capable of possessing, the identity, status, and capabilities of a global leader. Extending this, China intends to design and implement comprehensive diplomacy targeting the entire world, without necessarily distinguishing between diplomatic targets and arenas as before.

The theme of the '2024 International Situation and China's Diplomacy' seminar, attended and addressed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi for the 13th consecutive year, was 'Global Transformation and China's New Role' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2024d). As the seminar's theme suggests, while China is wary of the uncertainties and challenges posed by the potential emergence of a second Trump administration, it also openly expresses its intention to seize the opportunity presented by the vacuum in global leadership to expand its role and influence. President Xi Jinping also re-emphasized the 'responsible great power' theory, first proposed in 1997, in his 2025 New Year's address. He stated that in a chaotic and complex world, China will take responsibility as a great power, actively promote the transformation of global governance, and deepen unity and cooperation with the Global South (People's Daily, January 1, 2025).

Specifics of the new role China envisions have also been presented. For instance, Foreign Minister Wang Yi identified four major hotspots where China will play a constructive role through its peace capabilities: the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Palestine war, the Korean Peninsula, and the Myanmar issue. A commonality among these four hotspots is that China has consistently advocated for 'political solutions' alongside a 'constructive role.' The underlying intention of China's 'political solution' is to highlight US responsibility, and therefore it is difficult to view this as an expression of China's new will to play a substantive role. Although Wang Yi mentioned a 'constructive role' through these four hotspots, China's role in resolving major issues, including the two wars, has been practically limited. In essence, rather than envisioning a new, leading, and proactive role, China is preparing for potential new attempts and changes in the context of the two wars and the North Korean nuclear issue following the emergence of a second Trump administration, aiming to protect its national interests by countering the US and maintaining its influence in this process. This can be seen as a preparation within the framework of its strategy toward the US.

While China expresses its desire to expand its role and influence in the chaotic international landscape, its ability to do so will inevitably be constrained in 2025 due to complex domestic challenges. In particular, China faces the reality of prioritizing economic recovery and regime stability while responding to the unpredictable new challenge of a potential Trump return to power. President Xi Jinping also emphasized in his New Year's address that China's economy faces challenges from new circumstances and external uncertainties, and that the 14th Five-Year Plan must be completed in 2025.

Since the beginning of Xi Jinping's second term, China's foreign policy strategy has essentially focused on domestic development and the maintenance and strengthening of the Communist Party's regime based on this development. China has presented a long-term development plan to build a 'modern socialist powerful country with Chinese characteristics' by 2049, the second centenary. In this process, it has presented a development vision to achieve phased development goals, setting intermediate targets for 2035 and 2029, the 80th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, which was newly presented as a development stage at the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee in July 2024. Therefore, its foreign policy strategy must also focus on creating an external environment and conditions conducive to achieving these phased development plans. The most significant practical challenge China faces in achieving its long-term development plan is securing its development rights while circumventing the US's decoupling and de-risking offensive. The new role and global leadership China envisions in the international community must ultimately be a part of its diplomatic strategy to secure development rights, which is the reality China faces.

II. The Emergence of a Second Trump Administration: China's Prospects and Strategy

1. The Dilemma of Four Red Lines in China-US Relations

China's diplomacy toward the US is also designed with a long-term strategic focus, aligning with its national long-term development plan, and tends to prioritize continuity over change. China emphasizes the stability and continuity of its US diplomacy strategy. However, the return of a Trump administration presents a new variable and a significant challenge to China's long-term US diplomacy strategy. In 2025, China faces the diplomatic challenge of managing its economy while preparing for the uncertainties of a potential second Trump administration. China fundamentally views strategic competition with the US as an unavoidable long-term race and seeks to manage US-China relations stably by delaying it as much as possible. China recalls the foundation for strategic communication and cooperation laid at the San Francisco summit with the Biden administration in 2023 and emphasizes dialogue, conflict management, trust-building, and expanded cooperation between the two countries. China hopes to maintain stable relations with a potential second Trump administration as well.

However, China is reserving judgment and preparing for various possibilities, as it is difficult to predict in which areas and how the Trump administration's offensive against China will unfold, and what its ultimate objectives will be. China may seek to manage the situation by avoiding conflict and confrontation as much as possible, assuming that a second Trump administration will launch a persistent and strong offensive against China from the outset. Meanwhile, if opportunities arise, China will seek to expand its role as a global leader by leveraging its five capabilities.

However, China faces challenges in responding when the US offensive continues in areas where it is difficult to respond flexibly due to the nature of its political system. The four red lines that China has repeatedly asserted toward the US, namely the Taiwan issue, system and institutions, democracy and human rights, and development rights, as articulated at the APEC summit in Lima in 2024 and in Wang Yi's speeches, represent China's diplomatic concerns. China seeks stable, healthy, and sustainable development of relations with the US but is preemptively warning that the four red lines must not be crossed. These four red lines are more specific than the existing three core interests of security, sovereignty, and development, and they more strongly reflect China's concerns about regime security. In essence, China is sending a message to a potential second Trump administration that it is most wary of attacks on its system and that there is no room for compromise on this issue. Nevertheless, if the Trump administration crosses these red lines and continues its offensive, the Xi Jinping government will have little room for flexibility and will face the dilemma of being unable to avoid the worst-case scenario of conflict and confrontation. In short, the realization of China's envisioned new global role hinges on how it can manage the significant obstacle of the 'Trump variable.'

2. Prospects and Challenges of Comprehensive Diplomacy Based on Five Capabilities

While China expresses concern and vigilance about the new tensions and uncertainties in the international situation that could arise from Trump's return, it also harbors expectations for new opportunities due to the potential vacuum in global leadership. China anticipates the possibility of new tensions arising between the US and its allies after the inauguration of a second Trump administration and intends to pursue comprehensive diplomacy by exploring strategic measures to actively exploit these gaps.

In presenting its comprehensive diplomacy, Wang Yi particularly emphasizes multilateral cooperation through organizations such as Russia, Europe, the Global South, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS, and outlines specific cooperation directions and strategies. China claims that through these efforts, it will leverage its five capabilities and expand its role in the international community. However, the reality is that the strategy-driven focus on countering the US in China's comprehensive diplomacy paradoxically creates significant challenges and tasks.

To counter the offensive of a potential second Trump administration, China seeks to stabilize its surrounding regions while simultaneously attempting to expand its circle of allies. In particular, a strategy of focusing on developing relations with regional powers such as Japan, India, and Vietnam is evident. These three countries have strengthened their ties with the US while responding to the US-led network to contain China during the Biden administration. However, if a second Trump administration pursues policies prioritizing US national interests, such as imposing tariff pressure and demanding increased defense spending from its allies, China expects that the US-led containment network centered around its allies may weaken.

With this possibility in mind, China is proactively attempting to develop relations with major regional powers to secure friendly forces. China is pursuing improved relations with Japan with a forward-looking approach, holding successive summit and foreign ministerial meetings and even considering lifting the ban on Japanese seafood imports. Notably, the agreement reached in December 2024 to enhance border exchange and cooperation, following a special representative meeting held for the first time in five years to resolve the border issue, a root cause of conflict between China and India, is a symbolic move.

In its relations with Europe, China is also hopeful that its long-standing request for increased diplomatic autonomy may be accommodated. Historically, the European Union (EU) and other European countries have pressured China in trade disputes, aligning with the US on issues such as human rights, the environment, and relations with Russia. However, China anticipates that if a second Trump administration attempts tariff pressure on Europe and if the Russia-Ukraine war is resolved early, a key link in the anti-China coalition may weaken, and is actively engaging in diplomatic outreach to European countries.

Furthermore, China's recent assertion of itself as a member of the Global South and its active diplomacy toward the Global South are also driven by its strategy toward the US. By advocating for the 'unity of the vast majority of the world,' China has implicitly signaled its intention to actively pursue diplomacy toward the 'Global South,' including emerging and developing countries, to counter the US's de-risking offensive. The reasons for China's focus on the 'Global South' are clearly demonstrated in Foreign Minister Wang Yi's speech at the 13th BRICS High-Level Meeting on Security Issues in July 2023. Wang Yi argued that pursuing independence and self-reliance is the political background of the Global South, development and rejuvenation are its historical mission, and fairness and justice are its common propositions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2023). In essence, the keywords China seeks to achieve through cooperation with the Global South are independence, development, and fairness. That is, China envisions the Global South as a cooperative partner pursuing multipolarity while countering US-led 'interference, technological control, and unilateralism' against China.

However, questions arise as to whether China actually possesses the resources, capabilities, and legitimacy to rally and lead the Global South by leveraging the unity it claims (Lee Dong-ryul 2024a). First, unlike the Third World during the Cold War, the Global South does not have strong internal cohesion or solidarity. Moreover, while China claims to be a 'natural' member of the Global South, a considerable number of Global South countries question this claim and do not consistently support China. The active diplomacy toward the Global South is also driven by factors related to the US, rather than solely by the desire to play a global leadership role. If US attention and support for the Global South weaken under a second Trump administration, debates about the cost-effectiveness and utility of Global South diplomacy may arise within China.

In summary, the Xi Jinping government is presenting a vision to enhance its status as a global leader through comprehensive diplomacy based on new global capabilities. However, this comprehensive diplomacy is realistically still focused on weakening or countering US pressure and offensives against China. The primary objective of China's efforts to thwart US offensives is to create an environment for securing development rights and maintaining and strengthening its regime. China has not yet reached the point of presenting universal values, standards, and public goods that can garner international support and consensus by leveraging the vacuum in US global leadership. China also lacks sufficient means, resources, and internal capacity to expand its opportunities and diplomatic space. If China's newly presented five capabilities remain mere diplomatic rhetoric or are perceived as prioritizing China's national interests, it could provoke a backlash, further stimulating anti-China sentiment.

III. China's Evolving Perceptions of the Korean Peninsula and South Korea-China Relations

The changes in China's diplomatic paradigm are also reflected in its perceptions and strategic planning regarding the Korean Peninsula and South Korea-China relations, leading to gradual but significant shifts. In China's new diplomatic paradigm, South Korea is being transformed from an important cooperative partner to a security object to be managed at the geopolitical level. This significant change in China's perception of the Korean Peninsula has been gradually unfolding over the past few years and became more clearly evident in Foreign Minister Wang Yi's 2024 speech. Wang Yi identified the Korean Peninsula as a major hotspot, parallel to two wars, and presented it as an issue to be managed through China's peace capabilities. This suggests that China perceives the Korean Peninsula issue as a significant global challenge and a security concern for China. China ultimately frames the Korean Peninsula issue as the North Korean nuclear problem and seeks to address it from the perspective of its global strategy and strategy toward the US, rather than solely from a bilateral South Korea-China standpoint.

In discussing the achievements of its neighborhood diplomacy in 2024, China specifically mentioned ASEAN countries, Central Asian countries, and regional powers like India and Japan, elaborating on specific cooperation content, relationship development achievements, and intentions. In contrast, it conspicuously omitted any mention of South Korea and North Korea, even at the bilateral level. The absence of any mention of South Korea-China relations, despite the potential for a new breakthrough and increased dialogue and exchange following the trilateral summit between South Korea, China, and Japan in 2024, suggests that China's strategic perception of South Korea may differ from our expectations. Amidst rising anti-China sentiment in South Korea, strategic expectations and interest in South Korea are declining within China.

Indeed, official statements from the Chinese government have shown an unusual trend of decreasing mentions of the Korean Peninsula in recent years. Following the US-China summits in Bali in 2022 and San Francisco in 2023, unlike the US, China's official statements have consistently omitted any mention of the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula was also not mentioned during Foreign Minister Wang Yi's press conference at the Two Sessions in 2023. The Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, held in December 2023 after a five-year hiatus, also did not include the Korean Peninsula issue. As US-China strategic competition intensifies, the importance of US strategy and US-China relations has expanded in China, and neighborhood diplomacy has become a subordinate variable to US strategy. In particular, as South Korea strengthens its alliance with the US and its security cooperation with the US and Japan, China increasingly perceives and approaches the Korean Peninsula and South Korea-China relations from the perspective of its strategy toward the US.

However, at the 2024 Two Sessions press conference, Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned the Korean Peninsula for the first time in a while, in response to a question from a South Korean journalist. Wang Yi unusually directly mentioned war on the Korean Peninsula, stating, 'The world is already chaotic enough; there should not be war and chaos again on the Korean Peninsula' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2024a). Furthermore, the issue of the Korean Peninsula was discussed in the joint statement following the China-Russia summit in May 2024. It included the statement: 'Oppose military threat actions by the United States and its allies that could escalate confrontation with North Korea, leading to armed conflict and heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2024b). Both China and Russia have moved beyond their previous emphasis on US responsibility regarding North Korea to include the responsibility of South Korea, a US ally. This reaffirms that China considers the Korean Peninsula issue a significant security concern for China. That is, the Xi Jinping government is wary of the instability of the situation on the Korean Peninsula due to North Korea's repeated provocations, which could lead to instability in the buffer state of North Korea and an expansion of US influence.

On the one hand, China needs to manage its relations with North Korea to curb its provocations, while on the other hand, it recognizes the necessity of communicating with South Korea to ensure stability on the Korean Peninsula. China seeks to foster a consensus on stability on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and relationship restoration with South Korea, and also to preemptively respond to the potential emergence of a second Trump administration by sending a message of improved relations to South Korea.

It is unlikely that the Xi Jinping government will play the role South Korea expects in resolving North Korea's military provocations and nuclear issues. In particular, if the US faces a leadership vacuum under a second Trump administration and China engages in direct dialogue with North Korea, bypassing South Korea, South Korea's strategic standing and value in China could further decline. It is not impossible that an unexpected situation could unfold where both the US and China effectively bypass South Korea, weakening its voice on the Korean Peninsula issue. To make matters worse, if the domestic leadership vacuum is prolonged, there is a risk of missing the golden opportunity to preemptively and swiftly respond to such a dysfunctional situation.

While China generally maintains a policy focused on managing and stabilizing the Korean Peninsula, it has attempted policy shifts and active engagement when two significant situations that could critically impact China's national interests were anticipated. Specifically, when China perceives an imminent crisis in the North Korean regime, which serves as a buffer zone, amidst intensified US pressure on China, and when there is a concern about a significant weakening of China's position and influence on the Korean Peninsula, China has sought to manage and stabilize the situation through active intervention (Lee Dong-ryul 2024b).

South Korea needs a phased and pragmatic approach that seeks to foster mutual understanding and find common ground, rather than pursuing goals that China is structurally unlikely to accept. Especially at a time when South Korea and China are just beginning to restore dialogue after eight years of strained relations following the THAAD dispute, even though North Korea-China relations may appear somewhat distant at present, it is unrealistic to approach China with the aim of changing its North Korea policy in a direction South Korea desires.

In the context of an unstable and unpredictable international situation, it is necessary to carefully devise phased implementation strategies based on a broader vision for the Korean Peninsula to nurture and utilize the nascent efforts to improve relations between the two countries. Realistically, with the intensification of US-China strategic competition following the emergence of a second Trump administration and concerns about North Korea's seventh nuclear test, it is crucial to first establish a certain level of consensus with China and prepare institutional frameworks for strategic communication, starting with addressing and managing North Korea-induced instability on the Korean Peninsula. ■

References

Lee Dong-ryul. 2024a. “China's Discourse, Strategy, and Challenges Regarding the Global South.” *Journal of Chinese Social Science Studies* 6, no. 2: 64-96.

______. 2024b. “How Should We Understand the 'Unusual Currents' in North Korea-China Relations?” GLOBAL NK. September 6.https://www.globalnk.org/publication/view.php?cd=COM000156&ctype=1&s_search_keyword=china&start=10(Accessed: December 28, 2024.)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2023. “Wang Yi Proposes Four Points for Strengthening Cooperation Among Global South Countries.” July 26. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202307/t20230726_11117824.shtml(Accessed: January 9, 2024.)

______. 2024a. “Wang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Answers Questions from Chinese and Foreign Journalists on China's Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations.” March 7. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/2024lh/(Accessed: March 13, 2024.)

______. 2024b. Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Two Countries (Full Text). May 16. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml(Accessed: December 28, 2024.)

______. 2024c. "Wang Yi: China Will Firmly Be a Force for Peace, Unity, Openness, Justice, and Inclusiveness." December 17. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202412/t20241218_11496965.shtml(Accessed: December 28, 2024.)

______. 2024d. "Standing at the Forefront of the Times, Demonstrating Responsibility - Speech at the 2024 Seminar on the International Situation and China's Diplomacy." December 17. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202412/t20241218_11496987.shtml(Accessed: December 28, 2024.)

People's Daily. 2025. "President Xi Jinping Delivers 2025 New Year's Address." January 1. http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2025/0101/c1024-40393454.html(Accessed: January 1, 2025.)

■ Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies and Professor of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

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